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Abstract 
It was a year of decisions that heralded the pre-dreadnought era, perhaps the least understood 
chapter of modem naval history. In March 1889, the Salisbury ministry officially endorsed what 
later became the Naval Defence Act, which in its final form authorised the largest shipbuilding 
programme of its kind in the nineteenth century. When it was finally completed five years later, 
the Royal Navy would have a new fleet based around 10 battleships, 42 cruisers and 18 torpedo- 
gunboats, all of the latest design and at a cost of £21,500,000. Then, in December 1889, the 
Harrison administration sought legislative approval to adopt a forward offensive naval strategy, 
complete with a fleet of battleships and armoured cruisers in an unprecedented shift in American 
naval policy. This strategic rationale provided the intellectual framework to transform the United 
States into a modem seapower. 
The purpose of this comparative study is to revisit the decisions of 1889, with the benefit of 
underutilised archival sources and an innovative research methodology recently embraced by the 
naval historical community. Whereas prior accounts of these decisions generally assess their 
historical significance in terms of the naval construction that ensued in the pre-dreadnought era, 
this thesis focuses instead on the pervasive influence of strategic ideas and how strongly they 
affected the personalities, institutions and events that shaped the respective outcomes in both 
London and Washington. That strategic ideas shared among naval officers can be decisive in this 
regard is the underlying tenet behind the cultural approach to historical naval analysis, which is 
introduced here to highlight the impact of organisational cultures upon the strategic and force 
structure choices of military organisations. 
The length of this thesis is 100,000 words. 
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Introduction 
The creation of modern seapower in Britain and the United States can be traced to the 
decisions of 1889, when both countries initiated a rapid and sustained rate of naval expansion that 
continued throughout the pre-dreadnought era and into the First World War. The Naval Defence 
Act, enacted in May 1889, authorised the construction of 10 battleships, 42 assorted cruisers and 
18 torpedo-gunboats at the cost of £21,500,000. When finally completed in 1894, the Naval 
Defence Act resulted in the largest shipbuilding programme of the nineteenth century, the size of 
which was deemed necessary to modernise the British fleet and deter other countries from 
following suit. Then, in December 1889, a similar proposal to modernise the American fleet was 
circulated in Washington, on the heels of a new strategic outlook that envisioned an offensive 
naval force as the modus operandi for hemispheric defence. The result, in both cases, was an 
unparalleled transformation of naval power on both sides of the Atlantic, due not only to maturing 
naval technologies and the appearance of the modem battleship, but also the pervasive influence 
of strategic ideas and their impact upon the policies of peacetime naval administration. 
The purpose of this thesis is to revisit the decisions of 1889 in view of these strategic ideas, 
and from an organisational perspective which combines underutilised archival sources with 
modern historical techniques to the study of naval policy formulation. Whereas prior accounts of 
these decisions generally assess their historical significance in terms of the naval construction that 
ensued in the pre-dreadnought era, this thesis focuses instead upon the shaping influence of 
strategic ideas and how they were inspired, institutionalised and finally implemented in the 
policies enacted in 1889. That strategic ideas shared among naval officers can be decisive in this 
regard is the underlying tenet of the cultural approach to historical naval analysis, which is 
introduced here to highlight the impact of organisational cultures upon the strategic and force 
structure choices of military organisations. 
The Research Problem: 
The Decisions of 1889 in Naval Historiography 
Naval historians have written extensively about the pre-dreadnought era, revolving their 
discussions of British and American naval policies during this period mainly around naval 
construction, while leaving the decisions of 1889 essentially untouched. Indeed, that the period 
between 1889 and the appearance of the H. M. S. Dreadnought in 1906 is known as the `pre- 
dreadnought era' speaks volumes of its historical treatment in the field of modern naval history. 
Typical of the scholarship written of this period is an overarching emphasis upon the technical 
aspects of naval shipbuilding, as evidenced by the design histories written by David K. Brown 
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and Norman Friedman. ' These histories, while excellent for their detailed descriptions of the 
shipbuilding process, fall far short in their analysis of the substantive rationale behind key policy 
choices. `The problem', observed one prominent naval historian with respect to design histories 
in general, `is that we need to address warships and their development as a historical problem, and 
we need to address it with respect to organisation, to personality, [and} to technology... I. 2 
Yet this line of inquiry remains to be applied to the decisions of 1889. Despite their 
magnitude and the weighty issues associated with them, much of what has been written about the 
decisions of 1889 tends to confuse more than it enlightens. This, to a large degree, is also 
symptomatic of the extent to which naval historians misunderstand how naval policies are 
formulated, treating the process as a whole as one of the elusive vagaries of peacetime naval 
administration. The tendency to consign the policy formulation process to the confines of the 
conceptual `black box' is further encouraged by existing trends in naval historiography and, more 
specifically, the limits of the `policy-and-operations' perspective to naval policy formulation. 3 At 
its worst, this perspective oversimplifies the internal realities of formulating policy, strategy and 
doctrine in navies, which become increasingly pronounced in peacetime when organisational 
decisions are often reflective of the ideas and experiences of naval officers. `Naval officers', in 
the words of David Alan Rosenberg, `acquire their experience and understanding of naval strategy 
and operations, and later apply it in decisionmaking positions, within the unique organisational 
structure of the navy'. 4 In absence of this distinction, key policy decisions in peacetime are 
juxtaposed and treated as if they were made under wartime conditions, when external factors such 
as foreign naval rivalries and threat perceptions generally assume priority in the decisionmaking 
process. Thus, in failing to discriminate between these two different settings for policymaking, 
the potential exists for core naval histories to be misinformed as to the motivating factors behind 
policy selection and implementation. 
' David K. Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development, 1860-1905, (London 1997); and 
Norman Friedman, U. S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History, (Annapolis 1986). Other noteworthy 
design histories related to this period include Robert Gardiner, (ed), Steam, Steel and Shellfire: Warships, 
1815-1905, (London 1992); R. A. Burt, British Battleships, 1889-1904, (Annapolis 1988); John C. Reilly 
and Robert L. Scheina, American Battleships, 1886-1923: Pre-Dreadnought Design and Construction, 
(Annapolis 1980); and Roger Chesneau and Eugene Kolesnik, (eds), Conway's All the World's Fighting 
Ships, 1860-1905, (London 1979). 
2 `Discussion of the Papers Written by Dr. Jon Sumida and Dr. David Rosenberg, ' in James Goldrick and 
John B. Hattendorf, (eds), Mahan is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir 
Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, (Newport 1993), p. 182. 
3 Jon Tetsuro Sumida and David Alan Rosenberg, `Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management and 
Money: The Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of Twentieth Century 
Naval History', in John B. Hattendorf, (ed), Doing Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement, (Newport 
1996), p. 31. 
4 David Alan Rosenberg, `Process: The Realities of Formulating Naval Strategy', in James Goldrick and 
John B. Hattendorf, (eds), Mahan in Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir 
Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, (Newport 1993), p. 145. 
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No where is this more apparent than in traditional accounts of the decisions of 1889, which 
have never before been the subject of historical reassessment. Conventional wisdom about the 
Naval Defence Act can be attributed to the research of Arthur Marder, who as a pioneer in the 
field of modem naval history popularised the `policy-and-operations' perspective in his landmark 
studies of British naval policy. 5 Failing to consider the shaping influence of internal factors in 
peacetime policy deliberations, Professor Marder framed his account of the Naval Defence Act 
entirely around three conceptual pillars - external provocations, threat perceptions and civilian 
intervention. On this basis, he concluded that the Naval Defence Act was spurred by a 
combination of these external factors, with heightened emphasis upon a rumoured Franco-Russian 
naval combination that Marder believed was ultimately responsible for the new course in 
Admiralty policy. 6 Less problematic are the Mahan hagiographies, which together form the basis 
of conventional wisdom about the American naval officer and his alleged individual crusade for 
strategic adjustment in the United States. ' Yet these core naval histories have also overlooked 
other internal factors in favour of an oversimplified image of how American naval policy evolved 
in the 1880s. That the historian Jon Tetsuro Sumida elected not to debunk this image but chose 
instead to perpetuate it in his most recent assessment of the celebrated naval theorist and his 
writings - Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command (1997) - testifies to the extent to 
which the strategic discourse that prompted the revolution in American naval affairs remains 
obscured by the literary exploits of its most famous participant. 8 
Analytic Structure and Methodology: 
The Decisions of 1889 from an Organisational Perspective 
Whereas the `policy-and-operations' perspective oversimplifies the process in which naval 
policies are formulated in peacetime, naval historiography has evolved in the 1990s to include 
broadened discussions of naval policy formulation from an organisational perspective. This new 
perspective is based on the presumption that navies are complex organisations, with sophisticated 
ideas, structures and processes which combine to affect how naval officers think about and 
prepare for war within the larger context of policy formulation. `Navies', in the words of Sumida 
5 Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Seapower: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre- 
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, (New York 1940); and idem., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The 
Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919,5 Volumes, (London 1961-70). 
6 Marder, Anatomy, p. 120. 
7 See, for example, Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918, (Princeton 
1939); idem., Toward a New Order of Seapower. American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922, 
(Princeton 1940); Margaret Sprout, `Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power', in Edward Mead Earle, (ed), 
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, (Princeton 1941); and W. D. 
Puleston, Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, (New Haven 1939). A more 
balanced historical treatment of Mahan can be found in Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man 
and his Letters, (Annapolis 1977); and Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristorcracy: The Golden Age of 
Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism, (New York 1972). 
8 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred 
Thayer Mahan Reconsidered, (Baltimore 1997). 
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and Rosenberg, `might instead be better understood as institutions whose manifold dimension, 
variations in major characteristics, and potential for radical reformation need to be taken into 
consideration when investigating the. . . motives underlying the behavior of naval 
decisionmakers'. 9 To accomplish this task, the naval historical discipline has been urged to 
embrace new analytical techniques and research methodologies borrowed from the social 
sciences, especially those that could be used to sort out complex issue areas in naval technology, 
personnel, economics, administration and finance. '0 
A number of naval historians have already responded with studies that are modelled largely 
around internal factors and the organisational perspective. Jon Sumida has written extensively on 
the formulation of British naval policy between 1890 and 1914, with a particular emphasis upon 
the interaction of internal factors and their impact upon the key policy choices made during the 
Fisher era. " Nicholas Lambert has followed with a similar research agenda in his own studies of 
the Fisher era, while John Beeler has recently applied an organisational perspective to an 
investigation of mid-Victorian British naval Policy. 12 Finally, and with much fanfare, Andrew 
Gordon's superb analysis of British naval command highlighted internal factors that detracted 
from the operational performance of the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland. 13 Because of their 
analytical roots in the organisational perspective, these studies are marked by a presumptive faith 
in the pervasive influence of strategic ideas, or naval professional arguments, and their impact in 
shaping the content and process of naval policy formulation. Yet, as one naval historian has 
recently warned, it is simply not enough to identify which idea(s) mattered most in the 
policymaking process: `In order to explain the history of naval strategy, we must move behind 
the ideas to consider where they came from and how they were translated from theory into 
practice' . 
14 Understanding key policy choices - in this case the decisions of 1889 - is thus 
dependent upon a study of strategic ideas and, more importantly, the organisation in which these 
ideas were inspired, institutionalised and finally implemented in policy frameworks. 
Implicit to the pervasive influence of strategic ideas is the concept of organisational culture, 
which this thesis borrows from the social sciences to link strategic ideas with the environment in 
9 Sumida and Rosenberg, p. 32. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 
1889-1914, (London 1989). See also idem., `Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval 
Mythology', The Journal of Military History, (October 1995); idem., `Technology, Culture and the Modern 
Battleship', Naval War College Review, (Autumn 1992); and idem., `British Naval Administration and 
Policy in the Age of Fisher', Journal of Military History, (January 1990). 
12 Nicholas Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, (Columbia 1999); idem., `Admiral Sir John 
Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909', Journal of Military History, (October 1995); and 
John F. Beeler, British Naval Policy in the Gladstone and Disraeli Era, 1866-1880, (Palo Alto 1997). 
13 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, (London 1996). 
14 Rosenberg, p. 145. 
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which they evolved into preferences within the professional mindset of British and American 
naval officers. Having originated from organisational theory, the concept of culture has in recent 
years attracted the attention of political scientists and some historians, who have incorporated it in 
their analyses to explain certain aspects of military behaviour. 15 Although frequently categorised 
in this literature as `service culture', or `military culture', it is defined for our purposes as a set of 
attitudes, beliefs and other common habits of thought that are shared among naval officers and 
serve as the intellectual basis for their conceptions as to the roles and missions of the service. For 
evidence of culture and its impact upon military and naval decisionmaking, scholars have relied 
upon departmental records, official and private communications, journal articles, newspaper 
submissions, personal memoirs, as well as the private papers of senior officers. When combined 
with an archival-based research methodology, the cultural approach adopted in this thesis is 
ultimately intended to provide answers to the following questions about the decisions of 1889: 
" To what extent were the decisions of 1889 reflective of internal factors, and in particular 
the strategic ideas and actions of naval officers? 
" How were these ideas inspired, institutionalised and finally implemented by naval officers 
within the context of naval policy formulation? 
" What was the overall impact of these ideas and actions - the imprints of organisational 
culture - upon the content and process of naval policy formulation? 
Each of these questions were framed with the expectation that underutilised archival sources, 
in conjunction with the supporting research of other naval historians, would shed considerable 
insight into the circumstances which led to the decisions of 1889. The findings of this thesis 
indicate strongly that conventional wisdom about them is misinformed to varying degrees. In the 
case of Britain and the Naval Defence Act, the Marder account simply unravels when it is firmly 
established through intelligence reports that British naval confidence prevailed in the 1880s 
despite widespread rumours of a Franco-Russian naval combination. Similarly, archival evidence 
from American departmental records and private papers do not support the image of naval policy 
formulation upheld in the Mahan hagiographies, although his role was indeed critical among the 
personalities, institutions and events that spurred a new strategic outlook for the U. S. Navy. 
15 Among political scientists, see as examples Elizabeth Kier, Imaging War: French and British Military 
Doctrine Between the Wars, (Princeton 1997); idem., `Culture and Military Doctrine', International 
Security, (Spring 1995); Jeffrey Legro, `Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two- 
Step', American Political Science Review, (March 1996); and idem., Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo- 
German Restraint During World War II, (Ithaca 1995). Among historians, see Gordon, The Rules of the 
Game; Williamson Murray, `Does Military Culture Matter', Orbis, (Winter 1999); David Johnson, Fast 
Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U. S. Army, 1917-1945, (Ithaca 1998); and Williamson 
Murray and Allan R. Millet, (eds) Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (Cambridge 1996). 
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Perhaps even more compelling are three additional observations drawn from the cultural approach 
as adopted in this thesis. First, in both cases, naval officers worked together to ensure that 
strategic ideas inspired by the lessons of naval history were studied and represented in selected 
policy forums, which included professional associations and semi-official think-tanks such as the 
U. S. Naval Institute, the Royal United Services Institute, and later the Navy Records Society. 
Also seen in both cases are similarities in how these ideas were institutionalised and implemented 
in existing policy frameworks. This was accomplished by a new brand of strategic thinking that 
quickly found favour in war colleges, intelligence departments and among service patrons when 
bureaucratic opposition threatened their usefulness. Finally, both cases demonstrate the shaping 
influence of organisational culture, as reflected in ideas and actions of naval officers in the late 
1880s, upon the content and process of naval policy formulation. 
Organisation of Thesis 
At first glance, it might seem that the introduction of organisational culture to naval or even 
military history is an unusual combination. Although a few military historians have applied the 
concept sparingly, naval historians have on balance proven reluctant to include a cultural lens in 
their analytic toolboxes. 16 This situation remains despite the emergence of the organisational 
perspective to naval policy formulation, which treats navies as complex organisations and, as 
such, require innovative approaches to study them. The cultural approach adopted in this thesis 
certainly qualifies as innovative, in the sense that never before has a cultural lens been applied to 
assess the pervasive influence of strategic ideas and their embodiment in key policy decisions, as 
was the case with the decisions of 1889. For this reason, it is necessary to elaborate further on the 
cultural approach, its compatibility with the organisational perspective, and how it will be applied 
as an analytic instrument in each of the case studies that follow. Chapter 2 will address these 
methodological concerns, with a survey of the historical and theoretical literature from the fields 
of naval history and political science. With the three conceptual pillars of the Marder account in 
full view, a reassessment of the Naval Defence Act will follow in Chapters 3,4 and 5, with each 
chapter focused on the transformation of strategic ideas from theory into practice in the policy 
sphere. Chapters 6 and 7 are arranged with similar objectives in mind for a discussion of the 
evolving nature of American naval policy in the 1880s, which culminated in the formal adoption 
of a forward offensive naval strategy in November 1889. Finally, Chapter 8 will consider what 
has been learned in both cases, not just about the decisions in and of themselves but also their 
implications to naval policy formulation in London and Washington, as well as the possibilities 
for the cultural approach in future studies of modern naval history. 
16 See Footnote 15. 
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Chapter 2 
The Cultural Approach to Historical Naval Analysis 
- 13 - 
INTRODUCTION 
It seems that military historians are prepared, now more than ever, to embrace the linkage 
between organisational culture and military behaviour. Within the last year, in fact, the 
American-edited policy journal Orbis published selected papers from a conference it sponsored to 
consider the cultural dimension to the American way of warfare. ' While the conference was 
tailored specifically for a discussion of American defence policy issues, an historical assessment 
of military culture was offered by the prominent military historian Williamson Murray, in which 
he demonstrated through historical evidence why organisational culture is so important to the 
military historian when attempting to explain how militaries prepare for the next war. 
`Unfortunately, historians have done little on the subject', observed Murray, `focusing on the 
most part on more immediate factors such as leadership, doctrine and training to explain victory 
or defeat. Even works specifically examining military effectiveness and innovation tend to 
discuss military culture as a tangential issue'. 2 That Murray was one of the first military 
historians in the 1990s to attribute specific cases of military behaviour to cultural impulses is 
exemplified in his own edited volume, first published in 1996, that examines the patterns of 
military innovation observed during the interwar period. 3 `The history of the first half of this 
century', he concluded, `would suggest that military culture was a crucial determinant of how 
well military organisations adapted to war' .4 Thus, while 
it is still too early to tell whether or not 
other military historians will follow suit and include culture in their own explanatory frameworks, 
the likelihood that they will has certainly been increased due to the research of Murray and others 
in this evolving area of scholarship. 
Yet the same cannot be said in general about naval historians, although recent trends in naval 
historiography during the 1990s seem to indicate that the discipline, as a whole, is on the verge of 
expanding its preferred scope of research to include new lines of inquiry, including the impact of 
organisational culture upon particular aspects of naval policy. The primary aim of this chapter is 
to establish the cultural approach to historical naval analysis and, more importantly, how it is used 
in this thesis as an analytic lens to explain the strategic and force structure choices reached in 
Britain and the United States in 1889. There are three main sections. The first section considers 
recent transactions in naval historiography, including the emergence in the 1990s of the 
organisational perspective to naval policy formulation. Also highlighted is the extent to which 
1 See Harvey Sicherman, `The Future of American Military Culture', Orbis (Winter 1999), pp. 9-10; Don 
M. Snider, `An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture', Orbis, (Winter 1999), pp. 11-26; Williamson 
Murray, `Does Military Culture Matter? ', Orbis, (Winter 1999), pp. 27-42; and John Hillen, `Must U. S. 
Military Culture Reform? ', Orbis, (Winter 1999), pp. 43-57. 
2 Murray, p. 27. 
3 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, (eds), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (Cambridge 
1996). 
4 Murray, `Military Culture', p. 35. 
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cultural analyses were encouraged within the discipline by both naval historians and political 
scientists, a recent example of organisational culture in historical naval analysis, and some 
insights into the possible reasons why the cultural approach has been applied so infrequently by 
naval historians. The second section uses literature from political science to compare and contrast 
three analytic approaches available to explain the sources of military behaviour in peacetime, to 
emphasise the explanatory value of the cultural approach when compared with the traditional 
modes of analysis in strategic studies. Each approach focuses on different aspects of military 
organisation, ranging from the structure of the organisation itself and its constituents to the ideas 
and preferences shared within the professional officer corps. This last aspect is largely analogous 
to Murray's definition of military culture, as `the ethos and professional attributes, both in terms 
of experience and intellectual study, that contribute to a common core understanding of the nature 
of war within military organisations'. 5 On the basis of this comparison, the chapter concludes 
with an overview of how the cultural approach is to be incorporated in this thesis to explain the 
decisions of 1889. 
ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS IN NAVAL HISTORIOGRAPHY 
As a whole, the study of naval history has experienced its peaks and troughs throughout the 
twentieth century, culminating in the 1990s with a renewed challenge to revive the discipline 
when confronted again with the prospect of academic obscurity. What was particularly 
noteworthy about the decade were the instances of scholarly introspection, when naval historians 
convened a series of discussions about the future of the discipline, opportunities to improve the 
research and writing of naval history, as well as the promise of adopting new concepts and 
methodologies from related disciplines in the social sciences. 6 In the process, naval historians 
succeeded in identifying narrow trends in the historical literature which, in the past, have 
generally informed naval historiography and should be discontinued. Included among these trends 
was a research agenda that focused mainly on the policies and operations of navies in wartime or 
in preparation for inevitable conflict, where the motives and intentions behind key policy 
decisions were assessed merely as parochial responses to actual or perceived threats. The 
unfortunate result of this policy-and-operations perspective was an overused historiographical 
method of writing modem naval history, which oversimplified the process in which naval policies 
were formulated among politicians and naval professionals in peacetime. What was advocated in 
its place resembled a Kuhnian paradigm shift in the research and writing of naval historians, to 
5 Ibid., p. 27. 
6 These discussions are codified in John Hattendorf, (ed), Doing Naval History: Essays Toward 
Improvement, (Newport 1995); idem, (ed), Ubi Sumus?: The State of Naval and Maritime History, 
(Newport 1994); and John Hattendorf and James Goldrick, (eds), Mahan is Not Enough: The Proceedings 
of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, (Newport 1993). 
- 15 - 
include for the first time a multidisciplinary orientation and new lines of inquiry that consider the 
internal as well as the external sources of naval policy. 
It further became apparent in the 1990s that naval historians could no longer ignore the 
explanatory value of understanding the relationship between organisational culture and the policy 
formulation process in navies. `Navies are complex institutions', observed Jon Tetsuro Sumida, 
`whose history as such can only be understood through scholarship that takes into account the full 
range of technical, tactical, strategic, administrative, economic, financial, political, sociological 
and cultural characteristics that define their nature and function'. This section will review the ' 
introduction of organisational culture to the study of naval history, its relevance to the perceived 
weaknesses of the discipline, and the limited application of cultural arguments in a recent 
contribution to naval history. 
Navies as Complex Organisations: 
The Organisational Perspective to Naval Policy Formulation 
The introduction of organisational culture to the study of naval history is linked largely to the 
recognition that navies are complex organisations and should be treated as such within the 
boundaries of naval historiography. The first scholar to champion the point of organisational 
complexity in the patterns of historical naval analysis was Professor Sumida, whose individual 
contributions to the discipline includes a well-received revisionist assessment of the 
`Dreadnought Revolution' and the formulation of British naval policy during the Fisher era. 8 in 
his 1989 work, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, Sumida combined an innovative research 
methodology with underutilised archival sources to fashion a well-documented version of British 
naval policy that highlighted the financial, technical and organisational inputs to key policy 
decisions made between 1904 and 1914.9 Even more impressive is the extent to which Sumida 
succeeded in unravelling the decisionmaking process in the Admiralty to show how each of these 
internal inputs factored into the strategic and force structure choices that heralded the construction 
of the Dreadnought-class battleships and, in particular, the hybrid battlecruisers favoured by 
Admiral Fisher. It was thus no surprise when these choices are attributed by Sumida to a `multi- 
7 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, `Technology, Culture and the Modem Battleship', Naval War College Review, 
(Autumn 1992), p. 87. Emphasis not included in original text. 
8 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 
1889-1914, (London 1989). 
9 The research of the late Professor Marder was largely responsible for informing conventional wisdom 
before the publication of the Sumida volume. See Arthur Marder, Fear God and Dreadnought: The 
Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 3 Volumes (London 1952-59); and 
idem., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919,5 Volumes, 
(London 1961-70). 
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tiered process [of decisionmaking] that was heavily influenced by budgetary pressure, technical 
uncertainty, flaws in bureaucratic organization, and the vagaries of chance'. '° 
That Sumida did not consider organisational culture as a factor is not surprising, for the 
concept remained on the periphery of strategic studies until the mid-1990s. Still, however, his 
volume is important to the current thesis in three critical respects. First, Sumida's research 
agenda was predicated on the assumption that the Royal Navy in the early twentieth century was 
supported by a sophisticated and highly complex institutional structure and, for this reason, 
necessitates a comprehensive archival-based approach to sorting through the volumes of 
Admiralty records. `The history of this subject', Sumida observed in describing his mode of 
analysis, `must instead be painstakingly reconstructed piece by piece from a wider range of 
materials than have been previously customary.... Such an approach requires the historian to 
examine very large quantities of evidence, investigate much that is recondite, and present major 
findings about significantly related but nonetheless diverse topics' .'1 Equally instructive was his 
departure from the policy-and-operations perspective popularised by the historical narratives of 
the late Arthur Marder and Stephen Roskill. While the contributions of these two prominent 
naval historians should not be undervalued, their focus on wartime naval policy and operations 
can now be shown as incomplete in light of the standard established by Sumida. Thus, by 
adopting an `organisational perspective' that presumes that navies are complex organisations, 
Sumida concluded with findings that contradicted `previous treatments of British naval policy, 
which have for the most part focused on the actions of a few senior officers and politicians, paid 
scant attention to finance, greatly oversimplified the technical issues, ignored administrative 
context, and largely factored out the role of happenstance'. 12 
Finally, and most importantly, the explanatory value of the organisational perspective, 
complete with its archival-based approach and methodological rigour, has prompted other naval 
historians to adopt it to some extent. Two recent studies warrant particular attention here, for the 
underlying objective behind both volumes seeks to reduce British naval policy to its core political, 
economic, technical and administrative components, all of which were discovered to have shaped 
naval policy formulation in the Admiralty. This was indeed the case during the Fisher era, as 
originally suggested by Professor Sumida above and largely substantiated by the research of 
Nicholas Lambert. In his book, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (1999), Lambert faulted the 
generally accepted core naval histories of the period, especially those written by Marder, for 
sustaining an incomplete and oversimplified perspective of the archival evidence available at the 
10 Sumida, p. xviii. 
1' Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii. 
12 Ibid., p. xviii. 
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time. 13 The differences between the Marder and Lambert accounts, it is inferred, become 
immediately apparent when evaluating them each on the scope of their of archival research, which 
in theory would determine whether or not the archival evidence collected was overlooked by a 
narrowly conceived research agenda. On the basis of such an evaluation, Lambert argued that the 
Marder account is short-sighted and often inaccurate. `As a result of largely oversimplified 
analysis', continued Lambert in an obvious reference to Marder, `important issues during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as the impact of the rapid advances of naval 
technology upon the formulation of naval strategy and the influence of financial, economie [sic] 
and industrial considerations, too often have been dismissed as being of marginal importance'. 14 
For the moment, however, this study is less interested in the conclusions reached by Lambert 
than the historiographical method used to derive them. Nonetheless, it is important to observe 
that Lambert also attributed key policy decisions during the Fisher era to a host of internal factors 
that were inadvertently missed by historians who described them as responses to external 
provocations from foreign naval developments. This, in essence, exemplifies the fatal defect in 
the policy-and-operations perspective, which in general can be attributed to suspect research 
methodologies and narrative integrity. `Naval planning and operational performance', concedes 
Lambert, `are generally regarded by historians to form the heart of naval history - judging by the 
emphasis placed on these subjects in more core naval studies'. 15 But in this case, the core naval 
studies were off the mark, as Marder and others `failed to take cognizance of a myriad of 
"internal" influences upon the formulation of "naval policy", such as the prevailing climate of 
16 limitation, institutional or personal ambitions, or the impact of interservice rivalry' .6 
Ironically, the conclusions reached by Lambert are strikingly similar to those offered by John 
Beeler, even though the latter concerns himself with the formulation of British naval policy in the 
nineteenth century. Whether he intended to or not, Beeler incorporated in his analytical 
framework an organisational perspective to reassess naval policy formulation during the 
Gladstone and Disraeli ministries, all the while explicitly departing from the traditional emphasis 
upon technological developments at the expense of other internal factors that were later found to 
shape key policy decisions in the Admiralty. `Technology was (and is) an important element in 
naval warfare, policy, and strategy, but technology should be viewed in its contemporary setting', 
cautioned Beeler at the outset of his analysis. 17 'It cannot be fully understood without reference to 
13 Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, (Columbia 1999). 
14 Nicholas A. Lambert, `Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909', The 
Journal of Military History, (October 1995), p. 646. 
'5 Ibid. 
16 Lambert, `Sir John Fisher', p. 7. 
17 John F. Beeler, British Naval Policy in the Gladstone and Disraeli Era, 1866-1880, (Palo Alto 1997), p. 
5. 
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the political, economic, administrative, international, and even ideological context within which it 
evolves' . 
18 Writing about a complex organisation in a complex era, Beeler discounted the notion 
that British naval policy was largely reactive to a technological arms race and perceived threats 
from France, as his archival-based conclusions revealed that Admiralty officials were quite aware 
of the growing disparity in naval strength in favour of Britain from the late 1860s. 
Nor does his research show that the different political agendas espoused by Gladstone and 
Disraeli resulted in anything more than incremental shifts in the conduct of British naval policy, 
when in fact Admiralty officials trod carefully throughout this period of technological uncertainty 
despite the fiscal concerns of the prime minister. Beeler focused instead on other factors, which 
included `the domestic political scene, government fiscal policy, the administration (and 
administrators) of the navy, and certainly not least of all, British perceptions of foreign 
governments and navies'. 19 In the process, Beeler reduced the scope of his analysis even further 
to consider the role of specific individuals and their ideas on the shaping of British naval policy, 
which as will be seen below is analogous to the cultural approach as adopted by political scientists 
in explaining the behaviour of complex military organisations. Thus, while Beeler did not 
formally consider organisational culture in his analytical framework, the prerequisites were 
certainly there to add an explicit culture lens to this chapter of naval history, especially since the 
volume is described on the dustjacket `as much a case study in human responses to the process of 
modernization as it is an investigation of mid-Victorian British naval policy'. 20 
The Introduction of Organisational Culture to Naval History 
The organisational perspective was first showcased at a time when naval history, as a 
discipline, was struggling for its academic survival. Although few studies adopting this 
perspective have followed the publication of Sumida's In Defence of Naval Supremacy in 1989, 
naval historians seemed eager to embrace a new treatment of naval organisations in modem 
historical analysis, for it offered the real prospect of a thorough understanding of the complex 
nature of naval administration and its related functions. Accordingly, in the 1990s, naval 
historians invited discussion of the merits of the new perspective, its potential application in 
historical scholarship and, more to the point, its relevance to new approaches to the research and 
writing of naval history. Without doubt, the most important discussion of these issues occurred at 
a conference convened at Yale University in June 1994, the proceedings of which were 
subsequently codified in a volume appropriately entitled Doing Naval History: Essays Toward 
Improvement. 21 The conference was significant for many reasons, as implied by the title of the 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. 4. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Footnote 6. 
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volume, for it was here for the first time that naval historians seriously considered linkages 
between organisational culture, naval policy formulation, and the sources of naval conduct. What 
emerged from the discussions that ensued were persuasive arguments, from two naval historians 
and a political scientist, for adding a cultural lens to the toolbox of the modem naval historian, 
especially when treating navies as complex organisations in historical naval analysis. `In this, all 
will agree', concluded John Hattendorf, `that navies are instruments of government and operate as 
highly technological organisations within the context of both domestic and foreign politics, 
finance, technology, and bureaucracy. This range is as much the realm of political scientists as it 
is of naval historians'. 22 
As will be discussed further below, political scientists have generally been more amenable to 
the concepts borrowed from the other social sciences, especially those that are perceived to add 
explanatory value to theories that explain and predict variations of military behaviour. Naval 
historians, out of force of habit, have traditionally been so less inclined, at least until the 
precarious state of naval history compelled them to be less exclusive and to look elsewhere for 
new research methodologies and analytical approaches to improve the writing of their subject. `If 
we are to achieve any improvement in our understanding of navies in the machine age', warned 
Captain James Goldrick, R. A. N., `there must be a new approach to the subject, one which 
integrates the elements of technology, finance, strategy, operations and personnel... ' . 
23The study 
of navies as complex organisations would accomplish the enormous task of integrating these 
elements, a point that was underscored by Professors Sumida and Rosenberg in a paper delivered 
at the Yale conference. The underlying objective of their paper was to outline a persuasive 
rationale for a multidisciplinary orientation to encourage the renovation of the standard core naval 
histories in light of the limitations of the policy-and-operations perspective and the underutilised 
volume of archival materials available: `Speaking very generally, the core histories oversimplify, 
and thereby obscure, the influence of technical, personnel, economic, administrative, and financial 
matters to extreme degrees'. 24 
22 Hattendorf, `Doing Naval History', p. 2. 
23 James Goldrick, `The Problems of Modern Naval History', in John B. Hattendorf, (ed), Doing Naval 
History: Essays Toward Improvement, (Newport 1995), p. 22. A distinguished naval officer as well as an 
accomplished historian, Goldrick combines historical analysis with personal experiences with modem naval 
administration, a useful combination that lends additional credence to his observations. 
24 Jon Tetsuro Sumida and David Alan Rosenberg, `Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management, and 
Money: The Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of Twentieth Century 
Naval History', in John B. Hattendorf, (ed), Doing Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement, (Newport 
1995), p. 31. For similar points, see Jon Tetsuro Sumida, `Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The 
Sources of Naval Mythology', The Journal of Military History, (October 1995); and David Alan 
Rosenberg, `Process: The Realities of Formulating Modem Naval Strategy', in James Goldrick and John B. 
Hattendorf, (eds), Mahan is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian 
Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, (Newport 1993). 
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To assist naval historians in their tasks to renovate these core naval histories, Sumida and 
Rosenberg recommended that scholars should be enlisted from the social sciences and other 
related disciplines, ranging from political science, economics and military sociology, to a host of 
historical subspecialties (ie., diplomatic, political and scientific), international security, and 
strategic studies. In their estimate, scholars trained in these fields would be in a better position to 
contribute `new model monographs' which would renovate the standard historical narratives 
through the application of research methodologies and novel analytical techniques used in their 
respective disciplines. Of particular interest to Sumida and Rosenberg are those methodologies, 
concepts and techniques specifically tailored for subjects that were previously relegated by naval 
historians to conceptual `black boxes', such as the impact of complex institutional settings upon 
the decisionmaking process. When taken together, these modes of analysis are deemed critical for 
their potential to reveal and document the internal sources of naval policy, including the extent to 
which organisational cultures impact the strategic and force structure choices rendered in upper 
level policy debates. On the prospect of cultural analyses of this sort, Sumida and Rosenberg 
were confident: 
The navy history literature had for all intents and purposes not taken account of this 
factor, and the general proposition that it was an issue of considerable significance is a 
worthy one. Unfortunately, the exaggeration of claims, the dependence upon anecdote 
rather than the deployment of systematic argument, and inadequate or faulty evidence has 
compromised much of the value of this work, and thus restricted its influence. On the 
other hand, the proliferation of well-founded and conceptually advanced writing on 
navies as institutions will provide the basis for more sensible analyses of the social and 
cultural context of naval officer behaviour, and that of politicians and bureaucrats as well. 
This should establish socio-cultural analysis as a much larger and more important form of 
naval history than is currently the case. 25 
The inclusion of organisational culture as a focal point of study in naval history was also 
encouraged by Robert Jervis, one of the political scientists who attended the Yale conference who 
urged naval historians to embrace the organisational perspective and the multidisciplinary 
approach advocated by Sumida and Rosenberg. `There is something of a paradox here', observed 
Jervis, `in that we need to be able to isolate the field of naval history on (sic) order to study it and 
yet part of what makes the field so interesting is the links it has to many other areas - e. g., foreign 
policy, organizational theory, [and] the uses of technology'. 26 Accordingly, the focus of naval 
historians should now be redirected to explore naval-related subject areas that were once 
considered on the periphery of the discipline. Jervis highlighted several of these subject areas, 
including the naval inputs to national power and patterns of international politics, the internal and 
external sources of naval conduct, and the propensity for innovation in naval organisations. Each 
of these lines of inquiry, however, requires a research methodology that is tailored specifically to 
2-5 Ibid., p. 34. 
26 Robert Jervis, `Navies, Politics, and Political Science', in John B. Hattendorf, (ed), Doing New History: 
Essays Toward Improvement, (Newport 1995), p. 41. 
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answer the questions relevant to the researcher: `A student of the role of navies in international 
conflict, for example, will use different concepts, examine different data, and employ different 
methodologies than the person who wants to know how navies influenced and were influenced by 
conceptions of gender'. 27 Similarly, a cultural explanation of certain strategic and force structure 
choices would require a much different conception of the organisation and its constituents, the 
impact of organisational culture as an intervening variable in the process of policy formulation, 
and critical linkages between the personalities, institutions and events relevant to the outcomes 
under scrutiny. In the following diagram, Jervis visualised his conception of how organisational 
culture intervenes between the flow of inputs and outputs in the formulation of naval policy: 
Table 1.1 
External Environment Procurement 
Domestic Politics 
Organisational 
Culture Strategy 
Capability 
Bureaucratic Politics Technology Tactics 
Available 
Propensity to 
Decision-Making Innovate 
Source: Jervis, p. 47. 
The overview above is intended to flow from left to right - from inputs to outputs, with culture 
and technology the intervening variables - but Jervis specifically refrained from complicating the 
diagram with arrows that suggest causality, especially when there are multiple connections 
between the categories. Nevertheless, the primary aim of the overview is to illustrate that 
organisational culture is an important factor for naval historians to consider when attempting to 
explain the host of circumstances that shaped key policy decisions, which often are obscured in 
complex organisations such as navies. In some cases, the researcher may discover that the 
sources of naval conduct emanated from external considerations, as commonly seen in strategic 
and force structure choices rendered in response to foreign provocations or threat perceptions in 
anticipation of conflict. However, explanations of key policy decisions can be increasingly 
complicated in the absence of wartime conditions and, for this reason, naval historians are now 
compelled to pierce the veneer of modern naval organisations and to prioritise which decisional 
inputs were most influential in the decisionmaking process. For these reasons, the future research 
agendas of naval historians should be expanded to include adequate consideration of both the 
external and internal dimensions of naval policy formulation. What is found through archival- 
based research might reveal the existence of service cultures as the most significant factors that 
27 Ibid. 
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shaped the ideational context- from which strategic ideas and other preferences were inspired, 
institutionalised and implemented. 
Organisational Culture and the `Rules of the Game' 
Yet, for the most part, it appears that naval historians are reluctant to consider the 
organisational cultures of navies when framing the answers to their research questions, despite the 
enthusiasm recorded at the Yale conference for the organisational perspective and the arguments 
presented above by Sumida, Rosenberg and Jervis. The only exception in the naval historical 
literature is the recently published research of Andrew Gordon. In his well-received book, The 
Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (1996), Gordon attributed the 
incompatible approaches to command and control exercised at Jutland to a signals-dominated 
service culture that emphasised a centralised system in steam-tactics since the publication of 
Captain P. H. Colomb's Manual of Fleet Evolutions in 1874.28 When a decentralised philosophy 
of command came into practice under Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon in the 1890s, known 
simply as `action principles' or TA, Gordon suggests that a transition in philosophies would have 
ensued had Tryon not met an untimely death in the Victoria-Camperdown collision in 1893. 
Instead, a `counter-reformation' occurred which further factionalised the senior officers corps into 
two schools of thought, those in favour of a flexible and decentralised style of command, as 
opposed to those officers who advocated the resumption of the more rigid and centralised system 
of command and control. Historically more comfortable with the latter, centralisation again 
prevailed in the Royal Navy, as practised by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe in manoeuvres with the 
Grand Fleet and later reflected in the inflexibilties of his Grand Fleet Battle Orders. `By the time 
of Jutland', observed David Syrett in support of the Gordon thesis, `the Royal Navy had thus 
developed into an institution in which all authority was centralized in the commander, with 
subordinate officers almost reduced to automatons whose only task was to respond to the 
commands of their superiors'. 29 
It is thus within this cultural context that Gordon revisited the tactical movements of the 
British Grand Fleet at Jutland, with particular emphasis on the failed coordination between Vice- 
Admiral Sir David Beatty and Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas that ultimately culminated in the 
loss of two British battlecruisers and serious damage to two battleships. Trained as a signals- 
officer and a disciple of the traditional centralised school, Evan-Thomas is shown here to have 
waited until he was formally signalled to reverse the course of the Fifth Battle Squadron and close 
with the Battlecruiser Fleet commanded by Beatty. Gordon equally faulted Beatty for assuming 
that his subordinate would anticipate the movement to turn south and close with his vulnerable 
28 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, (London 1996). 
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battlecruisers, which may have occurred had Evan-Thomas been familiar with Beatty's 
preferences for delegation and initiative. In the final analysis, Gordon highlighted British 
experiences at Jutland to further the point that organisational culture, or military culture as he 
refers to it, can have a serious impact on operational performance, especially when conflicting 
tactical doctrines of command and control are advocated within the senior officer corps. `Military 
cultures impart doctrine by corporate ambience as much as by explicit teaching', concluded the 
author, adding that `the "ambience" of a military culture consists out of its ethos, its conceits and 
its traditions'. 30 Although Gordon confined his historical analysis to the linkage between 
organisational culture and the development of British tactical doctrine in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the volume nonetheless demonstrates the value of the cultural lens in 
explaining other aspects of naval history, including the strategic and force structure choices 
examined in this thesis. 
But Gordon would be the first to admit that the cultural context of his analysis was informed 
not from any innovative trend in naval historiography, but rather from his intimate knowledge of 
service culture as an officer in the Royal Naval Reserve. 31 So why has the organisational 
perspective and the related concept of culture been applied so infrequently by naval historians? 
There are three possible reasons. The first reason is a function of time and resources in a 
specialised discipline, as the application of the organisational perspective requires extensive 
archival research over a broad range of materials, which include the financial, political, economic 
and administrative aspects of naval policy. Many of these studies, in fact, begin as doctoral 
32 research and are continued beyond the dissertation. The second can be attributed to the mixed 
message over the level of research skills and training required to sustain an organisational 
analysis. While Jervis, for example, seemed to encourage naval historians to apply for themselves 
the concepts and methodologies borrowed from political science and elsewhere, Sumida and 
Rosenberg implied that their colleagues should leave these lines of inquiry to qualified researchers 
from other disciplines. `How quickly changes will come is impossible to predict', explained 
Sumida and Rosenberg, `but the prospects for advance are not fair. There are few historians of 
naval affairs of any kind to start with, and fewer still who are likely to pursue the course of 
scholarship just presented'. 33 Finally, it is quite possible that naval historians remain unconvinced 
whether or not culture should be included among the traditional inputs of policy formulation in 
29 David Syrett, `Roundtable: Notes on Andrew Gordon: "The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British 
Naval Command"', International Journal of Maritime History, (December 1997), p. 183. 
30 Gordon, p. 580. 
31 Conversation with Dr. Andrew Gordon on 24 September 1999. See also Andrew Gordon, `The Rules of 
the Game Revisited', International Journal of Maritime History, (December 1997), p. 189. 
32 The contributions of Sumida, Lambert and Beeler described above, for example, all originated from 
postgraduate research. 
33 Sumida and Rosenberg, p. 39. 
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military organisations. For this we turn our attention to three schools of thought on the topic in 
political science and strategic studies, to outline how cultural arguments have evolved in assessing 
the sources of military behaviour in peacetime. 
EXPLAINING MILITARY BEHAVIOUR IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Contributions to naval history from political scientists can sometimes be problematic, 
especially when theoretical insights are offered as explanations to the rise and fall of naval 
powers. In this case, however, naval historians will find the contributions of political scientists to 
be quite instructive, as the latter group of scholars have frequently borrowed concepts from 
organisational theory to postulate their own theories of particular aspects of military behaviour. 
These range from the sources of military doctrine and conflict escalation to organisational inputs 
to military innovation, weapons acquisition and grand strategy. The theories postulated thus far 
are far from homogenous, as divergent schools of thought among political scientists have emerged 
in the 1990s to debate the merits of each approach and the host of external and internal factors 
perceived to evoke variations in military behaviour within and across national boundaries. 34 
When used to inform the naval historical community, the theoretical qualities of each approach 
is less important than the factors used to underwrite them, which will be referred to here 
respectively as the bureaucratic, professional and cultural approaches to organisational analysis in 
strategic studies. Each of these approaches can be distinguished according to: (1) its conception 
of the military organisation; (2) the role of civilians and military professionals in the policy 
formulation process; and (3) the inputs perceived to shape organisational action (ie., strategic 
choices), the most prevalent of which include external provocations, threat perceptions, civil- 
military relations, domestic political structures and organisational culture. As will be seen further 
below, the addition of culture to this list of variables coincided in the 1990s with an evolving 
perspective of military organisations among political scientists, one which conforms largely with 
the treatment of navies as complex organisations and the potential for cultural arguments in 
historical naval analysis. 
The Bureaucratic Approach: 
Structures Matter in Explaining Military Behaviour 
Naval historians, particularly the advocates of the policy-and-operations perspective, would 
find the bureaucratic approach the most familiar among the three approaches to organisational 
analysis presented here. Simply put, it attributes the selection of military strategies and force 
structures to external circumstances, as manifested in actual or perceived threats to national 
security from foreign military developments or other systemic changes in the status quo among 
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nations. The agents for choice in these circumstances are civilian policymakers, who are 
frequently compelled to intervene in military preparations when organisational actions are deemed 
parochial and insufficient, which is often perceived to be the case when military professionals are 
left to their own devices to decide how to prepare and organise for conflict. Meanwhile, 
incentives to innovate within military organisations are virtually non-existent, as institutionalised 
forms of warfare are routinely applied in carefully orchestrated roles and combat missions. 
Military behaviour, in short, is thus seen as a function of three essential inputs - external 
provocations, threat perceptions and civilian intervention - that together contribute to the most 
widely accepted interpretation, in both political science and strategic studies, of how states 
generate military power and organise themselves for war. 
Political scientists will immediately recognise the underlying tenets of neorealism, also known 
as structural realism, that are rooted in this account of how states prepare for war in heightened 
periods of uncertainty. 35 It is based largely upon the research of Barry Posen and his efforts to 
explain strategic and doctrinal choices as systemic imperatives while adopting a bureaucratic 
characterisation of military organisations. In his book, The Sources of Military Doctrine (1984), 
Posen asserted the explanatory value of the neorealist account after comparing it with a traditional 
form of organisational theory, at the core of which is a narrow conception of organisations that 
emphasises institutional structure over the behaviour of its constituents in shaping organisational 
outcomes. 36 With structure deemed ever so important, it is further alleged that similarly- 
structured organisations will assume predictive qualities, such as the usage of preestablished 
routines and standard scenarios to reduce levels of uncertainty and with it the incentives for 
innovation. In essence, Posen adopted the bureaucratic conception of organisations popularised in 
the 1970s by Graham Allison in The Essence of Decision (1971), which portrayed military 
organisations as risk-averse, excessively rigid, and predisposed to organisational inertia. `Where 
the international environment cannot be negotiated', observes Allison, `organizations deal with 
remaining uncertainty by establishing a set of standard scenarios that constitute the contingencies 
34 This debate is summarised in Michael C. Desch, `Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in 
Security Studies, International Security, (Summer 1998), pp. 141-170. 
35 Neorealism is a research paradigm within political science that attempts to explain various forms of state 
behaviour through references to the international system and, more precisely, the competition that 
inherently develops between states confronted with different levels of military capability. As such, a 
neorealist lens of military behaviour generally does not consider factors at the organisational or state levels 
of analysis. As observed by Goldman and Andres: `For neorealism, the competitive logic governing the 
international system creates a powerful incentive for states to adopt new military methods and to emulate 
the military practices of the most successful states in the system'. Emily O. Goldman and Richard B. 
Andres, `Systemic Effects of Military Innovation and Diffusion', Security Studies, (Summer 1999), p. 82. 
36 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between The World 
Wars, (Ithaca 1984). Posen adopts this conception from organisational theorists who advocate the natural 
systems model of organisational behaviour. For more on this point, see Theo Farrell, `Figuring Out 
Fighting Organisations: The New Organisational Analysis in Strategic Studies', The Journal of Strategic 
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for which they prepare'. 37 For these reasons, Posen viewed civilian intervention into strategic and 
doctrinal matters as essential, since concerns for organisational autonomy will exacerbate civil- 
military relations to the point where self-absorbed military organisations are `unwilling to provide 
civilian authorities with information that relates to doctrinal questions, especially those having 
most to do with the actual conduct of operations'. 38 
What actually causes civilians to intervene in military affairs is a question which Posen 
answered with predictions from structural realism and, in particular, his observation that `soldiers 
are not better equipped than civilians to interpret the international political system and come to 
reasonable doctrinal conclusions'. 39 To emphasise his point, Posen compared the origins of 
strategic and doctrinal choices in Britain, France and Germany during the interwar period. He 
attributed British defensive preparations for war in the 1930s, for example, to civilian recognition 
of the necessity to equip the Royal Air Force with sufficient fighter strength to oppose the 
German Luftwaffe in anticipation of the Battle of Britain. When the RAF resisted entreaties to 
bolster Fighter Command at the perceived expense of Bomber Command, civilian intervention 
was required to compel the RAF to accept a defensive orientation, despite the individual efforts of 
Air Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding. `The heating up of the international system', observed Posen, 
`encouraged civilians to intervene in the operational preparations of the RAF and, against its will, 
press it in the direction of greater air defense efforts'. 40 
Similarly, French authorities also sought to redress deficiencies in their own preparations for 
war, but in the main were preoccupied with finding coalition partners (ie., Britain) to `balance' the 
perceived threats from Germany - strategic behaviour that is anticipated by the neorealist school 
of thought. As a result, French interwar doctrine continued to evolve with civilian political 
support toward a strict defensive orientation, even though the exigencies of the situation required 
innovative military thinking beyond that offered by General Maurice Gamelin, Chief of Staff for 
National Defence from 1938-1940: `The changes suggested by French military authorities such 
as De Gaulle had an excessively offensive appearance that would have undercut the broader 
purposes of French grand strategy' . 
41 Finally, Posen concluded that the German Wehrmacht - as 
an organisation - was of less importance than the anticipated wartime contingencies that spurred 
development of innovative doctrinal concepts and armour formations envisioned to invade France 
in a multifront war. Civilian intervention was thus required to compel the Wehrmacht to embrace 
Studies, (March 1996), pp. 124-125; and W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open 
Systems, Third Edition, (Englewood 1992), pp. 51-75. 
37 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, (Boston 1971), p. 84. Emphasis in the original. 
38 Posen, p. 53. 
39 Ibid., p. 188. 
40 Ibid., p. 178. 
41 Ibid., p. 139 
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the Blitzkrieg concept, especially as General Heinz Guderian and other proponents of high-speed, 
deep armoured thrusts were opposed within the German Army. `That even the offensively 
inclined German Army', observes Posen, `required a good kick from the outside to create such an 
offensive innovation provides still more support for the utility of organization theory in 
42 explaining certain tendencies within modem military organizations' . 
While the conclusions reached by Posen are not universally accepted by historians and 
political scientists, as evident in the evolution of scholarship outlined below, the neorealist 
account and its bureaucratic conception of military organisations remains the traditional approach 
to explaining the sources of military conduct in peacetime. Still, however, other political 
scientists have recently attempted to soften the bureaucratic approach with variations that 
combine external pressures with a less pessimistic evaluation of military organisations. Emily 
Goldman, for example, has postulated that strategic adjustments, defined as alterations in service 
roles and missions, can originate within military organisations provided that such innovations are 
triggered by the notions of urgency, desirability and possibility. 43 That is, the external pressures 
arising from threats abroad and domestic political incentives provide, respectively, the urgency 
and desirability to encourage new roles and missions that hinge on the nature of possibility. 
`Organisations can adjust', Goldman concluded, `provided the appropriate stimulants are 
present'. ' An alternative perspective, offered by Kimberly Zisk, provides a theoretical bridge 
between the bureaucratic and professional approaches to organisational analysis in strategic 
studies. On the one hand, Zisk sides with Posen in her conception of military organisations, 
observing that `[they] will resist innovative ideas that threaten their budgetary resource share or 
corporate autonomy'. 45 In similar fashion, Zisk also describes military innovation as reactions to 
external pressures, originating from shifts in enemy doctrine or from domestic threats posed by 
political elites. Where Posen and Zisk disagree, however, is over the perceived weight of 
strategic ideas and the individual contributions of constituents from within the organisation, 
which Zisk believes can rival institutional self-interest in shaping organisational outcomes. In 
sum, the theories advocated by Goldman and Zisk, while they depart from the bureaucratic 
approach in some critical respects, unite in their mutual agreement that militaries are essentially 
reactive institutions which require some combination of external provocation, threat perceptions 
42 Ibid., p. 226. 
43 Emily O. Goldman, `Mission Possible: Organizational Learning in Peacetime', in Peter Trubowitz, 
Emily O. Goldman and Edward Rhodes, (eds), The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, 
and Interests, (New York 1999). See also Emily O. Goldman, `The US Military in Uncertain Times: 
Organizations, Ambiguity, and Strategic Adjustment', The Journal of Strategic Studies, (June 1997), pp. 
41-74. 
"Goldman, `Mission Possible', p. 251. 
' Kimberly Martin Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 
(Princeton 1993), p. 14. 
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and civilian intervention to ensure that military preparations adequately reflect national security 
concerns. 
The Professional Approach: 
Individuals Matter in Explaining Military Behaviour 
The professional approach, on the other hand, seeks to explain military behaviour through the 
interaction of external and internal inputs that occur within military organisations, and among 
individual decisionmakers, to shape strategic choices and other aspects of military policy. It 
conforms largely to a second school of organisation theory, which focuses less on structure than 
the internal operations of complex organisations, including how decisionmakers perceive their 
external environment and render strategic decisions when confronted with circumstances that 
require changes in organisational action. Typical of this research paradigm is the view that a 
`complex organization is more like a modern weapons system than like old-fashioned fixed 
fortifications, more like a mobile than a static sculpture, more like a computer than an adding 
machine. In short, the organization is a dynamic system'. ' 
The intellectual origins of the professional approach can be traced to Samuel Huntington, who 
characterises military organisations not in terms of perceived structural impediments to optimal 
strategies and force structures, but rather by the professional competence of military officers that 
reside in them. In his book, The Soldier and the State (1957), Huntington described militaries as 
`human organisation[s] whose primary function is the application of violence', which in turn is 
regulated in democratic societies by the conduct of civil-military relations in formulating military 
policy. 47 When viewed in this way, whether or not military organisations follow their own 
agendas in organising and preparing for war is determined largely by the actions of individuals, or 
more precisely the relationship between civilian leaders and their military counterparts. A critical 
element of the Huntington thesis is the practise of objective civilian control which, contrary to the 
civil-military friction anticipated by Posen, encourages the emergence of professional attitudes 
and behaviour among the members of the senior officer corps, thereby ensuring that operational 
strategies and force structures are compatible with the security needs of the country. The pattern 
of civil-military relations envisioned by Huntington, in short, infers that civilian intervention in 
military affairs is the exception and not the rule, as professional military officers are quite capable 
of incorporating new roles and missions without prodding from their political masters. 
46 Harold J. Leavitt, William R. Dill, and Henry B. Eyring, The Organizational World, (New York 1973), p. 
4. Cited in Scott, p. 93. On the relevance of this strain of organisation theory in strategic studies, see Emily 
0. Goldman, `Thinking About Strategy Absent the Enemy', Security Studies, (Autumn 1994), pp. 40-95. 
47 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 
(Cambridge 1957), p. 11. 
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A more recent application of the professional approach was conducted by Stephen Rosen. In 
his analysis of military innovation - Winning the Next War (1991) - Rosen argued that civilian 
intervention is unlikely to stimulate innovation without critical support from within the 
organisation, offered by senior military officers who have previously identified the necessity for 
change and are empowered to accomplish it. A civilian order to innovate without it, for example, 
would be rendered ambiguous by the lack of familiarity with the task requested, and complicated 
further by organisational resistance to civilian visions of new warfighting strategies and force 
postures. Rosen cites as evidence British defensive preparations in the 1930s, the same case 
offered by Posen to exemplify the urgency of civilian intervention as predicted by the 
bureaucratic approach. While agreeing with Posen that civilian intervention `altered the balance 
of resources in favor of fighter aircraft', Rosen attributed the creation of the British air defence 
network to senior officers within the RAF who `laid a sound intellectual organizational 
foundation' for the rapid construction of fighter aircraft and the successful incorporation of radar 
technology. 48 Had steady doctrinal development not occurred within the RAF beforehand, as 
fervently supported by Air Marshall Sir Hugh Trenchard, Sir Hugh Dowding and Sir Geoffrey 
Salmon throughout the 1920s and 1930s, civilian intervention would have been muted. Similarly, 
Rosen attributed the development of carrier aviation within the U. S. Navy in the same period to 
Rear Admiral William Moffett and the strategy he employed to press forward an innovative 
concept in a process that spanned over twenty years. `It was a strategy', observed Rosen, `based 
on shaping the process of generational change in the officer corps, and as such, must have 
appeared maddeningly slow to the young officers advocating aviation, but it worked'. 49 
In the end, Rosen concluded that there are multiple patterns of military innovation, but 
common among them is the role of senior military officers in determining when and how their 
organisations innovate. 50 Critical to his understanding of the process of innovation is the nature 
of the organisation itself. Rosen viewed military organisations as `complex political 
communities', each with its `own culture and distinct way of thinking about the way war should 
be conducted, not only by its own branch, but by the other branches and services with which it 
would have to interact in combat'. 51 While the process of innovation occurs infrequently, it first 
requires a strategic assessment of the security environment and then an `ideological struggle' in 
which new military concepts and technologies are championed by senior officers on behalf of 
their subordinate advocates. The outcome of this ideological struggle, which often evolve over 
decades, determines whether or not these senior officers can sustain the innovation through the 
48 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, (Ithaca 1991), p. 14 
and 18. 
49 Ibid., p. 80. 
50 This point is also made in Murray and Millett, `Military Innovation', pp. 301-328. 
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promotion of their supporters. `At the practical level', explained Rosen, `[innovation] depends on 
a senior officer or a group of senior officers who first attract officers with solid traditional 
credentials to the innovation and then make it possible for younger officers to rise to positions of 
command while pursuing the innovation'. 52 
In sum, the professional approach emphasises process over structure when attempting to 
determine the sources of military conduct within and across national boundaries. Similar to the 
organisational perspective to historical naval analysis, it treats militaries as complex organisations 
whose perceptions of the security environment are framed by professional military officers in 
senior-level positions. While external pressures are indeed important in assessing the 
circumstances behind particular strategic and force structure choices, the professional approach 
does not presume that external inputs alone shape organisational outcomes. What occurs instead 
can be described as a confluence of external and internal inputs (ie., organisational culture, 
patterns in civil-military relations), which in turn influences the selection process to determine the 
appropriate warfighting strategies that reflect national security concerns. As agents of these 
choices, military leaders are deemed qualified to decide for themselves how they should organise 
and prepare for war, despite theories that suggest that civilian leaders are frequently compelled to 
intervene out of fear of military incompetence. 53 The interpretations offered by Huntington and 
Rosen, moreover, lend credence to the assertion that senior military officers and their ideas often 
shape organisational outcomes, so much so that their actions are seen to provide ideational 
context for explanations of military behaviour. As will be described further below, the third 
approach reduces the scope of analysis even further to consider the impact of these ideas as the 
cultural subtext to strategic and force structure choices in military organisations. 
The Cultural Approach: 
Ideas Matter in Explaining Military Behaviour 
While the literature that exemplifies the professional approach assumes that cultures exist 
within complex military organisations, the cultural approach seeks to explain how shared habits of 
51 Rosen, p. 21. See also Carl. H. Builder, The Masks of War. American Military Styles in Strategy and 
Analysis, (Baltimore 1989), pp. 3-41. 
52 Rosen, p. 96. 
53 The reader should not infer from this that military leaders are infallible and render optimal decisions on 
all occasions, as military history is full of examples where military organisations did not adopt warfighting 
strategies that reflected strategic and operational circumstances. One well-known case of this was the 
persistence of the cavalry into the twentieth century despite the clear demands of the modern battlefield. 
Incompatible strategies and doctrines were also seen in World War I and Vietnam. On these cases, 
respectively, see Edward L. Katzenbach, `The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century', Public Policy 
(1958), pp. 120-149; Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the 
Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918, (London 1987); and Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army in 
Vietnam, (Baltimore 1986). 
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thought among military officers shape organisational choices and subsequent action. 54 The 
approach emerged in the 1990s as an alternative to the neorealist conceptions of military 
organisations and their behaviour, as political scientists again borrowed central concepts and ideas 
from organisational research, including the revived perspective that culture and not structure 
defines organisational outcomes. `All [cultural approaches] take the realist edifice as a target', 
writes lain Johnston, `and focus on cases where structural materiel notions of interest cannot 
ss explain a particular strategic choice', 
Indeed, the explanatory power of the cultural approach becomes especially apparent when 
examining strategic developments in peacetime that occurred irrespective of civilian intervention, 
as emphasised in neorealist explanations of the same developments. Elizabeth Kier, for example, 
has argued that `civilian intervention is unusual and can hinder the development of doctrine', 56 
She suggested instead that, while civilian decisions are not unimportant, strategic developments 
largely reflect organisational preferences that in turn are informed by the organisation's culture, 
which can be defined broadly as a set of attitudes and beliefs that are commonly held within the 
senior officer corps. On this point, Kier is supported by the observations of Ann Swindler, a 
prominent sociologist who argued that `[c]ulture influences action not by providing the ultimate 
values toward which action is orientated, but by shaping a repertoire or "tool kit" of habits, styles 
and skills from which people construct "strategies of action"'. 57 
In her book, Imagining War (1997), Kier challenged the conclusions reached by Posen with a 
cultural explanation of the strategic and doctrinal choices rendered in Britain and France during 
the interwar period. Of particular interest here is the fundamental difference that characterises the 
research methodologies used by both scholars, as Posen framed his arguments almost entirely 
upon secondary sources whereas Kier combines primary and secondary sources from which to 
base her observations. Indeed, a successful application of the cultural approach requires archival- 
sa That the professional and cultural approaches are closely aligned is underscored by the fact that both 
Huntington and Rosen are advocates of cultural explanations in strategic studies. See Stephen P. Rosen, 
Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies, (Ithaca 1996); and idem., `Military Effectiveness: 
Why Society Matters', International Security, (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31. 
ss Iain Johnston, `Thinking About Strategic Culture', International Security (Spring 1995), p. 41. 
56 Elizabeth Kier, Imaging War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars, (Princeton 1997), 
p. 12. Kier remains the only political scientist to date who has used the cultural approach to explain the 
strategic and doctrinal choices of military organisations. See also idem., `Culture and French Military 
Doctrine Before World War II', in Peter J. Katzenstein, (ed), The Culture of National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics, (New York 1996), pp. 187-215; and idem., `Culture and Military Doctrine', 
International Security, (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93. Jeffrey Legro has also used the cultural approach to study 
a specific form of military behaviour - escalation in conflict. See Jeffrey W. Legro, `Culture and 
Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step', American Political Science Review, (March 1996), 
pp. 118-136; idem., Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War it, (Ithaca 
1995); and idem., `Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II', International Security, 
(Spring 1994), pp. 108-142. 
-32- 
based interpretations of this sort. `Determining the culture of a military organization', cautioned 
Kier, `requires an extensive reading of archival, historical, and other public documents, including 
curricula at military academies, training manuals, personal histories of officers, internal 
communications in the armed services, and leading military journals' . 
58 Similarly, Jeffrey Lego 
has echoed Kier and contends that a military organisation's culture can only be unveiled `by 
reviewing available internal correspondence, planning documents, regulations, exercises and the 
memoirs of individual members. These multiple sources provide a composite picture of the 
hierarchy of legitimate beliefs within an organisation'. 59 What is required by the cultural 
approach, in sum, is a broader scope of primary and secondary source materials, along with 
interpretative skills which should be equally familiar to both historians and political scientists. 
From her review of these materials, for example, Kier found that shift from an offensive 
doctrine to a defensive orientation in France during the 1920s did not result from attempts by 
French civilian leaders to appear less bellicose for the purpose of attracting British support to 
offset the emerging threat from Germany, as first suggested by Posen in The Sources of Military 
Doctrine. 60 Her interpretation of these events suggests the opposite, that `external balancing' was 
not the primary motivation of French security policy. `France seem unconcerned about potential 
reactions to an offensive strategy', observed Kier. `And in the late 1930s, British policymakers 
were alarmed that the French did not have an offensive doctrine... '. 61 Instead, Kier argued that the 
French Army gradually reverted to a defensive orientation at the behest of the senior officer corps, 
which since the Franco-Prussian War emphasised an offensive doctrine but instead chose a 
defensive posture following the introduction of short-term conscription in 1923. Simply put, 
French military officers could not conceive of implementing an offensive doctrine with short-term 
conscripts; they switched to a defensive orientation out of perceived necessity. While 
parliamentary action to reduce the term of conscription was indeed significant, French 
policymakers deferred to senior military officers in formulating an effective strategy to defeat 
Germany at the outset of conflict. That these senior officers chose to conduct a static defence was 
a reflection of the organisational culture that prevailed within the French Army. `Thus, despite 
adequate funding, knowledge of offensive alternatives, and freedom from civilian interference', 
Kier concluded, `the French army did not integrate offensive concepts into its doctrine, and 
57 Ann Swindler, `Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies', American Sociological Review, (June 1986), 
p. 273. 
58 Kier, `Culture and Military Doctrine', p. 70. 
59 Legro, `Cooperation Under Fire', p. 30. 
60 A critical review of this volume is found in Douglas Porch, `Military "Culture" and the Fall of France in 
1940', International Security, (Spring 2000), pp. 157-180. 
61 Kier, `Imagining War', p. 51. 
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instead, after the reduction in the term of conscription to one year in 1928, became increasingly 
committed to a defensive doctrine. Its organizational culture would not allow otherwise' . 
62 
As for the cultural approach as a basis for historical research, Kier also supported the notion 
that military organisations possess powerful cultures that have been shown in the past to intervene 
in upper policy debates and shape strategic decisions. Military cultures, in particular, are 
strengthened by responsibilities and assimilation processes that are both unique and unparalleled 
by conventional forms of societal organisation. Indeed, the teachings at service academies and 
other intellectual activities at institutions such as the U. S. Naval War College and the Royal Naval 
College, Greenwich, represent effective transmission mechanisms from which to instil within the 
senior officer corps a firmly rooted cultural framework to guide organisational practices and 
conceptions of mission- i. e., the traditions, professional ethos and historical experiences that are 
made available to successive classes of officers for future use in formulating strategy, tactics and 
overall policy. 63 
Yet, at the same time, it is indeed possible for a transition in organisational culture to occur 
within the senior officer corps, the process of which is analogous to the `generational change' 
suggested by Rosen above and seconded here by Kier: `[O]rganizational culture is not the sum of 
the values and beliefs of a few individual members. Replacing a few leading officers is unlikely to 
give rise to a new organisational culture'. 6`` What is required instead is a commitment to change, 
instigated at the behest of an individual or group of senior officers who are certain to encounter 
resistance from within the organisation as to the roles and missions of the service. `Although it 
may be more difficult for leading officers to overcome the initial hurdle of recognizing that a 
change in the organization's culture is necessary', concludes Kier, `once this barrier has been 
crossed it should be easier to impose a change in the military's culture'. 65 
That other cultural analyses of this sort are few and far between should not come as a surprise 
to political scientists, as the cultural approach remains controversial and subject to criticism, some 
of which is warranted when considering the primary research objectives espoused by the 
discipline. Most of the criticism levied on the cultural approach, in fact, has more to do with its 
theoretical shortcomings rather than its explanatory value to research endeavours where a 
thorough understanding of strategic choices is more important than assessing events that are 
`generalised' and `predictable' within existing theoretical frameworks. As one of the more vocal 
critics of the cultural approach within political science, Michael Desch argues that cultural 
explanations of military behaviour are inherently flawed precisely because of its theoretical 
62 Ibid., p. 73. 
63 This point is also made in Murray, `Does Military Culture Matter? ', pp. 27-42. 
64 Kier, `Imagining War', p. 152. 
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limitations, namely the absence of predictive elements in cultural explanations of military 
behaviour: `Prediction... is central to the social scientific enterprise not only for theoretical 
reasons (we need theories to make predictions in order to test the theories), but also for policy 
analysis (theories that do not make clear predictions are of little use to policymakers)'. 66 In the 
same breath, however, Desch concludes that the cultural approach can be a powerful explanatory 
tool when presented with circumstances that cannot be explained via the conventional lenses most 
familiar to political scientists. When viewed in this way, cultural analyses can supplement 
neorealist accounts of strategic behaviour but not supplant them, especially in those cases where 
the structure of the international system cannot determine organisational outcomes. `In such an 
indeterminate threat environment', observes Desch, `it is necessary to look to other variables to 
explain various types of strategic behaviour. Culture and other domestic variables may take on 
greater independent explanatory power in these cases' . 
67 
CONCLUSION: 
THE CULTURAL APPROACH AND THE DECISIONS OF 1889 
Despite its theoretical limitations in political science, the cultural approach provides naval 
historians with a new analytic instrument borrowed from the social sciences to assess naval policy 
formulation from an organisational perspective. When assessing navies as complex organisations, 
the cultural approach is especially befitting for its emphasis upon the ideas and actions of naval 
officers as potential motivations behind key policy decisions, as was the case with the decisions of 
1889. This, to a large degree, contradicts much of what has already been written about them in 
the core naval histories, the best example of which is undoubtedly The Anatomy of British 
Seapower, perhaps the most widely cited volume on the Naval Defence Act. Confined to the 
`policy-and-operations perspective' of British naval policy, Marder focused exclusively upon 
external factors that were inconsistent with the peacetime lull of the 1880s, all of which he 
attributed to fears of a Franco-Russian naval combination that failed to materialise. Similar 
criticism can be levied at the Mahan hagiographies which, because of an oversimplified image of 
naval policy formulation, understated the ideas and actions of other naval officers in shaping the 
course of American naval policy during the same period. 
If the decisions of 1889 revolve essentially around strategic ideas - and the actions of naval 
officers in support of them - it is incumbent upon this thesis to trace these ideas from theory to 
practice in the policy sphere. As will be seen further in the chapters that follow, evidence of this 
65 Ibid., p. 161. 
66 Desch, p. 153. Similar criticism of the cultural approach has also been registered in recent analytical 
products from the policy community. See, for example, Jeffrey A. Isaccson, Christopher Layne and John 
Arquilla, Predicting Military Innovation, (Santa Monica 1999); and Ashley J. Tellis et al., Measuring 
National Power in the Post-Industrial Age, (Santa Monica 1998). 
67 Ibid., p. 169. 
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progression can be seen in the manner in which strategic ideas were inspired by the lessons of 
naval history and which were later institutionalised and implemented in collaboration with naval 
officers in support of them. It is these three phases which, in sequence, describe how strategic 
ideas became firmly embedded in the strategic thinking that heralded the decisions of 1889, under 
the auspices of service patrons who championed these ideas despite political opposition to them. 
Also critical to understanding how strategic ideas progressed through these phases is an emphasis 
upon the personalities, institutions and events that linked naval officers with their intellectual 
conceptions as to the roles and missions of the service. Evidence of these linkages were in both 
cases found in departmental records, official and private communications, journal articles, 
newspaper submissions, personal memoirs, as well as the private papers of selected senior naval 
officers. 
With this in mind, the next three chapters will consider the Naval Defence Act in Britain, 
which for comparative purposes begins with a critical assessment of the Marder account and the 
three conceptual pillars used to support it. Meant as an overview of the arguments in support of a 
revised account of the Naval Defence Act, Chapter 3 also establishes a nexus between culture, 
history and strategy of the Royal Navy, from which strategic ideas were inspired and unofficially 
passed on to successive generations of British naval officers until the formalised study of naval 
history in the 1870s made them a permanent feature in the postgraduate course at the Royal Naval 
College, Greenwich. Their resurgence is credited here to the writings and teachings of John Knox 
Laughton - the pioneer naval educator and historian - Chapter 4 then focuses on how these ideas 
later became institutionalised in the 1880s in a new brand of strategic thinking within the 
Admiralty and, more specifically, the newly formed Naval Intelligence Department. Finally, 
Chapter 5 considers the extraordinary efforts undertaken by naval officers to implement their 
strategic ideas within the larger context of naval policy formulation. 
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STRATEGIC REVITALISATION IN BRITAIN 
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Chapter 3 
In the Shadow of Marder: 
Two Perspectives of the Naval Defence Act 
-38- 
INTRODUCTION 
For over 60 years, the study of British naval policy in the 1880s has been defined primarily by 
the research of the late Arthur Marder, whose special access to Admiralty archives in the 1930s 
led to findings later published in The Anatomy of British Seapower in 1940. ' In what is 
undeniably the most widely cited reference on the subject, Professor Marder portrayed the Naval 
Defence Act as a reaction to widespread fears of a possible Franco-Russian naval combination. 
More specifically, the explanatory value of the Marder account rests upon whether or not the 
historian accepts three fundamental observations: 
  British naval supremacy was in serious jeopardy in the 1880s, due mainly to the progress of 
naval modernisation in France and Russia, and the prospect that these two countries would 
somehow form an effective naval combination and succeed in defeating the Royal Navy. 
According to Marder, the Franco-Russian threat to Britain at the time was more than credible, 
inferring that the latter was falling behind their potential adversaries in such crucial areas as 
materiel, armament, and rate of construction. ' 
  Not only was the prospect of a Franco-Russian naval combination a serious challenge to 
British naval supremacy, but the threat was perceived as such by those responsible for naval 
policy formulation in and outside of the Admiralty. This is critical to the Marder thesis, as 
threat perceptions from external provocations form the basis of the British reaction that was 
eventually manifested in the Naval Defence Act. Marder refers to these threat perceptions 
and the reactions of British policymakers collectively as `the navy scare of 1888'. 3 
  The strategic and force structure choices embodied in the Naval Defence Act were made at 
the behest of the Salisbury ministry and not from the Admiralty itself. According to Marder, 
Salisbury was compelled to intervene into the strategic calculus when a reluctant Admiralty 
Board, unwilling to concede the disparity in naval strength vis-ä-vis France and Russia, 
remained adamant that it possessed sufficient numbers of battleships and cruisers to fulfil the 
roles and missions of the service in the event of war. 4 
With each of these observations, the Marder account defines the Naval Defence Act in terms 
of external provocations, threat perceptions and civilian intervention, which in hindsight is typical 
of how the `policy-and-operations' perspective to naval policy formulation is misapplied to 
explain the strategic and force structure choices of navies in peacetime. Accordingly, the next 
1 Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Seapower: 
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, (New York 1940). 
2 Ibid., p. 120 and 131. 
3 Ibid., p. 131. 
4 Ibid., p. 132. 
A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre- 
-39- 
three chapters were written with three critical tasks in mind: (1) To reassess the Marder account 
and offer in its place an organisational perspective that points to the ideas and actions of naval 
officers as the underlying motivation behind the Naval Defence Act; (2) To trace these ideas to 
the corporate memories of the Royal Navy and show how naval officers institutionalised them in 
a new brand of strategic thinking in the Admiralty; and (3) To highlight the extraordinary 
campaign by naval officers to implement their strategic ideas and in the process transform how 
policy deliberations were conducted among civilians and professionals. Each of these three tasks 
emphasise the pervasive influence of strategic ideas among naval officers and is reflective of the 
cultural approach to historical naval analysis. 
The primary aim of the current chapter is twofold. With the Marder account upheld in recent 
biographies of Lord Salisbury, it first becomes necessary to reassess it in light of underutilised 
archival materials and the supporting research of other naval historians. 5 In shaping this 
discussion precisely around external provocations, threat perceptions and civilian intervention, the 
reader will quickly acquire an appreciation for how British naval policy in the 1880s was 
motivated more by the budgetary concerns of politicians than the naval threats posed by France 
and Russia. For purposes of comparison, this will be followed by an organisational perspective of 
the Naval Defence Act, as seen through an analytic lens which describes the decisions of 1889 
generally in terms of the culture, history and strategy of the Royal Navy. The last half of this 
chapter, in particular, concerns itself mainly with the origin and substance of these strategic ideas. 
Their resurgence in the 1870s and 1880s is shown here to have occurred at the behest of John 
Knox Laughton, the pioneer naval educator and historian who encouraged naval officers to apply 
naval history to the solving of strategic problems in modern naval warfare. Whether he intended 
to or not, Laughton succeeded in inspiring a campaign for strategic awareness which culminated 
in 1889 with the formulation and passage of the Naval Defence Act. 
THREATS AND PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT IN THE ADMIRALTY 
With the vantage of hindsight, the threat posed from a Franco-Russian naval combination has 
been determined by other naval historians to be a product more of anxiety than of an accurate 
depiction of the naval balance between the three countries in the 1880s. Referring to the 
apprehension of British policymakers over such a likelihood, Theodore Ropp concluded that 
`[t]hese fears were largely illusory - even though France and Russia had signed an alliance in 
1892, they did not enter into naval conversations until 1900, and the French naval command not 
only never considered the possibility of a union between the two fleets but was unanimously 
5 Andrew Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, (London 1999) and David Steele, Lord Salisbury: A 
Political Biography, (London 1999). 
-40- 
opposed to it' .6 Paul Kennedy also faulted the British 
for blowing the threat out of proportion, 
observing that `it seems in retrospect that they probably overestimated the danger from this 
direction, forgetting the weaknesses of their rivals and seeing only those in their own fleet'. ' 
What appears to be a clear and explicit departure from the Marder thesis, however, is in actuality 
a tacit admission that the threat posed from a Franco-Russian naval combination, or more 
precisely the misperception of the threat, was indeed the underlying factor behind the passage of 
the Naval Defence Act - known hereafter simply as the Act. In the end, Professor Kennedy 
would echo Marder and invoke a causal linkage between the threat and the actions taken by the 
Salisbury ministry: 'The prospect of a Franco-Russian naval alliance, which would pincer the 
under-strength Mediterranean Fleet and cut that vital line of communication in time of war, was 
too grim to be dismissed with soothing phrases and half-measures'. 8 
Thus, whether the threat was real, imagined or exaggerated, the Marder thesis remains 
undisputed so long as the mere perception of a Franco-Russian naval threat existed within the 
Admiralty in the years prior to 1889. With Admiralty records pertaining to the years in question 
readily available, especially the vast inventory of reports from the Naval Intelligence Department, 
it is indeed possible to retrace the steps of Professor Marder and to assess whether or not his thesis 
is sustained by the evidence. When reconciled with the relative naval strengths of both France 
and Russia in the 1870s and early 1880s, these reports reveal in the aggregate an objective 
appraisal of the strategies and effective forces available to both countries for deployment against 
the Royal Navy along defensive orientations. What is noticeably absent from these reports is any 
indication that the Admiralty was needlessly preoccupied with the prospect of a Franco-Russian 
naval combination and the threat it represented to the security of the home islands and the rest of 
the Empire. The rest of this section will expand upon Admiralty appraisals of the naval 
developments of France and Russia, with a particular emphasis on their respective strategies, fleet 
composition and trends in shipbuilding. 
Naval Development in Russia 
Given the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean to British access to India and other 
colonial possessions, it was entirely understandable for the Admiralty to be well informed of 
naval developments in Russia, even though Russian naval capabilities had never posed a serious 
challenge to British naval supremacy at any time before, during or after the Crimean War. 9 Even 
6 Theodore Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 1871-1914, Stephen Roberts 
(ed), (Annapolis 1987), p. 205. 
7 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (London 1976), p. 210. 
8 Ibid. 
9 For an overview of Anglo-Russian relations in the nineteenth century, see Andrew D. Lambert, `Great 
Britain and the Baltic, 1809-1890' in Gören Rystad, Klaus R. Böhme and Wilhelm M. Carigren, (eds), In 
Quest of Trade and Security: The Baltic in Power Politics, 1500-1990, Volume I, (Stockholm 1994), pp. 
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though the Admiralty in the latter stages of the Eastern Crisis of 1876-78 sought to purchase four 
ironclads being built in British dockyards for the Ottoman Empire and Brazil, the supplement in 
naval strength was viewed mainly as a measure to ensure that the vessels were not transferred to 
hostile parties. `In none of the surviving correspondence regarding the "war scare" purchases of 
1878', observed John Beeler, `is there any indication that [the] Admiralty or cabinet was 
motivated by a sense of urgency, much less necessity'. 10 The Admiralty, after all, had other 
tangible evidence to point to when rendering its benign assessment of Russian naval forces and 
facilities in both the Baltic and Black Seas, the most likely theatres of operations in an Anglo- 
Russian naval was. During the 1870s, the Russian battlefleet was composed mainly of coastal- 
defence turret ships with inadequate armour protection and armament, a material weakness for a 
defensive force designed principally for coastal defence and not for offensive naval operations. " 
An American observer underscored this point in 1877, writing in his report that `Except for coast 
defence, the Russian fleet is rather numerous than powerful. The Peter the Great and the Minin 
[an armoured cruiser] are the only two vessels on the list which approach the modern standard of 
fighting efficiency'. 12 
Attempts by Russia to redress the profound disparity in naval strength during the 1880s were 
largely an incremental enterprise. This, however, was not due to shortage of funds. On the 
contrary, the Russian Government since 1878 demonstrated that it was indeed willing to expend 
the resources necessary to subsidise an investment that was hoped to yield a naval force roughly 
comparable to that possessed by Britain. In fact, Russian naval expenditures steadily increased 
throughout the decade, from £4,200,000 in 1880 to £5,828,571 in 1889 - an increase of roughly 
39% over ten years. 13 Admiralty estimates of Russian naval expenditures would seem to be more 
alarming; one intelligence report calculated that the increase in Russian naval spending increased 
by almost 54% during the same period. 14 The fact that this increase failed to stir pangs of anxiety 
within the Admiralty is indeed a testimonial to the level of overwhelming confidence in the 
multifaceted capabilities of the Royal Navy. It was also due to a realistic appraisal of relative 
capabilities vis-a-vis Russia. Given the complexities of naval warfare on the open seas, the 
British recognised accurately that the Imperial Russian Navy remained in a relative stage of 
infancy since the 1870s, while the Royal Navy was years ahead in terms of strategy, fleet 
297-334. For the impact of Russia in British defence planning, see Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last 
Tzar: British Policy and Russia, 1894-1917, (Oxford 1995), pp. 111-143. 
10 John F. Beeler, British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1866-1880, (Palo Alto 1997), p. 203. 
11 Roger Chesneau and Eugene Kolesnik, (eds), Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, 
(London 1979), p. 172; and ibid., pp. 202-203. 
12 J. W. King, European Ships of War and Their Armament, Naval Administration, etc., (Washington 1877), 
167. Cited in Beeler, p. 202-203. 
John F. Beeler, `A One Power Standard? Great Britain and the Balance of Naval Power, 1860-1880', The 
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composition, logistics and naval construction. It was more than obvious to Admiralty officials 
that the Russian battlefleet, such that it was, first had to learn to walk before it could run - and the 
Royal Navy was for decades accustomed to running at a pace heretofore unmatched by the 
principal maritime powers of the nineteenth century. 
What informed this assessment of Russian naval capabilities were the periodic visits to foreign 
naval dockyards by the British naval attache, who would then forward his observations to the 
intelligence department for analysis and dissemination. 15 When the opportunity presented itself, 
the naval attache occasionally supplemented this information with observations made from his 
attendance at foreign naval manoeuvres, which in many cases provided considerable insight into 
the strategies and forces most likely to be employed in the event of war. Russia provided such an 
opportunity to the British in 1884, and Captain Henry Kane was quickly dispatched to observe the 
annual manoeuvres of the Russian Baltic Fleet. What he observed and later recorded about the 
manoeuvres only reinforced Admiralty perceptions of the backward condition of the Baltic Fleet, 
which in effect constituted the bulk of the Imperial Russian Navy. 
His report contained observations that bordered on condescension for a grossly inferior naval 
service, including a notation that `a great deal of practice was given to the [Russian] officers, if 
not in "manoeuvring" as we understand the word, at least in managing their ships'. 16 His most 
pointed and particularly insightful criticism was reserved for the absence of what was commonly 
known as `steam tactics', that consisting of tightly choreographed geometrical evolutions 
controlled by flag signals between warships. `Fleet Manoeuvring or "steam tactics", which the 
Russians were famous for, in theory, in the days of Admiral Boutakoff', Kane observed, `seems to 
have been completely overlooked. They did not have a single day's drill of that sort. They never 
cruised in any formation but the single line ahead. They appear to have so devoted themselves to 
torpedo warfare as not to be able to think of anything else'. " The underlying objective of these 
exercises was also highly noteworthy, for it revealed Russian interests in evading the inevitable - 
an enemy blockade of Cronstadt and the defending squadron. Only the Royal Navy could have 
met the requirements of their hypothetical adversary. 
In effect, the Russian naval manoeuvres of 1884 were merely a reflection of a naval strategy 
formulated along a defensive orientation, a fact that was later underscored by an article written by 
14 N[aval] I[ntelligence] D[epartment] Report No. 119b, `Present and Prospective Shipbuilding Policy of the 
Principal Maritime Nations', March 1889. ADM 231/15. 
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Department of the Admiralty', Mariner's Mirror, (February 1995), p. 69. 
16 F[oreign] I[ntelligence] C[ommittee] Report No. 50, `Naval Manoeuvres in the Baltic', October 1884. 
ADM 231/5. The Foreign Intelligence Committee preceded the establishment of the Naval Intelligence 
Department in 1887. See Chapter 4 for more on this subject. 
17 Ibid. 
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a senior Russian naval officer, translated by the Foreign Office and forwarded to the intelligence 
department in April 1888.18 The report reinforced the notion that the Baltic fleet was in reality a 
coastal defence force of secondary importance to the army: `It is difficult to admit the idea that 
Russia is striving for mastery over the Baltic. The attainment of this objective would not be worth 
the sanguinary struggle which it would involve, and moreover, the same result could be gained by 
Russian troops on the plains of Pomerania'. 19 As territorial defences of the Russian frontier, the 
author went further and advocated additional fortification of Cronstadt, so as to prevent the 
reduction of Russia's principal naval port by naval bombardment. When the same officer 
broached the idea of establishing a northern station in the Baltic, from which to dispatch forces to 
frustrate enemy blockading squadrons off Cronstadt, Captain Hall doubted the feasibility of such 
a suggestion. His written comments on the jacket of this report reveal the extent to which the 
Admiralty was well apprised of what the Russians could and could not do with respect to their 
navy: `Recent reports in Russian papers lead me to think it will be some time before steps are 
commenced to make a military harbour inside the Gulf of Finland'. 20 
Visits to Russian naval dockyards proved to be equally informative, for the types and qualities 
of warships building there generally reflected their programmed roles and missions in wartime. 21 
During these inspection tours, the naval attache also recorded his observations of Russian 
shipbuilding practices and activities, as well as his predictions of the combat effectiveness of 
future additions to the battlefleet. For most of the 1880s, Russian activities in these dockyards 
were limited mainly to the completion of a small number of ironclads and cruisers in various 
stages of construction, most of which were begun in the late 1870s. 22 As a result, the Russian 
battlefleet of the 1880s consisted only of two first-class ironclads, four second-class ironclads 
(late armoured cruisers) and 21 coastal-defence ironclads. 23 Most of these vessels were unsuitable 
for extended operations abroad, particularly those in the latter category, a fact that spurred 
Russian shipbuilders to emulate British and French warship designs. On his visit to inspect the 
Baltic naval dockyards and facilities in early 1887, Captain Kane observed that `the Russians pay 
great attention to English and French shipbuilding, and every detail concerning our ships is well 
known and studied here. There is a reading-room at the "New Admiralty" Dockyard, at 
which... English professional papers and magazines are more read than Russian'. 24 
18 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 18 April 1888. ADM 1/6933. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 I am indebted to Professor Andrew Lambert for this point. 
22 Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, (New York 1974), pp. 192-197; and 
Fred T. Jane, The Imperial Russian Navy (London 1983) pp. 202-251. 
23 Beeler, `British Naval Policy', p. 275. 
24 N. I. D. Report No. 118, `Russian Fleet and Dockyards (The Baltic)', January 1887. ADM 231/10. 
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It was thus not surprising to the British when the Russians began construction of five new 
first-class ironclads between 1886 and 1888, most of which were roughly comparable to British 
first-class ironclads in terms of size and speed. Three of these ironclads - Tchesma, Sinope and 
Ekaterina II - were being built at Black Sea dockyards, while the remaining two ironclads - 
Alexander 1 and Nicolas I- were laid down in the Baltic. 25 A significant development in Russian 
naval modernisation, the progress of these new vessels undoubtedly attracted the attention of the 
Admiralty back in London, but the new construction did not seem to arouse any sense of 
unwarranted anxiety. While recognised as an `important subject' by the Foreign Office, 
Admiralty records again reveal a well-informed yet muted approach to what could have been a 
contentious issue between the two countries, that being the implications stemming from the 
presence of three new Russian ironclads in the Black Sea. 26 In response to a request from the 
Foreign Office for more information about the new ironclads, Captain Hall provided a rather 
benign assessment of the new vessels, noting that their completion would by delayed until 1890 at 
the earliest. At the same time, Hall also referred to the deplorable state of the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet, noting that `such a force can hardly be capable of coping with the ironclads Turkey 
possesses though these are not modem vessels and it is doubtful all are efficient'. 27 In his 
estimate, the presence of the three ironclads would indeed alter the balance of naval power 
between Turkey and Russia in the Black Sea, but their presence was more of a Turkish concern 
than a British one. `But as there seems no disposition on the part of Turkey to acquire new 
ironclads', Hall observed, `it is evident that in 1890, Russia with three powerful ironclads will be 
relatively much stronger than at present'. 28 
In sum, there is little evidence in Admiralty records to denote a sense of anxiety over Russian 
naval developments in the 1880s. Rather, the scores of intelligence reports and other 
correspondence to and from the Admiralty during this period reveal a very different image than 
that offered by Professor Marder in The Anatomy of British Seapower. The image presented 
above describes a confident and well-informed Admiralty, complete with an intelligence function 
perceptive not only of British naval capabilities, but how they also compare with the capabilities 
of the other principal maritime powers. Russia, as one of these maritime powers, lagged far 
behind the British standard for a modern seapower. The Imperial Russian Navy was largely a 
defensive force, a fact clearly recognised by interested parties in London and manifested in the 
frequent reports filed by the British naval attache following his visits to Russian naval dockyards 
and facilities. What Russia considered to be a battlefleet, moreover, was more impressive on 
u Chesneau and Kolesnik, p. 172 and 178; and Jane, p. 223-229. 
26 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 11 June 1888. ADM 1/6934. The date of the response from Captain Hall 
was 22 June 1888. 
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paper than in action, as amply demonstrated by its mediocre performance in the 1884 naval 
manoeuvres. Between 1884 and 1888, Russia would embark on a shipbuilding programme to 
remedy its reliance on numerous but ineffective and obsolete coastal-defence monitors, but the 
future addition of five first-class ironclads was modest and simply not enough to bolster France in 
a credible challenge to British naval supremacy. For these reasons, it is quite understandable why 
the French considered any future cooperation with their incompatible Russian counterparts in the 
1890s to be of minimal benefit. It is with France in mind that we now turn to British perceptions 
of the navy that would have been the senior partner in a Franco-Russian naval combination. 
Naval Development in France 
There were a number of factors that traditionally complicated the British strategic calculus 
when contemplating the prospect of naval warfare with France, much more so those likely to be 
encountered in preparations for a one-sided contest with the Imperial Russian Navy. The first two 
can be reduced to geographical and meteorological circumstances. The obvious distances 
between the three countries aside, Russian naval operations were largely hindered by the lack of 
unfettered access to naval ports and sea lanes in the Gulf of Finland, a shoal-infested body of 
water that is ice-bound for much of the year. For this very reason, the intelligence department in 
the Admiralty never seriously considered the employment of offensive coastal operations for the 
reduction of Cronstadt, but instead planned for a blockade to be established at the entrance to the 
Gulf of Finland. 29 The proximity between Britain and France posed a much larger problem, as the 
second largest naval power possessed an extensive coastline with a number of excellent naval 
ports, which included Toulon, Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient and Rochefort. The idea of an invasion 
force crossing the English Channel from French ports certainly brought about a considerable 
feeling of anxiety from time to time among British politicians and military officers. `For the 
present the enemy is France', Lord Salisbury observed in 1887.30 In the following year, he 
cautioned that `France is, and must always remain, England's greatest danger'. 31 
The factor that mattered most in resolving this strategic dilemma, however, was the naval 
balance between the two countries, as British naval officers were confident in the knowledge that 
French naval capabilities between 1860 and 1890 were largely substandard when compared to the 
warships, personnel and administration of the Royal Navy. This was despite the occasional 
`invasion scare' which, as we will see later, was a baseless yet convincing practice used to justify 
increased naval expenditures to reluctant government ministers. In fact, France was no more a 
threat to British naval supremacy than Russia, especially in the aftermath of the Franco-German 
29 F. I. C. Report No. 64, `General Outline of Possible Naval Operations Against Russia', March 1885. 
ADM 231/6. Written by Captain Hall himself, this report will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 4. 
30 Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, Volume IV, (London 1932), p. 50. 
31 Ibid., p. 106 
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War of 1870-71. In the years following a harrowing defeat on their own soil, the French were 
more preoccupied with overland threats from Germany than the prospect of yet another challenge 
to British naval supremacy. The French navy suffered as a result, as governmental expenditures 
were diverted to other priorities, chief among them was the rehabilitation of the army. `For the 
majority of the decade', observed John Beeler, `the French navy was deprived of the funding to 
maintain its existing navy, much less renew the challenge to Britain. The immediate need to 
rebuild and remodel the French military establishment, coupled with the futility of naval 
operations during the war and the necessity of paying a huge war indemnity, made naval 
construction a low-priority item during the years immediately following the humiliation'. 32 
In the 1870s, the French navy thus consisted mainly of wooden-hulled ironclads built during 
the course of an ambitious shipbuilding programme in the early 1860s. 33 These vessels were no 
match for British warships in the same category, the latter having been designed with durable iron 
hulls, watertight compartments and thicker armour. 34 By the end of the decade, the Admiralty 
estimated that the disparity in ironclads between the two countries was nine to five in favour of 
the British, who during the course of the decade completed the construction of 13 ironclads and 
eight coastal defence vessels. 35 In contrast, French shipbuilders completed only seven such 
vessels, three of which were originally designed in 1865 or earlier. 36 While the French managed 
to begin construction of nine first-class ironclads in the latter half of the 1870s, most of these 
vessels were completed between 1886 and 1889.37 This trend in French shipbuilding would be 
greatly exacerbated in the 1880s by pervasive dockyard inefficiency, the burden of additional 
naval construction, as well as the frequent design changes made at the insistence of the Conseil 
des Travaux, an advisory board that convened back in Paris and was responsible for the approval 
and modification of warship designs. 38 
The Admiralty back in London was well aware of the problems that beset French shipbuilders, 
having been keep informed of their progress and working conditions by Captain Kane and his 
periodic visits to French dockyards. After one such visit in early 1884, Kane referred to the 
Conseil des Travaux as `the final court of appeals on questions of naval construction' that was `in 
the vein of altering many things'. 39 To underscore his point, he recounted the frustrations of a 
French naval officer, who lamented that `it is impossible to know what one of our ships will be 
like when completed, but it is very easy to see what she will not be; look at the design on which 
32 Beeler, `British Navy Policy', p. 205. 
33 Chesneau and Kolesnik, p. 282, and Ropp, p. 41. 
34 Beeler, `British Naval Policy', pp. 204-205. 
35 Ibid., p. 208, and Chesneau and Kolesnik, pp. 15-25. 
36 Chesneau and Kolesnik, pp. 283-291. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ropp, pp. 221 and 267-280. 
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they begin her construction'. 40 In this same report, Kane also provided Captain Hall and the 
intelligence department with some preliminary insight into the fractious atmosphere in the French 
Admiralty, contributed in part by the workings of the politically-motivated oversight board: 
"[T]he re-organisation of the Conseil des Travaux amounted to quite a revolution at the French 
Ministry of Marine, and was directed against M. De Bussy, who... had made himself too 
autocratic, and had forced designs on the department which were generally condemned .... 11,. 
41 In 
sum, this report and those that followed were read quite enthusiastically by the Admiralty, and 
their contents undoubtedly shaped the outlook of Admiral Sir Cooper Key, who served as First 
Naval Lord from 1880 to 1885. In a letter to Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby in December 
1884, Key exuded the level of confidence that was commonplace in the Admiralty, especially 
over the reported disparity in naval strength between Britain and France: 
We now have twenty-seven ironclads in commission. The French have eleven. We 
could commission thirteen more in a month. I cannot find that the French have more 
than two ready and one of these has her boilers condemned (Richelieu). Many of our 
ships are of obsolete types - so are many of theirs. Moreover, being of wood theirs 
cannot last long. I should have no fear whatever with France and Russia now, so far 
as our Navy is concerned [author emphasis). 42 
The situation in the French Admiralty would only get worse in the second half of the decade, 
before improving somewhat between 1887 and 1890. This can be traced not only to dockyard 
inefficiency and the workings of Conseil des Travaux, but also to the high policy naval debates 
that further divided the Ministry of Marine over competing schools of naval thought. The result 
was a incessant vacillation between naval strategies and capital ship design policies, as successive 
naval administrations selected their preference for one over the other. To complicate matters even 
further were the ascendance of Vice-Admiral Theophile Aube and his fellow disciples of the 
Jeune Ecole. These reform-minded officers maintained since the 1870s that French naval strategy 
should be based on the guerre de course, complete with a fleet of fast cruisers and torpedo boats 
to destroy enemy commerce and the vulnerable ironclad forces that protected it. 43 In January 
1886, the views of the Jeune Ecole would receive a short-lived priority over all others with the 
appointment of its principal spokesman as Minister of Marine. Never reticent to express his 
views on the subject, Admiral Aube received Captain Kane in his office on 10 February for a 
general discussion of naval strategy. In his report subsequently filed to the Admiralty, the naval 
attache recounted his meeting with the new Minister of Marine, including Aube's assertion that 
`no blockade will now prevent fast ships from putting to sea, and that it is therefore impossible for 
39 F. I. C. Report No. 35, `French Fleet and Dockyards (South Coast)', May 1884. ADM 231/4. 
40 Ibid. 
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42 Cooper Key to Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, 2 December 1884. Printed in Oscar Parkes, British Battleships, 
1860-1950, (London 1957), p. 328. 
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any nation to make herself Mistress of the Seas, in the way [the British] were after Trafalgar, 
however powerful she may be in ironclads'. 44 This and other comments made by Aube, however, 
did not have the desired effect of invoking any sense of anxiety within the Admiralty. Upon 
reading the report, Captain Hall merely noted that `Admiral Aube's views on naval policy given 
by him to Captain Kane agree with those expressed by him in French periodicals before his 
accession to office'. 45 
It was thus no surprise to the British that in the first few months of the Aube ministry, the 
construction of the ironclads in the dockyards were either delayed - as in the case of the ironclads 
of the Magenta class - or halted altogether in favour of new construction priorities. 
46 The lack of 
progress in building these ironclads, as evidenced first hand by the naval attache, eventually 
prompted a staff officer in the intelligence department to claim that `the armourciad fleet is not 
only now, but will be, when all ships of both nations building are completed, inferior to that of 
England... '. 47 The French instead exhausted their materiel and financial resources in the 
procurement of fast cruisers and torpedo boats. In the case of the former, the Aube ministry 
solicited designs for a number of cruisers of various types, the first among them a third-class 
cruiser of moderate tonnage with a speed of 19 knots and fair armament. ' Three vessels of this 
description were eventually laid down in 1886, and the dockyards laboured to complete these 
ships as quickly as possible. 49 Also laid down in 1885-86 were two large first-class cruisers - 
Tage and Cecille - that were specifically designed for commerce interdiction and destruction, for 
both vessels possessed the speed, coal capacity and armament for such missions-50 Finally, 
Admiral Aube sought funding for three more first-class cruisers, two second-class cruisers of an 
intermediate design, and six third-class cruisers, all of which were expected to be commenced in 
1887.51 All of these events, either in progress or expected, were known by the Admiralty in time 
to respond if necessary. 
The Admiralty was also well-informed of the latest developments in French construction of 
torpedo boats and their experimental deployment in the annual naval manoeuvres. By the end of 
1886, the intelligence department calculated that the French navy possessed 18 first-class and 39 
second-class torpedo boats, with 51 of the former in various stages of construction. 52 The 
"War Office to Admiralty, 15 February 1886. ADM 1/6942. 
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department also documented the sizeable budgetary request from the French Government, which 
Aube requested funding for 100 additional torpedo boats to be built over four years. 53 Over the 
protests of Aube, however, the government failed to accede to the broad outlines of the request. 54 
But his failure to obtain the funds was the least of his worries at the moment. The experimental 
deployment of the torpedo boats in the 1886 annual manoeuvres in the Mediterranean was 
inconclusive at best, a mediocre result that was known shortly thereafter by the Admiralty back in 
London. 55 In the absence of the observations from the naval attache, who for obvious reasons was 
not invited to attend the manoeuvres, the intelligence department instead secured first-hand 
accounts published in French periodicals. The subsequent report, written by Hall's assistant in the 
intelligence department, Captain Reginald Custance, referred to eyewitness accounts of French 
naval officers, who publicly expressed their doubts over the torpedo boat and its suitability for 
fleet operations. 56 
The results of the 1887 annual manoeuvres proved no better for the besieged vessel. 57 The 
performance of the torpedo boat was again left in doubt, especially when the remaining portion of 
the exercises were cancelled when Admiral Aube and the rest of the French cabinet fell from 
power in May 1887. While his tenure as Minister of Marine lasted less than 15 months, the 
aftermath of the Aube ministry revealed the extent to which the Jeune Ecole experiment was a 
complete and utter disaster for French naval policy. This point was underscored by Theodore 
Ropp, who observes that the `Jeune Ecole split the French Navy wide open, and the next fifteen 
years (1885-1890) was a period of incredible confusion.... [W]ith an increasingly complicated 
ministry, an increasing confusion in strategic ideas, and an increasing number of civilian 
ministers, it is a wonder that France had any naval policy at all. At times it is certainly difficult to 
find it'. 58 Aube's immediate successor was Edouard Barbey, who served essentially as a caretaker 
until the appointment of Admiral Jules-Francois-Emile Krantz in January 1888. 
What was inherited by Barbey and Krantz was a French navy in a state of grave disorder, 
stemming mainly from financial mismanagement, dockyard inefficiency, and the existence of 
divisive opinions over the future course of strategy and force planning. 59 Burdened from deficit 
spending and debt incurred from private borrowings, both ministers initiated measures to remedy 
the rather deplorable conditions found by the new British naval attache in his visits to French 
dockyards. In a report filed in April 1888, Captain Sir W. Cecil Domvile, who had succeeded 
53 Ropp, p. 172. 
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Kane in 1887, related his observations to the Admiralty, noting that financial considerations were 
responsible for the reduction made of workmen at the Toulon dockyard from 5,000 to 4,400 since 
his last visit. 60 Following the necessary reforms advocated by Barbey and Krantz, the efforts of 
the remaining workmen were focused on the completion of contract vessels and the repairs of 
vessels already in commission. These efforts were given a boost somewhat by the prospect of 
war with Italy in the early months of 1888. `There is no doubt that a month or so ago the French 
armourclads were in a deplorable state of unreadiness for war', wrote Domville in April, `a fact of 
which apparently no notice was taken till recent political events brought war with Italy within a 
measurable distance'. 61 
In short, it was more than evident from these intelligence reports that the Admiralty accurately 
realised that the French navy was in no condition to pose a viable threat to Britain for some time, 
despite the publication of alarmist sentiments to the contrary. Admiralty confidence in this 
respect was so high that even the First Lord, Lord George Hamilton, relished the disparity 
between the two navies, boasting in February 1888 that `many abuses and evils which we have 
eradicated here, flourish with exuberance in [French] dockyards, and the changes in policy and 
consequent waste of money in their building programme during the past two years contrast 
unfavourably with the continuity and consistency of action of the English Admiralty during the 
same period'. 62 Perhaps the best example of this perception of the French navy was ultimately 
reflected in the muted reaction by the Admiralty to alleged French naval provocations in the 
Mediterranean. In January 1888, The Standard published an account of unusual naval activity in 
Toulon, warning its readers that `[e]verything is being done to place a squadron of ironclads and 
63 all available cruisers in readiness to sail. The dockyard hands are working extra time'. 
Upon reading this newspaper account, Hall immediately requested the Foreign Office to 
ascertain further information that might shed additional insight onto the claim-64 The response 
was inconclusive. The Admiralty was furnished with three conflicting reports, one from the 
British military attache who reported that nothing unusual was occurring in Toulon. 65 This was 
contradicted by an excited Italian Charge d' Affairs, who claimed instead that the French were 
indeed mobilising a sizeable naval force in the Mediterranean; similar claims were relayed to the 
Foreign Office by the German Ambassador. 66With an accurate sense of the political aims of both 
Germany and Italy at the time, Admiral Arthur Hood discounted the latter reports and opposed 
60 N. I. D. Report No. 160, `French Fleet and Dockyards (Toulon and La Seyne)', April 1888. ADM 231/12. 
61 Ibid. 
62 The Times, 4 February 1888, p. 12. 
63 D. N. I. to Admiralty, 21 January 1888. ADM 1/6932. 
64 Admiralty to Foreign Office, 21 January 1888. ADM 1/6932. 
65 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 2 February 1888. ADM 1/6932. 
66 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 3 February 1888 and 4 February 1888. ADM 1/6932. 
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any British reaction that would be considered provocative by the French. `I think it would be 
advisable', cautioned the First Naval Lord, `unless there are really reliable grounds for believing 
the preparations at Toulon have any other motive than the usual preparations for commissioning 
vessels in the summer, not to create feelings of distrust or tension in the French Government, by 
otherwise strengthening the squadron in the Mediterranean'. 67 Lord George Hamilton concurred 
with this view, observing confidently that there was no evidence to suggest that the French navy 
could support such an enterprise with any reasonable probability of success. He again referred to 
the fact that `the French have a building programme far in excess of their financial supplies, and 
unless extraordinary credits to a large extent are voted, each successive year they will find 
themselves in greater difficulties, for they either continue finishing ironclads laid down 10 years 
back, or put off work on the fast cruisers already laid down' . 
68 
Thus, instead of exploiting the occasion as a pretence to incite a panic over French intentions 
and the state of British naval preparedness, Admiralty reactions to the situation - as expressed by 
Hamilton and Hood - were muted by a well-informed perception of French naval capabilities. 
Clearly, these are not the utterances of men filled with anxiety over a former rival. France was 
simply incapable of posing a viable threat to the Royal Navy, either in 1888 or in the foreseeable 
future. 
CIVILIAN INTERVENTION AND NAVAL POLICY FORMULATION 
It is abundantly clear from the analysis above that both the professional and civilian elements 
within the Admiralty did not perceive Russian and French naval developments in the 1880s to be 
particularly alarming, anymore so than the hints at naval modernisation from Germany and the 
United States in the 1890s. This is especially apparent in the tone of the numerous reports 
generated by the intelligence department during this period, which as a whole instilled an image 
of the Admiralty as both proactive and extremely confident of British naval capabilities, an image 
that inevitably conflicts with conventional wisdom and the conclusions reached by Professor 
Marder. Indeed, the Admiralty depicted in The Anatomy of British Seapower is a much different 
entity altogether, complete with a complacent and ineffective Admiralty Board that was slow to 
respond to the naval provocations of France and Russia, and did so only when prompted by the 
intervention of the Salisbury ministry. At first glance, this would seem to be an accurate 
depiction of the events in question. But upon further inquiry the explanatory value of the Marder 
account can now be seriously questioned, as can its favoured combination of external 
67 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 4 February 1888. ADM 1/6932. Hood surmised correctly that Germany's 
warnings about France were an attempt to push Britain closer to Germany, while Italy was hoping for a 
defensive naval alliance with England for the sole purpose of deterring French aspirations in the 
Mediterranean. For a general discussion of these events, see A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in 
Europe, 1848-1918, (London 1954), pp. 304-324. 
6' Foreign Office to Admiralty, 7 February 1888. ADM 1/6932. 
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provocations, threat perceptions and civilian intervention. Having already shown the first two 
factors to be of marginal importance to the decisions of 1889, this section will consider the last 
factor: the impact of civilian intervention into the strategic and force structure choices embodied 
in the Naval Defence Act, with a particular emphasis on the roles of Lord Salisbury and his 
civilian appointees in the formulation of British naval policy in the late 1880s. 
Salisbury and his Biographers on the Naval Defence Act 
While two biographies of Lord Salisbury have been published within the past year, little is said 
about Salisbury's role in the formulation of the Naval Defence Act. 69 Yet according to Lady 
Gwendolen Cecil in a multi-volume biography of her father, it was Salisbury who presided over 
the cabinet-level strategic review and intervened when the Admiralty Board proved reluctant to 
concede the dangers to Britain from the potential threat of a Franco-Russian naval combination. 70 
`The attitude of the Board of Admiralty on this occasion - its failure to appreciate deficiencies 
until their existence was driven home to it by Cabinet cross-examination - presents a curious 
inversion of the parts ordinarily played by Service officials and their political masters'. " In a 
letter to George J. Goschen reprinted in the biography, Salisbury alluded to his repeated 
exasperation over Admiralty administration, and ultimately credited civilian intervention as the 
underlying motivation behind the Naval Defence Act. `As to the mere question of enlarging the 
fleet', wrote Salisbury, `we were able to do some good by making a sort of raid upon [the 
Admiralty] and carrying back the Naval Defence Act as the spoils of victory. But we cannot 
govern the Admiralty from day to day by raids of this kind' . 
72 
While Salisbury ultimately claims the credit for the Act, the historical accuracy of his account 
is suspect for a number of reasons. The suggestion that Salisbury was attentive to the 
requirements of the naval service is first belied by the fact that at no time previously during his 
tenure as either prime minister or foreign secretary did Salisbury express an interest in British 
naval policy, other than that required to ensure that service expenditures were minimised for 
purposes of political expediency. He almost admitted as much in a rather acrimonious exchange 
with Viscount Wolseley in the House of Lords in May 1888, acknowledging that he could not 
remember ever having seen a plan of campaign before. 73 This is entirely plausible since 
Salisbury, like many of his immediate predecessors in office, always presumed that British naval 
69 See Footnote 5. 
70 Cecil, `Salisbury', p. 187 Marder cites the fourth volume in his own account of the Naval Defence Act, 
and even uses similar language to that employed by Cecil in her biography of her father. Marder, p. 143. 
71 Ibid., p. 188. 
72 Salisbury to Goschen, 10 February 1892. Cited in Cecil, p. 188. Goschen served in the Salisbury 
Ministry as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1886-1892. He later served in the third Salisbury ministry 
(1895-1901) as First Lord of the Admiralty. See Arthur Eliot, The Life of George Joachim Goschen, 1831- 
1907, Volume II, (London 1911), pp. 155-160 and 201-224. 
73 Hansard, P Series, 14 May 1888, Col. 105-106. ZHC 2/288. 
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supremacy would be just that, and never thought it necessary to depart from the ad hoc treatment 
of strategy and other defence policy issues before the Cabinet. 74 He especially resented the 
published opinions of naval and military officers who criticised the Government for its failure to 
attend to the more important matters of national defence. At the height of the public campaign 
waged by a number of prominent naval officers over the naval defences of the country - the 
subject of Chapter 5 in this thesis - Salisbury protested strongly `against the tones of panic which 
prevail and the language which is used, as though the Government were [sic] passing by all these 
matters in utter apathy ... ". 
'S This served only to reinforce Salisbury's rather cynical and long-held 
view of the professional element in military affairs. `I think you listen too much to the soldiers', 
Salisbury once observed to Lord Lytton in 1871. `No lesson seems to be so deeply inculcated by 
the experience of life as that you never should trust experts. If you believe the doctors, nothing is 
wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldiers nothing 
is safe. They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a very large admixture of common 
sense'. 76 
The Legacy of Gladstone: Salisbury and the Financial Dimension of Naval Policy 
In spite of their vast differences on most political subjects, Salisbury was also no different to 
his political rival Gladstone when it came to the matters of naval policy, as both statesmen were 
acutely sensitive to public reactions to increased naval expenditures. Gladstone, in fact, believed 
strongly that the formula for his own political success and that of the Liberal Party rested in their 
ability to `frame a budget large enough and palpably beneficial enough, not only to do much good 
to the country, but to sensibly lift the party in the public view & estimation'. " But to accomplish 
this required substantial reductions in naval and military expenditures. According to Gladstone: 
`If we can get from three-quarters of a million upwards towards a million off the naval & military 
estimates jointly, then as far as I can judge we have left the country no reason to complain, and 
may proceed cheerily with our work'. 78 Upon his succession into office in 1868, Gladstone 
immediately instituted a policy of financial retrenchment and installed a reform-minded political 
supporter - Hugh Childers - as First Lord of the Admiralty. Accepting the view that the Royal 
Navy should be a defensive force and not an instrument of an interventionist foreign policy, 
Childers immediately sought to reduce naval obligations abroad and wasteful expenditures in the 
dockyards, while at the same time moderating current and existing shipbuilding programmes to 
74 Edgar Feuchtwanger and William J. Philpott, `Civil-Military Relations in a Period Without Major Wars, 
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prescribed levels. 79 The result were annual service estimates that were palatable to the fiscally 
conservative Gladstone. `The first of Childers' budgets was indicative of the Liberals' naval and 
fiscal policies over the next five years', observed John Beeler in his seminal study of British naval 
policy during the Gladstone and Disraeli ministries. `During the period [1868-74], naval 
spending topped £ 10 million only twice, in one instance from the addition of £600,000 allocated 
to the navy from the vote of credit occasioned by the outbreak of the Franco-German War'. 80 
Gladstone would continue his struggle to limit naval expenditures throughout each of his four 
ministries, and when in opposition would repeatedly denounce the Disraeli and Salisbury 
ministries for their extravagant use of the Treasury. During his famous Midlothian campaign of 
1879 - which resulted in a Liberal victory at the polls and a second Gladstone ministry (1880-84) 
- Gladstone returned to a familiar theme that struck a chord within the public domain: `If all the 
millions bestowed upon giving effect to the warlike policy of the Government had, instead, of 
being so applied, been thrown down to the bottom of the sea, you would have been better off, 
with such a mode of disposing of the funds, than you are now'. 81 
The success of the rhetoric used by Gladstone in the Midlothian campaign was not lost upon 
Lord Salisbury. In his own biography of Salisbury, A. L Kennedy observed that his subject 
`appreciated at its true value the tremendous impression which Gladstone's exploitation of 
Conservative mistakes, and even of Conservative achievements, had made and was making all 
over the country. The success of the famous Midlothian campaign, indeed, had a lasting effect on 
Lord Salisbury... '. 82 Upon his own succession to the premiership in 1885 - and more permanently 
in 1886 - Salisbury no doubt realised that his own ministry would have to achieve a proper 
balance between military preparedness and the political necessity for fiscal parsimony and reform 
within the armed services. In effect, the popularity of the Gladstone message compelled Salisbury 
to emulate his political nemesis to some extent, if not with a strict adherence to the Gladstone 
policy of financial retrenchment but in a similar decision to install reform-minded appointees to 
the Admiralty. Until 1889, Salisbury was also willing to adhere to the Gladstonian approach to 
the annual naval estimates, using finance essentially as the final arbiter of naval policy. In this 
endeavour he was amply supported by his two civilian agents of naval reform at the Admiralty - 
Lord George Hamilton and Arthur Bower Forwood. 
The Agents of Naval Reform in the Admiralty 
79 Beeler, `British Naval Policy', p. 154-55. 
80 Ibid., p. 59. 
81 William Gladstone, The Midlothian Speeches, 1879, reprint, (New York 1981), pp. 130-157. Cited in 
ibid., p. 169. 
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The decision by Salisbury to appoint both Hamilton and Forwood to the Admiralty is of some 
significance when attempting to apportion credit or blame for the strategic, political and economic 
circumstances behind the Naval Defence Act. It is also indicative of the extraordinary 
countenance of Lord Salisbury and his competing desires to undertake a passive personal interest 
in naval matters while leaving it to his appointees to limit naval expenditures through increased 
efficiency in administration. `Salisbury was fundamentally uninterested in military matters', 
wrote Andrew Roberts in his recent biography of the Tory statesman, `and it took... a public, if 
hyberbolic, attack from the political Right to goad him into reforms' . 
83 
Ironically, his decision in 1885 to appoint Lord George Hamilton to the post of First Lord 
reflected more of a desire to placate a dependable political supporter in the House of Commons 
than an intention to effect the level of reform necessary to restrain naval expenditures. Salisbury 
originally had every intention of appointing Hamilton to the War Office and returning W. H. 
Smith to the Admiralty as First Lord, an experienced naval and treasury minister who had held the 
same post from 1877 to 1880.84 According to Beeler, Smith enjoyed a `high reputation as an 
administrator and, by carrying out a comprehensive reform of the Admiralty secretariat, he 
showed that he shared other qualities with [Hugh] Childers' - Gladstone's own appointee to the 
Admiralty in 1868.85 `But as a man of business', continues Beeler, `he fell squarely into the 
"economical" camp along with Childers, and both men... seem to have rated political 
considerations higher than the often alarmist pronouncements of their naval advisors'. 86 Given his 
utter contempt for service experts, Salisbury undoubtedly viewed Smith to be an ideal choice for 
what he had in mind for the Admiralty. But at the suggestion of Hamilton, Salisbury reversed his 
decision and appointed Smith to the War Office and Hamilton to the Admiralty, the latter insisting 
that he could not deal effectively with the Duke of Cambridge. 87 
With limited ministerial experience at the India Office and Education, Hamilton was a virtual 
neophyte when it came to naval matters. Despite his shortcomings of experience in naval 
administration, his entry in the Dictionary of National Biography proclaimed his tenure at the 
Admiralty an unqualified success: `Hamilton's administration was a period of extensive naval 
reform, during which the principles which were to govern organization of the fleet were 
formulated. Some great defects in departmental administration had been revealed, particularly in 
connexion (sic) with finance, repairs and shipbuilding' "88 
These achievements if true are indeed 
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worthy of such affirmation, but the process in which Hamilton laboured to place the naval service 
within the `compass of finance'S9 was in actuality more harmful than beneficial, so much so that 
his words and actions eventually invoked the consternation of Queen Victoria and even caused 
Lord Salisbury to consider replacing him. In June 1888, the Queen wrote to Salisbury at the 
height of the public debate over British naval strength and expressed her displeasure with 
Hamilton and his naval administration. She thought Hamilton to be `not near strong enough' for 
the post of First Lord, and decried his propensity to `declare all is right, which we know is not'. 90 
Her concern for the course of British naval policy prompted a muted reply from Salisbury, in 
which he confessed that the discipline in the Admiralty was unsatisfactory and reassured the 
Sovereign that Hamilton was well aware of the `great deal to be done' in order to remedy the 
defects in his administration. 91 In the aftermath of the debate and passage of the Act, Salisbury 
visited Queen Victoria at Windsor and broached the idea of replacing Hamilton with his original 
nominee Smith, who in poor health was unable to continue as Leader in the House of Commons. 92 
That Salisbury recognised early in his ministry that Hamilton was relatively inexperienced in 
naval affairs is supported by his decision to appoint Arthur Forwood as the Parliamentary and 
Financial Secretary of the Admiralty. It also impressed upon Hamilton and the naval element on 
the Admiralty Board of the political mandate for naval reform, as Forwood was not only an 
outspoken supporter of the Salisbury ministry but also a former mayor of Liverpool with 35 years 
of experience in the commercial shipping sector. `Your commercial knowledge and experience 
would be of great value', wrote Salisbury in offering the post to Forwood in August 1886.93 
Forwood promptly accepted the invitation from Salisbury, and Hamilton welcomed his expertise 
to the Admiralty, despite the fact that his appointment was made explicitly at the behest of 
Salisbury and did not come from Hamilton himself. 94 His presence at the Admiralty was 
undoubtedly viewed with suspicion by the four Naval Lords, who were especially resentful of his 
meddling into the technical aspects of naval policy. In explaining his modus operandi to 
Hamilton, Forwood admitted that `I quite appreciate that I may have departed from the course of 
my predecessors in dealing with some questions that have been before me in considerable 
detail'. The traditional role of the Parliamentary Secretary, however, did not preclude him from 95 
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expanding his responsibilities in the Admiralty. `For a business life of thirty-five years I have 
been in the practical management of ships and steamers', continued Forwood in November 1886, 
`and with the knowledge thus acquired I cannot refrain from commenting on the papers that come 
before me. It may be that having this knowledge was a reason for placing me in my present 
position'. 96 
Forwood amply returned the contempt of his naval colleagues with an equally critical view of 
the naval element of the Admiralty Board. He reserved his harshest criticism for their attitudes 
toward the annual naval estimates, the overall form and content of which was a responsibility 
shared by him and the First Lord. Forwood simply viewed the civil-military differences over the 
estimates as a contest of competing motivations. As for his naval colleagues, Forwood privately 
held that `[t]hey have at hand the old traditional policy that the Service exists for the Service, and 
support the naval as against the civil control which so excites service feeling when called into 
action. The question of civil control of expenditure is more or less at stake'. 97 Lacking the 
subtlety and refinement for a minister in his position98, his contempt for the Naval Lords 
eventually became a public spectacle, with statements to the press outlining his repeated 
frustration with them over such issues as the naval estimates, dockyard administration, and future 
shipbuilding requirements. " His antagonism of the Naval Lords - both in public and private - was 
so scathing in fact that it inevitably resulted in the second resignation from the Admiralty Board 
in less than three months, the first occurring in January 1888 when Captain Lord Charles 
Beresford resigned his position as Junior Naval Lord in protest over Hamilton's decision to 
reduce the funding and relative importance of the intelligence department. This time it was Vice- 
Admiral Graham who, as the Third Naval Lord and Controller of the Navy, chose to resign in 
April 1888 rather than continue to be subjected to the constant interference and criticism of the 
outspoken Parliamentary Secretary. For his part, Hamilton did what he could to restrain Forwood 
and preserve the appearance of harmony on the Admiralty Board, to the point where the latter felt 
that the First Lord was not providing his junior minister with the backing necessary to offset the 
demands of the Naval Lords. 100 
If Forwood worried that Lord George Hamilton would capitulate to the demands of his naval 
colleagues, it was a needless sentiment. When it came to the formulation of naval policy in the 
Admiralty, the First Lord was supreme and as such exercised complete control over the nature and 
conduct of business performed by the Admiralty Board. The responsibilities of each member of 
the Board were assigned by the First Lord, and subject to review and amendment when deemed 
96Ibid. 
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necessary. The Board itself convened on a weekly basis, with the agenda of each meeting having 
been approved and distributed to Board members beforehand. Any member wishing to forward 
an issue for discussion at the meeting had to receive the necessary sanction by Hamilton before it 
was raised before the Board as a whole. '°' This arrangement was later confirmed by Admiral 
Hood, the First Naval Lord who once conceded to a House select committee that `[c]onsultation 
takes place at the Board on any point which the First Lord thinks it is right and advisable that the 
Board should consider and adjudicate upon'. 102 Since no votes were taken at these meetings, the 
role of the naval element of the Admiralty Board was hence limited to the provision of technical 
advice and additional consultation when requested by the First Lord. 103 The only viable recourse 
to a dissenting Board member was to offer his opinion in a minute to be included in the official 
record. His opposition then muted, the Board had no choice but accept and abide by the decisions 
of the First Lord. Alternatively, he could resign, in which case he would then forfeit his generous 
salary of at least £1,200 per annum as well as the house and other privileges afforded to a Board 
member. 104 
While Hamilton exercised the power afforded to his position sparingly and with considerable 
discretion, he was more than willing to allow the independently wealthy Beresford and Graham 
resign in protest rather than undermine Forwood and their collective efforts to place the Admiralty 
within the `compass of finance'"105 In this endeavour the two civilian agents of naval reform were 
strongly supported by Lord Salisbury who, along with the First Lord and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, were ultimately responsible for determining just how much the Admiralty could 
expect to receive in appropriations from the Treasury. It was then left to the devices of the First 
Lord and the Admiralty Board to identify the needs of the service and frame a budget according to 
the financial parameters established previously in consultation with Lord Salisbury. Salisbury, in 
fact, would later relate his account of the procedure in place to determine the level of naval 
appropriations before the precedent established by the Naval Defence Act, including his role as 
the final arbiter of naval policy: `Questions of Estimate which are not settled by personal 
conference between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the War Office or Admiralty, as the case 
may be, are usually arranged in concert with the Prime Minister' . 
106 His participation in the 
budgetary process, moreover, was seen as instrumental to brokering a reasonable compromise 
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between economy and service efficiency, particularly since `[t]he Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
little familiar with the defensive services, is rightly the spokesman of economy. The heads of the 
War Office and Admiralty, unacquainted with the precise position of the Exchequer, are the 
natural and proper advocates of efficiency'. 107 Given his role as arbiter in the budgetary process, 
it is thus not surprising that Lord Salisbury would ultimately take issue with the pointed criticism 
of Hamilton and Forwood in 1888 over the inadequacies of annual estimates and what the 
proposed budget actually meant to the traditional wartime roles and missions of the service. 
Salisbury's Role in the Formulation of the Naval Defence Act 
In the first six months of 1888, the Salisbury ministry was engaged in a rather extraordinary 
public debate between naval officers and cabinet officials over the strategic and policy 
implications of the naval estimates. As will be discussed further in Chapter 5, this was a most 
critical period for the supporters of naval modernisation, as their collective efforts in the public 
domain eventually compelled Lord Salisbury to react with a cabinet-level strategic review that 
essentially framed the strategic and force structure choices embodied in the Act. For purposes of 
this discussion, it is important here to underscore the public indifference of Salisbury toward the 
policy questions brought up in the course of the public debate, preferring instead to allow the 
principal spokesmen of his naval policy - Hamilton and Forwood - to respond in kind to the 
numerous speeches and editorials written by the `service experts' that he despised so much. 
His first definitive public statement on the subject was made on 10 May, when he felt finally 
responded to the serious charges levelled by the critics of his naval administration. In making this 
statement, Salisbury appeared to be motivated more by a desire to rebuke the service experts than 
to reassure the public at large that the naval defences of the country were exactly what they should 
be. He angrily protested that his silence was not due to negligence or absence of concern, but 
rather from his insistence that discussions of defence policy should held in private and not in a 
public forum. Salisbury then proceeded to defend the policies of his ministry, stating that `there is 
no ground whatever for the implied reproach of parsimony and that we are neglecting the 
defences of the country'. 108 When it came to the subject of naval preparedness, Salisbury referred 
to the upward trend in naval construction, and even commented that the terms `strength' and 
`weakness' were relative and thus inappropriate to describe British naval capabilities. But 
Salisbury ultimately returned to the overall theme of his message. `[B]efore I sit down I feel that 
I cannot avoid to enter a protest against another practice. That is, the practice of those who are, or 
ought to be, distinguished authorities upon military affairs making statements against the 
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Government under whom they serve, and making them in a place where they cannot be 
answered'. 109 
In stressing his conviction that these policy questions should be addressed in a private forum 
by the Cabinet, Salisbury committed himself to conducting an ad hoc strategic review of the 
armed forces. In approving the cabinet-level initiative the very next month, Salisbury essentially 
conceded that he was reacting to what others thought was a necessary investigation to determine 
the military and naval requirements of the country. Selected to participate in the review were 
Hamilton and his counterpart in the War Office. l'° The scope of the review, however, was 
curiously limited to the traditional invasion threat posed by France. 'The one subject with which I 
propose to deal with is the alleged inability of our military organization to protect us from the 
invasion of London', Salisbury wrote in a memorandum to the participants on 6 June. ", 'I 
presume the examination may be confined to the danger of the occupation of London by France, 
for an attempt by any other Power to conduct such an operation does not seem to be within the 
widest limits of probability'. 112 Salisbury, moreover, seemed more interested in the plans of the 
War Office to repel a French invasion than with Admiralty plans to prevent the invasion force 
from crossing the Channel in the first place. 
The Admiralty initially contributed very little to the strategic review, that is until Salisbury 
agreed to allow the Naval Lords to submit a proposal for a shipbuilding programme on the basis 
of two hypothetical planning scenarios. In a subsequent memorandum, Hamilton confirmed the 
departure from the traditional budget-driven approach to force planning: `The Cabinet in July 
determined that Admiral Sir Arthur Hood should be requested to state the amount of force which 
he would require under certain eventualities. The questions... were drawn up after personal 
consultation with the Prime Minister' . 
113 Admiral Hood, in fact, offered to submit the proposed 
shipbuilding programme within a half-an-hour of being told what scenarios to consider. "4 He 
was able to make such a bold offer because the strategic framework for the shipbuilding 
programme had already been prepared in May 1888 by Captain Hall and the intelligence 
department. The opportunity merely presented itself to submit the ambitious proposal, which no 
doubt would have been rejected summarily had public attitudes toward increased naval 
expenditure not changed to render it politically acceptable to the Salisbury ministry. 
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THE ALTERNATIVE TO MARDER: 
CULTURE, HISTORY AND STRATEGY IN THE ROYAL NAVY 
As to who should be ultimately credited for the Naval Defence Act, the events outlined above 
simply do not support the version offered by Lord Salisbury and intimated in the Marder account 
of the circumstances that led to the formulation and passage of the unprecedented shipbuilding 
programme. Contrary to the Cecil biography and even his own recollections of the events of 
1888, Salisbury was clearly not the saviour of the naval defences of the country, nor was he 
remotely interested in naval affairs other than what was required of him during the annual 
budgetary process. Instead, it was Salisbury who reacted indignantly to the public campaign 
organised by naval officers following the Beresford resignation in January 1888. 
With the campaign victorious in the battle for public opinion, the prime minister quickly 
consented to a cabinet-level strategic review which at first focused mostly on the army and little 
on the navy. Discussion ultimately turned to the issue of naval preparedness, upon which 
Salisbury acted upon to embrace the demand for naval modernisation. The Admiralty Board 
responded to this shift in his priorities quite enthusiastically, having submitted within hours a 
proposal for an ambitious shipbuilding programme that was based on hypothetical planning 
scenarios already considered by the Naval Intelligence Department. The Board was well aware 
for some time of the naval capabilities of its potential adversaries relative to that of the Royal 
Navy; what it lacked was a healthy appreciation of the implications posed by the absence of a 
clearly articulated strategic doctrine and how that void compromised the future capabilities of the 
service to perform its traditional roles and missions. But this was a strategic dilemma that 
Salisbury and his agents of naval reform had very little interest in resolving until faced essentially 
with a fait accompli by the Admiralty Board in July 1888. From that point forward, Admiralty 
force planning would be determined more by naval professional arguments than the economic 
constraints imposed for purposes of political parsimony. 
Then who or what should ultimately be credited for the Naval Defence Act? As shown above, 
the answer to this question lies not in the Marder account and the combination of external 
provocations, threat perceptions and civilian intervention. The evidence suggests instead that the 
underlying motivation for the Act originated not from external factors but from the strategic ideas 
shared by naval officers, whose role in strategic and force planning had been overshadowed by 
the political agendas of the Gladstone and Salisbury ministries in the 1880s. Fearing that these 
ideas were being muddled by administrative complacency, technological determinism and a 
general failure to enunciate a coherent strategic doctrine from which to contemplate future 
shipbuilding requirements, a series of respected naval officers attempted in the late 1870s and 
1880s to promote a new brand of strategic thinking and essentially rescue the Admiralty Board 
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from itself. The first opportunity to do so occurred in late 1882, when the Board authorised the 
creation of the Foreign Intelligence Committee, supervised by a talented officer who would later 
transform the ad hoc committee into a full-fledged department. By the time Captain W. H. Hall 
departed from the Admiralty in January 1889, the first D. N. I. had established an intellectual 
tradition that would be sustained by other strategic thinkers appointed to the position, including 
among them Cyprian Bridge, Lewis Beaumont, Reginald Custance, Prince Louis of Battenberg, 
Charles Ottley, Edmund Slade and even his own son, Reginald `Blinker' Hall. 
The second important event of this kind occurred in 1886, when Captain Lord Charles 
Beresford was nominated by the Prince of Wales to serve as Junior Naval Lord on the Admiralty 
Board. "5 Beresford was a reform-minded officer who also grasped the necessity for both the 
civilian and naval elements within the Admiralty to embrace the demands for increased strategic 
awareness in upper level policy debates. He quickly sought to expand and formalise the 
intelligence function from an ad hoc committee to a full-fledged department, and resigned in 
protest when he viewed salary cutbacks in the newly created department as a reduction of the 
overall value of the tasks performed by Hall and his small staff of officers. 116 Fearing that the 
Admiralty would return to business as usual, Beresford enlisted the patronage of other prominent 
naval officers - Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Homby and Rear-Admiral Philip Colomb in 
particular - so that together they could organise an extraordinary campaign to pressure the 
Salisbury ministry to reform the process in which naval policy was formulated in the Admiralty. 
What they achieved during the course of this six-month campaign was a firm repudiation of the 
naval policies favoured by the Salisbury ministry. Eventually, even the editor of The Times, 
George E. Buckle, who had originally sided with ministry only months before on this issue, was 
persuaded by professional opinion. An admirer of Salisbury and his policies"', Buckle warned 
the government in May 1888 of the public support emerging in favour of naval modernisation, 
inspired by the months of speeches, editorials and papers written by Beresford and others: `[T]he 
country will not now be satisfied until the Government is able to assure it that, whatever plan of 
defence may be ultimately adopted, the Navy is strong enough to carry it into effect' . 
"8 The 
desired effect of these sentiments was achieved in July 1888, with the proposed shipbuilding 
programme that later became authorised by the Naval Defence Act. 
The Inspiration of Strategic Ideas: Culture, History and Strategy 
While these two events will be discussed at greater length in the next two chapters, the rest of 
this section will consider the origin and substance of the strategic ideas shared among British 
1 15 Roberts, p. 558. 
116 Allen, pp. 71-74. 
117 Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, (Chapel Hill 1981), p. 296. 
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naval officers, as well as their intellectual revival in the 1880s. As would be expected when 
linking organisational culture to military decisionmaking, these ideas were largely expressions of 
strategic predispositions firmly rooted in the wartime experiences of their predecessors - the naval 
element to what has been described as the `British way in warfare'. ' 19 British naval officers were 
taught from the earliest stages of their careers that naval predominance was the only means to 
ensure the copious flow of commerce while protecting the home islands from invasion. From the 
words and actions of their predecessors they further viewed the exploitation of British naval 
supremacy as the logical outgrowth of a forward offensive naval strategy, itself founded on a 
commonly held belief within the service that the territorial boundaries of the British Empire 
extended beyond the demarcations of maps or charts. `The frontier of the our Empire is the 
enemy's coastline', Colomb remarked in May 1888. `At the beginning of this century, there was 
a certain defined way of looking at the situation of these islands surrounded by water, at the water 
surrounding them, and at the possible enemies' coasts which bounded the water. Our islands 
were strictly regarded as the capital of an empire, surrounded by a water territory, the frontier of 
which was the enemy's coast'. '20 
The underlying essence of this linkage between culture, history and strategy in the Royal Navy 
during the nineteenth century is ultimately captured by the fact that, between 1650 and 1815, 
British naval officers gradually developed a highly effective strategic doctrine but never once felt 
it necessary to promulgate it in service manuals or sweeping doctrinal pronouncements. Instead, 
the senior officers corps of the service themselves inculcated the next generation of British naval 
officers, and ensured that their successors were intellectually prepared to fulfil the traditional roles 
and missions of the Royal Navy. This point is underscored by the research of Andrew Lambert, 
who has pointed out that `[t]he Royal Navy did not create doctrine in the nineteenth century, in 
contrast to the French, Russian, American and German navies, because it was neither rebuilding 
after defeat nor creating a new service. It relied on its corporate memory, its history for guidance. 
The transmission of this knowledge was a major part of the intellectual development of career sea 
officers' . 
121 The currency of British strategic doctrine in the nineteenth century, and later in the 
twentieth century as well, was thus founded in the shared interpretations of historical precedent. 
Looking to the past reminded naval officers of the strategic benefits of the close blockade and 
other traditional applications of British naval policy. From 1815 through to about the mid-1850s, 
118 The Times, 25 May 1888, p. 9. 
119 For more on the naval component of the British way in warfare, see David French, The British Way in 
Warfare 1688-2000, (London 1990). 
120 Cited in [John Knox Laughton], `Naval Supremacy and Naval Tactics', Edinburgh Review, (January 
1890), p. 148. 
121 Andrew D. Lambert, `The Royal Navy, 1856-1914: Deterrence and the Strategy of World Power', in 
Elizabeth J. Errington and Keith Neilson, (eds), Navies and Global Defense: Theories and Strategy, 
(Westport 1996), p. 81. 
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the principal expression of British naval strategy in peacetime remained the impressive power 
projection capabilities of a heavily-armed wooden battlefleet under sail, consisting of two and 
three-decked warships that were capable of conducting offensive missions such as the blockade 
and coastal bombardment. 
Perhaps the best reflection of the strategic traditions of the Royal Navy occurred in the period 
between 1840 and 1860, while the Admiralty was dealing with the potential of steam propulsion 
and the implications to both naval strategy in general and the future determinants of capital ship 
design policy. In what became known as the `Cherbourg Strategy', the Admiralty planned for 
renewed naval operations to thwart a French invasion of the home islands following the 
completion of a well-fortified naval base and dockyard at Cherbourg, on the northwest coast of 
France. 122 The primary objective of this strategy was to ensure British naval supremacy in the 
Channel through the blockade and eventual destruction of the new naval base and dockyard. To 
accomplish the latter task, Admiralty planners exploited the lessons learned during the last naval 
campaign against France. `The logic of war at sea after 1805 suggested that the Royal Navy 
would face its most difficult tasks ashore, or even inside the arsenals of its rivals', continued 
Lambert. 123 `In consequence of a new strand of naval thought, pioneered during the Napoleonic 
conflict, employed technology to enhance the capability of warships to act against the shore, both 
for amphibious power projection and for the direct assault of fortified harbours'. 124 The strand 
that Lambert refers to here is an important corollary to the forward offensive naval strategy that 
prevailed within the Royal Navy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While 
blockading operations would ensure command of the sea for Britain, the employment of offensive 
coastal operations would ensure the destruction of the enemy battlefleet once command of the sea 
was no longer in doubt. This combination proved especially useful when the enemy was 
predisposed to safeguard its `fleet-in-being' rather than risk the loss of its naval assets at sea in a 
contest with the Royal Navy. 
After the technological uncertainties of the 1860s and 1870s, the Royal Navy gradually began 
to regain its traditional strategic footing, due mainly to the widespread introduction of water-tube 
boilers and triple-expansion engines in British capital ship designs. With faster and more efficient 
steam engines, the application of the close blockade was again feasible to thwart the egress of 
commerce-raiders from enemy ports. Meanwhile, offensive coastal operations continued to 
remain an essential mission of the service, as evidenced by the Egyptian campaign and the 
bombardment of Alexandria in 1882. It became abundantly clear at the outset of the decade, 
122 For more on British reactions to the naval base at Cherbourg, see Andrew D. Lambert, The Last Sailing 
Battlefleet: Maintaining Naval Mastery 1815-1850, (London 1991), p. 11. 
123 Lambert, `The Royal Navy, 1856-1914', p. 78. 
124 Ibid. 
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however, that the Admiralty had yet to emerge from the 1860s and 1870s with a clear sense of the 
roles and missions it was expected to perform, compounded further by the bewilderment over the 
optimal mixture of forces required to accomplish them. This point was again underscored by 
Beeler: `The British navy was expected (and did) perform a multitude of operations worldwide. 
This salient fact largely explains why the formulation of a coherent strategy, and, much more, the 
construction of a fleet with which to implement it, were so problematic during the mid-Victorian 
era'. '25 What was required in the Admiralty were civilian ministers and naval officers who shared 
an avid interest in strategic issues and could work together to devise a force structure that best 
reflected the roles and missions of the service in wartime. That these men were largely absent 
from the Admiralty in the 1880s was a function of individual personalities and the appointment of 
senior naval officers who were generally amenable to the political mandate of the First Lord. 
It soon became evident that if the Admiralty was ever to embrace the demand for heightened 
strategic awareness, the impetus for such an overture would have to originate from within the 
senior officer corps, particularly from officers with the intellectual foundation and strategic vision 
to articulate the future requirements of the service. The officers who qualified for this distinction 
were undoubtedly encouraged by the writings and teachings of Sir John Knox Laughton, the 
influential naval educator and historian who advocated from the 1870s that history was the 
servant of strategic naval thought and as such was the basis for the development of modern 
tactics, service doctrine and national strategy. 126 What appealed to these naval officers was 
Laughton's revival of the strategic ideas that had been obfuscated by the economic and 
technological determinism that defined British naval policy in the 1860s and 1870s. Laughton, a 
naval instructor who served in the Baltic campaigns of 1854 and 1855, first gained widespread 
notoriety in the service as a distinguished lecturer in naval history at the Royal Naval College, 
Greenwich. The audience that he wished to influence most during the course of these annual 
lecture courses were the junior officers in attendance at the college, among them future flag 
officers and framers of naval policy. 
But his initiative and enthusiasm for the subject gradually expanded the audience to include 
most of the senior officer corps of the service. His most important convert was Admiral Sir 
Astley Cooper-Key, the first President of the College at Greenwich and First Naval Lord from 
1879 to 1885.127 Cooper-Key encouraged Laughton to continue his academic pursuits and 
'u Ibid., p. 234. 
126 For the definitive historical treatment of Sir John Knox Laughton and the formal study of naval history, 
see Andrew Lambert, The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the 
Historical Profession, (London 1998); and idem., `History, Strategy and Doctrine: Sir John Knox Laughton 
and the Education of the Royal Navy', in William B. Cogar, (ed), New Interpretations in Naval History: 
Selected Papers from the Twelfth Naval History Symposium, (Annapolis 1996), pp. 173-187. 
127 Lambert, `Foundations', pp. 34,46-49 and 74. 
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introduce them to the mainstream of strategic naval thought. In his presence in 1874, Laughton 
read a seminal paper at the Royal United Services Institute (RUST) on `The Scientific Study of 
Naval History'. 128 In this paper he argued that naval history, if properly studied with accurate and 
exact knowledge, can yield insightful lessons that are just as relevant in the ironclad era as they 
once were in the age of sail. `I have argued against the idea that the study of naval history is 
useless - is a waste of time; I have argued that, on the contrary, it is a study of vital importance, 
and that the lessons it conveys are of very direct and practical meaning'. 129 In the following year, 
Laughton reminded his listeners and readers that the study of naval history extended beyond mere 
tactical considerations. `A great deal has been said at different times about the study of tactics, 
but the scientific study of history is the study of tactics; it is a great deal more; it is the study of 
strategy, of organisation, and of discipline, and it is the only sound basis of that study'. 130 
Remaining at his teaching post at the Royal Naval College until 1885, Laughton received 
preferential access to the Admiralty archives and continued to promote a mode of strategic 
thinking that applied naval history to the solving of strategic problems in modern naval warfare. 
In this endeavour he received considerable support from the intellectual elite of the senior officer 
corps, chief among them Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Homby and Rear-Admiral Philip Colomb. 
Hornby for one was an ardent supporter of Laughton, so much so that the naval historian 
honoured Homby by dedicating his Letters and Despatches of Horatio, Viscount Nelson (1886) to 
him. Colomb also came to share Laughton's enthusiasm for naval history, and was later 
appointed to succeed him as lecturer in naval history at the Naval War College in 1887.13' Beside 
these two prominent naval officers, both of whom would later play critical roles in the public 
campaign for heightened strategic awareness in 1888, Laughton also interacted extensively with a 
number of current and future strategic thinkers in the newly formed intelligence department in the 
Admiralty. During the critical years of 1888 and 1889, for example, Laughton came into frequent 
contact with Captains Reginald N. Custance and S. M. Eardley-Wilmot, both of whom were active 
members of RUSI and had served on the executive council of the semi-official think tank with 
Laughton. 132 He was also well acquainted with the D. N. I., having previously served with Captain 
Hall for three years while onboard the Gunnery Training Ship H. M. S. Excellent. 133 In later years, 
the appointment of Captains Cyprian A. G. Bridge - Laughton's oldest friend and intellectual 
companion - and Prince Louis of Battenberg to the intelligence department brought Laughton 
128 J. K. Laughton, `The Scientific Study of Naval History', RUSI Journal (1874). 
129 Ibid., p. 525. 
130 JK Laughton, `Scientific Instruction in the Royal Navy', RUSI Journal (1875), p. 233-34. 
131 Lambert, `Foundations', p. 106. 
132 Custance and Eardley-Wilmot served on the council between 1888-1890. During this period, Laughton 
was listed as a corresponding member of the council. During these years, the members of the council were 
each listed on the first page of each volume of the RUST Journal. 
133 The relationship between Laughton and Hall will be considered further in Chapters 4 and 8. 
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even closer to strategic ruminations within the Admiralty. Thus, while Laughton never overtly 
sought to influence the framing of British naval policy during the 1880s, his imprint on the 
strategic thinking that inspired the Naval Defence Act is unmistakable and hence subject to 
reassessment. 
CONCLUSION 
By retracing the steps of Professor Marder in his historical treatment of the Naval Defence Act, 
this chapter has at great length documented the failed characterisations of British naval policy 
formulation in the 1880s and the `policy-and-operations' perspective used to support them. This 
was accomplished mainly by focusing upon each of three external factors upon which the Marder 
account was based, with the expectation that a new image of the Admiralty and how it conducted 
its business in the 1880s would emerge in their place. In the process, it was revealed that the 
Admiralty of the 1880s was not overly concerned with the naval developments of France and 
Russia, as regular intelligence updates bolstered Admiralty confidence in the favourable 
disparities in their respective naval capabilities. Neither was civilian intervention a significant 
factor in the events that led to the formulation of the Naval Defence Act. Contrary to the 
recollections of Salisbury and even the assertions of his biographers, credit for the shipbuilding 
programme ultimately belongs to naval professionals, whose actions in support of their strategic 
ideas ensured that policy deliberations would hence forward be conducted with a heightened 
degree of strategic awareness. 
If, however, the Royal Navy is treated as a complex organisation, as consistent with the 
organisational perspective to naval policy formulation, the Naval Defence Act stands out as 
example of how key policy decisions made in peacetime often reflect the shaping influence of 
internal factors such as the ideas and actions of naval officers. In the absence of threats from 
abroad and civilian pressures at home, the impetus for British naval modernisation came from the 
pervasive influence of strategic ideas, which in the 1870s and 1880s were translated from theory 
into practice by the manner in which they were inspired, institutionalised and finally implemented 
in the policymaking process. While the last section of this chapter has touched briefly on each of 
these three phases, it has dealt mainly with the inspiration of strategic ideas, with a particular 
emphasis upon their resurgence in the 1870s due to the writings and teachings of John Knox 
Laughton. The next two chapters will show how these ideas coalesced into a new brand of 
strategic thinking within the realm of Admiralty policy, as exemplified first in Chapter 4 by the 
formation and agenda of the intelligence function between 1882 and 1889. Also highlighted in 
this chapter is the extent to which bureaucratic pressures threatened the existence of the 
department, in the wake of an innovative force planning model developed by the D. N. I. in late 
1887 and which was immediately suppressed in favour a budget-driven approach advocated by 
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the Salisbury ministry. Chapter 5 will then focus on the aftermath of the move against the 
intelligence department and, in particular, the struggle between politicians and professionals for 
primacy over naval policy formulation, spurred in part by an extraordinary effort undertaken by 
senior naval officers to implement their strategic ideas in the policy deliberations that led to the 
Naval Defence Act. 
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Chapter 4 
From Theory into Practice: 
Ideas, Institutions and the Intelligence Function 
in the Admiralty, 1882-1889 
-70- 
INTRODUCTION 
The creation of an intelligence function in the Admiralty was the first significant step toward 
institutionalising the strategic ideas revived in the 1870s by John Knox Laughton and the 
formalised study of naval history. ' A critical improvement in how the Admiralty conducted its 
business in the 1880s, the occasion also marked the origins of a future struggle between 
politicians and professionals over a controversial budget-driven approach to naval policy 
formulation. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the formation and agenda of the 
intelligence function between 1882 and 1889, with a particular emphasis upon a new brand of 
strategic thinking that appeared in Admiralty planning documents and which reflected the 
evolving use of British naval history in the solving of strategic and tactical problems associated 
with modern naval warfare. Also of interest here is the expansion of the intelligence function 
from an ad hoc committee to a full-fledged department, which occurred at the urging of naval 
officers who were convinced that Admiralty preparations for war would be incomplete in the 
absence of intelligence collection and strategic planning. Among them was the first Director of 
Naval Intelligence, Captain W. H. Hall, who quickly secured a broad mandate for the new 
department so that he could instil a heightened degree of strategic awareness in the most essential 
aspects of British naval administration. In the process, Hall incited considerable bureaucratic 
opposition from his primary consumer - the Admiralty Board - whose most senior members 
reacted negatively to the initiatives undertaken by the department, most notably the submission of 
an innovative force planning model in December 1887. A review of these events is of particular 
importance to this study, as it will show how the ideas and actions of naval officers were 
responsible for transforming a minor controversy over the intelligence department into a public 
debate that led to the strategic and force structure choices embodied in the Naval Defence Act. 
THE ORIGINS AND WORK OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE 
In the present age, it would be quite unusual for a military service not to possess a specialised 
department responsible for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information that, in 
theory, would inform relevant staff of potential threats and their implications to the present course 
of strategy development and force planning. The security environment, however, was much 
different for the Royal Navy in the midst of a century of peace following the defeat of Napoleon 
in 1814. Simply put, the Admiralty saw little need for the creation of such a department when it 
was the recipient of incremental intelligence of foreign naval developments from either the 
Foreign or War Offices, and in many cases from its own Department of Hydrography, which 
systemically collected pertinent information while conducting navigational surveys abroad. 
1A version of this chapter has recently been published by the author. See Robert E. Mullins, `New Ways of 
Thinking: The Intelligence Function and Strategic Calculations in the Admiralty, 1882-1889', Intelligence 
and National Security, (Autumn 2000), pp. 77-97. 
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The first major effort to enlarge the Admiralty to include an intelligence function originated in 
the 1870s, when Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Homby took particular exception to the absence of 
a professional staff that in his view would be instrumental in assisting the Naval Lords in the 
matters of strategy, wartime mobilisation and force planning. 2 The son of Admiral Sir Phipps 
Homby, who served with Lord Nelson onboard H. M. S. Victory in 1804, Hornby at the time was 
emerging as the most respected member of the senior officer corps. Aware of his status and 
considerable influence within the service, Hornby attempted on a number of occasions to compel 
the First Lord to agree to the formation of a naval staff. When invited to join the Admiralty Board 
in 1874, and again 1876, Hornby conditioned his acceptance with the stipulation that the First 
Lord would accede to his proposal for an enlarged professional element within the Admiralty. 
When Ward Hunt declined to accept his terms in 1874, Hornby refused the post, although he 
would later accept the position of Second Naval Lord at the urging of friends. 3 His conformity to 
the status quo within the Admiralty was short-lived when, upon the retirement of Admiral 
Alexander Milne in 1876, Hornby refused the post of First Naval Lord under similar 
circumstances. This time, however, Hornby solicited the support of the two officers he knew 
were most likely to be offered the post in his place - Admirals Frederick Beauchamp Seymour and 
Astley Cooper Key. 4 He suggested that the three band together in an attempt to compel Hunt to 
reconsider his proposal for a naval staff: "[I]f we agree that certain reforms are necessary for the 
efficiency of the service, and refuse to accept the position of First Sea Lord unless they are carried 
out, we must carry our point'. 5 Hornby's efforts in this regard were again unsuccessful, as Hunt 
simply selected the less able Admiral Sir Hastings Yelverton to become First Naval Lord. When 
the opportunity arose for another attempt for a united front in 1879, Hornby failed to convince the 
less wealthy and recently re-married Cooper Key, who accepted the post when offered and served 
in that capacity until 1885. 
With Cooper Key now in the Admiralty, Homby in 1881 was appointed President of the Royal 
Naval College at Greenwich following the brief stewardship of Admiral Sir Edward Fanshawe. 6 
In the meantime, another prominent member of the British defence establishment voiced his 
support for the formation of a intelligence function within the Admiralty. Captain John Colomb, 
R. M. A., M. P., the retired Royal Marine Officer and brother of Rear-Admiral Philip Colomb, 
echoed the importance of an intelligence function in naval matters in a lecture delivered at the 
2 Hornby to Cooper, 12 October 1876. PHI/120 (a). Cited in N. A. M. Rodger, `The Dark Ages of the 
Admiralty, Part II: Change and Decay, (1874-80)', Mariner's Mirror, (April 1976), p. 38. See also Mary 
August Egerton, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, G. C. B.: A Biography, (Edinburgh 1896), 
195. 
4 
Rodger, p. 35 and Egerton, pp. 183-84 and 198. 
4 Rodger, p. 38. 
5 See Footnote 1 and P. H. Colomb, Memoirs of Sir Astley Cooper Key, (London 1898), pp. 412-414. 
-72- 
Royal United Services Institution in 1881.7 In his support for an `organized and far-reaching 
system of naval intelligence', Captain Colomb outlined the classes of information that were 
crucial to the protection of commerce and the blockade of enemy ports in times of war. 
According to him, the most important classes of information include `the naval policies and 
arrangements of foreign nations as indicated by the war-vessels they build or buy, the material 
resources, active or dormant, of maritime nations, both as regards construction, refitment, and 
maintenance' "8 Colomb also earmarked as vital information `the principles and details of 
construction, armament, machinery, appliance, and efficiencies or deficiencies of their warships; 
all matters relating to the personnel, but active and reserve, of their war navies'. 9 Colomb, 
however, did not explicitly advocate the expansive scope of this proposed department to include 
operational planning and other activities in preparation for war. 
In March 1882, the argument in favour of a naval intelligence department was bolstered by the 
findings of the Carnarvon Commission on Colonial Defence. Along with Colomb, the 
conclusions reached by the commission revived the proposal for a complement of staff officers in 
the Admiralty. In December of that year, Admiral Sir George Tryon - recently appointed as 
Secretary of the Admiralty and a close confidant of Admiral Hornby - established the Foreign 
Intelligence Committee, an ad hoc standing group tasked with the collection, analysis and 
dissemination of the sort of information specified by Colomb in the previous year. 1° The work of 
the committee was performed under the auspices of the Military, Secret, and Political Branch, 
which in turn was administered directly by the Secretary of the Admiralty. " The hierarchical 
placement of the committee was highly significant, for the locus of power at the time remained 
within the office of the Secretary and the dominions to which he provided oversight and direction. 
The currency of this power flowed generously from the nature of the office itself and the 
unparalleled access to information afforded to it. The Secretariat in essence was a `clearing 
house' for all correspondence received by the Admiralty, and it was here where decisions were 
made as to the channelling of various reports and letters before reaching the highest levels of the 
organisation. Major General Sir George Aston, R. M., once referred to the Secretariat as `the 
greatest power in the Admiralty for good or for evil' during his tenure as a young staff officer on 
6 Egerton, pp. 331-337. 
7 For more on the Colomb brothers and their impact on British naval policy, see Donald Schurman, The 
Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914, (London 1965). 
8 Captain J. C. R. Colomb `Naval Intelligence and Protection of Commerce in War', RUSI Journal (1881) p. 
555 and 557. 
9 Ibid., p. 557. 
10 For more on this point, see Thomas G. Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, 1870-1914: The 
Development of a Modern Intelligence Organization, (Frederick 1984), pp. 68,71 & 78-79. 
" Matthew Allen, `The Foreign Intelligence Committee and the Origins of the Naval Intelligence 
Department in the Admiralty', Mariner's Mirror, (February 1995), p. 68. 
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the committee in 1886-1889.12 `They wielded great power', continued Aston, `by the way they 
presented the briefs to their Lordships, by the turn of the phrases in the letters they drafted to the 
Fleet and to other Government Offices, [and] by the influence they could exert upon the tone of 
13 the replies from other Departments... ' . 
Tryon also selected Captain William H. Hall to preside over the Committee. Hall, a fellow 
gunnery officer, once served as an instructor on the Gunnery Training Ship H. M. S. Excellent for 
three years along with Astley Cooper Key, Arthur Hood, John Fisher, Cyprian Bridge and John 
Knox Laughton, all of whom would voice strong and well-informed opinions on the course of 
British naval policy at the pinnacle of their careers. 14 During his time onboard H. M. S. Excellent, 
Hall became intimately acquainted with these officers, for the staff on board were few in number 
and the working conditions were far from spacious. 15 The time together was also significant in 
terms of his intellectual development, for Hall would have undoubtedly acquired a healthy 
appreciation for historical awareness from his working relationships with both Laughton and 
Bridge. Hall in time would become a recognised authority on naval matters at the pinnacle of his 
own career, while serving as the Director of the newly formed Naval Intelligence Department. In 
this capacity, he was considered by many to be `in the van of naval thinkers' - an attribute that 
itself was molded by the `wonders of sheer force of character and of knowing'. 16 
Described as `intelligent' and `zealous' by Cooper Key, Hall was known throughout the 
Admiralty as an excessively energetic staff officer who gained notoriety for what be can be 
described as an insatiable work ethic. " His early death in 1895 at the age of 52 was most likely 
the result of his outrageous schedule, or what Aston referred to simply as his `daily routine' of 14- 
hour working days with no real holiday. '8 During his tenure on both the Foreign Intelligence 
Committee and its successor, Hall was an ardent advocate of the notion that the navy was indeed 
the shield of the British Empire. He constantly reminded those under his charge of the underlying 
objective of the Royal Navy, as defined by the Carnarvon Commission: 
12 George Aston, Memories of a Marine: An Amphibiography, (London 1919) pp. 76-77. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Gunnery was considered the defining specialisation for leadership in the Royal Navy until the Second 
World War. Key, Hood and Fisher were destined to become First Sea Lords. Bridge would eventually 
succeed Hall as Director of the Naval Intelligence Department in January 1889. Laughton was the highly 
regarded naval historian whose writings strongly influenced those in position to effect the development of 
strategy and doctrine within the Royal Navy. For more on the gunnery specialisation and the H. M. S. 
Excellent during the 1860s, see Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval 
Command, (London 1996); and Andrew Lambert, The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox 
Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession, (London 1998). 
15 Lambert, p. 23. 
16 Custance to Hornby, 9 January 1888. N[ational] M[aritime] M[useum], PHI/120(c). Emphasis in the 
original. 
17 The Times, 3 February 1888, p. 7. 
18 Aston, p. 83. See also S. M. Eardley-Wilmot, An Admiral's Memories: Sixty Five Years Afloat and 
Ashore, (London 1927), pp. 80-81. 
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The Royal Navy is not maintained for the purpose of affording direct local protection to 
seaports or harbours, but for the object of blockading the ports of an enemy, of destroying 
his trade, attacking his possessions, dealing with his ships at sea, and, we may add, of 
preventing an attack in great force against any special place. 19 
To accomplish this task required an intelligence function capable of acquiring timely and 
valuable information on foreign naval developments. Throughout its existence, however, the 
Foreign Intelligence Committee was plagued with shortages in staff, with the group consisting 
only of Hall along with a few naval and Royal Marine officers. 20 With the services of a roaming 
naval attache, Hall and his officers were quite successful in acquiring a plethora of information on 
the naval developments of target countries, most notably France and Russia as both countries 
were for years viewed sceptically by the Royal Navy to be potential contestants for maritime 
supremacy. 21 The task for procuring such information was a somewhat easy endeavour due to the 
courtesy extended to foreign officials in durations of reciprocal transparency. Foreign naval 
attaches were routinely granted permission to visit naval bases and dockyards, where access to 
warships either in commission or construction afforded opportunities to assess the relative naval 
strength of the host country in addition to the progress and quality of its naval construction. 
These visits were vital to intelligence collection, for the design of the ships, as well as the scale 
and distribution of the dockyards, were in every way foretelling reflections of the naval policy and 
ultimately of the national strategy of the host country. 22 
Strategic Preferences in a War with France 
Within two years of being appointed to head the intelligence committee, Hall was afforded an 
exceptional opportunity to make a tightly argued case in favour of the core strategic principles 
that traditionally guided the Royal Navy in wartime. As the Admiralty was generally 
unaccustomed to a formal expression of these principles, the planning document Hall submitted to 
the Admiralty Board in September 1884 was also remarkable by the historical awareness that 
characterised a new brand of strategic thinking unfamiliar to naval policy circles. What actually 
spurred Hall to outline a naval campaign against France is unclear, but most likely it stemmed 
from a series of articles on `The Truth of the Navy', the first of which appeared in the Pall Mall 
Gazette on 8 September 1884. Written by W. T. Stead, an alarmist journalist and editor of the 
paper, the articles incited widespread panic over the readiness of British naval capabilities in 
19 Ibid. 
20 George Aston, Secret Service, (London 1930), pp. 20-22. 
21 See Chapter 3 in this thesis for a review of British intelligence assessments of French and Russian naval 
developments during the 1880s. 
22 These points were also made in the previous chapter. 
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wartime contingencies, with France featured prominently in his unsubstantiated accusations. 23 
`[W]e are just a little ahead of France in ships, behind her in guns and age of our ships', warned 
Stead. 24 `Instead of making up lost ground we are losing it... '. 2' With no one better qualified in 
the Admiralty to consider the opening phases of a future Anglo-French naval war, Hall proceeded 
with an analysis that combined applied naval history with modem strategic analysis. 
From the outset, Hall identified two possible naval strategies to defend Britain against its most 
troublesome neighbour across the English Channel, both of which possessed a substantive 
rationale rooted in historical precedent. The first was based primarily upon the doctrines of 
commerce protection and maritime interdiction, which in contemporary settings would involve 
British squadrons patrolling vital sea lanes of communication while convoy operations would be 
reinstituted to protect the merchant marine from attack by enemy commerce raiders. 26 Efforts 
would also be made to protect dockyard and commercial ports, as well as the foreign coaling- 
stations and colonial possessions vulnerable to attack by French squadrons. 
To follow such a strategy, in the opinion of Hall, would be to submit to a defensive policy that 
would be unfeasible given the scope of the operations required: `To carry it out would require far 
more ships than we are ever likely to be able to procure, and so many weak points would still be 
left, especially in our lines of ocean traffic, that it could not be effective'. 27 But what Hall 
considered the `gravest objection' to this policy was his insistence that such a defensive 
orientation would yield the initiative to France, as `it would leave the enemy free to employ his 
fleet as he thought proper, and to fit it out interruptedly what ships he likes'. 28 To do so would 
represent a radical departure from British strategic culture, and Hall made it perfectly clear in his 
report to the First Naval Lord that `a defensive policy .... 
is utterly at variance with the traditions of 
the British navy, whose role has always been that of attack, and not defence'. 29 Thus, the only 
available recourse was to adhere to the strategic traditions of the Royal Navy, conducting 
offensive operations designed to accomplish three primary objectives: (1) to seek out and capture 
all enemy warships on deployment at the onset of hostilities; (2) to blockade aggressively the 
23 For more on the impact of the Stead affair, see John F. Beeler, British Naval Policy in the Gladstone- 
Disraeli Era, 1866-1880, (Palo Alto 1997), pp. 265-268; and Ruddock F. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone, 
(Oxford 1973), pp. 179-181. 
24 `The Truth About the Navy', Pall Mall Gazette, 8 September 1884. Cited in John Henry Briggs, Naval 
Administrations, 1827-1892: The Experience of 65 Years, (London 1897), pp. 216-217. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Convoy operations had been discontinued by the Royal Navy by 1879 because they were becoming both 
`wasteful' and `inconvenient' in the face of the threat posed by a handful of steam cruisers. See Andrew D. 
Lambert, `The Royal Navy, 1856-1914: Deterrence and The Strategy of World Power' in Keith Neilson 
and Elizabeth J. Errington, (eds), Navies and Global Defense: Theories and Strategy, (Westport 1996), p. 
29. 
27 F. I. C. Report No. 51, `Remarks on a Naval Campaign'. ADM 231/5. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
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ports of the enemy so that its warships cannot provide an adequate and effective defence; and (3) 
to seek the reduction of enemy coaling stations, commercial ports, as well as its naval bases and 
dockyards, through naval bombardment. Such an offensive posture would retain the initiative for 
the British while denying it to the enemy. In the words of Hall: `Another strong reason in favour 
of an offensive policy is that if promptly carried out, by striking simultaneously at several 
vulnerable points on the French coast and in the French possessions abroad... . the attention of the 
enemy would be directed from the attack of our vulnerable points to the defence of its own'. 'O 
With these objectives in mind, Hall surmised correctly that the fleet could not possibly secure 
them all at the same time: `But the question naturally arises, if our present resources are unequal 
to the execution of all these operations simultaneously, could not the operations be taken in 
succession, or, if not, what is our fleet capable of accomplishing? ' .31 He then set out to answer 
this question by prioritising core strategic imperatives in a war with France. Of paramount 
concern was the attack and destruction of all enemy ships abroad: 
The operation which I place first is the attack of the ships in commission. This I consider 
to be the most important of all. The ships are distributed on the several stations in close 
proximity not only to our own war-vessels but our commerce, and frequently to our 
possessions, are always ready for action, and by a flash of the telegraph can be converted 
into active enemies and started off to harass our commerce and possessions. Their 
prompt capture is therefore of the most vital importance. 32 
Next on his list was the attack of French coaling-stations, home dockyards and commercial ports 
in succession. He advocated the immediate bombardment of the French naval bases at Cherbourg 
and Brest, to be conducted by a squadron of armourclads suitable for offensive coastal operations. 
In the meantime, armourclads in reserve at home would supplement the Mediterranean squadron 
to `watch' the French naval base at Toulon. Efforts to `watch' both Brest and Cherbourg were 
also perceived as necessary by Hall. 
In watching these French naval bases, Hall expected British naval squadrons to perform a less 
aggressive form of blockade. No provision was made for the `close' blockade of these ports in 
the traditional sense of the term. Referring again to the lessons of naval history, Hall doubted 
whether the close blockade would achieve the immediate and decisive results: `The chief work in 
which the bulk of our line-of-battle ships were employed in the last war with France, viz, the 
blockade of the enemy's ships in his home ports, is, however, considered to be an impossible, or, 
at all events, a most dangerous endeavour at the present time... ' . 
33 Thus, with full appreciation of 
the hardships likely to be encountered when conducting protracted naval operations off the 
30 Ibid. Emphases in the original. The vulnerable points referred to by Hall include British commerce, 
foreign coaling-stations and depots, and its own commercial ports and naval home arsenals. 
31 Ibid. Emphases in the original. 
32 Ibid. 
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enemy's coastline, Hall was extremely confident of British naval capabilities and the naval 
campaign that would ultimately ensure British maritime supremacy. Although he doubted the 
efficacy of the close blockade, and substituted instead a naval campaign conceived with offensive 
coastal operations in mind, the contents of his analysis indicate strongly that Hall was firmly 
committed to the strategic traditions of the service while remaining perceptive of the operational 
realities of modem naval warfare. 
Strategic Preferences in a War with Russia 
Hall would submit a similar planning document to the Admiralty Board in the following year, 
at the height of Anglo-Russian tensions in March 1885 over a boundary dispute in Afghanistan. 34 
The report reiterated many of the points made in his planning against France in the prior year. He 
assumed correctly that the Imperial Russian Navy, still in a state of infancy relative to the Royal 
Navy, would be impelled to target British commerce as the only viable means to avoid defeat. 
Indeed, a pamphlet obtained in the following month by a British consulate official only confirmed 
what was anticipated by Hall in a future war with Russia. Written by a senior naval officer, the 
Russians envisioned success with their own version of the guerre de course: `Only to prevent this 
free exchange [of commerce] for a short time and such complications will arise as are little 
dreamed of and therefore everything must be done to paralyse sea-borne trade. Thirty good 
cruisers... will be more terrible to England than the armed armada of the civilized world' . 
35 The 
problem with such a naval strategy, however, was the fact that the Imperial Russian Navy simply 
lacked the capabilities and resources to pursue a guerre de course in a manner that would actually 
constitute a genuine threat to those concerned in the Admiralty. 
As was the case with France, Hall again declined to support a defensive naval strategy that 
revolved around commerce protection, for such a plan `means the attempt to protect 92,000 miles 
of waterway communications'. 36 In a subsequent report most certainly written by Hall and 
submitted to the Admiralty in May 1885, the intelligence department cautioned that `no system of 
patrolling the ocean highways can of itself secure protection to our commerce... ' . 
37 At the same 
time, however, Hall and his staff discounted the actual threat posed by Russian "fast" cruisers and 
the guerre de course: `It is assumed that the class of vessel with which Russia will probably 
assail our commerce, more particularly our steam trade, on the high seas, is not the low speed and 
33 [bid. 
34 M. A. Yapp, `British Perceptions of the Russian Threat to India', Modern Asian Studies, (December 
1987), pp. 647-665 
35 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 25 June 1888, ADM 1/6934. 
36 F. I. C. Report No. 64, `General Outline of Possible Naval Operations Against Russia'. ADM 231/6. 
37 F. I. C. Report No. 73, `The Protection of Commerce By Patrolling the Ocean Highways and By Convoy'. 
ADM 231/6. 
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small coal capacity war-cruizer, but the long steam-cruizing armed merchant-steamer of good, but 
not necessarily very high speed' . 
38 
Predictably, Hall advocated an offensive naval strategy that, `besides being in keeping with the 
traditions of the British navy, is easier to accomplish than the other, and more likely to secure 
efficient protection to our commerce' . 
39 Due to the rather impressive defensive schemes existing 
at both Cronstadt and Sweaborg, however, he thought it advisable not to undertake coastal 
operations to reduce these `impregnable' naval bases by means of naval bombardment. 
Conditions were instead favourable for the deployment of a powerful squadron that would 
proceed and remain on station at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland. The primary objective of 
this squadron was to effect a `close watch' of Russian warships while a smaller squadron would 
be employed to hunt, capture or destroy those ships that managed to elude the blockading 
squadron. In the final analysis, Hall was very confidant that such a strategy would ultimately 
prove successful in retaining maritime supremacy: `I think we may fairly assume that our fleet 
should be able to lock up in port the ships of the Russian war navy and her mercantile marine, and 
to prevent those that may be awry from her ports when war is declared from materially injuring 
our commerce'. 40 Accorded with the strategic flexibility of a first-rate naval power, Hall 
formulated a war plan against Russia that reflected the circumstances before him, which he was 
able to do because the Royal Navy had become quite adept over the years of switching between 
the doctrines of blockade and coastal bombardment. Assessing the situation correctly, he deemed 
the former to be more preferable in light of the impressive fortifications at Cronstadt and the 
relative disparity in naval strength between the two countries. Thus, while the naval campaign set 
out for Russia differed from that prescribed for France in 1884, Hall again articulated a clear 
preference for an offensive naval strategy that was consistent with strategic ideas shared by his 
fellow officers in the Royal Navy. 
THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC THINKING AND THE FORMATION 
OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT 
In the aftermath of the Penjdeh Crisis, also known in exaggerated terms as the `Russian Naval 
Scare of 1885', concern within the Admiralty was voiced over the level of preparations in 
anticipation of naval operations against the Imperial Russian Navy. No voice was louder than that 
of Captain Lord Charles Beresford, the outspoken Junior Naval Lord who quickly became the 
self-appointed patron of the Foreign Intelligence Committee. Motivated by the absence of any 
contingency plan for naval mobilisation in the event of war, Beresford penned a memorandum in 
October 1886 that outlined a scheme whereby the Committee would be transformed into a formal 
38 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
39 F. I. C. Report No. 64. 
40 Ibid. 
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department tasked with the formulation of mobilisation plans in addition to the collection, 
analysis and dissemination of foreign naval intelligence. Never at a loss for words, Beresford 
`emphatically' and `distinctly' warned his colleagues on the Admiralty Board of the consequences 
of inaction in this matter, noting that `the greatest state of affairs would occur in this country if 
war was declared with a first-rate Maritime Power, simply through want of organization, 
forethought, and ordinary common sense, which would be simply ludicrous if not so perilous' . 
a' 
In writing such a provocative memorandum, Beresford was painfully aware that the politics of 
the Admiralty Board were not in his favour. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord George 
Hamilton, was a career politician whose administrative ethos emphasised fiscal restraint and, in 
particular, the efficacy of policy reform in an incremental fashion. His first task upon assuming 
office in June 1885 was to replace the current Board of Admiralty with senior officers who were 
quite amenable to his philosophy42, and those who were selected quickly embraced his strongly 
held view that `the resuscitation of a navy under present conditions must be a slow and laborious 
process' . 
43 Perhaps the most significant of Hamilton's selections was his choice for First Naval 
Lord. Admiral Sir Arthur Hood was the perfect candidate to serve Hamilton in this capacity, for 
he undoubtedly embodied the qualities Hamilton was searching for in the senior officer who 
would become his chief naval advisor. 44 Sir John Knox Laughton, who served with Hood 
onboard H. M. S. Excellent for a number of years, believed him to be `a careful, painstaking 
officer, without the genius that was much needed in a period of great change, and clinging by 
temperament to the ideas of the past, when they ceased to be suitable' . 
45 Hood was certainly a 
proponent of incrementalism when it came to the matters of naval policy, and he simply lacked 
the imagination and intellectual framework to support innovation on his own initiative. `The four 
years which followed [his appointment] were years of great change and advance", continued 
Laughton, `but it was commonly supposed that Hood's efforts were mainly devoted to preventing 
the advance from becoming too rapid'. 46 
Hamilton complemented the selection of Hood with the appointment of Vice-Admirals Sir 
Anthony Hoskins and William Graham as Second and Third Naval Lord respectively. In these 
capacities both officers aligned themselves with the naval reforms prescribed by their patron, for 
it was Hamilton who was directly responsible for their generous salaries, housing and the stature 
41 Admiralty & Secretariat Cases, `Reorganisation of the Foreign Intelligence Committee (Now the Naval 
Intelligence Department)'. ADM 116/3106. See also Allen, pp. 65-78. 
42 Lord George Hamilton, Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections, 1868-1885, (London 1916), pp. 
290-291. 
43 The Times, 7 May 1888, p. 12. 
44 Hamilton, p. 292. 
as Sidney Lee, (ed), The Dictionary of National Biography, Volume II, (London 1912), p. 293. Entry 
written by John Knox Laughton. 
46Ibid. 
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normally accorded to a member of the Board of Admiralty. 47 All were more than suitable to 
Hamilton, that is with the notable exception of Beresford. It was abundantly clear to him that 
Beresford was cut from a very different fabric. `Though a very gallant and capable officer afloat', 
Hamilton complained, `Beresford is not suitable to administrative work. His want of reticence 
and self-restraint makes him difficult as a colleague, and almost impossible as a subordinate. I 
have had much trouble with him... '. 48 Despite serious misgivings about his former childhood 
classmate, however, Beresford's appointment to the Board was made in the middle of 1886 
through Lord Salisbury and at the behest of the Prince of Wales, both of whom viewed Beresford 
more as a political asset than a future liability. Upon his startling resignation from the Admiralty 
Board in January 1888, Salisbury would later report to Queen Victoria that Beresford `was an 
officer of great ability afloat, but he too is greedy of popular applause to get on in a public 
department. He is constantly playing his own game at the expense of his colleagues in the 
49 Department, which causes much irritation'. 
Unlike the situation faced by his colleagues, Beresford was an officer of independent income 
and an influential member of Parliament. He was therefore inclined to offer opinions that differed 
from his superiors, and his actions to motivate them into action over the intelligence matter 
provides yet another example of the striking dissimilarities in his disposition and that Hood and 
Hamilton. Unwilling to await definitive action by the Board, Beresford prematurely leaked his 
memorandum to the press, which was first published in the Pall Mall Gazette on 13 October 
1886.50 Ironically, Hood was already considering his own proposal for a limited expansion of the 
intelligence function to include some oversight over the problem of mobilisation. As expected, he 
wanted to study the matter further, but was overruled by the First Lord who, as a politician, was 
incensed over the leak of Beresford's memorandum while acutely sensitive to the reaction 
stemming from its publication. 51 Hamilton immediately ordered a preliminary report to be 
furnished within a month, and the task to justify the expansion of the intelligence function was 
left to Hall, who happened to be the least objective naval officer when it came to matters of 
intelligence. 
47 Parliamentary Papers, Select Committee on Navy Estimates (1888), First Report. The First and Third 
Naval Lords - the latter being the Controller of the Navy - both received £1,500 per annum with a house. 
The Second Naval Lord earned £1,200 per annum with a house, while the Junior Naval Lord received 
£1,000 per annum with a house. These salaries - despite the house were quite exceptional during this 
period. On the First Lord's opinion of Hoskins and Graham, see Lord George Hamilton, Parliamentary 
Reminiscences and Reflections, 1886-1906, (London 1922), p. 87. 
48 Hamilton to Posonby, 1 January 1888. Cited in Geoffrey Bennett, Charlie B: A Biography of Admiral 
Lord Charles Beresford, (London 1968) p. 145. See also Hamilton, pp. 93-94. 
49 Salisbury to Queen Victoria, 19 January 1888. CAB 41/21/1. 
50 Allen, p. 72. 
51 Ibid. 
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As requested, Hall submitted his interim report on 4 November 1886, in which he predictably 
advocated the creation of an enlarged intelligence department with a broad mandate that included 
responsibility for mobilisation and foreign naval intelligence. 52 Of particular significance was his 
explicit request that strategy development be included within his portfolio. According to Hall, the 
preparations for war could only be considered complete when and if the intelligence function was 
afforded responsibility for `the consideration of the naval strategical operations that could be 
necessary in certain probable contingencies and the consequent distribution of the naval forces of 
the country'. 53 Hall was even more specific in his request: 
I would only submit that the question of naval strategical operations should be one of the 
subjects to be dealt with by the Intelligence Department; their duty in this respect being 
limited to laying before the Senior Naval Lord in the most convenient form, all the 
information required by him for the preparation of a plan of campaign, which preliminary 
work, judging from my experience of the Russian fear, it is at present nobody's business 
to undertake. 54 
Upon reading the report, Hamilton and Hood were quite impressed with the industry and 
ability of Hall, with the latter recommending that his former protege on H. M. S. Excellent be 
retained to head the new department for his `experience' and `knowledge of various subjects'. 55 
For his part, Hall was not overly enthusiastic about spending yet another two years in the 
Admiralty. While he clearly recognised the importance of his position and its potential impact on 
naval policy formulation, he was adamant that the functions of the department would be best 
served under the leadership of a senior officer. Hall was still a junior Captain, having been 
promoted to the rank only weeks after his appointment to the Foreign Intelligence Committee in 
December 1882.56 In later years he complained bitterly to Admiral Hornby, observing that 
`placing a junior officer at the Head of such a Department would excite unpleasant feelings' 
which could only be used `as an argument to deny its importance which is what has happened'. 57 
Hall also made reference to the presence of a venerable opposition that was concerned that his 
department might `usurp the functions and authority of the Board'. 58 Finally, Hall beseeched 
Hornby to use his considerable influence within the service and his stature as a public figure to 
assist in his endeavours to ensure `that the work we have been ardently been doing for the last 
twelve months may, under an officer of greater experience and more influence, develop into what 
59 
may be as useful to the navy as is the work of the German Staff to their Army' . 
52 Hall to Admiralty, `Preliminary Report on Proposals Made With the Organization for War', November 
1886. ADM 1/6820(a). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Admiralty & Secretariat Cases, `Reorganisation of the Foreign Intelligence Committee (Now the Naval 
Intelligence Department)'. ADM 116/3106. 
56 Allen, p. 68. 
57 Hall to Hornby, 9 January 1888. N. M. M., PH /120(c). Emphasis in the original. 
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If Hall desired the power and influence traditionally wielded by the German Chief of Staff, the 
broad and far-reaching mandate extended to his department provided him with what can only be 
described as a de facto staff system. His instructions from the Admiralty Board reveal the extent 
to which Hall was capable of shaping the course of Admiralty policy: 
1. To collect, sift, record, and lay before the board all the information relating to 
maritime matters likely to be of use in war. 
2. To prepare and keep correct to date, a complete plan for mobilising the Naval 
forces of the Empire with the utmost possible rapidity, and with the least strain on 
the Admiralty. 
3. When directed, to prepare plans of Naval Campaign, for the consideration of the 
Board. 
4. To bring to the notice of the Board all points affecting "Preparation for War", but 
it is to be distinctly understood that the Intelligence Department is not to indicate 
to the Board any policy in connection with shipbuilding, armaments, &c., unless 
called upon to do so. 60 
Hall was also afforded direct access to the Senior Naval Lord, and he reported only to the other 
members of the Board when circumstances required him to do so. His proximity to the locus of 
power was also enhanced significantly when the Transport Department was relieved of its coveted 
office space within the Admiralty building, as `it was considered desirable that the Intelligence 
Department be as close as possible to the Board'. 61 With such a broad mandate and liberal access 
to the Admiralty Board, Hall certainly had his fingers on the strategic pulse of the Royal Navy. 
BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION TO THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT 
Work in the newly formulated department was officially commenced on 1 February 1887. 
Under the watchful direction of Captain Hall, it was conducted by an augmented staff that was in 
turn divided into two discrete sections for mobilisation and intelligence. Captains Reginald N. 
Custance and J. Eardley-Wilmot were appointed as assistant directors to supervise the work 
performed in their respective areas of responsibility. Both officers were highly regarded in the 
Admiralty, not only for their performances in their official capacities, but also for their profound 
interest in naval strategy and ship design. 62 Custance busied himself mainly with matters of 
personnel and logistics. 63 Of specific concern to him was the coaling of naval squadrons in time 
of war, a favourite topic of Beresford during his tenure on the Admiralty Board. 64 Custance 
solicited the views of other department heads (i. e., Departments of Transport and Contracts) and 
endeavoured to formulate a coherent policy on the fitting and employment of colliers in 
60 N[aval] I[ntelligence] D[epartment], `Report on the Work of the Naval Intelligence Department During 
the Year 1887', February 1888. ADM 231/12. 
61 Ibid. 
62 It will be recalled from Chapter 3- Footnote 132 - that both officers served on the executive council of 
the RUSI during their tenures in the Naval Intelligence Department. 
63 Allen, p. 73. 
64Bennett, p. 143. 
-83- 
protracted naval operations in foreign waters. 65 The feasibility of this policy was continually 
assessed in the annual naval manoeuvres conducted under the auspices of the department. While 
the Admiralty Board developed the program to be followed in the manoeuvres, it was up to 
Custance and his staff to provide administrative oversight for the fleet exercises, including the 
compilation of reports from the umpires and participants. 66 
Eardley-Wilmot and his intelligence section, meanwhile, were tasked with the collection, 
analysis and dissemination of information related to foreign naval developments. On the main, 
the activities of this section depended on the reports of the roaming naval attache, who in turn 
received instructions from the Senior Naval Lord after consulting with Captain Hall. 6' During 
this period, Captains Henry Kane and Sir W. Cecil Doraville served the Admiralty in this 
capacity. Receiving their official instructions through the Foreign Office, the naval attaches 
frequently visited the naval dockyards and facilities in Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia and France. 
It was the naval developments of the latter two countries that attracted most of their attention, for 
both France and Russia were investing heavily in the modernisation of their fleets along defensive 
orientations. The reports forwarded to London were meant to provide accurate representations of 
the rate of modernisation, including qualitative details of French and Russian naval programs that 
were most revealing. As amply demonstrated by their handwritten notations, both Hamilton and 
Hood were avid readers of these reports, and their contents served only to discount the widely 
accepted notion that the countries were pursuing ambitious shipbuilding programs that would 
eventually render the warships of the Royal Navy inferior, both in terms of quality and quantity. 
Based on the information gleaned from the intelligence reports, Hamilton was strongly 
encouraged to continue his efforts to limit naval expenditures for political purposes, and to ensure 
68 that the Navy was placed within the `compass of finance' . 
Yet despite the apparent usefulness of the new department, the activities of Hall and his staff 
were immediately viewed with great suspicion by some members of the Admiralty Board, who 
were quite concerned that the new department would somehow usurp the assigned duties of the 
four Naval Lords. What complicated matters further was an inequitable division of labour and the 
overwhelming burden of administration in the absence of a formalised staff function. Unwilling 
to delegate these matters to the new intelligence department, the distribution of duties among the 
Board was seriously out of balance, with Hood as First Naval Lord assuming an oppressive 
65 N. I. D to Admiralty Board, 9 May 1887. ADM 1/6869. The attached report was entitled `Certain 
Questions Related to Colliers' and was written by Custance and Hall. 
66 See, for example, N. I. D. Report No. 179, `Report on the Naval Manoeuvres of 1888', October 1888. 
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67 N. I. D. to Admiralty Board, `Relations of Naval Attaches with the Naval Intelligence Department', 6 
February 1889. ADM 1/6970. This office memorandum was an update to one issued in February 1883. 
68 The Times, 4 February 1888, p. 12. 
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portfolio that included an inordinate amount of attention given to the daily operations of the fleet 
in peacetime. 69 Serving as Third Naval Lord and the Controller of the Navy, Vice-Admiral 
Graham was equally challenged with the excessive demands for his time from the various 
departments within his purview, which included the more vital departments of Ordnance and 
Construction. Fortunately for Graham, these departments were in the capable hands of Captain 
John Fisher and Sir William White respectively. 70 Meanwhile, the portfolios of the Second and 
Fourth Naval Lords were extremely limited, so much so that Beresford once described the duties 
of Admiral Hoskins as `frivolous'. 71 Interestingly, both Beresford and Hoskins clearly recognised 
the intrinsic value of the intelligence department. At one point, Beresford even suggested that 
`the principle which is now adopted with reference to the Naval Intelligence Department could be 
usefully extended, so as to have in that department an officer who would act as a staff officer to 
each of the Naval Lords' . 
72 Hoskins was equally confident that the officers of the expanded 
department `would insure the continuity of principle and policy, which is now entirely or largely 
broken when a naval officer goes out of office' . 
73 Had such a suggestion been approved by 
Hamilton for implementation, the First Lord would have done much to remove the administrative 
albatross that served only to impede strategic and force planning in the Admiralty. 
In the end, however, the willingness to expand the intelligence department was not shared by 
Hamilton or Hood, who simply thought it unnecessary to pursue such an option when the highly 
centralised system currently in place was more than adequate to accomplish the tasks at hand. 
Instead, both men concurred with a proposal from the Treasury in August 1887 to reduce the 
provisional salaries of those officers working in the department so as to limit further expenditure 
by the Admiralty. This was in part expected by Captains Hall and Custance, the latter confiding 
to Admiral Hornby in January 1888 that `[Hall] has been aware for a long time that he has not 
sufficient standing to hold his own. The strongest proof of this being that his pay has been cut 
down. Fancy the pay of D. N. I. being less than that of D. N. O. or Director of Transports. This is 
equivalent to saying that the whole is less than its part. '74 From his perspective, Beresford 
thought such a decision to be counterproductive, especially since he believed strongly that `the 
efficiency of the whole service was.. . 
bound up with the efficiency of the Intelligence Department; 
because that department was created for the express purpose of estimating and reporting what was 
required to fulfil its duties'. On 9 January 1888, Beresford surprised his colleagues by resigning 75 
69 This point was underscored in Briggs, pp. 241-242. 
70 Mackay, p. 188. 
71 Quoted in Bennett, p. 149. 
72 Parliamentary Papers, Select Committee on Navy Estimates (1888), First Report. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Custance to Hornby, 9 January 1888. PHI/120(c). 
75 Lord Charles Beresford, The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, (London 1914) p. 353. 
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his position on the Admiralty Board in protest over what he believed to be an arbitrary decision to 
limit the functions of the Naval Intelligence Department.. 
At the time, Beresford's resignation appeared to be in vain, for he was the only senior officer 
within the Admiralty in a position to remedy what can only be described as a form of policy 
inertia that extended to strategic and force planning. Without an expanded intelligence function 
or a formalised staff system, `the volume of business accumulating for managerial decision was 
so great that board members, often including the first sea lord, became so preoccupied with 
routine administration that strategic policy became a peripheral concern'. 76 The Admiralty Board 
thus fell victim to the `decoupling' of strategy and structure, where `formulating strategy and 
planning for the future become quite marginal'. " The fact that these activities were marginalised 
under the current system of naval administration was underscored by Hamilton himself. When 
asked if the tenets of British naval strategy were actually considered by the Admiralty Board 
when discussing future shipbuilding requirements, Hamilton simply proclaimed that `it is hardly 
advisable that I should go into a question of that kind. It is a complicated question of naval 
strategy, and that would not, of course be discussed at a shipbuilding Board'. 78 The decoupling of 
strategy and structure was also apparent in the budget-driven process by which the First Lord and 
the Admiralty Board determined the shipbuilding requirements submitted to Parliament for 
consideration in March 1888. The results obtained from this process were quite the opposite of 
the conclusions made in a force planning analysis prepared by Captain Hall and submitted to 
Hood and Hamilton in December 1887. 
STRATEGIC THINKING AND ADMIRALTY DIFFERENCES 
OVER FORCE PLANNING 
There are a number of approaches and techniques available to devise a force structure that can 
accomplish the strategic objectives of a military organisation. It is an arduous and highly 
complicated process even when performed by the most developed military organisation, but it is 
often made easier by a number of filter approaches that serve to reduce extraneous variables from 
force planning considerations. 79 Both the Admiralty Board and the Naval Intelligence 
Department in 1887 adopted approaches and analytical techniques to arrive at shipbuilding 
estimates that varied significantly, both in terms of the types and quantities of warships proposed 
for construction. How these estimates could be so different is of particular relevance to the 
origins of the Naval Defence Act of 1889. 
76 Christopher Dandeker, `Bureaucracy Planning and War: The Royal Navy, 1880-1918', Armed Forces & 
Society, (Fall 1984), p. 136. 
77 Ibid., p. 131. 
78 Parliamentary Papers, Select Committee on Navy Estimates (1888), Fourth Report. 
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Finance as the Final Arbiter of Naval Policy 
Consistent with the administrative ethos of Lord George Hamilton, the Admiralty Board 
adopted the fiscal, or budget-driven approach to force planning. What makes this approach 
particularly attractive, even in contemporary settings, is its fiscal conservatism, as strategic and 
force structure choices are made in light of expected budgetary allocations and other constraints 
upon government spending. When combined with other approaches, the budget-driven emphasis 
is extremely useful as it provides a measure of fiscal discipline in the force planning process. 
Outcomes of policy deliberations are often reflective of service priorities that are both realistic 
and attainable given previous and expected levels of government spending on national defence. 
Yet when used by itself, a budget-driven emphasis can seriously decouple strategy and structure, 
as decisions based solely upon financial concerns are made irrespective to the effectiveness of 
current force structures to accomplish the objectives of a national security strategy. Operational 
success at the service level is thus endangered by a general failure to design a force structure that 
is indicative of the roles and missions of the service in wartime. 
It was these drawbacks to the budget-driven approach that were evident in the force planning 
process established by the politicians in the Admiralty. It began in the summer of 1887, when 
Hood and Graham first met with Hamilton to discuss the basis from which they should frame their 
shipbuilding requirements for the forthcoming fiscal year. 80 Having already received his planning 
guidance from the Cabinet, Hamilton informed both Hood and Graham that the requirements 
should be framed in accordance to the level of shipbuilding expenditures in the prior year. From a 
strictly financial basis, both Hood and Graham then endeavoured to devise a construction program 
that was seen as `the best way of expending that sum of money to meet the requirements of the 
service' . 
81 At no point in time, however, had either of them been asked to provide an alternative 
scheme that took into consideration the strategic objectives of the service, while at the same time 
independent from the fiscal constraints imposed by the Cabinet. The absence of such a scheme 
was so significant in fact that Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton - the successor to Hood as 
First Naval Lord - would later concede publicly that `no complete scheme, showing what were the 
naval requirements of the country, had been laid before the Board, apart from the financial limits 
laid down by the Cabinet, at any time within the knowledge of those most conversant with 
Admiralty affairs' . 
82 The outcome of this skewed process was a shipbuilding programme that 
failed to fulfil the shipbuilding requirements of the Royal Navy, especially when taking into 
79 For a summary of the various approaches to force planning, see Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, and 
Timothy E. Somes, `The Art of Strategy and Force Planning', Naval War College Review, (Spring 1995), 
pp. 144-146. 
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account the strategic doctrines of close blockade and offensive coastal operations in a multiple 
threat environment. 
The Impact of Strategic Thinking upon Force Planning 
As noted above, Captain Hall and his staff were afforded a broad mandate in areas where 
strategic thinking had a decisive impact upon British naval administration, namely foreign 
intelligence, fleet mobilisation, and strategy development. One area beyond the scope of this 
mandate was the force planning function, the duties of which were traditionally the domain of the 
First Naval Lord and the Admiralty Board. In December 1887, however, Hall prepared a report 
that assessed the comparative naval strength of Britain, France and Russia. The first draft of the 
report was subsequently revised and submitted to the Admiralty in May 1888, at the height of 
intense scrutiny over the resources and capabilities of the Royal Navy. To classify this report as 
another planning document would be understatement, as the conclusions reached by Hall departed 
significantly from those made by his superiors in the force planning exercise outlined above. 
Using a worst-case scenario to highlight a strategic problem, the D. N. I. concluded that the Royal 
Navy - deficient in both battleships and cruisers - would be severely handicapped in a future 
maritime contest with France and Russia, the only two countries that in combination could pose a 
challenge to British for command of the seas, particularly in the Mediterranean. His analysis 
revealed a deficiency of 13 battleships, 38 cruisers and 32 torpedo vessels, all of which would be 
required to maintain a close blockade of enemy ports while providing an ample reserve squadron 
to be deployed in the English Channel. 83 In contrast, the Admiralty Board was quite content with 
the addition of a limited number of cruisers, gunboats and torpedo-gunboats, the cost of which 
was estimated at £2,667,000. No provision was made for the construction of battleships. 
In applying his brand of strategic thinking to solve this strategic problem, Hall advocated a 
direct linkage between strategy and structure in force planning initiatives. Not coincidentally, his 
analysis was again based on the core strategic principles that he believed would be used to guide 
the Royal Navy in wartime, with a particular emphasis upon the strategic doctrine of close 
blockade: `History teaches us that this policy was uniformly successful in preventing invasion, 
that it afforded good security to our commerce, and that by its adoption were able to hold our own 
against the united fleets of the three greatest maritime nations of the time. It is recorded that when 
blockade was rigorously enforced, it effectually prevented the escape of any war vessels'. 84 The 
effectiveness of this doctrine was of course predicated on the presence of sufficient numbers of 
battleships and cruisers to conduct blockading operations against both countries in multiple 
82 Richard Vesey Hamilton, Naval Administration, (London 1896) p. 167. 
83 N. I. D. Report No. 149a, `Comparison of the Fleets of England, France and Russia in 1890', May 1888. 
ADM 231/12. 
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theatres of action. For such a strategy to be effected with any measure of success, Hall surmised 
that the Royal Navy would require a force level far superior to that harboured in the French ports 
of Toulon, Brest and Cherbourg. The numerical challenge posed by the French navy was 
relatively insignificant by itself, but was further magnified by the necessity for replenishment 
operations, the absence of a reserve squadron in home waters, and the contingency for operations 
to prevent the egress of Russian warships operating from ports in the Baltic and Black Seas. 85 The 
report prepared by the D. N. I., in short, demonstrated that British naval capabilities would be 
overwhelmed by the scope of operations required to fulfil the roles and missions prescribed by the 
strategic traditions of the service. 
This is not to say, however, that Hall was completely objective in his analysis, an attribute 
which may have stemmed from a desire to avoid mitigating factors. For instance, Hall blindly 
assumed that Britain would be forced to fight without allies in a war with both France and Russia. 
Such an eventuality was highly improbable, for Italy was most interested in concluding a naval 
alliance to protect herself against a threat of the French navy in the Mediterranean. 86 It possessed 
a sizeable and well-trained navy, one that could supplement British blockading operations off 
Toulon, thereby allowing the Royal Navy to concentrate its forces elsewhere if needed. Hall also 
failed to consider the qualitative differences between the Royal Navy and its hypothetical 
adversaries. On this point, Hall received criticism from Sir William White, the Director of Naval 
Construction who received the report only as a courtesy to ensure the accuracy of the ship 
specifications contained therein. `Although the papers do not come to me for purposes of 
criticism', White protested, `I cannot allow them to pass without an expression of my strong 
dissent from some of the assumptions made in this Comparison'. 87 White was by no means an 
opponent of additional naval construction, but he did object to what he thought was an exercise in 
creative statistics. He considered Hall's analysis to be misleading in some respects, including his 
comparison of French and British battleships: `Nearly all the French battleships classed as second 
and third class have wood hulls. Three years hence, 15 to 21 years will have elapsed since they 
were launched. To reckon all of these ships as available for battle - presumably at sea - is in my 
opinion not reasonable'. gg White also brought attention to the fact that Hall failed to include 
84 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
85 Hall concluded that the number of battleships required to blockade a given number of vessels was 
equivalent to a+ 1/4a + b, where a represents the number of enemy battleships inside and b represents the 
number of blockaders always absent coaling. Similarly, the number of cruisers needed was equivalent to a 
+ 1/3a +c+d, where a represents the number of enemy cruisers in port, c represents the number of 
blockaders always absent coaling, and d represents the number required as dispatch vessels between the 
blockading squadron and its base. 
86 Foreign Office to Admiralty, `Italy and Her Alliances', December 1888. ADM 1/6935. See also C. J. 
Lowe, Salisbury and the Mediterranean, (London 1965). 
87 Hall to Admiralty, `Proofs of the Comparison of the Fleets of England, France and Russia', November 
1887. ADM 1/6873. 
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British warships that would be available for service within the specified timeframe, noting that `It 
is clearly wrong to exclude the 22 vessels to be laid down here in 1888, all of which will be ready 
by the end of 1890; while including vessels on the French side which are still in the earliest stages 
of construction... '. 89 Finally, and most importantly, White took exception to the absence of 
certain qualitative factors that rendered British vessels superior to those possessed by the French: 
`Comparisons of numbers of ships are valuable. But these comparisons do not take into account 
of the important fact that for twelve or fourteen years we have been building vessels with 
protective decks, whereas the French are only now developing the class. This adds enormously to 
the relative value of our force.... '. 90 
Admiral Hood concurred with this assessment, and instructed Captain Hall to revise the report 
to account for the criticisms forwarded by White and those from the First Naval Lord himself. In 
the end, however, the final version submitted in May 1888 included only slightly modified tables 
and a lightly worded reference to the qualitative differences between British and French warships. 
In so doing Hall provided an innovative force planning model that was eventually adopted by the 
politicians after suppressing it for months, following which Lord George Hamilton conceded and 
instructed Hood in July 1888 `to state the amount of force which would be required under certain 
eventualities'. 91 The result was a revised shipbuilding program that was eventually authorised by 
the Naval Defence Act of 1889.92 It was thus no coincidence that Admiralty estimates in 
shipbuilding differed only slightly from those proposed by Captain Hall and the Naval 
Intelligence Department. 
CONCLUSION 
The naval career of W. H. Hall has largely been overlooked by naval historians to date, due 
mainly to the fact that he had the audacity to die before he could reach flag rank and write his 
memoirs. Without the benefit of personal papers, what is known of him and his tenure at the 
Admiralty can only be pieced together through personal recollections and correspondence, 
supplemented by occasional references to him by the biographers of Fisher and Beresford. While 
this is clearly an unfortunate circumstance, the volumes of intelligence reports and estimates 
produced during his six-year tenure as the first D. N. I. serve as ample testimonials to a 
posthumous recognition as both strategic thinker and service intellectual. 
Even though his naval career was generally unremarkable until he was posted to the Admiralty 
in 1882, Hall contributed widely to Admiralty policy at a time when the Admiralty Board was 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
91 Hamilton to Cabinet Office, `Navy Estimates 1889-90', November 1888. CAB 37/21/24 
92 Admiralty to Cabinet Office, `The Requirements of the British Navy', July 1888. CAB 37/22/36. 
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preoccupied with financial reform and very much indifferent to the matters of strategy. To 
compensate for this, Hall sought to instil a new brand of strategic thinking within the Admiralty 
that touched upon the most critical aspects of naval administration, particularly in the areas of 
strategic and force planning. The planning documents written by him, especially the innovative 
force planning model outlined above, also reflect his respect for the strategic ideas preponderant 
among naval officers and an enthusiasm to institutionalise them within the policy frameworks that 
prevailed in the Admiralty. This was no doubt fostered by the revival of these ideas through the 
formalised study of naval history pioneered by John Knox Laughton, whose interest in the 
subject, not ironically, began to emerge during the three years Hall and Laughton served together 
onboard H. M. S. Excellent. That Hall was eventually succeeded in January 1889 by Laughton's 
closest friend and fellow service intellectual - Captain Cyprian A. G. Bridge - speaks volumes for 
the intellectual standard established by Hall and expected of his successors, who included Bridge, 
Battenberg, Custance, Slade, Ottley, and his son Reginald `Blinker' Hall. All of these men would 
later achieve flag rank, no doubt in recognition of their service as directors of naval intelligence. 
Had Captain Hall not succumbed at such a critical stage in his career, there is little doubt that he 
would have reached flag rank and distinguished himself in the Fisher era of British naval policy. 
What Captain Hall could not accomplish during his tenure at the Admiralty, however, was to 
overcome the bureaucratic opposition to his new department, particularly from his superiors on 
the Admiralty Board. He confided to Admiral Homby in January 1888 that the credibility of his 
department was being seriously undermined by his junior status, and hoped that a flag officer 
would be appointed to succeed him. 93 That his reports flowed directly to Admiral Hood and Lord 
George Hamilton, both of whom were lukewarm to the prospect of a formalised intelligence 
function, also insured that departmental products deemed unfavourable would be suppressed at 
the expense of their colleagues on the Admiralty Board. This is what seems to have happened to 
Hall's innovative force planning model in May 1888, when Hood and Hamilton initially chose to 
restrict the circulation of the report in favour of the political agenda of the Salisbury ministry. 
While the first draft of the report was given to W. H. White - the Director of Naval Construction - 
there is no evidence that the report was subsequently distributed to the other members of the 
Admiralty Board. That this report was kept out of the hands of the other Naval Lords was 
underscored by the fact that Beresford had no idea that it existed until years later. 
94 Such was the 
situation that confronted Captain Hall in the Admiralty in the late 1880s, which was only 
exacerbated by the salary reductions that appeared to be an act of retribution against the 
93 See Footnote 56. 
94 Beresford, p. 353 and 361. In his memoirs, Beresford refers to Captain Hall as `a most distinguished and 
patriotic officer' who in 1888 had `worked out the problem of naval requirements independently' of the 
Board. This he claimed to have learned only years later, for he never had any communication with Hall on 
the subject. 
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department. This is what finally prompted Beresford to resign his post on the Board, and to seek 
out another means to promote a heightened sense of strategic awareness in naval policy 
formulation. These were the two primary aims of the public campaign of 1888, the immediate 
cause of the Naval Defence Act and the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Implementing Strategic Ideas: 
Politicians vs. Professionals in the Public Campaign of 1888 
-93- 
INTRODUCTION 
Thus far in this study the naval members of the Admiralty Board, with a particular emphasis 
on the performance of Admiral Sir Arthur Hood, have generally been depicted as powerless to 
reverse the most harmful practices of their civilian political masters. Of these the most injurious 
to the operational effectiveness of the service was the annual budgetary process, where finances 
and not force requirements were the final arbiter of naval policy. Serving as First Naval Lord 
from 1885 to 1889, Admiral Hood cannot be excused for his decisive inaction in this regard, for 
he possessed the influence afforded to his position as well as the knowledge that past naval lords 
were willing to exchange `alarmist' assessments for increased naval expenditures and new naval 
construction. He was no doubt aware of the exploits of Admirals Sir Spencer Robinson and Sir 
Alexander Milne during the 1860s and 1870s, respectively, when both men attempted to compel 
the civilian leadership to accept the necessity of additional ironclad construction. Robinson was 
ultimately successful in this endeavour while Milne was forcefully rebuffed by George J. 
Goschen, the First Lord in 1873 who now served in the Salisbury ministry as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. ' The fact that Hood chose not to pursue a similar course suggests that he either 
quietly sympathised with the First Lord or was unwilling to subject Lord George Hamilton to 
`alarmist' sentiments they both knew were baseless and lacked corroboration from the Naval 
Intelligence Department. There is yet another plausible explanation for his motivations - Hood 
encouraged a decision environment in the Admiralty that was essentially resistant to innovation, 
which explains why he chose to suppress the Hall force planning analysis until the political 
atmosphere was generally amenable to the prospect of an extensive shipbuilding programme. 
Serving under Hood for two years on the Admiralty Board, Captain Lord Charles Beresford 
was well aware of the circumstances that confounded naval policy formulation in Britain, most 
especially the failure of the Board to formulate a coherent strategic doctrine from which to 
determine future shipbuilding requirements. In his memoirs, Beresford expressed his hope that 
the creation of the Naval Intelligence Department, under the capable direction of Captain W. H. 
Hall, would instil a heightened sense of strategic awareness that would manifest itself in 
Admiralty policy. `The efficiency of the whole service was, in my view, bound up with the 
efficiency of the Intelligence Department', Beresford observed in 1914, `because that department 
was created for the express purpose of estimating and reporting what was required to enable the 
Navy to fulfil its duties' .2 
His view of the department was so resolute in fact that Beresford 
eventually chose to resign his position on the Board over what he believed to be an effort to 
trivialise the work of the new department by reducing the salaries and the morale of the officers 
1 For more on this point, see John F. Beeler, British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1866-1880, 
(Palo Alto 1997), p. 95-96 and p. 152-153. 
2 Lord Charles Beresford, The Memoirs of Lord Charles Beresford, (London 1914), p. 353. 
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who staffed it. While the lure of the limelight may have encouraged his decision to resign, 
Beresford's experience with the Board no doubt convinced him of the necessity to arouse public 
support for reform in British naval administration. 
What followed was an extraordinary campaign undertaken by naval officers to pressure the 
Salisbury ministry to embrace the demands for heightened strategic awareness in naval policy 
formulation. The purpose of this chapter is highlight the activities of those officers who, through 
their lectures, speeches and frequent commentaries in The Times, succeeded in their efforts to 
ensure that key policy choices were reflective of the strategic ideas preponderant in mainstream 
naval professional opinion. It is divided into four main sections. The first section considers the 
aftermath of the Beresford resignation, with particular emphasis upon the attempts made by 
politicians and professionals to manipulate the press in support of their contradictory assessments 
of British naval capabilities and the logic behind them. It is here where the absence of strategic 
thinking is most apparent in the creative statistics supplied by Hamilton, who between January 
and June 1888 was unable to deflect widespread criticism of the naval tonnage calculations he 
used to assess comparative naval strength and formulate Admiralty shipbuilding requirements. 
The next section highlights the insertion of strategic ideas into the debate unfolding in the 
press and at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), where in May 1888 Admiral P. H. 
Colomb advocated a return to the core strategic principles illustrated in British naval history and 
which remained relevant to contemporary policy settings. The third section emphasises the extent 
to which the campaign became increasingly organised among prominent naval officers and 
interested parties in the private sector, whose activities culminated in the City National Defence 
Meeting in June 1888. Of particular interest here is the role of Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps 
Homby, whose increased presence during this stage of the campaign was deemed critical by 
Beresford, Colomb and Captain C. C. P. Fitzgerald, the three principal spokesmen in favour of a 
new era of British naval policy. Finally, the chapter concludes with the policy deliberations that 
resulted from the ideas and actions of these naval officers, most notably the articulation of 
strategic policy in the Admiralty in July 1888 and the shipbuilding programme that later became 
authorised by the Naval Defence Act. 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE BERESFORD RESIGNATION 
Captain Lord Charles Beresford officially tendered his resignation on 9 January 1888, an event 
that prompted a collective sigh of relief from the Salisbury ministry. Within a few days, however, 
his resignation received widespread attention from the political press in Britain, most especially 
from the editors of the St. James Gazette and The Times. Beresford, after all, was the first major 
defection from the Salisbury ministry since the resignation of Randolph Churchill in 1886, who 
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resigned his portfolio as Chancellor of the Exchequer in opposition to Salisbury's refusal to 
reduce the service budgets beyond prescribed levels of expenditure. 3 In the absence of a 
statement from either the Admiralty or from Beresford himself, the daily journals were left to 
editorialise and speculate as to the reasons that prompted his departure. The editor of the St. 
James Gazette, Frederick Greenwood, opined confidently that `Lord Charles Beresford 
understands his business. He knows what he wants because he knows what the Navy wants; and 
if - as is highly probable - he has spoken his mind with great freedom; if he has been 
uncompromising and even rudely so, it is because he is convinced that what the Navy wants it 
wants very badly indeed' .4 
Although The Times and its editor, G. E. Buckle, were generally supportive of the Salisbury 
ministry, he too sided with Beresford and portrayed the Admiralty as `too snug a nest of well-paid 
officials and comfortable sinecurists' who perform little or no work in return for generous 
salaries-5 The most widely circulated daily journal in London, The Times also reserved 
considerable space for letters written by senior naval officers who approved of the action taken by 
Beresford. Admiral Sir George Eliot, for example, predicted that `the entire naval service will 
admire.. . the almost solitary instance of an officer abandoning the sweets of the office and 
incurring the displeasure of bigoted politicians and breaking up friendly ties out of devotion for 
the service which he belongs, and of which he is so bright an ornament'. 6 Perhaps the most 
insightful letter, however, was published in the St. James Gazette and written anonymously by an 
obvious Admiralty insider and fellow supporter of the work of the Naval Intelligence Department. 
Lord Charles Beresford represents a strong body of opinion, not only inside but outside 
the Admiralty, hostile to what they consider the parsimonious policy of politicians who 
look more to small savings than to the efficiency of the Navy. The issue between the two 
camps has been taken upon what Lord Charles regards as the most important department 
in the Admiralty - the Intelligence Department; but it is not so much the department that 
is in question, as the whole policy of which the treatment of it by the political authorities 
is an example. It may be that in this particular matter Lord Charles is wrong - upon that it 
is unnecessary to express an opinion. Certainly his opponents will be able to make out a 
plausible case in favour of the reduction [of the intelligence department]. But, on the 
other hand, I for one consider that he is right in the great importance he attaches to the 
efficiency of the department, and that he has chosen a good point on which to raise the 
whole question of the efficiency of the Navy generally. 7 
Beresford's first comments about his resignation appeared in a speech to his constituency of 
East Marylebone at the end of January. Beside him on the dais was Admiral Homby, an officer 
so highly regarded throughout his career that he posthumously earned the distinction of being 
3 For more on the Churchill resignation, see Andrew Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, (London 1999), 
pp. 407-422. 
St. James Gazette, 19 January 1888, p. 3. 
5 The Times, 27 January 1888, p. 9. 
6 The Times, 3 February 1888, p. 7. 
St. Jame's Gazette, 25 January 1888, p. 4. 
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`universally recognized in the navy as the highest authority on naval tactics and naval strategy' .8 
Although he never experienced naval warfare first hand, Homby was instilled with what John 
Knox Laughton called `a very exceptional familiarity with fleets, but had also been the recipient 
of the traditions and reflections of past generations'. 9 For this reason, he was known throughout 
the service as `Uncle Geoff, and his admirers frequently sought his counsel on a variety of naval 
subjects. 10 Those who corresponded with him represented the elite of the British naval 
establishment, among them Laughton, Bridge, Colomb, Hall, Custance, Fisher and Tryon. It is 
thus not surprising why Beresford appealed to Hornby for his support and presence at the meeting 
with his constituents. `Please come and support me by your presence', Beresford wrote to 
Hornby on 22 January, `and I may ask you to say a few words if you support my views as 
expressed.... You know the case. I protest against a system of administration that reduced our 
Navy to such a state of disorganisation that we could not have used what we have got'. " 
Unfortunately for the historian, Hornby's statement in favour of Beresford was not recorded for 
purposes of posterity, but the overall theme of his remarks was captured in subsequent 
correspondence between the two men. `I felt quite proud when you said that I had another 
constituency: The Navy', Beresford wrote to Homby on the day following his speech. `My 
whole object has been and will be to give expression to the views I believe to be those of the 
service. I do hope it may do good. But I shall peg away in Parliament and keep it going as well 
as I can'. 12 
The Response from the Admiralty 
The controversy brewing over the Beresford resignation could not have come at a more 
inopportune time for the Salisbury ministry and in particular Lord George Hamilton, who as First 
Lord was expected to defend its naval policy when Parliament reconvened in March 1888. He 
fully expected Beresford to use his seat in the House of Commons as political platform from 
which to challenge Hamilton and the Salisbury ministry over the fate of the intelligence 
department. To pre-empt such a challenge, Hamilton decided to answer the allegations from 
Beresford with his own public speeches and leaks to the press. In a speech to his constituency of 
Ealing Broadway, the First Lord argued that `Lord Charles has resigned because he objects to the 
First Lord having supreme power, and because he considers that in a particular instance I made an 
8 Sidney Lee, (ed), Dictionary of National Biography, Supplement to Volume II, (London 1901), p. 443. 
Entry written by John Knox Laughton. 
9 Ibid. 
10 For more on Hornby's career and his influence in the Royal Navy, see Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the 
Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, (London 1996), pp. 184-89 and 279-283. 
11 Beresford to Hornby, 22 January 1888. [N]ational [M]aritime [M]useum, PHI/120(c). Emphasis in the 
original. 
12 Beresford to Hornby, 27 January 1888. N. M. M. PHI/120(c). 
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improper use of it'. 13 Hamilton also provided his version of the events that led to Beresford's 
resignation, explaining why the he approved the salary reductions for the intelligence department 
without consulting his professional advisors beforehand. In effect, Hamilton trivialised 
Beresford's objections to this action, and portrayed him as an intransigent Board member who 
was willing to resign over the paltry sum of £900 if the decision was not reversed to his 
satisfaction. '4 
Hamilton's speech also contained the politically expedient themes of financial reform and 
accountability in the armed services, which had been successful in the past for the Salisbury 
ministry. One area that he highlighted in particular were the dockyard reform initiatives enacted 
during his naval administration. `Perhaps you are not aware', the First Lord observed to his 
constituents, `that a great and much needed reform in this direction has during the last two years 
been quietly been carried out in the dockyards of this country .... Ships can now 
be built as 
expeditiously in the dockyards as in private yards, and waste has been stopped and reforms 
initiated in every direction'. 15 He referred to this achievement as the work of the entire Admiralty 
Board, which alone would ensure that the Royal Navy remained quantitatively superior to its 
potential adversaries in Europe. `By keeping the number of ships building within the compass of 
finance we are able to put the maximum number of men that be economically employed upon 
each, and we advance our building programme about 30 percent faster than any other nation in 
Europe'. 16 Finally, and most importantly, Hamilton concluded his speech with a mixture of fact 
and boastful prediction that would later become a recurrent theme in his speeches in the 
Commons: `Our relative superiority to other fleets is greater now than it has been for years past. 
Next year and the year after it will be greater still' . 
17 
In the weeks leading up to the next session of Parliament, Hamilton also leaked a 
memorandum to the press, which was promptly published in The Times and elsewhere on 6 
March. The motivation behind the leak was immediately questioned in Parliament two days 
hence, when Hamilton was asked to explain just how the London and provincial newspapers 
could have received it prior to the members of the House. 18 Hamilton was terse in his reply, and 
simply noted that the House members should have received it the same day it appeared in the 
press, but that `a mistake of an official' had prevented the distribution of the memorandum until 
13 The Times, 4 February 1888, p. 12. 
14 For an account of the controversy over the salary reductions in the Naval Intelligence Department, see 
Matthew Allen, `The Foreign Intelligence Committee and the Origins of the Naval Intelligence Department 
of the Admiralty', Mariner's Mirror, (February 1995), p 73-74. 
15 The Times, 4 February 1888, p. 12. 
'6 Ibid. 
'7 Ibid. 
18 Hansard, P Series, 8 March 1888, Col. 581-582. ZHC 2/285. 
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the next day. Hamilton also belatedly assured his colleagues that steps would be taken to prevent 
such an occurrence in the future. 19 
The memorandum, which was to be included in the presentation of the annual service 
estimates to Parliament, outlined the types and quantities of vessels included in the shipbuilding 
programme proposed by the Admiralty Board. What was proposed by the Government was a 
modest shipbuilding programme that was based on a number of factors, including the force 
requirements of navy as well as `careful examination' accorded to `the shipbuilding policy now 
being pursued by foreign navies'. 20 No allusion was made by Hamilton to the linkage between 
the roles and missions of the service and the forces required to achieve them; a quantitative 
comparison was all that Hamilton believed was necessary to reassure the public of the superiority 
of British naval capabilities vis-a-vis France and Russia: 
The experience gained since last year and the opportunities afforded during the time of 
making close and minute comparison between the strength of this country and that of 
foreign nations confirms my previous statement that our relative superiority is undoubted, 
and that we shall, if the present expenditure be maintained, each year increase that 
superiority. 21 
While Hamilton refrained in the memorandum from providing specific sums to be spent for 
each class of vessel, The Times later revealed that the total cost for new shipbuilding construction 
would consume about £2,700,270.22 Subsequent analysis of the estimates by Lord Brassey 
reduced this amount to about £2,667,000 excluding indirect charges. 23 Of this amount, 
£1,944,814 was allocated for the construction of two first-class cruisers - Blake and Blenheim - 
along with five Medea second-class cruisers and 2 third-class cruisers. What was particularly 
noteworthy about these vessels were their armament and speed, all of which were designed to 
reach or exceed 19 knots. 4 But what Brassey found most regrettable were Admiralty plans to 
spend £621,186 for sloops, gunboats and torpedo gunboats, which in his estimation were far too 
slow and `designed only for peace requirements, not suitable by reason of insufficiency of speed 
for the protection of commerce, and not powerful enough for the line of battle'. 25 Another curious 
aspect of the programme was the absence of any provision for first-class armourclads (late 
battleships), the Board having decided to refrain from building any more of these vessels until the 
completion of outstanding work on the five Admirals - Anson, Benbow, Camperdown, Howe and 
19 Ibid. 
20 The Times, 6 March 1888, p. 4. 
21 Ibid. 
22 The Times, 12 March 1888, p. 9. 
23 Hansard, 3`l Series, 9 July 1888, col. 694-696. ZHC 2/287. 
24 Ibid. 
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Rodney - as well as the four Victoria- and Trafalgar-class turret ships. 26 Thus, in total, the 
shipbuilding programme proposed by the Government would provide 24 vessels of varied types to 
the Royal Navy, most of which would contribute little to the wartime functions of the service. 
In leaking the memorandum before it was distributed to House members, Hamilton received 
an immediate endorsement from G. E. Buckle, the editor of The Times who exclaimed that `the 
statement of the First Lord is calculated to afford no little satisfaction to Parliament and the 
country. We may accept it as an earnest introduction of a new and more business-like spirit into 
naval administration'. 27 Yet, at the same time, the memorandum revealed a considerable lack of 
strategic vision on the part of the First Lord, particularly his inference that the Royal Navy in the 
future may be unable to protect the commerce of the country. `The conditions of naval warfare 
have so changed and are so changing from day to day that nothing but actual experience could 
justify any confident prediction as to how a thoroughly effective protection can be given by any 
fleet to a commerce whose seagoing steam tonnage is double that of the rest of the world? ' . 
28 It 
were statements like these that elicited concern among senior naval officers. `For the first time in 
my life I think', confessed Admiral P. H. Colomb to Admiral Homby in early March, `I am quite 
seriously alarmed at the A[rmy] and N[avy] Estimates. It is not so much the actual state of these, 
29 as the spirit which has dictated them that I am frightened at'. 
Colomb was particularly concerned that the service budget was framed without any 
consideration accorded to core strategic principles, which were reflected by a forward offensive 
naval strategy and the protection it afforded to the mercantile fleet in wartime. What was 
required, he reminded Hornby, was the provision of naval squadrons that would ensure `command 
of the sea' and with it the protection of commerce: 
[I]f we provide moderate blockading squadrons - proportionate to the number of ships we 
know to be within the enemy's ports - and a moderate reserve squadron at home.. . there 
cannot be any of these attacks feared. But if these squadrons are not provided, and the 
home reserve squadron is not part of a settled policy, then our ports will be blockaded and 
our people starved. 30 
Hornby was also beseeched by Colomb to further these views in a letter to The Times: `[Y]ou 
hardly know what an influence your name has not only on the Navy, but on the Country... '. 
31 In a 
similar vein, Rear Admiral R. C. Mayne (Ret. ), of late a member of the House of Commons, also 
26 The Times, 6 March 1888, p. 4. The vessels of the Victoria-class included the H. M. S. Victoria and Sans 
Pared, both of which were finally completed in 1890-91 and about the same time as the two Trafalgars - 
H. M. S Trafalgar and Nile. For more on these vessels, see Roger Chesneau and Eugene M. Kolesnik, (eds), 
Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, (London 1979), pp. 29-31. 
27 Ibid, p. 9. 
28 Ibid, p. 4. 
29 P. H. Colomb to Hornby, 4 March 1888. N. M. M. PHU120(c). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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wrote to Hornby to request his assistance in formulating an effective argument in opposition to 
the Government's representations about its naval policy. Assuring Hornby that the navy `counter' 
was unified in the House, Mayne informed him what he wished to accomplish: `I propose to 
endeavour to show the "system" - for it is that we must attack - is bad from top to bottom, and that 
nothing shows this more clearly than Lord George Hamilton's own speeches. Is there any chance 
you will be in town soon? As I should like to have a talk with you about it' . 
32 Hornby replied 
within days of the request, providing Mayne with data that prompted the latter to admit that 
`[t]hough I was cognisant of the fact that we were deficient in fast cruisers... I never realised it 
fully till I read your list'. 33 
Parliamentary Debate and Investigation over Naval Policy 
British naval policy and the Beresford resignation were the two foremost topics of discussion 
when Parliament convened in the second week of March 1888. Beresford, wasted no time in 
outlining his objections to the manner in which Hamilton and the Admiralty Board calculated the 
navy budget, with a particular emphasis on the failure to formulate a shipbuilding programme that 
took into consideration the wartime contingencies of the Royal Navy. Knowing exactly what to 
ask of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Beresford invited Hamilton to reveal the extent to which 
the Admiralty was prepared for hostilities with one or more peer competitors. `I challenge the 
First Lord to produce any plan of campaign, any plan for the protection of the Mercantile Marine, 
or any organisation for war whatever, except a defective paper on mobilisation. I know from 
experience they do not exist'. 34 Beresford also accused his former childhood classmate of 
devaluing the work of the Naval Intelligence Department, as it `ought to be the best brains of the 
whole Service, and the best men ought to be in it' . 
35 Finally, the former Junior Naval Lord 
attacked the manner in which British naval capabilities were assessed on the basis of numerical 
comparisons with France and Russia. He referred to this caustically as `the book-keeping way of 
measuring the strength of the Navy, simply by adding up two columns to see whether we had 
more ironclads than any other country'. 36 Such an assessment was analytically bankrupt, as the 
roles and missions of the Royal Navy in wartime far exceeded that of its hypothetical adversaries. 
In reply, Hamilton defended his observations as to the relative naval strengths of Britain, 
France and Russia: `I do not know by what means you can test the relative superiority of this 
country as compared with other countries except by taking the number of ships, the number of 
32 R. C. Mayne to Hornby, 15 February 1888. N. M. M. PH /120(c). 
33 R. C. Mayne to Hornby, 1 March 1888. N. M. M. PHI/120(c). 
34 Hansard, 3'l Series, 12 March 1888, Col. 933. ZHC 2/285. See also The Times, 13 March 1888, p. 7. 
35 Ibid., Col. 945. 
36 Ibid., Col. 938. 
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men, and the guns, which those respective countries have'. 37 He implored his colleagues to accept 
the fact that `our relative superiority as far as fighting power is concerned is established, and that 
if we continue upon our programme we shall continue to make a greater advance in superiority' . 
38 
What Hamilton failed to address to their satisfaction, however, was their concern over whether or 
not British naval capabilities were indeed sufficient when considering the vast roles and missions 
of the service in wartime. Captain Penrose Fitzgerald, R. N., M. P., reminded the First Lord of a 
point that to him was seemingly lost in quantitative comparisons, that being the indisputable fact 
that in the past `England occupied a different position from other nations with regard to her 
Navy.... Of such importance to England was the command of the sea that it was little short of 
madness not to be assured that our Navy was able to perform all the duties which would be 
required of it'. 39 Equally unconvinced was Captain John Colomb, R. M. A., who in his own speech 
sought to transform the debate into a general discussion of British naval policy. No doubt advised 
by his brother, Colomb reminded the House that the organisation for war must ultimately be 
fashioned according to the naval policy of the country, which in turn must be formulated by the 
ideas and experiences of their predecessors. The critical element to this policy was a forward 
offensive naval strategy and the doctrine of close blockade. With this in mind, Colomb called on 
the First Lord to reveal whether or not such a strategy was still advocated by the Admiralty. Only 
then could he and his colleagues determine whether the Royal Navy indeed was prepared to fulfil 
its wartime functions. 40 
What resulted from this exchange was agreement on 13 March to refer the issue to a Select 
Committee tasked with a mandate to consider the adequacy of the naval estimates. Appointed to 
serve on this committee were spokesmen for both sides of the debate, and included Beresford, 
Hamilton, Mayne, Arthur Forwood, Edward Reed and Henry Campell-Bannerman. With 
Campell-Bannerman in the chair, the Select Committee began its work in April 1888 with the 
testimony of Evan McGregor, the Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty. 41 In the following 
months, the committee would hear evidence from three Naval Lords - Admirals Hood, Hoskins 
and Hotham - in addition to Hamilton and Forwood. While the committee held hearings and 
heard testimony from both politicians and professionals in the Admiralty, the evidence it 
accumulated during its five-month existence was more helpful to the historian in 2000 than to the 
policymaker in 1888. In the end, the work of the committee members came to nought, as the four 
reports completed were neither conclusive or successful in remedying the weaknesses in 
Admiralty administration. 
37 The Times, 13 March 1888, p. 7. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Hansard, 3`l Series, 12 March 1888, Col 981-982. ZHC 2/285. 
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The same can be said for the work of the Hartington Commission, the origins of which can 
also be traced to March 1888, when House members demanded that a Royal Commission be 
established to consider `the extent to which our present naval and military systems, as at present 
and organized and administered, are adapted to the national wants' . 
42 The Salisbury ministry 
initially demurred at such a request on the grounds that the terms of reference were unacceptable. 
After months of sidestepping the issue, it was left to W. H. Smith to explain to the House that, in 
the opinion of the ministry, the proposed scope of the committee was so wide as `to render it 
impossible for any Commission to report within a reasonable period upon any of the points about 
which the House and country want advice and guidance. The terms of reference have therefore 
been restricted to those points upon which the greatest desire for inquiry prevails' . 
43 Reminding 
his colleagues that the commission would not consider the efficiency of the navy, Smith provided 
the terms of reference that were acceptable to the Salisbury ministry: `To inquire into the civil 
and professional administration of the Naval and Military Departments, and the relation of those 
departments to each other and [the] Treasury; and to report what changes in the existing system 
would tend to the efficiency and economy of public service'. 44 The Hartington commission was 
eventually formed in May 1888, but in spite of the `restrictions' in the terms of reference, the 
committee would issue two reports - one in 1889 and the other in 1890 - both of which were 
preceded by the passage of the Naval Defence Act. 45 
Thus, with the formation of the Select Committee in March and the prospect for a Royal 
commission to follow, House members turned their attention to other matters requiring debate and 
legislation, chief among them was the lingering controversy over the question of home rule in 
Ireland. 46 This, however, had little effect in discouraging the tit for tat between politicians and 
professionals. The exchanges generally followed a similar pattern that normally began with 
speeches by either Hamilton and Forwood, in full expectation that their comments would be 
printed in The Times on the following day. This was normally followed by letters published in 
The Times, written either by Beresford himself or other prominent naval officers and fellow 
parliamentarians who supported his views. A typical exchange of this type first occurred at the 
end of month, when on 21 March Hamilton was invited to speak at the annual dinner of the Royal 
Institute of Naval Architects. With Beresford and Admiral Colomb in attendance, the First Lord 
42 The Times, 17 April 1888, p. 6. 
43 The Times, 5 May 1888, p. 9 
44Ibid. 
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commented that, `great as was the experience of the naval officers in matters needing 
administration, there were many which were in the main civil, and of which the naval officers had 
not the monopoly of experience'. 47 With references to more facts and figures, Hamilton claimed 
that his representations should be enough to assuage the sceptics of his administration, and even 
went so far as to assure his audience that British naval capabilities were sufficient `to guard the 
nation against risk of danger from any hostile combination'. 48 Forwood would continue this 
theme two days later, when he was asked to address the annual dinner of the London Chamber of 
Commerce. He dismissed the `exaggerated' charges that were being made against the Admiralty, 
and insisted that British naval capabilities were sufficient `to cope with any reasonable 
combination of foreign powers'. 9 As evidence, Forwood cited the `battleship-gap' that existed 
between Britain, France and Russia. He claimed that Britain possessed 34 battleships at the end 
of 1887, whereas France and Russia together possessed only 26 battleships. This disparity in the 
so number of capital ships was not expected to change in the near future. 
As expected, the two speeches provoked a lengthy response from Beresford. In a letter to The 
Times and published on 26 March, the former Junior Naval Lord took particular exception to the 
comments made by Forwood, who as the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty was extremely 
unpopular among naval officers serving there. He cautioned his readers that Forwood was 
responsible for the financial aspects of naval administration, but in this speech the Parliamentary 
Secretary `takes the responsibility for the fighting efficiency of the fleet by making statements 
which the British public will think are made by a person who is entirely conversant with the 
matter on which he gives his ipse dixit'. 5' He again sought to discredit the comparison referred to 
by Forwood, suggesting that the numbers used were `totally and dangerously misleading'. 52 In 
his estimate, comparisons such as these were particularly fallacious when the Admiralty Board 
did not possess a plan of campaign to fight the next naval war. `But what is the use of flashing 
these comparisons before the British public when there is no organization or suggestion of what 
53 you would do with these vessels when you came to the actual test of fighting? ' . 
This was followed in less than week by a letter to The Times written by Captain C. C. P. 
Fitzgerald. While Beresford had been well supported by naval officers far more distinguished than 
Fitzgerald, the junior officer would later prove instrumental in organising the City National 
Defence Meeting in June 1888. Similar to Beresford in many respects, Fitzgerald shared with his 
47 The Times, 22 March 1888, p. 10. 
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more famous colleague a self-professed disaffection for inactivity and an underlying devotion to 
the profession. `Being of a restless disposition and failing to appreciate the charms of idleness', 
Fitzgerald would later observe in his memoirs, `I looked around for some object which might be 
at least innocent and perhaps worthy of my attention... and it was not long before I joined a gang 
of conspirators known as the "panic-mongers and chronic alarmists", who were trying to awaken 
their countrymen to the fact that our Navy has been allowed to fall in a state of weakness... '. 54 
In his letter of 30 March, Fitzgerald embraced the role of an `alarmist', a description he fully 
expected to be attributed to him in light of the attacks levied against Beresford and his supporters 
in recent weeks. He seconded Beresford's arguments against the numerical comparisons used by 
Hamilton and Forwood, that despite a 30 to 40 percent superiority in naval tonnage the Royal 
Navy still did not possess the capabilities to accomplish the roles and missions traditionally 
assigned to it. This, he believed, would become immediately obvious to the policymaker if he 
would `take the trouble to sit down with a paper and pencil and add up a few figures, and then 
look at the problem by the twin lights of history and geography'. 55 Invoking the lessons of 
history, Fitzgerald further warned that numerical comparisons of opposing fleets would not by 
themselves assure British naval supremacy in the event of war with France and Russia. As an 
example, he referred to the strategic situation that confronted Britain in 1805, when the combined 
fleets of France and Spain challenged British naval supremacy. The Royal Navy ultimately 
prevailed despite a numerical disadvantage, and the fact that it did so under such adverse 
circumstances devalued the use of numerical comparisons in assessing comparative naval 
strength. `In estimating what will be required of the British navy in case of war', Fitzgerald 
observed, `history will be a tolerably correct guide.... [A]lways bear in mind that our difficulties 
will be increased by the introduction of steam and quadrupling of our commerce'. 56 Finally, and 
most importantly, Fitzgerald implored his readers to reach their own conclusions in full view of 
the professional arguments made by Captain John Colomb and his less famous brother, the 
admiral and naval historian. 
THE WEIGHT OF STRATEGIC IDEAS AND NAVAL HISTORY 
IN THE PUBLIC CAMPAIGN 
Having retired from active service in May 1886, Admiral P. H. Colomb embarked on a second 
vocation that was merely an extension of the first, that being a former practitioner interested in the 
teachings of naval history and their relevance to contemporary policy questions confronting the 
Admiralty. The range of his activities during his retirement was impressive if not exhaustive, and 
the vast scope of his knowledge in naval affairs was unmatched by his colleagues still in uniform. 
C. C. P. Fitzgerald, From Sail to Steam: Naval Reflections, 1878-1905, (London 1916), p. 156-157. 
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Colomb was especially active at RUSI where, among service officers and parliament ministers, 
discussions in the semi-official think tank frequently turned on issues of naval technology, 
strategy and tactics. He quickly became a prominent speaker at RUSI, and the first of two papers 
given there in 1887 received the highest honour in the annual essay contest. 57 His reputation as a 
well-versed essayist and service intellectual now firmly established, Colomb involved himself in a 
number of activities between 1887 and 1888 to influence policymakers over the course of British 
naval policy. 
Colomb accomplished this through his lectures and frequent letters to The Times, whose 
readers undoubtedly included those in Whitehall whom he wished influence most. Aside from his 
lectures at RUSI, Colomb was invited by the Admiralty Board in March 1887 to continue the 
course of lectures in naval strategy and tactics at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. 58 He 
promptly accepted the invitation within weeks, his enthusiasm for the endeavour no doubt 
attributable to his perceived weight of the subject and the underlying imperative to continue the 
historical themes of his predecessor. 59 John Knox Laughton considered Colomb to be a logical 
choice to succeed him. `Always a man of strong literary instincts', Laughton wrote of Colomb in 
his entry in the Dictionary of National Biography, `in his retirement he devoted himself more and 
more to the study of history as a key to the many problems of naval policy and strategy which are 
continuing arising'. 60 
Laughton also referred to Colomb as an `untiring correspondent of The Times', as evidenced 
by his frequent contributions to the journal whenever he felt it necessary to offer his opinion on 
any naval subject receiving particular attention in the press. 61 His penchant for submitting letters 
to the journal was so well known in the service that he was derisively referred to as `Colombus', 
`Colomb-Inches', or `Colomb-and-a-half of The Times. 62 It was thus no surprise when Colomb 
responded to the letter written by Fitzgerald with his own, published in The Times on 5 April 
1888.63 `The allusion which Captain Fitzgerald has made to my views on this question will, 
perhaps, excuse me for asking a little space to develop them', wrote Colomb. 64 In it he aligned 
himself publicly with the positions taken by Fitzgerald and Beresford. His response was both 
supportive and didactic in tone, expounding on the potential of naval history as an abundant 
source of guidance in shaping British naval policy. This despite the transition from sail to steam: 
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`As I studied the past and compared it with the present, I found point by point arising and 
convincing me that the historical chain was complete, and that steam, so far from breaking it, had 
hardened and strengthened the links'. 65 
From his perspective, naval history provided the substantive rationale in favour of a forward 
offensive naval strategy and the traditional doctrines of blockade and coastal assault. Offensive 
operations such as these would ensure command of the sea, which in turn would afford adequate 
commerce protection and shield the Home islands from invasion. And the mixture and level of 
forces required to secure command of the sea was the same as in years past. `We require a naval 
force of the ironclad sort, or whatever may, in naval opinion, represent the line-of-battle ship of 
the past, in sufficient quantity to watch and render neutral the same sort of force which the enemy 
may be able to prepare in his great war ports'. 66Whether or not such a policy was still in force in 
the Admiralty remained unknown to him, a fact that he underscored by the questions posed at the 
conclusion of his letter: `When did we part from these old rules of naval war? And if an answer 
could be forthcoming - which is not the case - we should further ask why did we part from 
them? ' . 
67 
In writing this letter, Colomb was apparently venting his private frustration with the Admiralty 
over its failure to articulate a coherent naval policy, especially when the elements of that policy 
existed in the wartime experiences of their predecessors. Colomb fretted that the Admiralty 
Board was not only displaying a careless disregard for these experiences but had strayed from the 
strategic traditions of the service. His lectures during his first year at Greenwich reflected his 
desire to ensure that naval history remained the common currency of naval strategy and tactics. 
The underlying themes of these lectures were ultimately reflected in the questions he prepared for 
the final course examination. He sent them to Admiral Homby in May 1888, knowing all too 
well that his old patron would appreciate his endeavours at the College: 
1. Explain the effect of the growth of sea-borne commerce on the course of naval war. 
2. What is the nature of "Convoy", and how has it been carried on for outward and 
homeward bound commerce? Show where it has failed, and consider its application 
to present conditions of commerce. 
3. Define and illustrate by historical examples what is meant by the "Command of the 
Sea", and how it is asserted and maintained. 
4. Trace the principles of "Blockade", and consider its application to existing 
conditions. 68 
64 P. H. Colomb, The Times, 5 April 1888, p. 3. 
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Questions 2 and 4 were already the subjects of the two lectures Colomb had delivered at RUSI 
in 1887. The first, delivered in March 1887, was devoted to a larger discussion of convoy 
operations and their contemporary application despite the advent of steam propulsion. With 
Laughton as his guide through naval history, Colomb considered the efficacy of such operations 
in the past, and concluded that `steam is in every way in favour of a revival of convoy, and if 
nothing else prevented such revival but the change in the mechanical condition of trading ships, 
convoy in the next war might be expected to revive'. 69 In his view, merchant steamers were no 
longer the `helpless flock of sheep' that could be poached by faster unarmoured cruisers. 
Merchant steamers now possessed the requisite speed and, in some cases, the light armament 
necessary to evade capture by the enemy. Nevertheless, a formal system of naval protection for 
the slower steaming vessels was critical at the onset of hostilities. Instead of convoy operations in 
the traditional sense, Colomb suggested an offensive orientation whereby merchant steamers in 
the Channel would be protected by a chain of cruisers cooperating with one another through the 
use of signal posts. These posts would then be used to request reinforcement should the enemy 
approach the route with a superior force. Once the merchant steamers exited the Channel they 
would be free to pursue their own navigational course to their respective destinations, but would 
be strongly advised to possess light armament. British naval squadrons, meanwhile, would be 
concentrated on or about the narrow seas, straits and other strategic chokepoints deemed vital for 
protection. 70 
How the Royal Navy would ensure commerce protection in wartime was also the subject of his 
second lecture at RUSI two months later, when Colomb provided a reassessment of the strategic 
doctrine of close blockade, which was again in favour in naval policy circles. The crux of his 
arguments were again rooted in the lessons of naval history, which he believed were equally 
relevant in contemporary policy settings: `[I]t is impossible to form correct views of the present 
and future of naval warfare unless they are based on a pretty thorough investigation of its history 
in the past'. " In so doing, Colomb distinguished between three different forms of blockade, which 
he termed `Sealing-Up', `Observation' and `Masking'. With a number of historical examples at 
hand, Colomb conceded that British naval blockades were no longer impenetrable, due to mainly 
to the advent of steam propulsion and fast cruisers that could exceed 20 knots. As a result, British 
naval squadrons could no longer `seal-up' enemy ports and prevent the egress of every enemy 
cruiser attempting to evade the blockade. 
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However, Colomb believed it was still possible for British naval squadrons to observe and 
mask the enemy fleet with a considerable amount of success. He envisioned the use of the new 
`torpedo-catchers' of the Sharpshooter class - with their superior speed and low draught -- to 
close with and observe enemy warships in port for the purpose of collecting intelligence on their 
intentions and anticipated movements. These specialised vessels would be detached from a 
superior force awaiting updates on enemy fleet movements. `In the case of vessels or squadrons 
attempting to escape', Colomb explained, `it would be less the duty of these [specialised} ships to 
engage them, than to hang on their flanks and continually report their movements by signal to the 
off-shore squadron, which would detach and concentrate sufficient force to intercept the 
runaways'. 72 In sum, Colomb believed that the close blockade was still practicable in offensive 
naval warfare, the purpose of which was to achieve and exploit command of the sea. As the 
importance of command of the sea was often taken for granted by British policymakers, Colomb 
concluded his lecture with an ominous warning: `Keep command of the sea as you value your 
national life. With it you can do everything. Without it you will be blotted out from the list of 
73 great countries' . 
Strategic Awareness and the Higher Policy of Defence 
Thus, in the course of two lectures in 1887, Colomb provided the Admiralty with the broad 
outlines of a strategic policy from which to base future shipbuilding requirements. That this did 
not happen only reinforced his perception that the Admiralty Board had failed to grasp the 
importance of strategic thinking in naval policy formulation. With his penchant for sharing his 
views with others, it would have therefore been impossible for Admiral Colomb to resist the 
temptation to comment further on a debate that, at this point, was limited mainly to the exchanges 
between Lord Charles Beresford and Lord George Hamilton. In May 1888, Colomb again 
returned to the lecture podium at RUSI, a forum that he was accustomed to and where his 
audience undoubtedly included a mixture of well-connected politicians and professionals. The 
seemingly innocuous title of the paper - `The Naval Defences of the United Kingdom' - hinted 
strongly at general overview of the subject, but in actuality Colomb had prepared a tightly argued 
case in favour of the core strategic principles that traditionally shaped key policy decisions in 
wartime. 
He presented these arguments by comparing two naval strategies exemplified in British naval 
history, which he credited to Lord St. Vincent and Lord Howe. Colomb argued that St. Vincent 
favoured a forward offensive naval strategy where British naval squadrons blockaded the ports of 
72 Ibid., p. 75 1. 
73 Ibid., p. 752. 
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their French and Spanish adversaries. This was considered by him to be the first line of defence; 
the second and third lines of defence consisted of an ample reserve squadron and two auxiliary 
squadrons, respectively. In contrast, Lord Howe believed that blockading operations conferred an 
undue advantage to the enemy, especially when considering the materiel and physical hardships 
that inevitably result from the protracted nature of such operations. As a result, Howe adopted a 
naval strategy along a defensive orientation, preferring in 1793 to base the grand fleet at Torbay 
and a reserve fleet at St. Helens. Only when it came known that the enemy fleet had finally 
emerged from its ports would the fleets be deployed for decisive action. 
Before assessing the costs and benefits of both naval strategies, Colomb posed a number of 
rhetorical questions, which in and of themselves are significant as they reveal his overall agenda 
and the real audience of his lecture - the Admiralty: `Now there are before us two systems of 
naval defence, one older than the other and superseded by it. Do we still hold by the system to 
which experience ultimately led us? If we do not hold it, why have we abandoned it? And what 
have we substituted for it? '. '4 Colomb then proceeded to outline his case in favour of the core 
strategic principles adopted by Lord St. Vincent. `I think it is imperative on us to prepare to adopt 
St. Vincent's method', Colomb explained, `and that solely on account of our commerce'. 75 He 
argued that the Howe system did not afford adequate commerce protection, as it yielded the 
initiative to the enemy and with it an opportunity to pursue a destructive guerre de course. On the 
other hand, Colomb pointed to the commerce protection afforded from British blockading 
squadrons. `When the system of blockade was adopted, the necessity for large convoys was to a 
great extent abrogated, and latterly it appears as if only the single privateer, or the very small 
group of privateers, were able to escape to sea and attack our commerce, which, to suffer, must 
have either been very slenderly guarded or not guarded at all. '76 
Colomb then turned his attention to recent trends in naval shipbuilding. He warned of the 
`strategical error' of building warships that were not reflections of a clearly articulated naval 
policy. He also referred to the construction of coastal defence vessels and fortifications as both 
wasteful and excessive, especially when a smaller number of ironclads - designed for purposes of 
blockade and coastal assault - would afford the same amount of protection. `The error we have 
fallen into arises', Colomb observed, `from forgetting that the strategy of a naval Power in 
command of the sea is necessarily diverse from that of the naval Power which cannot hope to 
have it'. " To underscore this point, he cited the construction of the coastal defence vessels 
74 P. H. Colomb, `The Naval Defences of the United Kingdom', RUSI Journal, (1888), p. 569. 
7s Ibid. 
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building in France as the physical reflections of a reactive and defensive naval strategy that 
automatically yielded command of the sea to Britain. Thus, for this reason, it was imperative for 
the Admiralty to formulate a strategic policy from which to base force requirements and a capital 
ship design policy that was reflective roles and missions of British naval squadrons. He made the 
same argument back in 1887. `[W]e want in our shipbuilding policy to settle, before we build the 
ship, exactly what she is wanted to do, and when we know what she is wanted to do... then I think 
we may proceed to build her on a proper design for the object in view'. 7s 
Colomb expanded on this point even further now, and he reminded his audience that strategic 
choices -- whether it be the strategic policies followed either by Lord St. Vincent or Lord Howe - 
must always inform and precede force structure decisions made by the Admiralty. It was 
imperative for the Admiralty in 1888 to make these important choices, and to pursue a 
shipbuilding programme that was reflective of core strategic principles. He argued that the 
situation confounding the Admiralty would be permanently effaced once a heightened degree of 
strategic awareness became a permanent feature in naval policy formulation. If achieved, British 
naval policy would again be guided by the core strategic principles advocated by Lord St. 
Vincent. `My paper is nothing but that I say in my own belief that the blockade system is the 
system which we ought to work for, and begin about tomorrow, and to build our ships on purpose 
for it' . 
79 
The public reaction to the Colomb lecture was considerable. The Times provided expanded 
coverage of this `very important and striking lecture', which could only have delighted Colomb 
and the naval officers whose views he represented so well. 80 The editor, G. E. Buckle, proclaimed 
Colomb's professional arguments to be `logical, coherent and intelligible, and based on successful 
experience' . 
81 More importantly, for the first time since the public campaign started with the 
Beresford resignation, Buckle sided firmly with the professionals rather than the politicians in the 
Salisbury ministry: `[T]he paramount necessity is manifest of adopting a coherent, intelligible, 
and adequate scheme of naval policy, adopted with the utmost nicety to such conditions of 
modern warfare as are determinate and leaving a reasonable margin of security for such as are 
uncertain and indeterminate'. 82 Unwilling to leave it there, The Times also published a lengthy 
article written days later by an anonymous contributor and appropriately titled `The Higher Policy 
83 of Naval Defence'. Most likely written by Laughton, the article applauded the Colomb lecture 
78 Colomb, `Convoys', p. 322. 
79 Ibid., p. 598. 
80 The Times, 19 May 1888, p. 11. 
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and endorsed his brand of strategic thinking as a shaping influence over the conduct of British 
naval policy: 
Admiral Colomb's valuable essay has prepared the way for discussion on the only true 
lines of bringing sober history to bear upon the airy generalities which have been 
plentifully scattered around. The policy which has been successful in the past, which has 
brought the Empire not safety alone, but conquest, may apparently be our guide today. 
We are here on firm ground at last and, starting from such a basis, it becomes possible to 
lay down the outlines of the higher policy referred to. 84 
Unwilling to leave it there, Admiral Colomb contributed yet another letter to The Times on 31 
May, in which he elaborated further on the value of the blockade and responded to his critics who 
doubted the effectiveness of blockading operations. 85 In this regard, he claimed to have secured 
the support of Admiral Hornby, who according to Colomb had considered his distinction between 
the three forms of blockade to be of paramount importance when formulating naval strategy. 
Returning to the themes he advocated since 1887, Colomb argued that blockading operations 
should be limited to the masking of the enemy fleet in their home anchorages. Again using 
France as the example, he envisioned a scenario whereby the Royal Navy would mask the enemy 
fleets harboured at Cherbourg, Brest, Rochefort and Toulon while sealing-up the commercial 
ports of Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Havre and St. Malo. With this accomplished, the Royal Navy 
would then undertake offensive coastal operations that included the mining of French naval ports 
as well as the seizure and holding of territory for use as forward naval bases. British preparations 
for these operations, if known to their potential adversaries, would certainly add to the deterrent 
value of the Royal Navy. `I know of one thing which would altogether prevent our indulging in 
these various naval pleasures', observed Colomb, `and that is that the whole world should know 
we are ready and willing to begin about them at short notice'. 86 All that was needed now was for 
the Admiralty Board to fully consider the implications of the naval professional arguments 
advocated by Beresford, Colomb, Fitzgerald and others over the past few months. In the coming 
weeks, their efforts would succeed in reshaping the political atmosphere in Whitehall and compel 
the Salisbury ministry to conduct its first cabinet-level strategic review. 
THE HORNBY FACTOR AND THE CITY NATIONAL DEFENCE MEETING 
At this point, the public campaign for heightened strategic awareness was limited primarily to 
speeches, lectures and letters written for domestic consumption in The Times. Aside from the 
literary exertions of Admiral Colomb, Beresford continued to write lengthy contributions to The 
Times and even expanded his efforts to include articles in the monthly journals. In his private 
correspondence with Admiral Hornby, Beresford announced his intention to write at least one of 
84 Ibid. 
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these articles per month, the first two appearing consecutively in the journal Nineteenth Century 
in May and June 1888.8' Numerous letters and articles were also written by Captain C. C. P. 
Fitzgerald during this period, who continued to write in The Times and the monthly journal 
Blackwood's Magazine. 
What these officers also had in common was their mutual regard for Admiral Hornby, whose 
public stature was enhanced further by his promotion to Admiral-of-the-Fleet in May 1888. 
Hornby had heretofore assumed a supportive role in the overall effort, providing information and 
professional opinions to those in a better position to argue the case on behalf of the service. Now 
he was receiving countless letters from Fitzgerald, Beresford, Colomb and others requesting him 
to assume a more active role in the public campaign. Admiral Colomb had already made a similar 
suggestion to Hornby in early March. Now it was the turn of Captain Fitzgerald, on 10 April, to 
make his own appeal: 
Write to The Times and stir them up; your name would have great weight, and they will 
all go to sleep unless the ball is kept rolling; the only way to make people pay attention is 
to keep on irritating them. A few isolated shots are not much good, but a steady 
continuous fire from all quarters might cause the country to think seriously of its situation 
whilst the day of grace still holds. The more one looks into the matter of our naval 
weakness even as against France alone, the worse it appears; and this is also the opinion 
of all three Captains of the Intelligence Department, whose special business it is to study 
the subject. 88 
Homby was a strong advocate of the intelligence department, and in particular Captain W. H. 
Hall, a fact not lost upon Fitzgerald given Hornby's recent editorial in support of him. Wrote 
Homby of the D. N. I.: `No one values more highly than I do Captain Hall and the remarkable 
work he has done'. 89 With this in mind, Homby agreed to address the London Chamber of 
Commerce on 28 May. 90 Beresford was asked to preside over the Hornby presentation, where the 
Admiral was expected to outline the shortcomings of Admiralty policy and the limited resources 
available to afford adequate commerce protection to the mercantile fleet. Beresford was delighted 
to hear of Homby's much anticipated address. `Perhaps your don't know it', he wrote to Hornby 
on 25 April, `but the whole service looks to you as our big man, and you can do more than all of 
us together to drive the nails home that reformers are striking into the public mood' . 
91 Beresford 
also expressed his confidence that the presentation would incite public interest to ensure the 
adequate protection of commerce flowing to and from Britain. `Your paper will give a 
87 Lord Charles Beresford, `The Admiralty Confusion and its Cure', Nineteenth Century, (May 1888); and 
idem., `Imperial Safety: A Workable Admiralty', Nineteenth Century, (June 1888). On his writing 
intentions, see Beresford to Hornby, 27 April 1888. N. M. M. PHI/ 120(c). 
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Captains Hall, Custance and Eardley-Wilmot, all of whom served in the intelligence department. 
89 St. James Gazette, 9 January 1888, p. 3. 
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tremendous feeling to the question of the defence of our mercantile marine. The present 
advertised system seems to do nothing till war is declared and then by personal experience of loss, 
to see what should be done on another occasion' . 
92 To assist him in this regard, Homby wrote to 
Captains Hall and Fisher in the Admiralty, seeking information from the D. N. I and D. N. O. in 
preparation for his address to the Chamber of Commerce. Both men promptly furnished what 
information they could to Hornby, despite a `special' warning from the Admiralty Board. 93 Fisher 
skirted around the warning, providing Hornby with a newspaper article that was written 
`independent of official information'. 94 
Preparations for the City National Defence Meeting 
During the critical months of April and May 1888, Admiral Homby also became involved with 
preparations for a public meeting in the City of London. The purpose of what became known as 
the City National Defence Meeting was twofold. The organisers of the meeting first wished to 
appeal directly to commercial leaders and businessmen, especially those from the maritime 
insurance and commerce sectors. Such an appeal was useful in the past, when in 1885 a similar 
meeting was convened at the behest of W. H. Smith, a former First Lord and current House Leader 
then in opposition to the second Gladstone ministry (1880-1885). 95 The results were budgetary 
increases in naval expenditures, from £10.7 million in 1884-85 to £11.4 million in 1885-86. But 
the motivations of the meeting organisers in 1888 varied somewhat from those of W. H. Smith in 
1885. While supportive of an increase in naval expenditures, they also wanted to reform the 
process in which naval policy was formulated by the Salisbury ministry. 
The idea for the City National Defence Meeting seems to have originated from Beresford, who 
first referred to the efficacy of such a meeting in late March. 96 But it was Captain Fitzgerald who 
served as the principal organiser with overtures to his cousin Henry Hucks Gibbs, the financier of 
the St. James Gazette and 1S` Baron Aldenham whose active participation in the Smith meeting 
had been critical in 1885.97 When the idea for such a meeting began to take hold, Beresford wrote 
to Hornby to secure his support and attendance. `I hope you will be able to attend and say a few 
words there too, as your name on the circulars will be such a tremendous strength to the object we 
have all in view'. Hornby's presence at the meeting was deemed so important that Beresford 98 
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dispatched another letter to him only days later, in which he again urged Hornby to attend and to 
convince others to attend as well. `Do go on and get others to go on too', he wrote to Hornby on 
27 April. `People are beginning to listen .... We are sure to win but it will take us a little time and a 
heap of trouble' .9 
Ironically, the trouble anticipated by Beresford arrived in the form of two letters from W. H. 
Smith, who attempted to quash the meeting on behalf of the Salisbury ministry. '0° His pleas to 
the committee organisers unsuccessful, Beresford and Fitzgerald continued their preparations for 
the meeting, with the assistance of three prominent civilians from the private sector - H. O. 
Arnold-Forster, John J. Jackson and Alex Wood. '°' On 10 May, the organisers requested The 
Times to publish a circular to publicise the importance of the upcoming City National Defence 
Meeting. The stated purpose of the meeting was to promote further dialogue on the subject and to 
demand remedial action from the Salisbury ministry: 
The only remedy to avert disaster is to demand from the Government an immediate 
inquiry into the strength of the Navy, and more particularly with regard to the urgent 
necessity of adding several fast cruisers to the fleet for the safeguard and protection of our 
mercantile marine, which carries out food supplies and raw material, and also the 
completion of our coast and harbour defences and coaling stations. 102 
In the days following the public notification, a second meeting among the organisers was held 
at the Cannon Street Hotel, which happened to be the site of the Smith precedent in 1885. Homby 
was in attendance at that meeting, and even offered to address the future City National Defence 
Meeting on the subject of commerce protection and the inadequacy of the fleet. 103 The organisers 
also decided at this meeting to request permission to convene the proceedings at the Guildhall, 
which required the approval of the Lord Mayor of London. The request was summarily rejected 
in no uncertain terms by P. De Keyser, who owed his appointment as Lord Mayor to Salisbury. 
Expressing the support of his principal benefactor in a letter in The Times, the Lord Mayor 
believed that the citizens of London did not share the concerns of the organisers and the objects in 
their view. 104 `On the contrary', remarked De Keyser, `I believe there is a strong feeling among 
them that the discreditable panic which has been recently created in the matter of national 
defences has gone too far already' . 
105 He therefore concluded that `a public meeting would, I am 
sure, have no effect whatever, moral or otherwise, and I can be no party to fomenting an 
106 unpatriotic agitation which is unworthy of this great nation'. 
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The Salisbury ministry was already attempting to minimise the potential impact of the City 
National Defence Meeting, especially now that Smith's efforts to quash it were unsuccessful. In a 
speech at the annual banquet of the Royal Academy of Arts, Lord George Hamilton refused to 
waver on his assessment of British naval capabilities and the proposed shipbuilding programme. 
`We are now stronger than we were this time 12 months back', Hamilton confidently observed, 
`and if our present policy and programme be not interfered with, year after year we shall continue 
to gain strength and to accumulate a reserve of power'. 107 With Beresford and Homby in 
attendance, the First Lord pleaded with them not to use their widespread popularity to incite 
public alarm. Instead, Hamilton suggested that these `distinguished and gallant officers' focus 
their energies in a more constructive fashion. `If they will only exercise their influence on trying 
to steady public opinion and prevent it from rushing to any ephemeral extremes', Hamilton 
concluded, `they will do much to permanently promote the efficiency of the service in which they 
are interested, and they will certainly do much to lighten that burden of anxiety and responsibility 
which must ever rest on the shoulders of those who are temporarily entrusted with the 
administration of Her Majesty's Navy'. 108 
Strategic Thinking, Naval History, and the City National Defence Meeting 
While it is unknown if Admiral P. H. Colomb conferred with the organisers of the City 
National Defence Meeting, to be held on 5 June 1888, his thought provoking lecture at RUSI on 
18 May provided the historical arguments in favour of heightened strategic awareness in naval 
policy formulation. As noted above, the overall theme of the Colomb lecture was well-received in 
The Times and elsewhere, and the publicity that followed afforded Colomb with the opportunity 
to further arouse public support for the issues that would soon be addressed by his naval 
colleagues only days later. But Colomb was not the only service intellectual who was active in 
this regard during these two weeks. Captain Cyprian Bridge wrote to The Times on 23 May, on 
the occasion of the upcoming Armada Tercentenary. 109 The purpose of Bridge's letter was to 
draw attention to the lessons to be learned from the Armada experience, and in particular the 
insightful comments of his friend John Knox Laughton at a lecture on the same subject at RUSI 
on 5 May. ' 10 
Heretofore, Laughton had preferred to remain outside of the controversy over British naval 
capabilities, but in this lecture Laughton alluded to what he believed was the core issue and the 
means to redress it. `Money will do a great deal, but the want shown is not that of money, but of 
107 The Times, 7 May 1888, p. 12. 
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intelligence, care, judgement and economy. In these matters, we should do well to imitate the 
great men in the past'. 1 ' Bridge went even further on this point, warning in his letter that `it will 
be a pity if we fail to learn the lessons which that stupendously important event ought to teach 
us'. 12 In his estimation, the most important lesson to be derived from the Armada experience was 
the overarching importance of `undisputed' command of the sea, from which the peoples and 
commerce of the Empire were protected from foreign subversion. It was therefore a strategic 
imperative for the Royal Navy to be well prepared for similar challenges in the future. 
`Notwithstanding all the millions the British taxpayer gives we are now farther from being able to 
do so than we were in the year of Poitiers or the year of Blenheim. At the same time our interests 
on the sea have enormously increased, and we are less than ever in a position to fritter away what 
should be devoted to their protection'. 113 
Hornby was well aware of the historical arguments posited by Bridge and Laughton, the 
themes of which were no doubt conveyed in the past by his close friend Laughton when Homby 
was the President of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich (1880-81). On 28 May, Hornby 
premised his address to the London Chamber of Commerce on the lessons of naval history. ' 4 
With Captain Lord Charles Beresford presiding over the affair, the Homby address was 
numerously attended by an impressive number of senior naval officers and influential politicians, 
many of whom would also attend the City National Defence Meeting in the following week. The 
address itself contained many illustrative facts and figures, some of which originated from 
Captains Fisher and Hall in the Admiralty, and coupled with a number of ominous implications 
stemming from inadequate commerce protection. The speech, while it succeeded in exposing the 
weaknesses inherent in the current system of commerce protection, was also extremely 
provocative and alarmist in the extreme. 
Homby framed his arguments around two principal observations, both of which were 
essentially borrowed from Admiral Colomb. The first related to the prospect that blockading 
operations would prevent the egress of all commerce raiders from enemy ports. This to Homby 
was also an unrealistic proposition, cautioning his audience that `on the whole, it is far more 
difficult than ever to prevent an enemy from putting to sea'. 115 The second observation pertained 
to the relative importance of strategic chokepoints in any system of commerce protection adopted 
by the Royal Navy. `The points of danger during war to merchant ships are, manifestly, those 
where they draw together, such as straits and projecting capes; their safety is in the vicinity of 
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neutral waters, or of points occupied by friendly squadrons' .' 
16 In sum, Hornby sought to evoke 
an alarmist sentiment that no doubt was intended to inspire businessmen and the public at large to 
support the views of the senior officer corps, the majority of which were in attendance to hear his 
speech. He was certainly the most `alarmist' of the naval officers active in the public campaign, a 
fact underscored by a subsequent plea from Beresford to tone down the rhetoric and the 
outrageous shipbuilding estimates. `Such demands, thought they may be right, will drive the 
country into thinking we had better take our chances as we are than go into any extra expense at 
all if it takes so much', wrote Beresford in October 1888. `The politicians know that and [will] 
play on it, as Forwood has already with great effect. And we shall get nothing'. 117 
Despite his alarmist rhetoric, Homby's presence was still deemed by his colleagues as 
essential to the success of what became the final act of the six-month public campaign of 1888. 
Homby had every intention of attending the City National Defence Meeting, but was prevented 
due to an attack of hepatitis. ' 18 For a time it was even uncertain whether `Uncle Geoff would 
survive his illness. His presence at the meeting on 5 June was clearly out of the question, but 
Hornby ensured that his prepared remarks were forwarded to the meeting organisers and read at 
the proceedings. 119 Despite his noticeable absence - Fisher likened it to `Hamlet' failing to show 
up for his own performance - the meeting went forward as planned and was attended by most of 
the influential senior naval officers, politicians and businessmen in London. 120 Among those 
present were the most senior members of the British naval establishment, including Admiral Sir 
Beauchamp Seymour [Lord Alcester], Admiral Sir George Elliot, Admiral Sir Edward Fanshawe, 
Admiral Sir John Hay, Admiral Sir Edward Ommanney, Admiral Sir Robert Spencer Robinson 
and Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton. They were present to hear the speeches by Hornby, 
Colomb, Beresford and Fitzgerald - the four naval officers who for the past six months conducted 
themselves as the principal spokesmen of the strategic ideas preponderant among the senior 
officer corps. Each speaker emphasised the importance of heightened strategic awareness in 
naval policy formulation, which if achieved would be reflected in key policy decisions in the 
future. The meeting concluded with a strongly-worded resolution: `This meeting calls upon Her 
Majesty's Government to take immediate steps to place the security of the country beyond doubt, 
and it is convinced that in any financial scheme that may be necessary to place the Navy and 
defences of the country upon proper footing for the protection of the Empire, her Majesty's 
tz' Government may be assured of the hearty co-operation of all classes'. 
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From the vantage of hindsight, the evidence suggests that the Admiralty facade, premised on 
the creative statistical comparisons offered by Lord George Hamilton and Arthur Forwood, was 
already beginning to crumble. On 23 May, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, E. Ashmead Bartlett, 
conceded at a meeting of the Primrose League that he for one `would not grudge any expenditure 
122 necessary to put the Navy or Army upon a strong or equal footing'. With Beresford in 
attendance, the Civil Lord even went so far as to acknowledge that `it would require millions and 
millions alone to complete this work'. 123 Within two weeks of this admission, Lord Salisbury set 
in motion a series of events that ultimately led to the formulation and passage of the Naval 
Defence Act. This never would have been accomplished, however, without the five months of 
letters, lectures, speeches and other forms of public demonstrations that occurred when naval 
officers felt compelled to rally public support against the Salisbury ministry on the issue of naval 
policy. While the Prime Minister may have been impervious to the opinions of the `service 
experts' he despised so much, as a politician Salisbury was extremely sensitive to the slightest 
change in the political climate and immediately embraced the demands for naval modernisation 
when circumstances compelled him to do so. That the political atmosphere was transformed to 
such a degree was largely the function of the public campaign of 1888, whose principal organisers 
were senior naval officers motivated by the strategic ideas they sought to implement in policy 
deliberations conducted by politicians and professionals. Whether they knew it or not, the 
primary focus of the public campaign - strategic awareness- was finally achieved on 1 July 1888, 
when Admiral Hood drafted an unprecedented shipbuilding proposal that reflected the outlines of 
a strategic policy drafted by Captain Hall and the Naval Intelligence Department. The immediate 
cause of the public campaign was now serving as the strategic conscience of the Admiralty Board, 
as it was originally intended to do. 
EPILOGUE: STRATEGIC POLICY AND THE NAVAL DEFENCE ACT 
The articulation of Admiralty strategic policy in July 1888 was the final act needed to 
convince the Salisbury ministry of the necessity for a new era in British naval policy formulation, 
where professional opinions received priority over political agendas. In that month, as noted in 
Chapters 3 and 4, Admiral Hood was requested by the Cabinet to `state the amount of force which 
he would require under certain eventualities' . 
'24 More specifically, the First Naval Lord was 
asked to formulate his response to three questions drafted after personal consultation with Lord 
Salisbury: 
" What is the amount of naval force necessary in a naval war between this country 
without allies, and France under similar conditions, in order to protect the coasts of 
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the United Kingdom against invasion or bombardment, and to protect the fortresses 
of Gibraltar and Malta, if attacked by the enemy's fleet? 
" What force is required to afford (1) reasonable protection to trade routes, and (2) 
relief to coaling stations if attacked by a fleet? 
" What is the amount of naval force necessary in a naval war between this country 
without allies, and a combination of France and Russia, in which case Constantinople 
would have to be defended? 125 
To address each of these questions, Hood relied exclusively on the framework that had been 
devised originally by Captain Hall in the force planning analysis submitted back in May 1888. 
Like Hall, the First Naval Lord advocated a combination of blockade and offensive coastal 
operations. In the event of war with France, for example, Hood envisioned the deployment of two 
naval forces, one assembled at Gibraltar and superior to that of the French at Toulon, while the 
other assembled at Portland and was superior to French naval forces at both Cherbourg and Brest. 
These two battlefleets would be constantly informed of enemy fleet movements by fast cruisers in 
close watch of these ports, and would be quickly dispatched to intercept French naval squadrons if 
the latter ever emerged to contest British naval supremacy in the Channel as well as in the 
Mediterranean. The overall objective here was to effect a close watch of these three ports and to 
achieve a decisive outcome if provided the opportunity to do so. At the same time, Hood 
conceded the likelihood that limited numbers of fast enemy cruisers may elude British naval 
squadrons and, for this reason, the Royal Navy was prepared to station its own cruisers along the 
principal trading routes and critical strategic chokepoints (ie., the Cape of Good Hope and the 
Straits of Malacca). Finally, Hood envisaged the immediate reduction of Cherbourg through 
coastal bombardment and the capture of Goree on the west coast of Africa, which at the time was 
considered to be a vital coaling station and a potential base from which French cruisers could 
launch attacks against British commercial interests. In sum, Hood argued that this plan of 
campaign would afford adequate protection to both the Home isles as well as the maritime 
commerce flowing to and from Britain. 
In such a war with France, Hood concluded that Britain possessed the requisite naval 
capabilities to accomplish the roles and missions outlined above. The Gibraltar fleet in 1888 was 
expected to consist of 14 battleships, two armoured cruisers, with two additional battleships and 
armoured cruisers to be added to the fleet by April 1889. Its Portland counterpart included eight 
battleships, one armoured cruiser and three armoured coastal defence vessels, to be augmented the 
next year by one battleship, five armoured cruisers and three armoured coastal defence vessels. 
Both fleets were to be provided with the `necessary numbers of cruizers and torpedo-vessels'. 126 
But in the event of war with both France and Russia together, these two fleets were hardly 
sufficient to accomplish the additional roles and missions expected in the Baltic and Black Seas. 
125 Admiralty Board to Cabinet, `The Requirements of the British Navy', 1 July 1888. CAB 37/22/36. 
126 Ibid. 
-120- 
These new missions required the diversion of forces from both the Gibraltar and Portland fleets: 
`I should propose to station at the entrance of the Baltic, if war broke out now, four battleships - 
two battleships from the fleet to be stationed at Gibraltar and two from the fleet proposed for 
Portland'. 127 While additional forces would be available in 1889 and 1890, from which to form an 
independent naval squadron for Baltic operations, there was still the question of defending 
Constantinople and the absence of a powerful reserve fleet to meet unforeseen contingencies. 
British naval capabilities were thus stretched to the limit in this scenario, which in Hood's 
estimation could only be remedied by a shipbuilding programme conceived `to place this country 
in a position to meet with undoubted success a combination of France and Russia in a naval 
war... '. 128 He included in this programme 8 first-class and 2 second-class battleships, 38 
improved fast cruisers of the Mersey, Medea and Barham classes, and 18 torpedo-gunboats of the 
Sharpshooter class. These numbers were scaled down slightly from those proposed by Captain 
Hall, who originally calculated a deficiency of 13 battleships, 38 cruisers and 32 torpedo- 
gunboats. 129 Nevertheless, the programme proposed by Admiral Hood represented an abrupt 
reversal of opinion, for only two weeks had passed since the First Naval Lord testified in front of 
the Select Committee on Navy Estimates that such a programme was unnecessary and that he 
wished only for six more fast cruisers to be built by the end of 1890! 130 
From this point forward, the only significant items left in doubt were the design attributes of 
the first- and second-class battleships. While historians have commonly treated the issuance of 
the "Three Admirals Report" - written in the aftermath of the 1888 naval manoeuvres - as the 
cause celebre behind the Naval Defence Act, the archival record indicates that the programme 
was well in place before the submission of the report to the Admiralty Board on 21 November 
1888 13' By that point, W. H. White, the Director of Naval Construction, had already submitted to 
the Cabinet on 1 November a memorandum outlining the five-year schedule for the proposed 
shipbuilding programme. 132 Only days later, on 10 November, Lord George Hamilton finished a 
draft of the 1889-90 service estimates, which included a discussion of the financial aspects of the 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 N. I. D. Report No. 149a, `Comparison of the Fleets of England, France and Russia in 1890', May 1888. 
ADM 231/12. 
130 Parliamentary Papers, Select Committee on Navy Estimates (1888), Fourth Report. 
131 The authors of this report were Admirals W. M. Dowell, Richard Vesey Hamilton and Sir Frederick 
Richards. Their report, while confirming the necessity of the new shipbuilding programme, has received so 
much attention by historians because it supported the resumption of the two-power standard: `[N]o time 
should be lost in placing our Navy beyond comparison with that of any two Powers'. The standard was 
quickly embraced by the Salisbury ministry and served as the underlying basis for both the Naval Defence 
Act and the Spencer Programme in 1894-95. See Hood to Admiralty Board, `Committee Upon Late Naval 
Manoeuvres', 11 October 1888. ADM 1/6926. 
132 WH White to Cabinet, `Special Programme for New Construction, 1889-90 to 1894-95', 1 November 
1888. CAB 37/22/30. 
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programme. 133 Finally, the Admiralty Board convened a special board meeting on 16 November 
to discuss the specific design attributes for the first-class battleships. 134 Invited to this meeting 
were White, Admiral J. K. E. Baird and Captains John Fisher and Lord Walter Kerr, in addition to 
the authors of the "Three Admirals Report". 135 What emerged from this meeting was a clearly 
articulated capital ship design policy, from which the first battleships of the pre-dreadnought era - 
the Royal Sovereign class - were subsequently designed and built. The Admiralty Board formally 
approved the designs of the new Royal Sovereigns on 19 November and, in less than a year, the 
first of these new powerful battleships was laid down at Portsmouth on 30 September 1889.136 
On 11 December, Lord Salisbury wrote to Queen Victoria to inform her that the new 
shipbuilding programme was formally approved by the Cabinet and was to be forwarded to 
Parliament when it convened in February 1889.137 With much anticipation and broad support in 
the House, the first order of business in the new session was a brief announcement by Lord 
George Hamilton, assuring his impatient colleagues that the Salisbury ministry would soon 
introduce the Naval Defence Bill in the following week. 138 The Naval Defence Bill introduced in 
early March sought to authorize the expenditure of £21,500,000 over five years for the 
unprecedented peacetime shipbuilding programme, the only difference between the original 
proposal submitted by Hood and the final version was the addition of four new cruisers made at 
the behest of the Cabinet. 139 The First Lord of the Admiralty also announced the resumption of 
the two-power standard and a new era in naval policy formulation in the Admiralty, where the 
roles and missions of the Royal Navy would now serve as the basis for future shipbuilding 
programmes. 140 In such a supportive political atmosphere, the outcome of the debate that ensued 
in the House for the next two months was never in doubt. After three readings of the Bill, the 
House overwhelmingly approved the popular shipbuilding programme, and it officially became 
the Naval Defence Act on 31 May 1889. 
Thus, in the span of a year, the Salisbury ministry was essentially compelled by a successful 
public campaign to reform how it formulated British naval policy, complete with a heightened 
degree of strategic awareness that virtually ensured that naval professional opinion would hence 
133 Hamilton to Cabinet, `Navy Estimates 1889-90', 10 November 1888. CAB 37/21/24. 
134 Admiralty Board Minutes, 16 November 1888. ADM 167/20. 
135 White and Fisher at the time were the Directors of Naval Construction and Ordnance, respectively, while 
Kerr and Baird were invited because of their participation and opinions about the 1888 naval manoeuvres. 
Admiral Sir George Tryon was also invited to this meeting but could not attend. See Frederic Manning, 
The Life of Sir William White, (London 1923), pp. 241-242; and Ruddock F. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone, 
(Oxford 1973), pp. 196-197. 
136 Admiralty Board Minutes, 19 November 1888. ADM 167/20. See also Mackay, p. 197. 
137 Salisbury to Queen Victoria, 11 December 1888. Excerpts reprinted in George Earle Buckle, The Letters 
of Queen Victoria, (London 1930), p. 456. 
138 The Times, 22 February 1889, p. 7; and 5 March 1889, p. 6. 
139 Hansard, 3'' Series, 7 March 1889, col. 1171-1195, p. 7. ZHC 2/295. 
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forward provide the substantive rationale behind key policy decisions. The Naval Defence Act 
that followed in 1889 reflected this sudden shift in emphasis from finance to strategy in naval 
policy formulation, which was due largely to the ideas and actions of naval officers in the 1880s. 
No where was this more apparent than in the public campaign that unfolded in the first six months 
of 1888, when prominent naval officers conducted themselves as institutional patrons of strategic 
preferences preponderant in the senior officer corps and which were rooted in the wartime 
experiences of their predecessors. Although the translation of these ideas from theory into 
practice had already led to a new brand of strategic thinking within the Admiralty, as evidenced in 
the planning documents of the newly formed intelligence department, an external pathway was 
necessary to navigate these ideas around considerable bureaucratic opposition to them. It was at 
this critical juncture when Beresford, Hornby, Colomb and Fitzgerald rallied public opinion in 
support of strategic awareness, the results of which were extraordinary for its impact upon how 
politicians viewed the business of naval policy formulation. 
140 Ibid., p. 1171. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In March 1889, the month in which Parliament undertook its first deliberations of the Naval 
Defence Act, Benjamin F. Tracy became the last of five politicians to serve in the 1880s as the 
civilian Secretary of the Navy Department. Within his first year in office, Tracy presided over a 
firm repudiation of the traditional strategic practices that informed mainstream naval professional 
opinion, the culmination of which was an appeal to congressional authorities for a formidable 
fighting force of battleships and armoured cruisers to accompany a forward offensive naval 
strategy. `We must have a fleet of battleships to beat off the enemy's fleet on approach', wrote 
Tracy in his annual report to Congress in November 1889.1 '[W]e must be able to divert an 
enemy's force from our coast by threatening his own, for a war, though defensive in principle, 
may be conducted most effectively by being offensive in its operations'. 2 What followed in the 
1890s was a unprecedented transformation of the naval component to American strategic culture, 
as Congress provided - though reluctantly at first - the funds for the construction of four classes 
of pre-dreadnought battleships. More importantly, American naval authorities were emboldened 
by the revelations of a new brand of strategic thinking, later made popular by the historical 
justifications of Alfred Thayer Mahan, that served collectively as a virtual blueprint for modern 
seapower formation in the United States. 
In the next two chapters, the cultural approach to historical naval analysis will be used to 
show how this brand of strategic thinking was used by naval officers to shape the rationale behind 
the decisions of 1889. This is in sharp contrast to the image of naval policy formulation upheld in 
the Mahan hagiographies, which for obvious reasons chose to overlook the contributions of naval 
officers other than Mahan in developing a new strategic outlook for the U. S. Navy in the 1890s. 3 
In actuality, the origins of this outlook precede Mahan with the founding of the U. S. Naval 
Institute in 1873, whose most active members quickly became identified as promoting a reform- 
minded atmosphere within the junior and senior officer corps. From their professional naval 
arguments emerged the intellectual underpinnings of a service culture that in time would revolve 
around the membership and activities of the voluntary association of naval officers. The most 
celebrated naval reformers of the 1880s, in fact, were also active members of the USNI. The 
individual exploits of Mahan and Stephen Luce are the most widely cited among naval historians, 
but frequently overlooked is a supporting cast of naval reformers whose own contributions 
warrant further consideration by scholars. Together these officers represented the intellectual 
vanguard of a service culture inspired by the notions of naval reform, strategic innovation and the 
lessons of naval history. 
' Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1889, (Washington 1890), p. 4. 
2 Ibid. 
3 For a sample of the Mahan hagiographies, see Chapter 1, Footnote 7. 
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The discussion that follows will revolve around the personalities, institutions and events 
which, between 1873 and 1885, shaped the process in which strategic ideas were inspired and 
then translated from theory into practice in the policy sphere. It is divided into four main 
sections. The first section explores the formation and early activities of the USNI in the 1870s, 
with an emphasis on the research programme to transform mainstream naval professional opinion 
through the activities of a semi-official think tank devoted exclusively to naval affairs. While 
lacking an official connection to the Navy Department, the USNI found in 1881 a critical agent of 
naval reform and institutional sponsor in the offices of the Bureau of Navigation. Accordingly, 
the second section will highlight the appointment of Commodore John Grimes Walker who, 
during his eight-year tenure as Bureau chief from 1881 to 1889, created an intellectual sanctuary 
for reform-minded officers from which to inspire, institutionalise and implement strategic ideas 
under the auspices of official research institutions. The lobbying effort required by Walker and 
others to develop, establish and sustain both of these institutions, the Office of Naval Intelligence 
(1882) and the U. S. Naval War College (1884), will be the subject of the third and fourth sections 
respectively. As in all of the sections of this chapter, the personal relationships and interactions 
between the naval reformers, the most important of which was that between Luce and Walker, 
will be highlighted to underscore the shaping influence of organisational cultures, as reflected in 
the ideas and actions of naval officers, upon the strategic and force structure choices embodied in 
the decisions of 1889. 
THE U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE AND THE INSPIRATION OF STRATEGIC IDEAS 
From 1775 to 1898, the naval component of American strategic culture was shaped largely by 
political and strategic circumstances that encouraged a strict defensive orientation. Until the 
outbreak of the Spanish-American War, American policymakers were continually divided over 
whether their country should consider a maritime aspect to its insular continental existence among 
its neighbours and rivals. 4 When it came to national security, the most divisive issue was over the 
efficacy of peacetime naval expansion, as American conceptions of security stressed strategic 
insularity and the doctrines of coastal defence and limited commerce destruction. What was 
eventually found to be politically acceptable was a small to moderate naval force to be augmented 
in the event of impending crisis, but in peacetime would be organised and equipped to perform 
only those roles and missions anticipated in congressional shipbuilding deliberations. There was, 
moreover, little incentive in Washington to develop a maritime strategic doctrine and dispense 
with the informal security guarantees extended by Britain and the overwhelming presence of the 
Royal Navy in the Atlantic. `For a century after the Peace of Ghent', an American historian once 
°A classic account of this debate can be found in Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval 
Power, 1776-1918, (Princeton 1939). 
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conceded, `the Royal Navy was the main shield of the American Republic against the distresses of 
Europe'. 5 
There was thus little incentive to depart from the American way of warfare that had remained 
largely intact for little over a century. 6 The situation was further complicated in the 1870s by 
evolving nature of naval technology, competing naval strategies, and the general absence of 
American naval thought. In response to these concerns, a self-selected group of naval officers 
formed a voluntary organisation in October 1873 for the purpose of providing a forum where 
discussion and debate on subjects of professional interest could be fostered among naval officers. 
In attendance at the organising meeting at the U. S. Naval Academy in Annapolis were fifteen 
officers, most of whom remain unknown to contemporary naval historians. 7 Among the original 
members of what eventually became known as the U. S. Naval Institute (USNI) were 
accomplished naval practitioners and service intellectuals, the most notable included Commodore 
hoxhall Parker, Lt. Commander C. F. Goodrich and Lt. Charles Belknap. 8 Parker, the chairman 
of the committee which organised the USNI, was well regarded in the naval community for his 
work on tactical problems, first set forth in Squadron Tactics under Steam (1864) and later in 
Fleet Tactics under Steam (1870). 9 Belknap, whose subsequent naval career remained 
unremarkable, became the most active of the original members after the death of Parker in 1878.10 
But even his efforts were quickly overshadowed by Goodrich, whose subsequent collaboration 
with Stephen Luce and William Sampson to promote the conditions favourable for strategic naval 
development will be explored further in this and the next chapter. 
At that first meeting, an executive committee was established to organise and schedule future 
gatherings of the group, which were to be convened once a month during the academic session at 
Annapolis. This proved to be most convenient to the members, as most if not all of them were 
faculty instructors or administrators. To encourage membership and promote the evolving aims 
of the new organisation, it was also agreed to solicit the support of the Navy Department. " 
Accordingly, a letter was immediately sent to Commodore Daniel Ammen, the Chief of the 
Bureau of Navigation who, along with Commodore C. R. P. Rodgers of the Bureau of Yards and 
5 Harry L. Coles, The War of 1812, (Chicago 1965), p. 271. 
6 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of Warfare: A History of United States Military Strategy, 
(Bloomington 1973), pp. 42-46 and 167-168. 
7 Roy C. Smith III, `The First Hundred Years Are... ', U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (known hereafter as 
USNIP), (October 1973), pp. 50-52. 
8 Lawrence Carroll Allin, United States Naval Institute: Intellectual Forum of the New Navy, 1873-1889, 
(Manhattan 1978), p-24- 
9 John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes, (eds), American National Biography, Volume 17, (New York 1999), 
pp. 19-20. Entry written by B. F. Cooling. 
10 Belknap would later serve on the executive board of the USNI in 1880-8 and receive first prize in the 
annual essay contest sponsored by the Institute. See Charles Belknap, `The Naval Policy of the United 
States', USNIP, Vol. VI (1880), pp. 375-391. 
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Docks, happened to be the Bureau chief most receptive to the concept. Ammen as expected 
endorsed the group and their aims: `There is, I think, nothing more likely to promote an interest 
in professional matters, or to increase the usefulness of officers, or their devotion to the service, 
than a properly organized society as is now initiated'. 12 Also requiring immediate attention was 
the nomination of a distinguished naval officer and educator to deliver a paper at the next meeting 
on such short notice. Upon receiving the invitation in Boston in late October, Captain Stephen 
Luce promptly accepted and prepared within two weeks a lecture on one of his favourite 
occupational passions - apprentice training in the navy. 13 While not present for the organising 
meeting the previous month, Luce was later credited by Goodrich for originally encouraging the 
formation of USNI. 14 This is entirely possible, as Luce was a frequent visitor of the Naval 
Academy in the 1870s and exchanged correspondence with Foxhall Parker; both of them would 
later work together in writing articles on a variety of naval subjects. 
In subsequent meetings, a constitution for the organisation was written and adopted by the full 
membership, which comprised 36 naval officers by the end of 1873.15 The constitution specified 
the official purpose of the USNI as `the advancement of professional and scientific knowledge in 
the Navy' (the addition of `literary' came in 1884). 16 As the senior officer in the service, Admiral 
Porter was recognised as the first President of the Institute, although he was quickly replaced in 
1874 after showing little interest in its activities. The most important clause in the constitution, 
however, pertained to the transmission of new ideas and their dissemination throughout the naval 
service. It specified that `whenever papers read before the Society, and the discussions growing 
out of them, shall accumulate in quantities to make one hundred octavo pages printed matter, they 
shall be prepared for issue in pamphlet form... '. " Later in February 1874, the pamphlet was 
referred to for the first time as the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, or known 
simply as the Proceedings. The format of the quarterly journal was to follow that adopted in the 
successful Journal of the Royal United Services Institute in Britain and La Revue Maritime et 
Coloniale in France. 
First appearing in print in 1875, the journal quickly became a popular medium for the 
transmission of innovative ideas, technological assessments and progress summaries, appraisals of 
foreign navies, and other policy-related contributions to American naval thought. Among the 
" Smith, p. 50-52. 
12 Daniel Ammen to Edward Terry, 21 October 1873. Reprinted in Ibid., p. 7. 
13 Terry to Stephen Luce, 28 October 1873. Luce Papers. N[aval] H[istorical] F[oundation] 
Collection/L[ibrary] [of] C[ongress]/Reel #5. The paper Luce delivered at that meeting was later published 
in the first issue of Proceedings. See Stephen B. Luce, `The Manning of Our Navy and Merchant Marine', 
USNIP, Vol. I (1874). 
14 Caspar F. Goodrich, In Memoriam: Stephen Bleeker Luce, (New York 1919), p. 3. 
15 Smith, p. 52. 
16 Ibid. 
-129- 
most insightful papers published in the Proceedings during the 1870s were indirect strategic 
discussions by Foxhall Parker, Captain W. N. Jeffers, and Lt. T. B. M. Mason, the latter of whom 
would later prove instrumental in the creation of the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882.18 In a 
paper published in the first issue of Proceedings, Parker related his sobering observations of 
American naval preparations and capabilities following the seizure of the American-registered 
Virginius in 1873 by the Spanish cruiser Tornado off the coast of Cuba. When preparing to seek 
retribution for the summary execution of 37 crew members, who were rightly accused of aiding 
Cuban insurrectionists, the Americans assembled a squadron off Key West for manoeuvres and 
quickly discovered that their vessels were ill-prepared and equipped for a confrontation with 
Spanish ironclads. Parker, who witnessed the manoeuvres firsthand, decried in his paper the 
dreadful condition of the assembled fleet, and suggested a remedial shipbuilding programme on 
the basis of functional specialisation. Parker envisioned a fleet of cruisers, rams and torpedo 
boats, all of which were expected to close with and destroy an enemy squadron off the coast of the 
United States. 
Similarly, in the same issue, Jeffers transformed a discussion of naval armament into a critique 
of American shipbuilding policy. The current Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance was particularly 
critical of the prevailing naval strategy and operational doctrine: 
It is very right that when a vessel of war encounters a superior force, speed should be able 
to make her safe, but the necessary diminution of offensive power should not be so great 
as to disable a first-class steamer from matching any vessel of her own class of inferior 
speed, but provided with a proper armament; otherwise its usual business would be 
running - fighting [would be] the exception! 
Although the large vessels of the Tennessee and Florida were constructed on the theory 
of cutting up an enemy's commerce and flying from its cruisers, yet it is repugnant to our 
nation to employ such large and expensive vessels for this purpose. 19 
Mason, in a lecture subsequently published in 1876, adopted a more creative and highly 
imaginative approach to underscore the near-term potential for American naval modernisation, 
while at the same time alluding to the consequences of failing to address the shortcomings in 
American naval policy. These themes were firmly present in two exchanges of correspondence 
between fictional naval officers, the imaginary conversations first occurring in 1880 and later in 
1906. The first exchange of letters takes place in the aftermath of `War of 1880', when following 
a disastrous naval campaign an officer bitterly complains about the inferior quality of American 
warships and the shortsightedness that resulted in the unfortunate outcome. `As soon as they were 
in range, we opened fire, but we might as well have been throwing peas at a stone wall, whereas 
17 Ibid., p. 60. 
18 Foxhall Parker, `Our Fleet Manoeuvres in the Bay of Florida, and the Navy of the Future', USNIP, Vol. I 
(1874), pp. 163-166; William N. Jeffers, `The Armament of Our Ships in War', USNIP, Vol. I (1874), pp. 
105-122; and T. B. M. Mason, `Two Lessons from the Future', USNIP, Vol. 11 (1876), pp. 57-74. 
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we received a number of heavy shells, some passing through us and some bursting onboard 
us... and our ship went down in no time 9.20 In contrast, the second group of letters exchanged in 
1906 describes a modernised American battlefleet composed of armoured vessels, cruisers and 
rams. Mason's main letter-writer also includes a rather detailed description of a modem system 
of American naval tactics, which emphasised the offensive advantages of concentration and 
superior firepower to engage and destroy an opponent approaching the American coastline. Thus, 
in the latter years of the 1870s, Mason and other members of the USNI were actively considering 
a departure from the strategic and shipbuilding practices that traditionally informed mainstream 
professional naval opinion in the United States. The Proceedings ensured that these innovative 
ideas were available to naval and congressional authorities in Washington, provided of course that 
the intended audience was receptive to the prospect of an American revolution in naval affairs. 
Still, however, it would be incorrect to exaggerate the influence of the USNI and that of its 
members in the 1870s. The USNI was indeed emerging during this period as an `informal guild' 
and a `lobbying body for career officers', as aptly described in a recent discourse on the 
intellectual roots of American naval strategy. 21 While membership in the voluntary organisation 
remained exceptionally low throughout the 1870s and 1880s, the USNI included within its rolls 
an exceptional complement of naval practitioners and service intellectuals. 22 From discussions of 
professional naval subjects arose a service culture that essentially defined itself around the 
primary aims and activities of the USNI. `[T]he absorption with strategy and ship design was 
ultimately a self-perpetuating concern, ' observes an American student of naval affairs, `arising 
from an inner circle of common intellectual interest.... Their world of thought and social activity 
was the realm of strategic debates'. 23 Among the most active members in the 1870s were the 
most celebrated naval reformers of the 1880s - Luce, Mahan, Sampson, Goodrich, Soley and 
Mason - all of whom shared an agenda that led them to promote the conditions favourable for 
strategic and naval modernisation. Yet the underlying influence of the USNI and its members 
were initially constrained in the 1870s for reasons due primarily to its minority status within the 
naval establishment. What was required was a powerful patron in the Navy Department, if not the 
department secretary then a Bureau chief who wielded considerable influence in the business of 
naval administration. 
19 Jeffers, p. 118. 
20 Mason, `Two Lessons', p. 58. 
21 Benjamin L. Apt, `Mahan's Forebearers: The Debate over Maritime Strategy, 1868-1883', Naval War 
College Review, (Summer 1997), p. 93. 
22 See `Annual Report of the Secretary and Treasurer', USNIP, Vol. XV. (1889), p. 166. It is important to 
note that in a 10-year period, from January 1879 to January 1889, membership in the USNI increased to 862 
members, an impressive increase of 595 members since 1879. Most of these new members joined between 
1880-1885, afterwards the rate slowed to an average of only 25 new members per year. 
23 Apt, p. 108. 
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A PATRON AND INSTITUTIONAL SPONSOR IN THE NAVY DEPARTMENT 
In the 1880s, support for the membership and activities of the USNI gradually increased 
through the growing popularity of the quarterly journal Proceedings and the themes contained 
therein. By December 1881, in fact, the work of the USNI received particular attention from the 
Secretary of the Navy himself. In a response to a request from the Institute to purchase 100 
subscriptions of the Proceedings, Secretary William H. Hunt ordered 50 annual subscriptions for 
specific use by officers in the Navy Department. Thus, while the order was only half of the 
amount suggested by the Institute, the work of the USNI finally received the `solid foundation' it 
sought from the Navy Department, especially now the department secretary extended his 'official' 
approval of Institute's efforts to encourage the `advancement of professional and scientific 
knowledge in the Navy'. 24 
But selling copies of the journal to the department was one thing; patronage beyond the 
honorific was something else. To translate ideas about naval reform into policy required the 
active patronage from a highly-placed department official with the power, influence and political 
capital to expend for the sake of small minority within the junior and senior officer corps. The 
USNI and the reforms advocated by its members needed such a person if it was to effect any 
progress toward a modernised fleet and a new strategic doctrine. 
Critical Relationships and Formative Experiences: Porter, Luce and Walker 
The most obvious choice was Admiral David Dixon Porter, the most senior officer in the Navy 
who occupied the `Office of the Admiral'. The son of Admiral David Porter, the younger Porter 
firmly established his own reputation during the American Civil War, commanding Federal 
blockading squadrons on the Atlantic and riverine forces on the Mississippi. In the decade 
following the conflict, Porter emerged as the most powerful and influential officer in the service, 
benefiting from the personal intervention of President Ulysses Grant and his appointment in 
March 1869 as a `technical advisor' to the weak civilian presence in the department. Although a 
self-styled advocate of reform, Porter made poor decisions that served only to inflame the 
divisiveness in service opinions, especially between the line and staff officers. 25 In June 1869, 
George M. Robeson was quickly appointed to replace the figurehead secretary, A. E. Bone, thus 
ending Porter's brief reign in the Department. His tenure as virtual department secretary 
unsuccessful, Porter continued as the head of the Board of Inspection, an appointment he held 
until his death in 1891. While he submitted annual reports to the civilian department secretary, 
Porter never again achieved the power and influence he exercised in the 1870s. `His position was 
24 W. H. Hunt to F. M. Ramsay, 1 December 1881; and Charles Belknap to C. R. P. Rodgers, 17 October 
1881. Both reprinted in USNIP, Vol. VIII (1882), p. xxviii-xxix. 
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anomalous and highly unsatisfactory for him', wrote the American naval historian Charles Oscar 
Paullin. `Holding the highest rank, he was subordinate to navy bureau chiefs in the councils of 
the navy. For years he seldom entered the department' . 
26 
But Porter never stopped in his efforts to influence the policyma. kers in their formulation of 
naval policy, and he maintained contacts in both the Congress and in the White House. In April 
1881, Porter wrote to President James Garfield, whose Republican administration was less than a 
month old. 27 He urged the new chief executive to shake up the department with the appointment 
of a fresh group of naval officers to replace the Bureau chiefs he considered grossly negligent in 
their duties. Once again, Porter's suggestions were not acted upon, except when it came the 
Bureau of Navigation, the most powerful of the seven Bureaus in the department. Porter 
informed Garfield that the current Bureau chief - Commodore William Danforth Whiting - was 
blind and totally incapable of performing his duties. In his place, he suggested the appointment of 
Captain John Grimes Walker who, in the opinion of Porter, was `one of the most ablest officers of 
his grade, noted for his administrative ability and integrity, and he will lend all his energies to put 
a stop to fraud [in] the Navy Department'. 28 Walker was notified of his appointment by Secretary 
Hunt four months later, and eventually assumed the position as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation 
on 18 October 1881.29 It was a position that he would not vacate until late 1889. 
Walker was someone Porter knew quite well. A veteran of the Civil War, Walker 
distinguished himself under his command in a number of naval campaigns, first with the 
Mississippi Squadron and later on the Atlantic coast blockade. 30 Porter considered Walker to be 
one of his ablest officers, so much so that latter was appointed to his staff when Porter served as 
Superintendent of the U. S. Naval Academy. While at Annapolis from 1866 to 1869, Walker's 
position as the personal aid to his mentor afforded him opportunities to interact with some of the 
brightest minds among the faculty and midshipman. 31 Among those present at Annapolis were Lt. 
Commanders William T. Sampson and William Bainbridge-Hoff, and Cadets T. B. M. Mason, 
Raymond P. Rodgers, Seaton Schroeder and Richard Wainwright. Their individual talents would 
later be tapped by Walker throughout his tenure as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. 32 
25 Lance C. Buhl, `Mariners and Machines: Resistance to Technological Change in the American Navy, 
1865-1869', The Journal of American History, (December 1974), pp. 703-727. 
26 Dumas Malone, (ed), The Dictionary of American Biography, Volume VIII, (New York 1963), pp. 85-88. 
Entry written by Charles Oscar Paullin. 
27 David D. Porter to James Garfield, 12 April 1881. Porter Papers, NHFC/LCIContainer #2- 
28 Ibid. 
29 John Grimes Walker to William H. Hunt, 8 August 1881. Walker Papers. NHFCILC/ Container #1. 
30 Dumas Malone, (ed), Dictionary of American Biography, Volume X, (New York 1936), p. 349. Entry 
written by Allan Westcott. 
31 Ibid. 
32 The contributions of these naval officers, particularly Sampson and Mason, will be discussed further in 
this and the next chapter. 
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The most important relationship formed at the USNI during this period was that forged 
between Walker and Stephen Luce. Walker's duties at the academy no doubt required him to 
work closely with Luce, another Porter protege who served as Commandant of Midshipman 
during the first two years of Walker's three-year tenure at Annapolis. As will be developed 
further below, Walker was more of a practitioner than a service intellectual, but his later 
initiatives to sustain the efforts of Luce and his supporting cast of emerging service intellectuals 
implies a commonality in thought - most likely in the areas of naval education and history. Both 
men certainly shared an avid interest in the naval operations of the Civil War, and it is unclear 
whether it was Luce or Porter who recommended Walker to a prominent publisher as a potential 
candidate to author The Gulf and Inland Waters - the last of a three part series collectively entitled 
The Navy in the Civil War. 33 In the end, Walker declined the offer to write the book that was 
eventually written by Alfred Thayer Mahan. 34 
That Walker and Luce respected and confided in each other is quite evident in the 
correspondence between the two officers. Albert Gleaves, Luce's biographer who knew both men 
quite well, referred to Walker as a `strong friend' of Luce who was `one of the most ablest 
administrators and executives the Department has ever had' . 
35 Gleaves also referred to Walker as 
`politically the most powerful man in the service', on account of his close relationship with 
William B. Allison, Walker's brother-in-law and a Republican senator from Iowa. 36 From as 
early as 1881, Allison served as the chairman of the powerful appropriations committee in the 
Senate, which controlled the Navy Department's budgetary allocations until 1899.37 
While it was clearly evident to his friends and colleagues that Walker was a talented and well- 
connected naval officer, Walker himself harboured certain doubts as to the future of his career in 
the navy. Like many of his peers at the time, Walker was granted a two-year leave of absence in 
1879 so that he could explore an alternative career in the private sector. He chose the railroad 
industry, securing a position with the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad. 38 During that 
time, he immersed himself in his new profession and had little contact with other naval officers. 
`I am digging away here at railroad work and I quite like it', Walker wrote to Admiral Porter in 
33 Walker to Charles Scribner and Sons, 4 October 1882. Walker Papers. NHFC/LC/Container #1. 
34 A. T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters, (New York 1883). 
35 Albert Gleaves, Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, (New York 1925), p. 172-73. 
36 Ibid. 
37 For more on the impact of the congressional committees upon naval policy formulation, see Robert G. 
Albion, `The Naval Affairs Committees, 1816-1947', USNIP, (November 1952). 
38 Daniel Howard Wicks, `New Navy and Empire: The Life and Times of John Grimes Walker', 
(Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation: University of California, Berkeley, 1979), pp. 38-39. 
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January 1880.39 `I rarely see a naval man and know very little of naval matters. I suppose it is the 
same old thing, no money and nothing doing'. 40 
This did not mean, however, that Walker was altogether indifferent about the navy. As the 
expiration of his leave of absence drew close, he confided in other naval officers about the 
prospects for naval reform, beginning with the present situation in the Navy Department. He was 
particularly hopeful in the months before the Garfield inauguration in March 1881, observing that 
`the best interests of the Navy will be served by putting into those places men not identified with 
the present clique'. 41 Writing to Commander Albert Kautz, who himself was aspiring to be Chief 
of the Bureau of Navigation, Walker clearly sided with the young reformers, even those that he 
did not know. 
I shall be glad to see the incoming Secretary make a clean sweep and make a fresh start 
with men who can spare some time to look out for the Navy rather than devote their 
whole to log rolling for themselves. I have been so long out here that I do not know who 
the younger men will unite upon, but you can count upon me to support "the ticket". I 
shall be glad to aid the good cause, or yours personally, or both at once .... Keep me 42 posted. 
Walker, incidentally, warned his ambitious colleague of the consequences of inaction in the 
event that he was appointed to the Bureau. `If you go into the Bureau of Navigation and don't 
show yourself to be better than Whiting', Walker warned Kautz in February 1881, `I shall be 
ready to vote to hang you and I shouldn't want to see an old friend strung up either' . 
43 In the end, 
such drastic action was not required, as Kautz failed to secure an appointment to the Bureau. 
Meanwhile, Walker continued to deliberate about his own future in the navy, and when time came 
to make a decision, he resigned from his civilian employment to assume command of the U. S. S. 
Powhatan. 44 Even then, however, he doubted whether his decision to return to the navy was the 
right one. In the days before leaving his employers, Walker apprised Commander [later Admiral] 
George Dewey of his apprehension, noting solemnly that `Our people here are very grumpy and 
as disgusted at my leaving them, and I am half inclined to think that I am making an ass of myself . 
Walker promptly arrived in New York in April 1881 to assume command of the U. S. S. 
Powhatan. The surviving correspondence between Walker and Admiral Porter provides little 
insight into whether or not Walker was aware of his mentor's efforts to place him in the Bureau of 
Navigation. His response upon hearing of the appointment suggests that he was indeed surprised 
39 Walker to Porter, 16 January 1880. Walker Papers. NHFC/LC/Container #1. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Walker to Albert Kautz, 8 February 1881. Walker Papers. NHFC/LC/Container #1. 
42 Ibid. 
4' Walker to Kautz, 22 February 1881. Walker Papers. NHFC/LC/Container #1. 
44 Walker to President and Board of Directors, CBQ Railroad, 9 March 1881. Walker Papers. 
NHFC/LC/Container #1. 
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by his selection. `I desire to most heartily thank you', Walker wrote to Secretary Hunt in August 
1881, `for the evidence of my professional attainments and for the very kind way in which it is 
conveyed'. 46 Porter was equally thrilled upon hearing of the appointment. In letters to Captain 
Luce, Porter returned to a common theme in their correspondence in the 1880s - corruption and 
gross incompetence among the officers who were tasked to advise the Secretary on naval matters. 
`If you knew all the trouble to get [Hunt] to do things you would wonder at my patience', Porter 
wrote Luce in the wake of the Walker appointment. `[H]e has some bad fellows around him, 
regular Samson's who are willing to pull down the gates of Gaza even if it causes their own 
destruction in the end'. 47 Now that Walker's appointment to the most powerful bureau in the 
department was assured, Porter was confident that the deplorable situation would soon reverse 
itself, to the point of overstating his own influence on departmental affairs. `[I]n 10 days from 
now, Walker will be in the Bureau of Navigation and Detail and then I can have somebody at the 
Secretary's side to keep him posted in my absence. Everything then will then go right'. ' 
Porter's confident prediction would only be partially fulfilled. Walker was indeed a 
scrupulous reformer who proved quite adept at promoting the interests of the service over the 
parochial machinations of the Bureau chiefs. 49 Upon assuming his duties in Washington, Walker 
and his assistant in the Bureau - Lt. Commander Bowman H. McCalla of the Powhatan - quickly 
became members of the USNI, ordering an additional 50 subscriptions in 1882 for use by officers 
in the Bureau. 5° Under his careful direction, the Bureau of Navigation soon resembled an 
intellectual sanctuary for the brightest minds in the department, and his unconditional support for 
the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval War College - both founded under his purview at 
the Bureau - created the intellectual framework and hence the conditions favourable for the 
decisions of the 1889. Yet despite the instalment of a Porter protege as a powerful Bureau chief, 
the senior Admiral was vastly mistaken if he thought Walker would serve as a mouthpiece for his 
own suspect agenda inside the department. Walker had his own ideas on naval reform, and they 
did not include his former mentor to any great extent. Porter would be made aware of this painful 
lesson soon enough. 
45 Walker to Dewey, 11 March 1881. Walker Papers. NHFC/LC/Container #1. 
46 Walker to Hunt, 8 August 1881. Walker Papers. NHFC/LC/Container #1. 
47 Porter to Luce, 15 August 1881. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/ Reel #6- 
48 Ibid. 
49 Correspondence between Walker and subordinates attest to his scrupulous nature during his years in the 
Bureau of Navigation. See, in particular, Walker to J. H. Stevenson, 27 December 1883; and Walker to 
C. H. Lyman, 2 January 1886. Walker Papers. NHFC/LC/Container #1. 
so See `Annual Report of the Secretary', USNIP, Volume IX. (1883), p. xxi-xxii. The first time that Walker 
and McCalla were listed as members of the USNI was on 1 January 1882. It appears that both men became 
members shortly after their appointments to the Bureau of Navigation in October 1881. For more on 
McCalla, see Paolo E. Coletta, Bowman Hendry McCalla: A Fighting Sailor, (Washington 1979). 
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Walker and the Bureau of Navigation 
Upon assuming his new duties in October 1881, Commodore Walker inherited the most 
expansive of the eight bureaus in the Navy Department, complete with the largest budget and 
contingent of officers assigned to it. 51 The Bureau of Navigation was originally created as the 
scientific bureau of the Navy Department. 52 As such, the new Bureau chief retained oversight of 
the Hydrographic Office, the Naval Observatory, the Nautical Almanac Office, and the Chief 
Signal Office. But Walker's power in the department was largely derived from the Office of 
Detail, which was transferred to the Bureau of Navigation in April 1865 to alleviate the 
overwhelming burden placed on the department secretary to issue routine orders to naval officers. 
Hence the bureau became known thereafter as the Bureau of Navigation and Detail. Walker had 
essentially inherited the power to assign naval officers to duties he thought they were most 
qualified for, sometimes with little regard for the seniority system that was supposed to govern 
such assignments. `I do not believe in putting young men in positions that are set apart for men of 
higher rank', Walker once informed a colleague in 1885, `but I do believe that where special duty 
requiring special knowledge, or special ability is to be done, that I believe the men best fitted for 
that work to do it without regard to their age'. 53 This prerogative would become particularly 
useful when the time came to staff the Office of Naval Intelligence and select the most qualified 
instructors for courses at the Naval War College. 
Shortly after beginning work in the department, Walker was accorded another significant 
administrative prerogative that was likely sought by the new Bureau chief himself. Secretary 
Hunt directed on 28 November 1881 that all reports, letters and telegrams relating to the 
movement of vessels be forwarded to the Bureau of Navigation. In his capacity as Bureau chief, 
Walker was further directed to account for the movement of all naval vessels, and prepare orders 
and instructions to be issued on behalf of the Secretary. This new directive was issued to the 
commandants of navy yards, commanders of squadrons and commanding officers of ships and, as 
expected, it caused considerable friction within the senior officers corps. 54 Captain Walker, who 
was bestowed the temporary rank of Commodore as a Bureau chief, now exercised the authority 
to assign senior naval officers to squadrons while regulating the movement of the vessels under 
their command. It was an administrative prerogative that Walker did not hesitate to invoke. On 
one particular occasion in 1882, for example, Walker felt it necessary to remind a flag officer of 
the relative importance of squadron evolutions, with a emphasis on the proper course of steam 
51 The other bureaus that comprised the Navy Department were: Yards and Docks, Equipment and 
Recruiting, Ordnance, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Provisions and Clothing, and Medicine 
and Surgery. The eight bureaus were established by an Act of Congress in 1862. 
52 Henry P. Beers, `The Bureau of Navigation, 1862-1942', The American Archivist, (October 1943), p. 212. 
53 Walker to Captain W. H. Kirkland, 5 August 1885. Walker Papers. NHEC/LC/Container #1. 
54 Beers, p. 220. 
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tactics. `In battle everything would be done under steam, and prompt and exact handling of a 
single ship might win or lose a squadron action. In these days of rams and torpedo boats, an 
officer should know just what his ship will do and in order to learn, he must practice'. " While his 
letter was phrased more as informal advice from a junior officer than a stem reminder from a 
Bureau chief, Walker nonetheless ensured that the recipient of his correspondence knew exactly 
what was expected of him and the squadron of vessels under his command. `I have no doubt of 
the great good coming from the present cruise, but I want to get all possible out of it'. 56 
Even his former mentor was not immune to the profound shift in power among the Bureaus of 
the Navy Department. The Bureau of Navigation was traditionally the strongest of the eight 
bureaus, but never before had departmental affairs been dominated by a single bureau chief, 
whose influence extended to critical personnel decisions as well as the movements of the fleet in 
peacetime. Admiral Porter discovered this new change in the internal dynamics of the department 
firsthand when he clashed with Captain Walker over the movements of the Training Squadron, 
currently under the command of Commodore Luce. Walker was insistent that all vessels fell 
within his purview, including those of the Training Squadron, while the senior Admiral attempted 
to argue that oversight for the training vessels should remain with him. That Porter was 
unsuccessful in overcoming a serious obstacle to reach the Secretary on this matter was captured 
in his numerous complaints to Luce, who remained neutral in the dispute between his two 
principal allies. `It is impossible to find an opportunity to talk to him', Porter wrote Luce in 
November 1882.57 `When I go to his office he is so full of people to whom he gives precedence 
that I have no chance to open the subject of the apprentice squadron and if I write to him the 
letters are handed to Captain Walker and that's the way the matter stands'. 58 Conceding that 
`Capt. W. is stronger than I am', Porter subsequently requested to be relieved of any responsibility 
59 for the Training Squadron. 
But there were indeed statutory limits to the powers of the new Bureau chief. As in the British 
system of naval administration, the civilian presence in the Navy Department was intended to 
reign supreme over its naval counterpart. Walker was thus subject to the whims of the civilian 
department secretary, whose discretion it was to countermand the actions of his predecessors. 
That is exactly what happened in April 1882, when Secretary Hunt was replaced in the wake of 
the assassination of President Garfield. In his place President Chester Arthur appointed William 
E. Chandler, a Republican from New Hampshire who had very little experience in naval matters. 
60 
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Similar to his predecessor, Chandler took a particular interest in naval reform, and was initially 
willing to afford Walker with the latitude to continue with the administrative scheme already in 
place in the department. Chandler even deferred to Walker as the Acting Secretary in his absence 
during the summer of 1882. 
But the professional relationship between the two men rapidly deteriorated, as Chandler began 
to question the efficacy of the scheme in light of some evidence of discontent within the senior 
officer corps. 6' Finally, in October 1883, Chandler sought to return the Office of Detail back to 
the Secretary's Office. Walker viewed the move as the latest in an attempt to force his 
resignation, but instead of resigning, the Bureau chief responded by appealing to his powerful 
political connections. He informed Senator Allison, his brother-in-law, that "I am just now 
undergoing the process of being frozen out. Chandler, who I think likes me personally well 
enough, has evidently made up his mind to take from me one duty after another until he forces me 
to resign as Chief of a Bureau'. 62 Reluctantly, Walker prepared his resignation to Chandler, but 
an accommodation between the two men was made - apparently at the suggestion of Senator 
Allison - whereby Walker agreed to consult more closely with Chandler in the detailing process. 
63 
Chandler eventually succeeded in returning the Office of Detail to his own office in October 
1884, in spite of yet another appeal to Senator Allison from Walker, the Bureau chief observing 
that `I don't know as there is any way of stopping it unless some pressure can be brought to bear 
upon him'. 64 The resolution imposed upon him was certainly viewed as a diminution of Walker's 
administrative prerogatives in the department, but it was only a temporary setback. In the first 
months of the Cleveland administration in 1885, Walker prepared an extensive memorandum that 
convinced Secretary William C. Whitney to return the Office of Detail back to the Bureau of 
Navigation. 65 In the meantime, Walker was obligated to consult with the other Bureau chiefs on 
personnel decisions, some of whom were quite jealous of Walker and the privileges afforded to 
the Bureau of Navigation. The antagonism between the Bureaus eventually boiled over in May 
1884, when a concerted effort was made by the other Bureau chiefs to reallocate office space at 
the expense of the Bureau of Navigation. It was essentially a parochial dispute, but the overall 
61 Chandler was informed of this discontent as early as May 1882. See C. A. Boutelle to William Chandler, 
30 May 1882. Chandler Papers. LC/Container #53. 
62 Walker to Allison, 27 October 1883. Walker Papers. NHFC/LC/Container #1. 
63 On the preparation of his resignation, see Walker to Chandler, 27 October 1883. Walker Papers. 
NHFC/LC/Container #1. The successful intervention of Sen. Allison was suggested in Wicks, `New Navy 
and New Empire', pp. 82-83. 
64 Walker to Allison, 16 August 1884. Walker Papers. N IFC/LC/Container #1. 
65 See Beers, p. 21 and `Informal Memorandum to the Secretary', 16 May 1885. Walker Papers. 
NHFC/LC/Container #I. Whitney issued an executive order returning the Office of Detail to the Bureau of 
Navigation on 22 May 1885. 
-139- 
tone of the memoranda exchanged between the two sides suggests that more was at stake than just 
office space. 66 
No resolution of the office space dispute was ever made by the Secretary, although Chandler 
seemed to side with Walker on the issue. 67 Notwithstanding the friction over the Office of Detail, 
Walker was surprisingly able to accomplish much during the first years of Chandler's term as 
Navy Secretary. While his role in the formation of the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882, and 
of the Naval War College in 1884, has largely been relegated to the footnotes to American naval 
history, Walker's timely support for both institutions in the 1880s was especially critical in a 
department consumed with parochial interests and power struggles. Aligning himself firmly with 
the service intellectuals he supported, Walker did not need to be convinced of the necessity of a 
naval intelligence function and of a postgraduate course for naval officers. And he did whatever 
he could to ensure that both institutions survived and prospered to the greatest extent possible. 
When B. F. Tracy announced his intention in November 1889 to design and build a fleet of 
battleships and cruisers along an offensive orientation, the aspiration of the new department 
secretary was not without a solid technological and intellectual foundation for strategic naval 
development. The Office of Naval Intelligence was the first instalment in a multi-step process of 
awakening naval officers, legislators and other interested parties to the prospects for American 
naval power, including its inherent value as effective instruments of power projection and 
deterrence given the rather complicated state of international relations. 
THE FORMATION OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 
At a time when British naval organisation did not include a separate department for 
intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, it is surprising to find that American naval 
officers were the first to remedy the void and establish an office for such a purpose in March 
1882. While their British counterparts in the Admiralty were for years accustomed to receiving 
piecemeal intelligence generally from fleet movements and were thus slow to recognise the 
organisational imperative for a formalised intelligence function, the American perspective on 
naval intelligence was not hindered by alternative sources of information from abroad. Other than 
scientific endeavours, occasional visits to foreign dockyards and unexpected opportunities in the 
1870s, intelligence collection for the American navy was an irregular and haphazard process with 
limited sources of information. American naval officers, particularly those attached to the Bureau 
of Navigation, were thus quick to embrace the concept of a formalised intelligence function, 
complete with a staff of talented young officers to procure a wealth of information on foreign 
naval capabilities and other topics of interest to the Navy Department. 
66 Bureau Chiefs to Chandler, 5 May 1884; and Walker to Chandler, 13 May 1884. RG 45/32/Reel #32. 
67 See Bureau Chiefs to Chandler, 10 June 1884. RG 45/32/Reel #32. 
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Mason, Intelligence and the U. S. Naval Institute 
Of those American naval officers credited with facilitating the formation of the Office of 
Naval Intelligence - hereafter known simply as O. N. I. - American naval historians generally refer 
to O. N. I as the brainchild of Lt. T. B. M. Mason, who was thereafter appointed its first chief 
intelligence officer. 68 Indeed, Mason's enthusiasm for intelligence matters can be traced to his 
duties while onboard the U. S. S. Franklin, then on station in 1870 with the European squadron and 
commanded by Captain (later Admiral) C. R. P. Rodgers. Rodgers detailed Mason and a few other 
junior officers to the task of collecting information on the naval organisation and capabilities of 
all the major European countries visited during the cruise. At the end of the cruise, in fact, Mason 
managed to obtain some leave in Europe so that he could learn more about foreign naval 
establishments, but his personal initiative was interrupted by orders to report for duty in the 
Hydrographic Office in Washington. 69 Rather than a diversion from his interest in foreign naval 
subjects, his new assignment afforded Mason with opportunities for further travel and study on 
hydrographic expeditions, some of which combined scientific exploration with economic and 
strategic analysis. This experience proved essential to the training of Mason and other future 
intelligence officers. `Indeed every important naval intelligence agent between 1882 and 1918 
served at one time or other on these missions, while four Navy hydrographers became chief 
intelligence officers', writes Jeffrey Dorwart in his seminal study of American naval intelligence 
during this period. 70 `This intimate relationship between scientific endeavor and early naval 
intelligence accounted partly for the scholarly, research-oriented nature of the first generation of 
naval intelligence operatives' ." 
Multilingual with a scholarly disposition, Lt. Mason certainly qualified as one of a select 
group of talented service intellectuals and naval practitioners, most of whom were desirous of 
naval reform and active members of the USNI. Mason was unquestionably the most outspoken of 
the latest generation of naval officers to graduate from Annapolis in 1868 or later. In a show of 
confidence in his abilities and commitment to the primary aims of the voluntary organisation, 
Mason was elected in 1877 to the executive committee of the institute, serving in that post 
concurrently with his appointment as an instructor of naval gunnery and infantry tactics at 
Annapolis. In the former capacity, Mason no doubt became personally acquainted with the 
perspectives of his fellow institute members and faculty instructors, which at the time included Lt. 
68 See, for example Jeffrey M. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First 
Intelligence Agency, (Annapolis 1979). A more recent account can be found in Wyman H. Packard, A 
Century of Naval Intelligence, (Washington 1996). 
69 J. M. Ellicott, `Theodorus Bailey Meyers Mason: Founder of the Office of Naval Intelligence', USNIP, 
(March 1952), pp. 265-266. 
7' Dorwart, p. 5. 
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Commander William T. Sampson, Professor James Soley and later Commander A. T. Mahan. 
Likewise, Mason was afforded an opportunity to expound on his previously exhibited interest in 
intelligence matters among other topics. He continued to write prolifically on a number of naval 
subjects, contributing lectures and critical essays for both the Proceedings and The United 
Service, the latter a new military journal that actually paid for the submissions of articles. 
Mason's first overt reference to an intelligence function was reserved for an article published 
in The United Service in April 1879. In the absence of an `intelligence bureau' in the Navy 
Department, Mason suggested that the USNI should serve as `the bureau of information for the 
navy'. 72 He encouraged his fellow naval officers, especially those assigned to foreign stations, to 
seek out opportunities to study the latest advances in foreign naval technology, perform their own 
scientific investigations of new designs, patents and inventions, and submit their conclusions for 
consideration by the institute and the subscribers to the Proceedings. Toward this end, Mason 
was hopeful that the USNI would receive some sort of official recognition from the Department, 
in a manner similar to the relationship between the Admiralty and the Royal United Services 
Institute in London. `The English Admiralty offers every inducement and facility to [RUSI]', 
explained Mason, `which is really semi-official in its nature; the facilities are sometimes 
substantial in their form, consisting of models, descriptions, official publications and data' . 
73 The 
institute could benefit from a such arrangement, as its members and the senior officers corps at 
large must be kept apprised of foreign naval developments. Until such an arrangement was even 
contemplated by the Department, however, Mason urged his fellow members to `constitute a sort 
of mutual learning company' and function essentially as an ad hoc intelligence department. 74 
Writing as if the institute was in fact a voluntary intelligence organisation, Mason argued that the 
USNI was an underutilised resource that, if afforded the opportunity, official recognition and 
adequate supervision, could effectively ensure the collection, analysis and dissemination of 
foreign naval intelligence. 
The intelligence department has been hampered by the fact that no one has the time or 
opportunity to take charge of it, and the bureaux and other officers do not furnish their 
information. It is hoped that soon the thing may be presented to our honorable Secretary 
by our President [of the Institute] in such a light that he may authorize or even direct the 
Bureaux to furnish the necessary information. An officer might be detailed to direct this 
department, so necessary for the education of the officers of the service, or, at any rate, 
the society might make it an object to some retired officer to become its permanent 
Secretary, as is the case with the Royal United Services Institute. 
75 
With Secretary Richard W. Thompson and his Bureau chiefs struggling to defend the 
Department against recurring charges of corruption and gross negligence, some of which were 
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73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
-142- 
indeed warranted, Mason must have surmised that his overture for an `intelligence bureau' would 
fall on deaf ears and thus fail to attract the critical support necessary for such an innovation in 
naval administration. 76 Quite possibly Mason's idea was rejected because Thompson was 
satisfied with current intelligence collection activities. " For the next three years, Mason reprised 
his role as a fleet intelligence officer, when Admiral Rodgers was appointed in 1879 to command 
the Pacific Squadron and requested Mason to accompany him to the U. S. S. Pensacola as his Flag- 
Lieutenant. 78 Serving onboard the squadron flagship, Mason collected naval intelligence on each 
major country visited. The highlight of the cruise for Mason was an opportunity to observe and 
report on the naval actions of the Pacific War of 1879-1881, pitting Chile against Peru and 
Bolivia. On one particular occasion, Mason and an intelligence team that included Lt. J. F. Meigs 
and Lt. Royal Ingersoll were given permission by Chilean officials to inspect the damage inflicted 
on the Huascar, a Peruvian ironclad that was captured after a bitter fight with the Chilean 
ironclads Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Enclada. 79 Following the advice echoed by Mason 
back in April 1879, their observations were promptly forwarded to their fellow USNI members 
back at Annapolis, and shortly thereafter articles appeared in both the Proceedings and The 
United Service. 80 
The Intelligence Function and the Bureau of Navigation 
Yet despite his best efforts in support of a formalised arrangement for intelligence collection, 
analysis and dissemination, Mason remained unsuccessful in formalising the intelligence process 
within the Navy Department. Upon completion of his duties with the Pacific Squadron, Mason 
reluctantly returned to the Naval Academy in late 1881 as an instructor and allegedly brooded 
over the matter. 8' Eventually, in a span of only six months, Mason was unexpectedly summoned 
to the Department to explain his views, and within weeks was assigned to the Bureau of 
Navigation so that he could assist in the formation of what ultimately became O. N. I. To assist 
him in this final lobbying effort was Lt. Commander Bowman McCalla, Walker's assistant in the 
Bureau of Navigation who developed a independent interest in naval intelligence after reading the 
lecture given by the British strategist Captain J. C. R. Colomb on the subject at RUSI in May 
75 Ibid., p. 296. 
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1881.82 `I had been much impressed with his views and practical suggestions', McCalla later 
recalled in his unpublished memoirs, `recognizing what an important part of an Admiralty, or of a 
Navy Department, such a branch might prove itself to be'. 83 Several months later, McCalla 
discussed the subject with Mason during a visit to the Naval Academy, after which he 
immediately recommended to Walker that Mason's proposal for an intelligence department be 
implemented. 84 The Bureau chief was quite amenable to the proposal, for Walker believed that 
the Navy Department could benefit from a systematic method of collecting and filing information 
about foreign naval developments, especially in the event of war. 85 Walker promptly drafted the 
order establishing the new department within the Bureau of Navigation, which in turn was signed 
by Secretary Hunt on 23 March 1882.86 
Between April and June 1882, the effort to organise and staff the newly established department 
stalled temporarily, as President Arthur replaced Secretary Hunt on 17 April 1882 with William 
Chandler. It was now left to Chandler to reaffirm the directive of his predecessor and, following a 
meeting with Mason in his office, Chandler assented to the creation of O. N. I. Mason reported to 
the Bureau of Navigation on 15 June 1882, whereupon Walker assigned him to be the first chief 
intelligence officer. Since direct funding of the new department was impossible without 
congressional action, Walker sustained the formative activities of O. N. I through funding and 
other resources allocated to his Bureau. 87 He initially assigned three officers to assist Mason, all 
of whom were already assigned to the Bureau of Navigation. 88 Clerks employed by the Bureau 
were also borrowed from the other offices within his purview, and office space was made readily 
available for the intelligence officers in the new State, War, and Navy Building. In subsequent 
years, Walker sought congressional recognition of O. N. I., and with it a coveted budgetary 
allocation to support and even increase the activities of the intelligence office. His efforts in this 
regard proved unsuccessful; congressional recognition and direct funding of O. N. I. would not be 
approved until 1900.59 Walker was thus compelled to continue siphoning funds from other 
sources within the Department. In short, the Bureau chief displayed considerable enthusiasm for 
the new institution, as reflected in both his efforts to sustain it with existing resources as well as in 
the words chosen to stress the important reasons for its creation. `An Office of Naval 
Intelligence', explained Walker in his annual report outlining his bureau's activities in 1882, `now 
generally recognized as necessary to the effectiveness of an Army or Navy... has been organized 
82 Captain J. C. R. Colomb, `Naval Intelligence and Protection of Commerce in War', RUST Journal (1881). 
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for the purpose of systematizing the collection and classification of information for the use of the 
Department, in relation to the strength and resources of foreign navies'. 90 
Mason, meanwhile, sought to define the scope of tasks and activities to be undertaken by the 
officers under his direction. In a letter probably drafted by Mason himself, Secretary Chandler 
outlined 14 independent categories of information to be collected by O. N. I., including not only 
intelligence on foreign naval developments but also information on American naval capabilities, 
coastal defence and fortifications, the mercantile marine, and other subjects that may be useful to 
naval officers in their professional studies. 91 Naval attaches assigned to foreign legations were 
expected to assist in the all important task of collecting information on foreign naval 
developments, the first of whom - Commander French E. Chadwick - had already received orders 
to report to the U. S. legation in London. 92 The Secretary, moreover, expected O. N. I to publish 
monthly bulletins to serve as a reference for the junior and senior officer corps, the contents of 
which were to include original articles submitted by naval officers. `The younger officers of the 
service', wrote Chandler on 25 July 1882, `will be encouraged in collecting and reporting 
intelligence and in writing articles on naval subjects'. 93 Finally, and most importantly, Chandler 
granted permission for Mason to avail himself of the facilities and resources of the USNI, 
precisely the informal arrangement that Mason had advocated since April 1879. `The United 
States Naval Institute, a voluntary organization of the officers of the Navy for the purpose of 
facilitating study, will be encouraged by a contribution of such matter as may be thought proper 
94 from time to time' . 
An Intellectual Sanctuary in the Navy Department 
Anticipating the technical intelligence requirements of his expected consumers within the 
Department, Mason organised his office according to functional rather than geographical areas of 
interest. 95 Intelligence collection efforts in the 1880s were focused largely on foreign technical 
information - in the form of warship and machinery designs, blueprints and design specifications - 
so as to overcome the technological obstacles to naval and strategic modernisation. This proved 
to be an enormous task that could not have been accomplished without an expanded complement 
of staff officers assigned to O. N. I. Fortunately for Mason and his successor, Lt. R. P. Rodgers, 
shortages in talented staff officers were never viewed as a serious organisational impediment to 
O. N. I. From 1886 to 1897, O. N. I. was continually staffed by an average of ten officers, which 
90 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1882, (Washington 1883), pp. 107-8. 
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was a rather large staff complement for an office in the Navy Department. 96 As the self-appointed 
patron of the new institution, moreover, Walker ensured that the staff complement increased not 
only in terms of quantity but also in quality. This was consistent with a departmental mandate, 
inspired by Mason at the outset, that `only such officers as have shown an aptitude for intelligence 
staff work or who by their intelligence and knowledge of foreign languages and drawing give 
promise of such aptitude, should be employed' . 
97 Toward this end, O. N. I. was staffed with the 
best and brightest among the junior officer corps. When including some of the officers directly 
employed by Walker, O. N. I. and the Bureau of Navigation constituted a sort of intellectual 
sanctuary among a strong anti-intellectual element in the Navy Department. 
The most accomplished of these officers were also active members of the USNI and frequent 
contributors to the Proceedings in the 1880s. Among them were Mason, Raymond P. Rodgers, 
Richard Wainwright, William Bainbridge-Hoff, Charles C. Rogers, Sidney A. Staunton, William 
L. Rodgers, Seaton Schroeder, Washington I. Chambers and Carlos Calkins. In addition to their 
official duties, these officers also lectured and wrote critical essays that further inspired 
aspirations for American naval and strategic modernisation. Both Mason and his successor 
Rodgers strongly encouraged their intelligence staff officers to contribute articles to the 
Proceedings. Throughout this period, their names appeared repeatedly in the table of contents 
that preceded each issue of the journal. The most thought-provoking submissions were reserved 
for the annual essay contest sponsored by the USNI, the topics of which were prescribed by the 
executive committee. 
Between 1882 and 1900, in fact, ten of the fifteen first-prize essayists were intelligence staff 
officers. Calkins, for example, received the coveted first-prize on two occasions, the first in 1883 
for an essay that considered functional specialisation within the officer corps. 98 His second essay, 
for which he was awarded first-prize in 1886, suggested improvements in naval organisation and 
training in steam tactics. 99 Similarly, Chambers received the award in 1884 for a provocative 
essay that recommended a set of policy prescriptions for naval modemisation. 10° Aside from the 
literary efforts of Calkins and Chambers, there were other submissions from current and future 
intelligence officers that also received special recognition from the judges. Wainwright received 
an honourable mention in 1882 for an essay that examined the revival of the American merchant 
marine. Schroeder also received an honourable mention in 1881 for an essay that outlined the 
96 Ibid. p. 5. 
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elements of a prospective shipbuilding policy. '0' Thus, as a result of these and other submissions 
from intelligence officers, the informal partnership between O. N. I. and the Institute during this 
period imparted `a tremendous spiritual and intellectual driving force to the growth of the Navy, 
not only by stimulating and encouraging thought and writing but also by furnishing the equally 
important means of publication, distribution and discussion'. 102 
Historical Awareness in Naval Intelligence 
The literary efforts above infer the challenging demands and expectations of the officers 
selected by the Bureau of Navigation for assignment to O. N. I. In their official capacities, 
intelligence officers such as Rogers, Chambers and Schroeder concerned themselves mainly with 
the collection of foreign naval intelligence, the translation of foreign technical journals, and the 
compilation of reports and articles for internal publication and distribution. Meanwhile, in their 
unofficial capacities as active members of the USNI, these same officers were also involved in 
discussions of contemporary policy issues, writing timely and often provocative articles for 
publication in the Proceedings. Yet there was also an element of historical awareness within 
O. N. I. that factored into the analytical progress of intelligence staff officers, in both their official 
and unofficial capacities. This no doubt was fostered by the Office of Naval Records and Library, 
which was created along with O. N. I and attached to the new intelligence office by the same 
general order issued by Secretary Hunt in March 1882.103 Appointed to head this new office was 
James Russell Soley, the well-respected professor of mathematics at the Naval Academy whose 
emerging passion for naval history rivalled an interest in his chosen discipline. Soley, who 
believed that history, like mathematics, `widens the scope of man's observation and interest', was 
the most logical choice for the position. 104 His rare combination of talents more than qualified 
him to serve in the role of archivist, librarian and naval historian, all of which were required as he 
slowly compiled an impressive collection of naval prints, photographs, and a 7,000-volume 
library for use by officers in the Navy Department. Soley also attempted to collect, catalogue and 
preserve American naval records for the purpose of future historical research and analysis. To 
assist him in this endeavour, Congress authorised in 1884 a small appropriation of $5,000 to 
ensure that the Office of Naval Records and Library was equipped for the enormous task of 
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publishing documents related to the naval operations of the Civil War. 1°5 It was a task that would 
occupy most of his time until 1890, when Secretary B. F. Tracy revived the post of Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy and appointed Soley to occupy it throughout the remainder of his 
administration. 
Soley's presence in the Navy Department during the 1880s has generally remained on the 
periphery of American naval history, not because his individual contributions were considered 
unworthy of comment, but rather from the subtle nature of his work in the Office of Naval 
Records and Library during the 1880s. There is, however, little doubt that Soley shared a 
common intellectual interest with his colleagues in O. N. I. The common linkages to Soley and the 
intelligence officers extended not only to their shared offices in the State-War-Navy Building, but 
also their identities as USNI members. Their proximity to Soley and his professional endeavours, 
moreover, further refined the emerging relationship between historical analysis and strategic 
formulation in the Navy Department, which would later serve as the underlying basis of the core 
curriculum at the U. S. Naval War College. `The location of this early work close to the work of 
intelligence compilation created a link in the approach and concern of both enterprises', observed 
John Hattendorf in describing the intellectual prospects for strategy development in the 1880s. 1°6 
`Intelligence officers seemed to become increasingly interested in historical insight while the 
historical work was kept specifically on the professional and service aspects of the topic'. 107 It is 
thus of little surprise to find that the adjunct faculty of the new college consisted primarily of 
Soley and a stable of intelligence staff officers during the formative years of the college, on loan 
temporarily from O. N. I. so that they could assist their institutional partner in encouraging the 
development of American naval thought. 
THE WAR COLLEGE AND THE ORIGINS OF A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 
If the published record of the U. S. Naval Institute provided a forum for O. N. I. staff officers to 
explore strategic and other policy-related aspects of naval modernisation, their distractions from 
their regular duties were no doubt heightened by the establishment in 1884 of the U. S. Naval War 
College in Newport, Rhode Island. Although the initial concept for an innovative postgraduate 
course for naval officers was the brainchild of Stephen Luce, the college most likely would have 
remained a half-developed concept in the 1880s if not for the critical support of Commodore 
Walker and the Bureau of Navigation. In fact, most accounts of the formative years of the Naval 
War College either completely overlook or obscure the contributions of Walker as a staunch 
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advocate of the college throughout his two tours in the Navy Department. 1°8 As the most 
powerful Bureau chief in the department, Walker was able to champion Luce's ideas over the 
strenuous objections of the other line Bureau chiefs. When the college was finally ordered into 
existence in 1884, Walker ensured the prosperity of the young institution through an affiliation 
with the Bureau of Navigation, which at the time resembled an intellectual sanctuary for officers 
that would soon divide their time between Newport and Washington. Finally, and most 
importantly, Walker ordered Mahan to Newport at the suggestion of Luce, and even protected him 
to the best of his ability when the college was threatened with closure and finally consolidated 
with the Naval Torpedo School in January 1889. 
In short, the founding of the Naval War College in 1884 was not the result of an individual 
crusade on the part of Stephen Luce, but a concerted effort among a minority of service 
intellectuals and practitioners who recognised the potential for such an institution and a core 
curriculum to explore the topics of naval strategy, tactics and history - the conceptual elements of 
a future strategic framework. This section will begin to highlight the contributions of these naval 
officers during the college's formative years, all of whom were active members of the USNI and 
who shared common ideas about naval reform as well as the requirements for a mature and 
multifaceted American naval force. Luce was certainly at the forefront of these efforts in the 
1880s, however, and any account of this sort must legitimately begin with him. 
Stephen Luce and the Initial Concept for the War College 
The idea for a postgraduate course for naval officers originated within the mind of an officer 
who was both an accomplished educator of midshipman and apprentices, as well as a keen student 
of naval history and warfare. Throughout most of his career, Stephen Luce was in some capacity 
affiliated with the system of naval education in the United States. He was first assigned to the 
U. S. Naval Academy as an instructor of gunnery and seamanship in March 1860, and would 
remain there throughout most of the Civil War. Returning to the academy in 1865 after a brief 
absence due to the conflict, Luce was soon appointed Commandant of Midshipman under the 
direction of Admiral Porter. His departure from the academy in 1868 marked the beginning of 
period where Luce frequently alternated between shore assignments and commanding vessels at 
sea. In either venue, Luce was largely occupied in the 1870s with ideas to improve the education 
and training of naval apprentices and enlisted personnel. Eventually, his efforts in this regard 
expanded to include postgraduate studies for naval officers, and in the late 1870s Luce first 
envisioned the establishment of a postgraduate school for such a purpose. 109 
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It is difficult to determine exactly when Luce conceived of his idea for a postgraduate course 
for naval officers. His correspondence during the mid-1870s indicates that the curriculum for 
such a school actually preceded any formal discussion of the school itself. During this period, 
Luce became particularly interested in the study of naval history as a source of instruction in the 
areas of naval strategy and tactics. In this regard he was greatly influenced by the writings of 
John Knox Laughton, the British naval historian and pioneer naval educator who at time was 
developing his own thesis on the scientific study of naval history. Laughton and Luce first met in 
September 1870 at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, and the discussions 
between the educators allegedly focused on the usage of historical themes in naval education. ' lo 
Following his encounter with Laughton, Luce eventually returned to the States in July 1872, 
whereupon he immediately requested assignment at the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport - the 
closest approximation to a postgraduate course for naval officers. The request was promptly 
denied. `The Department cannot conceive a proper discipline as likely to exist where a junior 
officer is the instructor, and therefore declines to order you as requested'. "' 
Luce instead was assigned to the Boston Navy Yard as an equipment officer, where he would 
remain until 1875. Aside from renewing his interest in the training system, Luce embarked on his 
own exploration of naval history. In this endeavour he consulted Laughton, and the two men 
began to exchange correspondence and papers as early as 1875. Luce had much to learn from and 
admire about the British naval historian, especially his mastery of facts painstakingly documented 
through archival research. Their first exchange of correspondence, in fact, involved a request 
from Luce to verify certain facts before writing an article on `The Sovereignty of the Sea' that 
subsequently appeared in Potter's American Monthly in November 1876.12 Laughton, 
meanwhile, was more than willing to guide Luce through the scientific study of naval history, at 
one point recommending to the American that he consult some of his earlier writings. It was a 
needless suggestion, for Luce had already read most of the articles, including those dating back to 
the years when Laughton himself was an aspiring naval historian at the Royal Naval College, 
Portsmouth, based onboard the Gunnery Training Ship H. M. S. Excellent (1866-73). 113 
That Laughton should receive some credit for shaping the underlying curriculum for the Naval 
War College was evident years later, when Luce delivered two thought-provoking lectures to the 
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officers beginning the course at the college in September 1886. The first of these lectures delved 
into core foundation of the curriculum - the study of naval warfare as a science - which, when 
compared with the teachings of Laughton, was an adaptation of the ideas developed originally by 
the British naval historian in the 1870s. Luce's remarks on the usage of naval history was 
particularly insightful in this regard: `[T]here is no question that the naval battles of the past 
furnish a mass of facts sufficient for the formulation of laws or principles which, once established, 
would raise maritime war to the level of a science' . 
"a While Luce did not refer to Laughton by 
name during the course of his first lecture, the British naval historian was indeed credited by Luce 
in the subsequent lecture devoted to the study of naval history. Here, as well as in the prior 
lecture, Luce was equally consistent with the views expounded by Professor Laughton. `It is by 
the knowledge derived from the history of naval battles', Luce reminded his audience, `that we 
will be enabled to establish a number of facts on which to generalize and formulate those 
principles which are to constitute the groundwork of our new science' . 
15 More importantly, Luce 
for the first time acknowledged the writings and teaching of Laughton to whom, in the words of 
his American student, `we are indebted for many valuable lessons'. 116 
The initial concept of a naval postgraduate school, complete with a faculty of military and 
naval officers to teach this curriculum - seems to have originated in the late 1870s. American 
naval historians generally refer to his visit in 1877 to the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, 
Virginia, as a defining experience for Luce and his concept for an advanced course in naval 
warfare. "7 The Artillery School owed its existence to Brigadier General Emory Upton, who at 
the time of Luce's visit was the commanding officer of the school. Upton certainly inspired Luce 
to forward a similar scheme for naval officers, for shortly after his visit Luce recommended the 
idea to Secretary Richard W. Thompson. `The leading feature of the postgraduate course would 
be the carrying of the young officers through a course of instruction in the Art of War', Luce 
wrote to Thompson in August 1877.118 His overture to the department secretary was 
unsuccessful, despite his best efforts to convince Thompson that such a school was an absolute 
necessity in light of new technological applications in naval warfare. 
The introduction of steam and the telegraph enabling military operations both on land and 
at sea to be conducted with great rapidity, and shortening to months great campaigns 
which had in times past consumed years, renders it absolutely necessary that to be a 
successful naval captain of the present day an officer must be a strategist as well as a 
tactician. 119 
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Luce's next attempt to interest the Navy Department in a postgraduate school yielded similar 
results. In November 1882, he broached the subject with Secretary Chandler, who had only been 
in the department under 7 months, less the extended vacation he took the previous summer. Luce 
suggested to the inexperienced department secretary that he establish a naval school for `the 
higher branches of the naval profession: the science of war, naval tactics, military and naval 
history, international law, military and naval law, modem languages, and such elective branches 
as might be found desirable'. 120 This time, however, Luce appears to have enlisted the support of 
Admiral Porter who, upon hearing of the idea immediately offered to `write as strong a letter as I 
can to deliver in person to the Secretary when he returns'. 121 But even Porter doubted whether his 
overture would have any effect on the often absent Chandler. `If I sent it in now, it would go into 
the pigeon hole and will probably go there anyhow! ' . 
122 Whether the letters evoked any reaction 
from Chandler is unknown, but the war school was certainly not viewed as a priority for the 
secretary. The half-developed concept was destined to languish in the department for another 
year. It must have occurred to Luce then that the war school project required another strong voice 
of support, preferably a naval officer and department insider who could champion the idea among 
sceptical colleagues. The logical choice was Commodore Walker, the most powerful and 
influential naval officer to reside in the Navy Department during the 1880s. 
Support for the War College in the Navy Department 
The historical record is imprecise as to when exactly Walker offered his support to Luce for 
the war school project. Most likely Walker learned of it when Luce first broached the subject 
with Chandler in November 1882. While he approved of the idea, Walker initially believed that 
such a school should be located in Annapolis, where facilities were already available to 
accommodate the institution. 123 Luce was adamant that the school should be located on Coasters 
Harbor Island in Newport, and his arguments to that effect were persuasive enough to convince 
Walker not only to support the institution itself but also the proposed location for it. 124 
Walker's support for the war school was critical in March 1884, following another attempt by 
Luce to persuade Secretary Chandler of the absolute necessity for a postgraduate course and 
school for naval officers. This time, however, Walker intervened and convinced the Secretary to 
order Luce to Washington so that he could further explain his proposal in person. Luce was 
subsequently afforded an audience in the Department, consisting of not only Chandler but also 
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Walker and the rest of the line Bureau chiefs-125 The outcome of the conference seemed to cast 
further doubt on the prospects for the war school, for it failed to secure support from the other 
bureaus. According to Luce, the bureau chiefs reacted `not very favourably, and in particular 
Capt. Sicard treated it in a manner bordering on derision'. 126 Luce would later add Commodore 
Winfield S. Schley to the list of bureau chiefs who opposed the war school project. Recently 
appointed as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment & Recruiting, both Schley and Sicard were 
opposed to the project more out of concern for their parochial interests in the Department. `They 
seem to fear that that it will clash with their interests here', Luce complained to Senator Nelson 
Aldrich of Rhode Island. 127 `They are mistaken, but still they refuse to be persuaded. At any rate 
their opposition is a serious obstacle for success, for they must have more or less influence with 
'28 the Secretary' . 
But Walker's support was all that was necessary to shelter the proposal from its opponents in 
the Department. After consulting with the Secretary, Walker on 3 May 1884 ordered that a board 
of inquiry be convened to fully consider the idea of a naval postgraduate school, the best location 
for such a school, and the subjects to be included in its curriculum. 129 Aside from Luce, whose 
views on the war school were well known, Walker appointed Commanders C. F. Goodrich and 
W. T. Sampson to conduct the inquiry. The conclusions of the board were essentially preordained, 
as all three naval officers were accomplished naval educators, active members and future 
presidents of the USNI, and deeply respected for their intellectual and technical faculties. 
Goodrich, in fact, was an original member of the USNI and a frequent contributor to the 
Proceedings, where his prize-winning essay on the general subject of naval education was 
published in 1879.130 Aside from his articles and service on the faculty at Annapolis, Goodrich 
was best known for his official report on the British military and naval campaign off Alexandria 
in 1882. He was personally selected for this assignment by Walker himself. 131 
The credentials of Goodrich's counterpart were equally impressive. Before achieving 
widespread fame in the Spanish-American War in 1898, Sampson was known more for his 
intellectual acumen than his service at sea. Goodrich once referred to his friend as `the most 
brilliant officer of his time'. 132 It was indeed an accurate depiction of Sampson, who was well 
regarded for his capacities as an instructor in the classroom at Annapolis. Between 1868 and 
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1878, in fact, Sampson spent some eight years at the academy, first as a physics instructor and 
later a department head. `Characteristic of the man and his methods', wrote the American naval 
historian Allan Westcott, `were his academy lectures, delivered quietly but with great clearness, 
and with such painstaking attention to detail that in his illustrative experiments a former student 
could "not recall a single failure"'. 133 His commitment to naval education was ultimately 
recognised in 1886, when Walker appointed him Superintendent of his beloved institution. It was 
a post that he would not vacate until 1890. In short, the orders for Goodrich and Sampson to 
report to Luce on this matter was part of a carefully orchestrated effort by Walker to ensure the 
outcome of the board of inquiry. But gaining approval for the war college was only one of the 
results obtained during the deliberations of the three officers. Included among their 
recommendations to the Secretary were the elements of a new strategic framework that in time 
would be refined and eventually adopted by the decisions of 1889. 
The Core Curriculum: Elements of a Strategic Framework 
The board of inquiry submitted its report to Chandler on 13 June 1884, in which it predictably 
concluded that a postgraduate school for naval officers be immediately established in Newport, 
consistent in almost every detail with the proposal laid out by Luce only months before. 134 The 
three naval officers strongly urged that the practitioners of their chosen profession should be 
encouraged, and even required to study the various problems of naval warfare through the analytic 
lens of the scientist. The war school was intended to stimulate intellectual development and 
increased knowledge among the naval officers selected to attend, so that they would be adequately 
prepared if and when the civilian policymakers ever authorised the construction of a modern 
battlefleet. While it was the explicit prerogative of these policymakers to brush the broad strokes 
of American naval policy, the overarching mandate of the war school was to further advance the 
naval profession and with it the professional development of first-class naval force. This was 
impossible so long as naval officers failed to appreciate the full potential of naval power in 
warfare, while at the same time congressional leaders failed to formulate a coherent policy that 
would inform them as to their proper roles and missions with the limited resources available. The 
war school was intended to remedy the knowledge gap, but it was the responsibility of Congress 
to provide the battleships and cruisers to accompany strategic naval development: 
The almost total absence of an adequate naval force adds to the burden of responsibility 
imposed upon our naval officers, and imperatively demands of them extraordinary 
exertion in the acquisition of professional knowledge in order to make such amends, as 
they best may, for the extreme paucity of the means furnished them. Here, then, is not 
133 Dumas Malone, (ed), Dictionary of American Biography, Volume VIII., (New York 1963), pp. 321-323. 
Entry written by Allan Westcott. 
134 Report of Board on a Postgraduate Course, 13 June 1884. RG 45/38/30. 
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simply a `reason', but an absolute necessity for the establishment of such a school as the 
order contemplates. 135 
While the above report did not elaborate on what exactly was to be taught and who was 
prepared to teach it, the specific details of the course of studies were provided in a subsequent 
memorandum to the Secretary in July 1884.136 At the institution that was now to be referred to as 
the `Naval War College', a faculty composed mostly of naval officers was anticipated to develop 
and teach a host of courses in a number of subject areas. Luce, Goodrich and Sampson listed 
these courses by name - Military Campaigns, Strategy and Tactics, International Law, Rules of 
Evidence and Modem Political History. But their efforts were clearly focused on developing 
three courses that would constitute the core curriculum at the college and hence the basic 
ingredients to strategic policy formulation along an offensive orientation. Their collective 
ambition for American naval power in the future was reflected in their expectations for each 
course: 
Naval Strategy - The disposition of a naval force for the protection of a coast or convoy - 
for the attack of an enemy's coast or fleet - for the destruction of an enemy's commerce - 
plans of naval campaigns - bases of operation - coaling stations and other supplying 
depots - analyses of naval campaigns - vulnerable points of an enemy's defence - 
practicable landing places in the neighborhood of strategic points - naval transport - 
defence of landing points on our coast -a study of the time required for any nation or 
probable combination of nations to concentrate a given force upon our own coast - their 
means of subsistence and probable point or points of attack and the means of defence to 
be employed in each case - etc. etc. 
Naval Tactics - The handling of a single vessel, squadron or fleet in the presence of an 
enemy - orders of battle - turning times - tactical circles - time and space required to 
change front or perform other evolutions of a fleet or vessel - disposition of the vessels of 
a fleet to secure most effective use of each class of weapon - relative value and limiting 
conditions of the gun, ram and torpedo - study of the best means of communicating orders 
and information in time of battle - analysis of principal naval battles and of joint or 
opposed naval and military operations, etc. etc. 
General Naval History - Resume of the naval history of the great maritime powers of 
ancient and medieval times - with fuller accounts of the naval conflicts of the 17`h, 18`h 
and 19`h centuries, etc. 137 
Thus, what was proposed to be taught at the Naval War College were the roles and missions 
associated with a mature and multifaceted naval force, most of which exceeded the limited 
capabilities of the U. S. Navy. What these courses represented, moreover, was the first implicit 
departure from the commonly held view - both in and outside of the service - that the navy should 
retain its traditional defensive posture, complete with coastal defence monitors, torpedo boats and 
the occasional commerce-destroyer. Luce, Goodrich and Sampson essentially provided a 
135 Ibid. 
136 Memoranda Relating to the Establishment of a Post Graduate Course, 19 July 1884. RG 45/38/30. 
137 Ibid. 
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blueprint from which naval officers could devise and interpret an offensive strategic framework 
for American naval power - what that was destined to be was still to be determined. 
When the time came to actually order the college into existence, Secretary Chandler was again 
absent from the Department, most likely due to his annual extended vacation in New Hampshire. 
Serving as Acting Secretary during his absence was Admiral T. E. Nichols, the Chief of the 
Bureau of Yards & Docks who, like many of his fellow bureau chiefs, was generally opposed to 
the creation of the new institution. Concluding that Nichols was disinclined to issue the order 
himself, Commodore Walker informed him that he would write the order and send it directly to 
Chandler for approval. `If you approve of it, will you be so kind enough to sign and return it to 
me, to be dated as of yesterday'. 138 Chandler promptly signed Order No. 325, dated 6 October 
1884, that authorised the establishment of the U. S. Naval War College, to be located on Coaster's 
Harbour Island in Newport. 
Now that the college was officially ordered into existence, it was left to Walker and the Bureau 
of Navigation to ensure that the joint venture received the essential prerequisites of any new 
educational institution - facilities, teachers, and students. The provision of naval officers was not 
a problem, for Walker retained the administrative prerogative to order who he wanted to attend 
the college. Facilities were also not an immediate concern, for Luce planned to use a building that 
already existed on the island. But that building would soon require extensive renovation, and the 
college would simply starve without congressional recognition and approval for an annual 
budgetary allocation. Toward this aim, Walker submitted in December 1884 a request for 
Congress to provide $13,000, from which Luce and his faculty could purchase the necessary 
supplies before the first class of naval officers arrived in Newport in September 1'885.139 'Besides 
necessary repairs on the house', Luce wrote to Senator Aldrich on 10 December 1884, `we need 
furniture, books, and apparatus of various kinds for lecture rooms. We have not, now, even so 
much as a chair to sit on; and that portion of the building recently occupied by the paupers is 
uninhabitable in the present condition'. 140 In the end, the individual appeals from Walker and 
Luce to Congress were unsuccessful, but the Bureau chief did manage to piece together a 
departmental appropriation of $8,000.14' That still left the issue of identifying the most qualified 
candidates to teach the courses envisioned by Luce, Goodrich and Sampson. It was especially 
imperative to find the right person to develop and teach the courses on naval strategy, tactics and 
history. 
138 Walker to Chandler, 7 October 1884. Walker Papers. NHFC/LC/Container #1. 
139 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1884, p. 166 and the following citation. 
"0 Luce to Aldrich, 10 December 1884. Aldrich Papers. LC/MD/Reel #13. 
141 Chandler to S. J. Randall, 2 February 1885. RG 45/5/18. See also Hattendorf et. al., p. 23. Randall was 
the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. 
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Luce assumed most of the burden of searching for these prospective candidates, although any 
final selection would have to be approved by Walker and the Board of Detail before arrangements 
could be made for the candidate to lecture at the college. Almost immediately, Walker and Luce 
differed on the efficacy of inviting an army officer to teach naval officers in the `art of war'. Luce 
thought that such an appointment was an absolute necessity, as presently there was no one in the 
navy who was qualified to undertake the endeavour. From his perspective, Walker viewed the 
appointment as tantamount to an admission of inferiority from the Navy Department. He argued 
that a naval officer must be found to instruct his brethren in the sensitive topics of naval strategy 
and tactics. `I have therefore to suggest', Walker wrote to Chandler on 23 October 1884, `that an 
officer to teach the art of war be selected from the line officers of the navy. As the War College 
has been placed under this Bureau, I write this to you that you may know my feeling, and that you 
may give such direction as you deem best' . 
142 The historical record is unclear as to who Chandler 
actually sided with on this issue, but a compromise between Luce and Walker seems to have been 
brokered. For purposes of expediency, Luce was empowered to secure the appointment of an 
army officer to teach military history, strategy and tactics at the college. He eventually persuaded 
a reluctant Lt. Tasker H. Bliss, USA, to accept the post that he would not vacate until 1888.143 In 
the meantime, Luce continued the search for a talented naval officer to teach naval strategy and 
tactics. 
His first choice was Commander Goodrich, to whom Luce wrote back in January 1884 to 
inquire whether he was interested in the post. 144 Goodrich graciously declined the offer, not 
because of a lack of interest but for monetary reasons; he simply could not afford to move to 
Newport after settling in Washington for his next assignment as an ordnance inspector at the 
Washington Navy Yard. Goodrich, moreover, doubted whether there was any naval officer 
qualified for such an endeavour. `Of one thing I am certain; there is not a person in the navy 
competent today without much careful preparation to fill the place' , 
145 Still without a lecturer in 
naval strategy and tactics, Luce also considered Lt. M. R. MacKenzie before eventually settling for 
Commander A. T. Mahan, to whom he wrote to in July 1884.146 Mahan, who at the time was in 
command of the U. S. S. Wachusett off the coast of Peru, enthusiastically accepted the post on 4 
September and immediately sought his detachment from his current duties so that he could 
adequately prepare for his next assignment. 147 Despite his enthusiasm, however, Walker was 
unable to secure Mahan's premature return because of Chandler's new scheme for the detailing 
142 Walker to Chandler, 23 October 1884. Walker Papers. NHFCILC/Container #1. 
143 Spector, pp. 28-29. 
144 Goodrich to Luce, 12 February 1884. Naval War College Papers. LC/MD/Container #1. 
las Ibid. 
146Luce to Walker, 29 August 1884. Cited in Spector, p. 29. 
147 Mahan to Luce, 4 September 1884. Printed in Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, (eds), Letters and 
Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Volume I, (Annapolis 1975), p. 577. 
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process in an attempt to limit Walker's power in the Department. ' The so-called Board of 
Detail, which also included the two Bureau chiefs most opposed to the college, Commodores 
Sicard and Schley, would never have approved of such an idea. Mahan would finally arrive in 
Newport for an initial meeting with Luce in October 1885, but not before antagonising the new 
department secretary - William C. Whitney - with a direct and unsuccessful appeal for his 
premature relief from command of the Wachusett. 149 There was now installed in the Department a 
future opponent of Mahan and his efforts at the college, but for now Walker ensured that the 
necessary orders were issued to the irritable naval officer. 
CONCLUSION 
By the time the celebrated American naval theorist arrived in Newport for the meeting with 
Luce, the first abbreviated session of the U. S. Naval War College had already been completed 
successfully, due in no small part to the individual efforts of Luce, Walker, Goodrich and 
Sampson. Five years later, Mahan would transform his college lectures on naval history into an 
epochal treatise on seapower that soon became required reading among statesmen, historians and, 
most especially, naval officers in the United States, Britain, Germany and Japan. Yet while the 
publication of The Influence of Seapower Upon History elevated Mahan to unprecedented levels 
of notoriety and exaltation, the popularity of the volume must be tempered by the fact that his 
analysis blended and refined the crude elements of a strategic framework outlined originally by 
Luce, Goodrich and Sampson back in July 1884. Foreshadowing Mahan, the three senior service 
intellectuals had developed a core curriculum six years earlier that was expected to stimulate 
American naval thought in the areas of strategy, tactics and history. In this regard they received 
the unqualified endorsement of Walker, the powerful Bureau chief whose timely support for the 
activities of O. N. I and the Naval War College revealed the extent to which intellectual activities 
in both institutions were viewed as critical to the fostering of American progress toward strategic 
naval development in peacetime. This was a viewpoint shared not only by Walker, but also a 
supporting cast of service intellectuals and practitioners who, in their duties in the Bureau of 
Navigation and as active members of the USNI, sought to awaken their colleagues to the potential 
for American naval power - and the vulnerabilities to national defence in absence of it. Inspired 
by the notions of naval reform, strategic innovation and the lessons of naval history, this self- 
selected group of naval officers were the principal spokesmen of a service culture that gradually 
surfaced between 1873 and 1885 through a voluntary association of naval officers. 
Thus far the cultural approach to historical naval analysis has provided the context behind the 
decisions of 1889, with a focus upon the personalities, institutions and events that were critical to 
"' See Chandler to Sicard, 1 October 1884. Sicard Papers. NHFCILCIContainer #1. 
149 Mahan to Whitney, 15 Mahan 1885. Printed Seager and Maguire, p. 605. 
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American progress toward strategic adjustment between 1873 and 1885. When these interrelated 
factors are pieced together in this fashion, the historical record suggests strongly that the ideas and 
actions of naval officers were instrumental in shaping key policy decisions made in the 1880s, 
such as the formation of O. N. I. and the War College. Strategic innovation in naval policy 
formulation, however, did not evolve during this period without encountering serious 
organisational resistance at the highest levels of the Navy Department. Even before Secretary 
Tracy entered the Navy Department in March 1889, his predecessor was a narrowly focused 
technocrat who was interested more in technological procurement than the strategic implications 
of the modest battlefleet he aspired to build. Such an emphasis on technology rather than strategy 
between 1885 and 1889 was tolerable, even commendable so long as the service intellectuals and 
their institutional sanctuaries continued to receive the official sanction of the department 
secretary. The next chapter will highlight the series of political and departmental obstacles that 
threatened to overturn the efforts of the service intellectuals, the culmination of which included 
the abrupt closure of the Naval War College in January 1889, the temporary exile of Captain 
Mahan to Puget Sound, and the premature retirement of Admiral Luce from the active list. 
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Chapter' 7 
Implementing Strategic Ideas: 
The Struggle Over Technology and Strategy 
in the Navy Department, 1885-1889 
-160- 
INTRODUCTION 
The founding of two innovative institutions within the Navy Department, the Office of Naval 
Intelligence in 1882 and the Naval War College in 1884, typified the progress made thus far in the 
import of strategic ideas from semi-official think tanks to naval policy circles in Washington. As 
seen in the previous chapter, this was facilitated by a number of factors between 1873 and 1884, 
including the membership and activities of the U. S. Naval Institute, the influx of service 
intellectuals to the Bureau of Navigation, as well as institutional sponsorship of new ideas and 
institutions to spur strategic naval development. The transition also benefited greatly from the 
patronage of Secretary Chandler, whose conduct of departmental affairs generally encouraged a 
decision environment conducive to innovation. His departure from office in March 1885 
commenced a new phase of modernisation, under the direction of William C. Whitney, a narrowly 
focused technocrat who became increasingly hostile to the War College and the officers most 
associated with it. These officers included Luce, Mahan, Walker and, to a lesser extent, Sampson 
and Goodrich. Although strategic ideas continued to evolve along with American naval policy 
during this volatile period, it was left to the actions of naval officers to overcome a series of 
political and departmental obstacles that endangered the War College, its research agenda, and the 
prospect for strategic innovation. 
This chapter will continue the emphasis on the personalities, institutions and events that 
shaped the process in which strategic ideas were translated from theory into practice in the 1880s. 
It is divided into four main sections and supported primarily by archival research. The first 
section outlines the limited strategic outlook reflected in departmental shipbuilding priorities, 
despite a resurgence of naval professional arguments offered in investigative reports, 
congressional hearings, and later the lectures of Mahan at the War College. The next section will 
consider the circumstances that threatened the existence of the college itself, including the impact 
of strained professional relationships and a personal vendetta to silence the advocates of the 
institution. Following an expanded discussion of the unsuccessful campaign launched by Luce, 
Mahan and Walker to save the War College from its opponents, the third section describes the 
subsequent measures undertaken to exploit opportunities to convince Whitney's successor of the 
untapped potential of the college, its contributions to American naval thought, and the prospect 
for a new brand of strategic thinking in the Navy Department. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
the implementation of strategic ideas, which required legislative arbitration to affirm a new 
strategic outlook in American naval affairs. This, not ironically, took place as Mahan's The 
Influence of Seapower Upon History was being readied for publication. ' 
' A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783, (Boston 1890). 
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THE CONCEPTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS OF NAVAL STRATEGY 
Resistance to policy decisions that foster innovation is common among military organisations, 
especially in periods of heightened uncertainty due to new technologies that render existing 
strategies and operational doctrines obsolete. Such was not the case during the three-year 
stewardship of William Chandler, whose tenure in the Navy Department between 1882 and 1885 
can be regarded as a period of successful innovation in American naval affairs. Indeed, 
throughout his administration, Chandler encouraged a decision environment that largely 
facilitated the process of naval modernisation, as amply demonstrated by the transition to modern 
steel warships, as well as the founding of O. N. I. and the War College at Newport. 
While his conception of naval strategy remained conventional and patterned according to 
traditional naval priorities, Chandler envisioned an effective combination in the future between 
coastal defence vessels and the offensive potential of armoured seagoing ironclads. `If the nation 
is to regain its position as a maritime and naval power', he wrote to congressional authorities in 
December 1882, `reasonable provision should be made, not only for offensive cruising vessels but 
also for harbor defenses, by means of ironclads'. 2 When his tenure in the Department concluded 
in March 1885, Chandler bequeathed to his successor the two organisational innovations that he 
authorised into existence, to provide their technological and strategic inputs to American progress 
toward naval modernisation. O. N. I. was tasked with the systematic acquisition and compilation 
of foreign technical information, while the War College was scheduled to consider the science and 
art of naval warfare when it opened in September 1885. 
Goodrich, Sampson and the Endicott Board 
Until Luce and Walker could complete their arrangements to open the War College, however, 
it was left to the initiative of the new department secretary to consider the strategic as well as the 
technological components to naval modernisation. While William Whitney proved quite eager to 
foster development of naval-related technology sectors and domestic shipbuilding facilities for 
new steel warships, the same cannot be said for his attention to the matters of strategy, which 
continued to remain on the periphery of American naval affairs. His first year in office, in fact, 
was devoted mainly to the procurement of naval materiel and new construction, interrupted by his 
frequent charges of corruption and the structural weaknesses inherent in the vessels laid down by 
his predecessor. 3 In his annual report for 1885, the contents of which reflect the technological 
2 Chandler to Davis, 30 December 1882. RG 45/5/17. 
3 For more on the transition between Chandler and Whitney, and the technological focus of the latter, see 
Leon Burr Richardson, William E. Chandler, Republican, (New York 1940), pp. 367-387; Mark D. Hirsch, 
William C. Whitney, Modern Warwick, (New York 1948), pp. 297-336; and Benjamin Franklin Cooling, 
Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex, 1881- 
1917, (Hamden 1979), pp. 57-84. 
- 162 - 
focus during his first year in office, Whitney highlighted the reforms he anticipated would 
overcome the technological impediments to naval modernisation, which included foreign 
instruction of American naval constructors and industrial partnerships with private shipyards and 
manufacturers. `The problem of keeping pace with the march of improvement in these lines of 
industry is one of incalculable difficulty; and yet unless the Government is prepared to avail itself 
promptly of all the improvements that are made in the construction and equipment of its ships, its 
expenditures are largely useless' . 
4 
While naval strategy was clearly not a priority for Whitney during his first year in the Navy 
Department, the strategic employment of naval forces was considered indirectly when Congress 
authorised the creation of a special investigative body to assess the coastal defences of the 
country. The congressional mandate of March 1885 specified that the Board consist of the 
Secretary of War, William C. Endicott, as well as a contingent of officers from the Army and 
Navy. Appointed to represent the latter were Commanders W. T. Sampson and C. F. Goodrich, 
both of whom it will be recalled were accomplished service intellectuals and naval practitioners 
who had previously collaborated with Luce in establishing the War College in 1884. At the time 
of their appointment, Sampson was the officer-in-charge of the Torpedo Station in Newport, 
while Goodrich served as an ordnance inspector at the Washington Navy Yard, both officers 
reporting directly to Commodore Montgomery Sicard in the Bureau of Ordnance. 5 Whether their 
assignment to the Fortifications Board, later known simply as the Endicott Board, was made at the 
explicit request of Commodore Walker is unknown. Given his oversight over personnel decisions 
in the Navy Department, Walker more than likely seconded the recommendation of Sicard. At 
minimum, it was a fortuitous selection, as both Sampson and Goodrich had previously exhibited 
an aptitude for strategic issues that was matched only by their mentor Luce and later Mahan in the 
senior officer corps. 6 
The deliberations of the Endicott Board remained confidential until the final report was 
transmitted to Congress in January 1886. In the absence of any input from the Navy Department, 
Sampson and Goodrich were thus afforded an extraordinary opportunity to advocate a new 
strategic prescription for the employment of naval forces in conjunction with coastal land 
fortifications. Their main contribution to the final report, contained in a separate appendix and 
authored by Sampson, offered the prospect for an incremental expansion of traditional naval 
practices to include an offensive orientation in the proposed scheme for coastal defence. While 
accepting the necessity for multiple barriers of coastal defence, in the form of land fortifications 
4 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1885, (Washington 1886), p. xxxiv. 
5 Navy Register for 1885, (Washington 1886), pp. 10-11. 
6 As will be recalled from Chapter 6, Goodrich and Sampson served on the Luce Board which 
recommended the establishment of the Naval War College in 1884. See pp. 151-154 in this thesis. 
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and other harbour defences (ie., floating batteries), Sampson distinguished between these passive 
defences and active offensive operations, the latter he envisioned would be conducted by vessels 
with sufficient armour and powerful guns to defeat a hostile naval force in a decisive naval 
engagement. In making this distinction, Sampson further urged an appropriate division of labour, 
with the Navy assuming the burden of conducting active offensive operations against hostile 
naval squadrons. `It is, therefore, deemed best that the use of floating batteries should be 
limited... in any scheme which has for its object the defence of the coast, without any element of 
active offensive operations beyond the immediate locality'. 8 These floating batteries and other 
passive defences should be left to the devices of the immediate defenders on land and in the 
harbours. `In other words', Sampson continued, `such floating batteries should be considered as 
part of the stationary defences of the country and not part of the Navy'. 9 On this latter point the 
summary report was silent, but in the most general terms concurred that armoured seagoing 
vessels were meant for active offensive operations, provided of course that they were possessed 
by the American navy. `We have none of that kind, and if hereafter built in sufficient number and 
power they would act offensively and not be confined to the defence of ports'. '° 
Conceptions of Strategy in the Navy Department 
In the end, the recommendations of the Endicott Board failed to attract widespread support 
within Congress, as the $126,377,800 estimated for the suggested improvements was seen as 
excessive and politically unpalatable. " One positive outcome from the investigation, however, 
was a renewed interest in the course of American naval policy, particularly from the House Naval 
Affairs Committee. With recent changes in the existing budgetary structure, the legislative 
committee was now empowered with jurisdiction over naval appropriations, a sweeping 
prerogative that had previously resided with the unpopular Chairman Samuel Randall and the 
House Appropriations Committee. 12 Appointed to chair the naval affairs committee in December 
1885, Hilary A. Herbert quickly convened special hearings in the wake of the findings of the 
Endicott Board. The hearings were held throughout February 1886 and included testimony from 
naval constructors, engineers and selected naval officers. But the highlight of the hearings 
= Sampson to Walker, 7 December 1885. RG 38/68/2. 
8 Report of the Board on Fortification or Other Defenses appointed by the President of the United States 
under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved March 3 1885,49`h Cong., ls` Sess., House Exec. 
Doc. No. 49, p. 309. 
9 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. 9. 
11 Edward Ranson, `The Endicott Board of 1885-86 and the Coast Defenses', Military Review, (Summer 
1967), pp. 74-84. 
12 Charles Stewart III, `Does Structure Matter? The Effects of Structural Change on Spending Decisions in 
the House, 1871-1922', American Journal of Political Science, (August 1987), p. 588. For more on the 
congressional career of Randall, see Albert V. House, Jr., `The Contributions of Samuel J. Randall to the 
Rules of the National House of Representatives', The American Political Science Review, (October 1935), 
pp. 837-841. 
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occurred on 12 and 13 February, when Secretary Whitney appeared before the committee to 
provide his input on the proposed special appropriation to provide for increased naval 
construction. In the process, Whitney revealed his reluctance to abandon traditional conceptions 
of naval strategy, despite the recent proposal from Sampson to develop a new strategic 
prescription for coast defence and with it a modern naval force to conduct active offensive 
operations at points distant from the American coastline. 
When asked about future naval requirements, for instance, Whitney outlined his preference for 
additional cruisers and how he envisioned their use in naval warfare as effective commerce 
destroyers. `If you break up the commerce of a nation now, you not only bring about financial 
disaster and distress to a country, but dominate almost in time of war', the Secretary informed his 
sympathetic audience on the committee. 13 `Take these fast cruisers that can run away from 
fighting ships and destroy merchant ships, and they play a very important part in time of war. A 
good many of these ships are pretty good fighting ships that they are building now'. 14 At the 
request of the committee, Whitney also provided a written assessment of foreign trends in naval 
construction, with a particular emphasis on the most powerful ironclads built or currently under 
construction in Britain, France and Italy. In this regard, the Secretary identified the Nile, Renown, 
Amiral Baudin and Lepanto, all in various stages of completion, and evaluated them in terms of 
their size, armour, armament, speed and cost. After reviewing the design qualities of each vessel, 
Whitney concluded that the ironclads were `unworthy of imitation', citing their excessive draught 
as an impediment to conducting operations in the shallow waters off the American coastline. 15 
Instead, the Secretary recommended the immediate construction of six protected cruisers and two 
armoured vessels of moderate dimensions to support the anticipated improvements to the seacoast 
and harbour defences suggested by the Endicott Board. 16 As these vessels were expected to be 
comparable to those built in foreign dockyards, Whitney also proposed that the most modem 
designs be purchased from naval constructors in Europe. `I think our true policy is to borrow the 
ideas of our neighbors so far as they are thought to be in advance of ours [and} give them to our 
17 shipbuilders in the shape of plans... ' . 
In contrast, the committee also received opinions that contradicted the views advocated by 
Whitney, particularly from senior naval constructors who were increasingly familiar with the 
designs and capabilities of British naval vessels. Theodore D. Wilson, Chief of the Bureau of 
Construction, countered that the question over the types of vessels to be built should first be 
13 Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs on Bill for Increase in the Naval Establishment. 49`' 
Cong., ls` Sess. Committee Papers. RG 233/75. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Whitney to Herbert, 28 February 1886. RG 45/5118. 
16 Whitney to Herbert, 12 February 1886. RG 45/5/18. 
17 Whitney to Herbert, 27 February 1886. RG 45/5/18. Emphasis in the original. 
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considered by a board of naval officers, in a manner similar to the administrative practices of the 
British Admiralty. While careful not to challenge Whitney's control over departmental affairs, 
Wilson inferred that the Secretary was simply not qualified to make such recommendations 
without prior consultation with `the line or fighting officers of the Navy'. 18 Even more critical in 
his remarks was Benjamin F. Isherwood, the well-respected former Bureau chief and outspoken 
commentator on American shipbuilding priorities. Isherwood railed against Whitney's narrow 
views on naval strategy, beginning with the wartime functions of modem naval forces. `A navy is 
not built with superior speed as its principal excellence, for flight from an antagonist, nor is it 
equipped with a view to privateering against an enemy's commerce... '. 19 Rather, the American 
navy should be organised and equipped to fight at sea, which alone necessitates the procurement 
of first-class ironclads and not the commerce destroyers recommended by Whitney. `Smaller and 
unarmored vessels may be found useful as auxiliaries... but they cannot be reckoned as fighting 
vessels, nor can there be any reason for their existence in the absence of ironclads'. 20 But what 
invoked his most strenuous objection was Whitney's assertion that ironclads such as the H. M. S. 
Nile and Renown were `unworthy of imitation'. He reminded Herbert and his fellow committee 
members of what the British were able to accomplish with these vessels, and what they meant to 
British conceptions of national security: 
This is the kind of vessel which the greatest naval power that exists, or ever existed, has 
arrived at after years of experimenting and millions of expenditure, as the only kind 
which can maintain her Mistress of the Seas, and preserve her shores safe from injury and 
insult. She builds no more fortifications; and needs none as long as she remains supreme 
on the water, and when that supremacy is lost the fortifications will not avail. 21 
Yet despite this divergence in opinion between the Secretary and the naval constructors invited 
to appear before the committee, the policymakers were more inclined to accept Whitney's 
strategic appraisal and the shipbuilding priorities that were contested at the hearings. What 
appealed most to the committee members had less to do with strategy than the moderate costs 
anticipated for the shipbuilding programme, even though the final version of the bill authorised 
only two of the six cruisers originally sought by Whitney. In the end, Congress authorised in July 
1886 the construction of the cruisers Baltimore and Vesuvius, the latter an experimental dynamite 
gun cruiser, in addition to the armoured vessels Texas and Maine. 22 But more importantly, an 
informal arrangement was established in the aftermath of the hearings between Whitney and the 
committee, which virtually assured him that his policies would remain unchallenged throughout 
18 Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs on Bill for Increase in the Naval Establishment. 49`h 
Cong., 1S` Sess. Committee Papers. RG 233/75. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Isherwood to Herbert, 2 April 1886. RG 233/75. 
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his term in office. The arrangement was alluded to in a committee report written by Herbert and 
submitted to the House on 10 March.: `The general policy pursued in framing the bill reported by 
the committee has been to leave a large amount of discretionary power in the hands of the 
Secretary of the Navy, who will thus be held responsible for results... . We think it better to leave it 
free to select what may seem at the moment to be the most desirable plan'. 23 Toward that end, 
Herbert and Whitney quickly formed a working relationship that was later described by Herbert's 
biographer as `cooperative' and `harmonious' . 
24 In the remaining years of the Whitney 
administration, the naval affairs committee drafted legislation that authorised the construction of 
additional protected cruisers and gunboats, the designs of which were consistent with a defensive 
orientation and their intended use as commerce destroyers and coastal defence vessels. 
Thus, in the four years between 1885 and 1889, the traditional naval practices of the American 
navy were blindly perpetuated by a department secretary who was concerned less about the 
strategic implications of the vessels he favoured than the technologies required to build them. 
What conceptions Whitney harboured about naval strategy, moreover, were narrowly focused 
around the commonly held doctrines of coastal defence and limited commerce destruction, when a 
careful study of naval history would have either validated his strategic and force structure choices 
or repudiated them in favour of alternative policy options. Whitney's technological focus would 
have prevented such a study, if not for the existence of the War College and its mandate to 
consider naval history as a medium from which to study the strategic and tactical problems of 
modern naval warfare. It was an innovative concept borrowed by Admiral Luce from John Knox 
Laughton, as will be recalled from Chapter 6.25 To assist him in this regard, Luce requested a 
talented understudy to assume the burden for the task at hand. The arrival of Mahan at the War 
College in October 1885 commenced a collaborative effort to uncover the strategic lessons of 
naval history. In less than a year, Luce's protege accumulated enough historical evidence to 
demonstrate the folly of American naval practices, especially those continued by Whitney in a 
critical period of naval modernisation. 
Conceptions of Strategy at the War College 
With few exceptions, modem naval historians continue to overlook the collaborative aspect of 
the professional relationship between Luce and Mahan, even though the countless letters written 
22 For further discussion of congressional deliberations over naval construction in 1886, see Mark Russell 
Shulman, Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882-1893, (Annapolis 1995), pp. 119- 
124. 
23 House of Representatives Reports, 49`h Cong., 1 S` Sess., No. 993. 
24 Hugh B. Hammett, Hilary Abner Herbert: A Southerner Returns to the Union, (Philadelphia 1976), pp. 
115-116. 
25 Chapter 6, pp. 148-150. 
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by Mahan during this period reveal the extent to which he was indebted to Luce for his tutelage. 26 
While Mahan should be credited for fulfilling the broad research agenda established by his 
mentor, it was Luce who guided him through the historical literature, encouraged him to adopt a 
rigourous methodological approach from which to develop his lectures, and in essence challenged 
the boundaries of his intellectual limits. That Mahan's accomplishments in the 1880s should be 
placed within its proper context was underscored by the prominent naval historian Donald 
Schurman: `The idea that tactics, strategy, policy and "principles" could be set up in a "scientific 
relationship" to one another was not a concept outside the temper of the times; but the insistent 
strength of this synthesising thrust came from Mahan's mentor - the founder of the Naval War 
College - Stephen B. Luce' . 
2' Similarly, there is a tendency in his hagiographies to portray 
Mahan as an atypical pioneer during this period, when in fact his conception of naval strategy was 
borrowed from the British and had already attracted the attention of service intellectuals and naval 
practitioners. 28 The strategic appraisals offered by Goodrich, Sampson and Isherwood are 
particularly noteworthy in this regard. In fact, it is reasonable to infer that Mahan's conclusions 
were essentially predetermined in July 1884, when Luce, Sampson and Goodrich developed the 
core curriculum to be taught at the War College - the descriptions of which were outlined in the 
previous chapter. Embedded within this curriculum were the elements of a new strategic 
framework, which Mahan was expected to refine and validate through historical analysis. 
To embark on an extended discussion of Mahan and his writings at this point would require 
another thesis, and is unnecessary when there is already an extensive and sophisticated literature 
on the subject. 29 For purposes of this study, however, it is necessary to summarise Mahan's 
conception of naval strategy as it evolved between 1886 and 1889 as an alternative to 
conventional wisdom prevailing in the Navy Department. In preparing for his first year of 
lectures at the college, Mahan confirmed through historical analysis what was previously alluded 
26 Mahan's letters to Luce are catalogued in Robert Seager II and Doris Maguire, (eds), Letters and Papers 
of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Volume I, (Annapolis 1975). The exceptions to the Mahan hagiographies cited in 
Chapter 1- Footnote 7 -can be found in Donald M. Schurman, `Mahan Revisited', in John B. Hattendorf 
and Robert S. Jordan, (eds), Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power, (New York 1989); and John B. 
Hattendorf, `Luce's Idea of the War College', Naval War College Review, (October 1984). 
27 Schurman, p. 104. 
28 Exceptions to this historical treatment include Barry D. Hunt, `The Outstanding Strategic Writers of the 
Century', Naval War College Review, (October 1984); Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War 
College and the Development of the Naval Profession, (Newport 1977); and Peter Karsten, The Naval 
Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism, (New York 
1972). 
29 See, for example, Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic 
Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered, (Baltimore 1997); John B. Hattendorf, `Alfred Thayer Mahan 
and American Naval Theory', in Keith Neilson and Elizabeth J. Errington, (edsj, Navies and Global 
Defense: Theories and Strategy, (Westport 1995); John B. Hattendorf, (ed), Mahan on Naval Strategy: 
Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, (Annapolis 1991); and John B. 
Hattendorf, `Alfred Thayer Mahan and his Strategic Thought', in John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan, 
(eds), Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power, (New York 1989). 
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to in the Endicott Report and the testimony of Isherwood. `Naval Strategy', he observed, `has for 
its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country' . 
3° 
As a means to an end - seapower - naval strategy could not be conceived in defensive terms, but 
rather with an offensive orientation and an expectation to contest the control of the seas in 
decisive naval engagements. His analysis of British and French naval history supported the 
notion that control of the seas, through the adoption of an offensive naval strategy, was the only 
effective means to protect American cities from bombardment and merchant ships from 
molestation. `It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have 
a value which is no degree lessened. They are useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also 
as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of conditions'. 31 
When fleshing out these precedents established by naval history, Mahan was especially careful 
in warning against naval operations that he considered peripheral to the principal wartime 
functions of navies: to seek out and destroy enemy naval squadrons immediately upon the 
outbreak of hostilities for the general purpose of obtaining command of the sea. Thus, in his 
conception of naval strategy, there was a clear distinction between what was peripheral and what 
was decisive, which by themselves were indicative of two different lines of policy. `[I]t is most 
desirable that all persons responsible for the conduct of naval affairs should recognize that the two 
lines of policy, in direct contradiction to each other, do exist'. 32 Mahan used an analogy to further 
underscore this point, presumably so that his fellow naval officers clearly understood the 
fundamental differences between them: `In the one there is a strict analogy to a war of posts; 
while in the other the objective is that force whose destruction leaves the posts unsupported and 
therefore sure to fall in due time'. 33 What he considered peripheral, in the end, were inherently 
defensive naval operations that, in lieu of an offensive orientation, automatically yielded 
command of the sea and hence the freedom of action for an adversary to conduct its own naval 
campaign with impunity. He agreed with Sampson that coastal defence, in the traditional sense, 
should be left to existing seacoast and harbour fortifications, while commerce destruction by 
independent cruisers would not be sufficient enough to force the capitulation of an adversary. On 
this latter point Mahan was insistent. `It is doubtless a most secondary operation of naval war', he 
warned his audience. `[B]ut regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to 
crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion and a most dangerous delusion, when presented in the 
fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives of the people'. 34 
30 Mahan, `Influence of Seapower', p. 89. 
31 Ibid., p. 9 
32 Ibid., p. 339. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 481. 
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By the time Mahan approached the podium for his first lecture in October 1886, the new 
President of the War College had already accumulated a 400 page manuscript, the bulk of which 
contained the research and analysis later published in The Influence of Seapower Upon History. 35 
Following the conclusion of his final lecture of the session, he received an enthusiastic 
endorsement from his mentor Luce, who had recently left the War College to command the North 
Atlantic Squadron. Reminding the student officers of his reference to the search for a naval 
Jomini, made in his opening address on 6 September, Luce explained that the search was no 
longer necessary. `He is here and his name is Mahan'. 36 For his part, Mahan was stunned and 
thrilled that his lectures were received with so much enthusiasm. `[M]y own lectures of the last 
session met with a degree of success which surprised me and which still seems to me 
exaggerated', he confided to former Midshipman and Academy roommate Samuel Ashe. 37 
Whether his lectures were to be entirely successful, however, depended to a large degree on the 
reception his viewpoints would receive in the Navy Department, especially since Mahan's 
conception of naval strategy was innovative and contrary to the views espoused by Whitney. To 
the surprise of Luce, Walker and Mahan, the volatile Secretary was initially inclined to endorse 
the research agenda conceived at the War College, at least until strained professional relationships 
evolved into a personal vendetta that threatened both the institution itself and the strategic reforms 
advocated by his perceived antagonists. 
SEEDS OF OPPOSITION AND THE CAMPAIGN TO SAVE THE WAR COLLEGE 
Exactly when Secretary Whitney sided with the opponents of the War College is unclear, 
although the seeds of opposition were clearly sown in the first months of his administration. 
Indeed, his first interaction with Mahan occurred in May 1885, when he received a tactless 
request from the naval officer for his premature relief from command of the U. S. S. Wachusett, 
presumably so that he could adequately prepare himself for his next assignment at the college. 38 
In both his private and official correspondence, Mahan made little effort to conceal his disgust 
over the deplorable condition of the Wachusett, as well as the general hardships of service with 
the distant South Pacific Squadron. In his letter to the unseasoned department secretary, Mahan 
assumed the naive Whitney would sympathise with his situation and credit him for lasting so long 
in such an undesirable billet. Whitney's reaction to the request, however, was immediate, severe, 
and quite expected from a man who was later described by his biographer as `unflinchingly 
immovable' at times and possessing a `stronger will and sharper temper' than Mahan could have 
anticipated. 39 The Secretary simply viewed the request as `weak and unworthy', and rebuked 
35 Mahan to Luce, 6 May 1886. Printed in Seager and Maguire, p. 632. 
36 William D. Puleston, The Life and Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, (London 1939) p. 95. 
37 Mahan to Ashe, 8 September 1887. Printed in Seager and Maguire, p. 641. 
38 Mahan to Whitney, 15 May 185. Printed in Seager and Maguire, p. 605. 
39 Hirsch, p. 266-267. 
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Mahan for both his improper language and the insolence displayed by his apparent willingness to 
complain to a superior over an assignment-40 The incident no doubt left a firm impression upon 
Whitney which, when considered in light of his future actions in opposition to the War College, 
certainly strengthened his resolve to object to the efforts of Mahan, Luce and others to secure 
departmental support and congressional recognition for the fledgling institution. 
Reversals of Opinion on the War College 
For the first two years of his administration, however, Whitney was not openly hostile to the 
War College or its principal advocates. At the close of 1885, in fact, Whitney neither sought to 
reverse his predecessor's order for its establishment, nor attempted to undermine Walker's 
creative financing scheme to sustain the War College with departmental funds in lieu of 
congressional action. 41 Included in his first annual report to President Cleveland in November 
1885 was a carefully worded endorsement of the War College, obviously intended to justify both 
the existence and objectives of the course at Newport. 42 Though written by Walker, Whitney 
remained noticeably silent about the institution and took no action to qualify the endorsement of 
the most powerful Bureau chief in the Navy Department. 
But less than a year later, in August 1886, Walker detected that Whitney's attitude toward the 
War College had moved from casual indifference to opposition, to the point where he felt the need 
to warn Luce of the impending danger to the institution. There was now for the first time a 
realistic prospect that the Secretary would intervene on behalf of their opponents in the 
Department, the most influential of whom still included Commodores Montgomery Sicard and 
Winfield Scott Schley. Before leaving the Department for his annual holiday, Walker assured 
Luce on 17 August 1886 that `I have had advertisements issued for repairs to the building on 
Coaster's Harbor Island and shall order a class there before I let go of the reins. I find it a little 
hard to carry the War College as the Secretary himself is opposed to it, but perhaps we shall be 
able to tide the matter over and have better luck later' . 
43 Walker apparently was so concerned 
about the situation that before leaving on his extended visit to Europe, he instructed his assistant 
to be readily available to Luce upon request. `Anything that I can do for you while Captain 
Walker is away', Commander Bowman McCalla wrote to Luce days later, `I shall be most happy 
to do, if you drop me a line'. 44 
40 Ibid. 
41 This point was also made in Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and his Letters, 
(Annapolis 1977), p. 179. 
42 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1885, (Washington 1886), p. 86. 
43 Walker to Luce, 17 August 1886. Luce Papers. NHFC/LCIRee1 #6. 
" McCalla to Luce, 28 August 1886. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel #6. 
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Upon his return to the Department in November 1886, Walker must have been surprised to 
discover that the War College had finally secured tacit approval of the Secretary, due mainly to 
the perceived success of the last academic session. Even before the eight-week course officially 
concluded on 20 November, Walker wrote to Luce to express his relief over this latest 
development. `The War College seems to have had quite a boom this season and I hope the result 
will be to put it out of all danger of being broken up. It was very near being discontinued at one 
time last spring. If I can do anything for you here let me know' . 
45 Later that month, the Bureau 
chief wrote again to Luce, assuring him that this sudden reversal in opinion by Whitney seemed 
permanent and not subject to further vacillation. `I think the War College is now on pretty safe 
ground. I think the boom given it last summer has modified the Secretary's views very 
considerable, although I have said nothing, or little to him. It came very near being broken up last 
summer' . 
46 
As to who or what was actually responsible for Whitney's apparent transformation is 
unknown, but the correspondence between Luce and the Bureau of Navigation points directly to 
Mahan. `I am happy that Mahan's lectures have been such a success', McCalla wrote to Luce on 
23 October. 47 `He has sent us a very capital report on the College which will, with its enclosures, 
look very well in print and ought to gain us friends'. 48 Whitney, in fact, appears to have been so 
persuaded by the efforts of Mahan and his fellow lecturers during the last session that he included 
in his own remarks, for the first and last time during his administration, an overwhelming 
endorsement of the War College in the annual report for 1886: 
The importance of the work to be done by the College can hardly be overestimated. 
Additional courses of lectures are now in preparation for the coming year upon other 
subjects bearing directly upon the art of war, and embodying those results of recent 
investigation which are inaccessible to the Service in general.... [I]t is hoped that in time 
its scope may be gradually enlarged in the direction of practical training with modern 
ships and guns, as far as the resources of the service will permit. 49 
But that was not all. Whitney went one step further and attempted, apparently on his own 
initiative or at the behest of Walker, to secure congressional recognition and the modest 
appropriation of $12,400 sought by the Bureau chief on behalf of the War College. In this regard 
he turned to Hilary Herbert, a fellow Democrat and Chairman of the House Naval Affairs 
Committee who emerged during this period as an influential opponent of the War College, for 
reasons he attributed primarily to naval efficiency and reform. Just weeks before, Herbert railed 
against the idea of supporting the War College when more important naval matters required 
as Walker to Luce, 11 November 1886. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel #6. 
46 Walker to Luce, 28 November 1886. Luce Papers. N HFC LC/Reel #6. 
47 McCalla to Luce, 23 October 1886. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel #6. 
48 Ibid. The report McCalla referred to was transmitted in a letter to the Bureau of Navigation. See Mahan 
to Walker, 19 October 1886. Printed in Seager and Maguire, p. 636. 
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congressional authorisation, particularly in the area of shipbuilding, armament and other naval- 
related technology sectors. `It does not seem to me that at this time when our old fleet is passing 
away', he cautioned his colleagues on the floor of the House of Representatives, `when it will 
soon live only in history, now when we need money so much for the building of warships and 
new guns, now is not the time for the establishment of another naval college' . 
50 Whitney must 
have been aware of Herbert's viewpoint on the subject, but nevertheless decided to write to him 
anyway in an attempt to convince him otherwise. `The college fills a most important place in the 
training of naval officers, and supplies a want that has long been felt in the service', he wrote to 
Herbert on 29 December 1886. `Although it is comparatively a young institution, it has already 
done valuable work, and has given such proof of future usefulness that I deem it in the highest 
degree worthy of being encouraged and fostered'. s' 
Yet less than two years later, in July 1888, Whitney once again appealed directly to 
congressional authorities over the future of the Naval War College, this time not in support of the 
institution but against it. His open opposition to the institution now permanent, the Secretary 
stunned the naval community at Newport with a plan to consolidate the War College with the 
Naval Torpedo School, the result of which would have subjugated the strategic awareness 
promoted by the former in favour of the technological emphasis of the Navy Department. As to 
what prompted Whitney to reverse course and vehemently oppose the War College, a host of 
personal papers and departmental correspondence point to the strained professional relationships 
that developed between the Secretary and the most ardent advocates of the War College - Mahan, 
Luce and Walker - during the course of 1887 and 1888.52 Alienated by the actions of these 
officers respective to command decisions and their individual appeals to congressional authorities, 
Whitney effectively became predisposed to the parochial arguments made against the War 
College and championed by Schley within the Navy Department. Within eight months of his 
favourable appeal to Herbert, in fact, Whitney would be antagonised by a public and bitter dispute 
over a command decision that, while not directly related to the War College, undoubtedly caused 
the Secretary to alter his perceptions of Luce and his beloved institution. 
Whitney, Luce and the Canadian Fisheries Controversy 
In late June 1887, Whitney ordered Admiral Luce and the North Atlantic Squadron to patrol 
the waters in and around the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where conflict frequently occurred between 
49 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1886, (Washington 1887), p. 26. 
50 Congressional Record, 49`h Congress, 1s1 Session, p. 5830-5839. 
51 Whitney to Herbert, 29 December 1886. RG 233177. 
52 Evidence of these strained professional relationships is offered further in this chapter. 
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American fisherman and Canadian authorities over statutory fishing restrictions. 53 Precisely what 
the Secretary expected the squadron to accomplish is unclear, as the orders received by Luce 
simply instructed him to `protect and look after the interest of American fisherman'. 54 Luce's 
instructions to his immediate subordinates were more explanatory, where he reminded them that 
`it will be your special aim to inculcate the necessity of a careful observance, on the part of our 
fisherman, of the terms of the treaty of 1818 relating to the three mile limit'. 55 So that his officers 
understood the guidelines and parameters of the treaty, Luce provided a reading list that, 
according to him, `may be read to advantage'. 56 Thus, upon completion of target practice in July 
1887, the U. S. S. Galena, Yantic, and Ossipee were dispatched to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, each 
vessel ordered to sail separately so as not to attract undue attention from the cruisers of the 
Canadian Fishery Protection Service. 
Luce did not accompany his vessels on the mission, but instead travelled to Portland, Maine, 
where he consulted with a delegation of American fisherman. At their request, he compiled a set 
of questions that he addressed to Captain P. H. Scott, R. N., the senior officer of the Fishery 
Protection Service who promptly responded to the inquiry with answers that Luce hoped would 
shed authoritative insight into the treaty obligations. 57 Without conferring with the Department 
beforehand, the Admiral decided to release the answers obtained in a circular that was distributed 
among the fisherman operating in Canadian waters. The motives for his action were made clear 
in a letter posted to the Canadian Minister of Marine and Fisheries shortly after the circulars were 
distributed: `It is believed that a few plain rules of action among our fisherman will go far 
towards obviating some, if not all, the difficulties which now prove to be a source of irritation 
between the United States and the Dominion of Canada' . 
58 Luce even sought a personal interview 
with the minister, the outcome of which seemed to confirm the wisdom of his initiative. `I have 
therefore nothing further to add', wrote George Forster to the Admiral on 10 August 1887, 
`except to say that I very much appreciate the spirit with which you met me, and join you in the 
earnest hope that as few infractions of the law as possible may take place, and that all needless 
harshness in its execution may be avoided' ? 
s3 For more on the fisheries disputes that in the late 1880s complicated relations between Britain, Canada 
and the United States, see Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapproachment: The United States 
and Great Britain, 1783-1900, (New York 1974), pp. 149-163. 
sa Quoted in Albert Gleaves, Life and Letters of Stephen B. Luce, (New York 1925), p. 200. 
ss Luce to C. M. Chester, 1 July 1887. Hayes Transcripts. Courtesy of Professor John Hattendorf. 
56 Ibid. 
57 For the interaction between Luce and the American fisherman, see A. M. Smith et. al. to Luce, 13 July 
1887, and the reply in Luce to Smith et. al., 30 July 1887. Luce Papers, NHFC/LC/Reel #6. The set of 
Testions were reprinted in Gleaves, p. 367-368 (Appendix A). 
5 Luce to G. E. Forster, 2 August 1887. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel #6. 
59 Forster to Luce, 10 August 1887. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel #6. 
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Luce could not have anticipated the departmental backlash that resulted when Whitney was 
apprised of the proceedings between Luce and Canadian officials, particularly his inquiry to 
Captain Scott and the circular that was distributed to American fisherman. Upon receiving an 
official report of the situation from Luce, the Secretary replied with a tersely worded telegram that 
was received on 5 August, in which he severely reprimanded the Admiral for exceeding the limits 
of his authority. `Captain Scott is not understood to be the agent of his Government for any such 
purpose as that for which you have employed him, and if he were the application might be made 
to our Government in case a correct statement of the Canadian claim is desired'. 60 Luce 
immediately acknowledged the report, and ensured Whitney that further distribution of the 
circulars would be avoided. 61 But unwilling to leave it there, Whitney leaked the telegram to the 
press, for no other purpose but to discredit the Admiral and force his resignation - which is 
exactly what was accomplished. The press sensationalised the dispute now made public, with 
newspaper pundits predicting that Whitney would relieve the Admiral when the Secretary 
travelled to Bar Harbor, Maine, to confer with Luce upon his return. 62 For his part, Luce was 
appalled by the bitterness and harsh treatment he was subjected to at the instigation of Whitney. 
In his letter of resignation, written on 26 August, Luce sought an explanation for the action taken 
against him: `I am yet at a loss to understand the process of reasoning that could have led to my 
63 being publicly censured and my high office brought into disrepute before the whole world' . 
Yet for reasons unknown to his biographer and naval historians, Whitney declined to accept 
his resignation at their meeting in Bar Harbor. More than likely the Secretary concluded that he 
had miscalculated in seeking to embarrass a naval officer whose public reputation matched his 
own. Regardless of the reason, Whitney moved next to dismantle the North Atlantic Squadron. 
The first vessel to be detailed elsewhere was the squadron flagship, U. S. S. Richmond, which was 
transferred to the Asiatic Squadron. Next to leave in succession were the U. S. S. Pensacola, 
which was deemed unfit for service; the U. S. S. Atlanta, the latest addition to the squadron which 
was also transferred elsewhere; and the U. S. S. Yantic and Dolphin, the tandem having been 
selected for inspection and special duty, respectively. This left Luce with a squadron that 
consisted of two vessels, and at times it became necessary for the Admiral to reside for months on 
shore before transferring his flag to one of the remaining vessels. While in theory Luce retained 
command of the North Atlantic Squadron, the departure of these vessels merely trivialised his 
appointment to what was considered the premier command billet among senior naval officers. 
But aside from the humiliation Luce must have suffered from the action taken against him, there 
60 Luce to Whitney, 8 August 1887. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel #6. 
61 Ibid. 
62 That Whitney intended to discredit Luce in public is underscored by a newspaper clipping that he retained 
and was found among his personal papers. See `Admiral Luce: Rumor that He Will Be Relieved of his 
Command', The Herald, 12 August 1887. Whitney Papers. LC/ MD/Volume 47. 
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were far more grave consequences to consider. The reduction in squadron strength rendered it 
virtually impossible for Luce to operate the vessels collectively as a "School of Application", 
which he envisioned as a practical complement to the lectures on naval tactics and strategy 
conducted at the War College. `The fundamental idea', he explained to Whitney, `is to make 
theoretical instruction and practical exercise go hand in hand; or, in other words, to correlate the 
work of the Squadron and that of the College'. 64With this in mind, Luce received permission 
from the Department in 1886, and again in 1887, to assemble the North Atlantic Squadron at 
Newport so the naval officers present could combine coursework with practical instruction. 
Also jeopardised were the joint amphibious exercises that Luce inaugurated in November 1887 
with the enthusiastic endorsement of the U. S. Army. 65 Nevertheless, the Admiral proceeded with 
every intention to conduct the joint exercises scheduled in 1888 with the vessels available, at least 
until he discovered that Whitney had instructed the Department to withhold payment for the coal 
to be expended in the course of the exercises. The Secretary expected the Army to pay for the 
coal out of its own budget, most likely anticipating that his counterpart in the Department of War 
would balk at such a request. 66 The relationship already strained by the events of the past year, 
Luce protested to Whitney in the strongest possible terms in July 1888, observing that in light of 
this latest incident `the truth was forced upon me that the views of the Navy Department had 
undergone a radical change, and were no longer in accord with the policy of making the North 
Atlantic Squadron a School of practical instruction' . 
67 Though carefully worded, the strong 
language used by Luce in his protest to Whitney bordered on insubordination, most especially his 
veiled accusation that the Department was intentionally obstructing his professional endeavours, 
particularly with regard to the North Atlantic Squadron. `I will not go so far as to say that the 
Department has purposely thrown obstacles in the way of these squadron evolutions, but its 
course with regard to the supply of coal is an unmistakable indication that it has no sympathy with 
them'. 68 The protest had no effect, for only days before Whitney moved definitively against the 
War College with a scheme to consolidate it with the Torpedo Station. 
The Campaign for Congressional Recognition of the War College 
Apprised by Commodore Walker of the negative atmosphere prevailing in the Navy 
Department, Luce was aware as early as December 1887 that Secretary Whitney was again a 
63 Luce to Whitney, 26 August, 1887. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel #6- 
6' Luce to Whitney, 28 July 1888. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel V. 
65 For more on these joint exercises, see Stephen B. Luce, Squadron Evolutions, (New York 1887). 
Reprinted as idem., `Applied Tactics, November 1887', Naval War College Review (October 1984), pp. 
21-25. 
66 Gleaves, p. 218. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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formidable enemy of the War College. Accordingly, Luce and Mahan began an intense lobbying 
effort the next month to secure congressional recognition of the institution, which if obtained 
would preserve the War College despite the opposition of the Secretary and his allies Schley and 
Sicard. His squadron preparing for an extended cruise to the West Indies, the Admiral confined 
himself to his strongest virtue, writing letters to congressional authorities to implore their support 
for a modest appropriation of $14,400 to sustain the War College for another year. 69 It was thus 
left to Mahan to travel to Washington and plead their case. He first visited the Navy Department 
to confer with Whitney, who made no attempt to conceal his opposition to the object in view. In 
his memoirs, Mahan recalled his encounter with the Secretary, especially his response to Mahan's 
request that he be allowed to interview personally with congressional authorities on behalf of the 
War College: `Mr. Whitney showed me a frowning countenance... and yielded only a reluctant, 
almost surly, "I will not oppose you, but I do not authorize you to express any approval from 
me"'. 70 In approving his request, the Secretary most likely figured that Mahan's initiative would 
fail to rally support for the college. Congress would be deemed responsible for the demise of the 
War College, not Whitney and his allies in the Navy Department. 
One of his first visits to Capital Hill was to the offices of Senator Nelson Aldrich, a frequent 
correspondent with Luce and the most ardent supporter of the War College in the U. S. Senate. 
The purpose of the meeting was to identify which members of the House Naval Affairs 
Committee would be most receptive to Mahan and the institution he represented. Aldrich ensured 
that Luce was aware of the outcome of the strategy session. `Capt. Mahan is now here, and I had 
a talk with him upon the subject', Aldrich wrote to Luce on 20 January 1888.71 `I will see Mr. 
Hayden and try to get him to take hold of the matter. I think he is the best man on the Committee 
if he is willing to do it. It is of the utmost importance that we should reach Mr. Herbert and Mr. 
Thomas. Just how to do this puzzles me, as it must be done through new agencies'. 72 In the end, 
it was decided to refrain from appealing directly to Herbert, as both Mahan and Luce were quite 
aware of the negative views espoused by `naturally obstinate' and `pigheaded' Chairman of the 
Naval Affairs Committee. `[Fi]e refuses to listen even to the proposition to keep us alive until 
some better arrangement (if there be any) can be made to further the works', Mahan observed to a 
colleague on 28 February 1888. `There is not the time, nor the force to reduce him within the 
73 limits of this year's campaign' . 
Mahan and Luce focused instead on the other members of the Committee. By that time Luce 
had already written to three of the 13 members, the most influential of whom was the committee's 
69 Spector, p. 55. 
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71 Nelson Aldrich to Luce, 20 January 1888. Luce Papers. NHFC/LCIReel #7. 
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most senior Republican and a staunch advocate of the War College. 74 Representative Charles A. 
Boutelle had little to reveal as to the potential outcome of impending deliberations, but he 
reminded Luce that recent changes in the composition of the Committee provided additional 
opportunities to win votes. `I cannot tell what the policy of the House Naval Committee will be, 
as its personnel is considerably changed -5 new Democrats and 1 new Republican - Mr. Hayden 
of Mass[achusetts]' . 
'S While in Washington the previous month, Mahan actually spoke with 
Hayden but missed an opportunity to consult with William Bourke Cochran, another new addition 
to the Committee on the Democratic side. In lieu of a personal interview, Mahan substituted a 
letter in which he enclosed a printed pamphlet of newspaper articles that contained laudatory 
descriptions of the War College. 76 Mahan also implored Cochran to consider the merits of the 
institution, and pointed out that there was no other institution where the systematic treatment of 
naval warfare could be studied and applied in practical exercises. The subject, moreover, was of 
such importance that it could not left to the voluntary devices of naval officers. `It is only by 
setting aside for the necessary study', wrote Mahan on 8 February, `and providing that the results 
of their labors be systematically be imparted to others that this, the very highest knowledge of our 
profession, can be reached and disseminated' . 
'7 Finally, Mahan suggested for the first time that 
he was receptive to the prospect of relocating the college from Newport to Annapolis in the 
future, provided of course that the War College was allowed to flourish without interruption and 
under congressional oversight. This last suggestion was obviously made in desperation, for Luce 
would never have approved of such a venture. 
Success in the House.... Defeat in the Department 
That Luce and Mahan would fail in their lobbying campaign must have worried Walker 
considerably. From his position in the Navy Department, the Bureau chief was painfully aware of 
the dim prospects for the War College in the absence of congressional recognition. For reasons 
that no doubt can be attributed to Whitney's open opposition to the War College, the Bureau chief 
was certain that he could not continue his creative financing scheme to sustain the college for yet 
another year. `There is a good deal of doubt about our being able to obtain an appropriation to 
carry on the War College', Walker wrote to Luce on 2 May 1888. `If an appropriation is not 
obtained of course the War College must be closed and that may put it back for some years to 
come. I am doing my best, however, to obtain an appropriation and do not yet despair of getting 
73 Mahan to John C. Ropes, 28 February 1888. Printed in Seager and Maguire, p. 650. 
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it'. 7g In the past, Walker proved quite persuasive in his efforts to support and nurture innovative 
concepts such as O. N. I. and the Naval War College, despite his episodic clashes with Whitney's 
predecessor over the scope of his administrative prerogatives as Chief of the Bureau of 
Navigation. Walker was even successful in 1885 and 1886 at convincing an indifferent Whitney 
to continue the War College in spite of the opposing views of Sicard and Schley. In later years, 
however, the professional relationship between the two men soured to the point where Whitney 
would later refer to the Bureau chief as `prejudiced' and `unjust' . 
79 Indeed, only months after 
leaving the Department in March 1889, Whitney warned his successor about Walker and his 
indomitable talents for persuasion, admitting to B. F. Tracy that `I was often (innocently) made by 
that officer to do injustice in ways I did not know of... '. 8° 
What was even more disturbing was the apparent elevation of Commodore Schley to the post 
of senior naval advisor to the Secretary. As will be recalled in Chapter 6, Luce had identified 
Schley in January 1885 as a strident opponent of the War College within the Department, rivalled 
only by Montgomery Sicard in the Bureau of Ordnance. 8' As Chief of the Bureau of Equipment 
& Recruiting, Schley was determined to wrestle Coaster's Harbour Island and the residence of the 
War College away from the Bureau of Navigation, for the avowed purpose of establishing a 
shore-based apprentice training station there. In this regard, Schley contested the administration 
of the War College at every opportunity, at one point refusing to approve vouchers for coal and 
other maintenance-related expenses that he deemed excessive. 82 Now he was rumoured to 
exercise considerable influence over Whitney. `I will not ask you to believe, what I believe but 
do not know', Mahan wrote to his friend Samuel Ashe, `but which is commonly believed in the 
Navy, that the Secy [sic] is largely influenced by a man named Schley - whom you may 
remember; who has never achieved more than a second-rate reputation, if that, among his brother 
officers'. 83 Thus, when it came to deciding what to do about the War College, Whitney was more 
inclined to accept the opposing views of Schley than those espoused by Walker on behalf of the 
service intellectuals. 
Yet while Walker was struggling to preserve the War College from within the Department, 
Mahan and Luce continued their lobbying campaign with a remarkable degree of success. In June 
1888, Mahan could boast that they were successful in securing the requisite number of votes on 
the House Naval Affairs Committee. `The fight so far has been in committee of the House in 
78 Walker to Luce, 2 May 1888. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel #7. 
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which we have been completely successful, having 10 votes out of 13', wrote Mahan to Ashe on 
14 June. M `The position would be perfectly secure but for the sustained and strenuous opposition 
of the Chairman, Herbert of Alabama'. 85 In the end, Herbert deferred to the majority on the 
Committee, and included in the naval appropriation bill - which was introduced on 19 June for 
consideration by the entire House - was the modest sum sought by Luce, Mahan and Walker. The 
bill was passed days later by an overwhelming majority. 86 But another hurdle was still to be 
overcome, this time in the Senate where pockets of opposition remained a particular concern. The 
most vocal opponent of the War College there was Senator Eugene Hale of Maine, a member of 
both the Senate Naval Affairs Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee, the latter 
responsible for approving the Senate version of the naval appropriation bill. Whether or not 
Mahan or Luce attempted to convince Hale to reverse his position is unclear, but most likely the 
two naval officers were content to leave the matter to Senators Chandler and Aldrich, both of 
whom were ardent advocates of the War College in the Senate. `I am giving attention to these 
subjects and think we shall take good care of the war college', Chandler assured Luce on 30 
June. 87 
Such a strategy might have worked had Whitney not personally intervened in the deliberations 
of the Senate. Only seven months before, in January 1888, Whitney acceded to Mahan's request 
to lobby the members of the House Naval Affairs Committee, apparently assuming that his 
initiative would end in failure. But the recent passage of the House appropriation bill, which 
included congressional recognition of the War College, virtually ensured the preservation of the 
institution for at least another year. To make matters worse, Whitney was informed that the 
Senate version of the bill also included a provision for the institution. `Aldrich was so much 
opposed to the removal of (so-called) War College that Allison and Hale determined to say 
nothing about it and let you do as you liked', Senator James Beck warned Whitney on 21 Jul Y. 88 
`I think it ought to go to the Torpedo Station, but it is [an] election year.... I think it is best to let it 
alone in the Senate'. 89 Unwilling to heed this advice, Whitney visited the Senate on 24 July to 
confront Aldrich and seek an amendment to the appropriation bill. He succeeded after a heated 
discussion with Aldrich, which allegedly included threats of administrative retaliation if the 
proposed amendment was not agreed to. 90 The Senate version of the naval appropriation bill was 
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quickly passed by an overwhelming majority on the next day. Whitney was now authorised to 
consolidate the War College with the Torpedo Station after 1 January 1889. 
In the wake of his successful appeal to the Senate, Whitney referred to the personal reasons 
and the officers that prompted his actions. `These officers have been working behind my back all 
united', the Secretary protested to his wife on 25 July, `and I recommended, but I didn't seem to 
get it as I recommended, and I finally awoke to the fact that the whole thing was being set up and 
worked in Congress behind me. I will wipe the whole thing out shortly'. 91 On 1 August, Whitney 
informed a stunned Mahan that the upcoming academic term would be shortened from four to 
three months. 92 A few days later, on 12 August, the Secretary released a statement to the press. `I 
have favored the War College in each of my annual reports', argued Whitney in defending his 
actions, `but I do not deem the present arrangement wise or sensible, and I have not seen any 
other person understanding the matter who does'. 93 The fate of the War College now determined 
for the remaining months of his administration, Whitney fulfilled what amounted to a personal 
vendetta to silence Luce, Mahan and Walker. Once an advocate himself, the strained 
relationships between Whitney and the these reform-minded officers quickly overshadowed the 
contributions of the War College and the potential for a new mode of strategic thinking in the 
Navy Department. Whether or not the naval officers would eventually be successful in 
resurrecting the institution, as well as its underlying objectives, depended to a large degree on 
Whitney's successor. Another lobbying campaign would be required, this time for the benefit of 
B. F. Tracy, who would succeed Whitney on 5 March 1889. 
THE WAR COLLEGE AND A NEW BRAND OF STRATEGIC THINKING 
In August 1888, the prospect that Whitney would be replaced in the Navy Department was far 
from certain, as the next presidential election was not scheduled to be held until November 1888. 
In the meantime, Luce and Mahan launched a final effort to convince the Secretary to reverse 
course and preserve the War College as an institution separate from the Torpedo Station, which 
was also located in Newport but fell under the jurisdiction of Commodore Sicard and the Bureau 
of Ordnance. Sicard was an opponent of the War College throughout its entire existence, having 
initially opposed it when the concept was first considered by the Bureau chiefs in March 1884. 
Now the Bureau chief would oversee the combined Torpedo Station and War College, which it 
soon became known after the Department officially ordered the consolidation on 11 January 1889. 
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Fortunately for Luce and Mahan, the officer-in-charge at the Torpedo Station happened to be 
Goodrich, a frequent lecturer at the college who had originally assisted Luce in shaping the 
institution and its curriculum back in 1884. Goodrich clearly grasped the implications of 
consolidation to the future of the college, and was determined to ensure its survival despite its 
new location and association with Sicard. `The evident purpose in this move was to kill the 
college', Goodrich later recalled. 94 `It happened, however, that the latter fell into friendly hands, 
and I made a point of honor of keeping it alive'. 95 Yet despite the short term assurances from 
their colleague Goodrich, both Luce and Mahan concluded that the underlying objectives of the 
War College were simply incompatible with those of the Torpedo Station, which retained a strong 
technological focus in its research endeavours. 96 In such an environment, the War College would 
not survive consolidation, especially in a future without Goodrich. 
The Debate between Technology and Strategy 
Luce and Mahan were certainly not averse to American efforts to develop a solid technological 
foundation from which to build modern battlefleets. But what they objected to was the constant 
struggle between technology and strategy, which was now resolved within the Navy Department 
in favour of the former, thereby rendering strategic naval thought a peripheral concern. Mahan 
decried this situation in his opening address when the next session of the War College convened 
on 6 August 1888, only days after Whitney notified him to condense the course from four to three 
months. His remarks were clearly meant for a multi-venue audience, located in both Newport and 
the Navy Department back in Washington. Without mentioning the Secretary by name, Mahan 
railed against the current trend in American naval policy that emphasised the pursuit of naval 
shipbuilding technology over the tactical and strategic elements of naval warfare. The War 
College, in his opinion, was the only institution within the American naval establishment with a 
departmental mandate from which to remedy this imbalance between technology and strategy. 
`Have not we, by too exclusive attention to mechanical advance', the speaker challenged his 
audience, `and too scanty attention to the noble art of war, which is the chief business of those to 
whom the military movements of the Navy are entrusted, contributed to the reproach which has 
overtaken both us and it? ' . 
97 
Obviously sensitive to the narrowly focused priorities of the Secretary, which did not include a 
strategic aspect to naval policy formulation throughout his administration, Mahan highlighted the 
limited scope of planning functions and activities that essentially precluded the formulation of 
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strategic policy in absence of an institution such as the War College. '[T]here seems little doubt 
that the mental activity which exists so widely is not directed toward the management of ships in 
battle, to the planning of naval campaigns, to the study of strategic and tactical problems, nor 
even to the secondary matters connected with the maintenance of warlike operations at sea' . 
98 
These were tasks that were best accomplished by naval officers and graduates of the War College, 
possessed with the foresight to apply what was learned through the systematic treatment of naval 
strategy, tactics and history. Before concluding his remarks, however, Mahan returned to his 
general theme on the precarious imbalance between strategy and technology in American naval 
affairs, and warned against optimistic assessments of naval progress that were based solely on the 
merits of technological development. `I will sound again the note of warning against the plausible 
cry of the day which finds all progress in material advance, disregarding that noblest sphere in 
which the mind and heart of man, in which all that is god-like, reign supreme; and against that 
temper which looks not to the man, but to his armor'. ' 
Later that month, Luce invoked similar arguments in a petition written by him and endorsed by 
Admiral David Dixon Porter and six unnamed officers. Addressed to Whitney and sent to the 
Department on 16 August, the group of officers officially protested the recent decision to 
consolidate the War College and the Torpedo Station, mainly on the grounds that the aims of the 
institutions were simply incompatible with each other. `[T]he lines of research followed by the 
War College are so entirely different from those of the Torpedo Station, that the two do not lend 
themselves to combination'. 100 It was urged instead that both institutions should be kept separate, 
in recognition of the fact that `the subjects treated by the War College, though of the highest 
importance, have been and are neglected by naval officers generally, in favor of the development 
of material'. '()' Without remedial action, the group of naval officers cautioned Whitney, the 
consolidation scheme `will stifle at its birth a movement which gives the highest promise of future 
102 usefulness to the naval profession' . 
That Whitney remained steadfast in his opposition to the War College was quite evident 
months later, when Walker wrote to Luce to express his doubts over the prospects for the 
institution. `Of course I shall do what I can to prevent the War College being hurt, but I am not 
very sanguine', he told the Admiral on 19 November 1888.103 The Bureau chief was apparently 
responding to some personal criticism from Luce, who for some reason blamed Walker for not 
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shielding the War College from Whitney. 104 His allegation was unwarranted, and Mahan did not 
hesitate to set the record straight. `I think Walker [is] both interested and angered about the 
College & that he will certainly work to undo the wrongs of this year', Mahan reminded his 
mentor on 14 November. '05 `But even if your estimate of his action were correct - it cannot be 
overlooked that he is the first party whose concern the College is, and I next under him. I know 
him to have accomplished a good deal and he has backed me up well... ' . 
106 
The friction between Walker and Luce at this point was quite understandable. The Admiral 
was clearly frustrated over the events of the past year, and he considered relinquishing command 
of the North Atlantic Squadron before his statutory retirement in March 1889. Luce, in fact, had 
tentatively arranged to be relieved on 15 January by his eventual successor, Rear Admiral 
Bancroft Gherardi, who had appealed directly to Secretary Whitney for the appointment. To 
further encourage the transition from Luce to Gherardi, the Secretary offered to appoint Luce to a 
commission that would choose the site for a new navy yard. Upon hearing about these 
discussions, Walker immediately wrote to Luce and pleaded with the Admiral not to consent to 
the scheme until the Bureau chief travelled to New York to see him. `I don't want you to commit 
yourself to giving up your squadron or any change of duty, until I have given you a pointer or two 
in conversation when I see you'. 107 By the time Walker arrived in New York for their meeting, 
Luce had already visited Gherardi that morning and assented to the transition, after which Luce 
and Walker conferred in private over the matter. Thereupon Luce quickly reversed himself and 
informed a stunned Gherardi that he had no intention of relinquishing command of the North 
Atlantic Squadron, until he was compelled to do so by statutory retirement. Gherardi brooded 
over Luce's intentions in a letter to Whitney on 26 November, the news of which must have both 
surprised and infuriated the Secretary-'08 If Whitney could not induce Luce into premature 
retirement and temporary exile on the proposed commission, the Secretary would certainly 
accomplish his other scheme. On 30 November, Whitney ordered Captain Mahan to head a 
similar commission, effectively banishing him to the Pacific Northwest for the remaining months 
of the Whitney administration. 
A Renewed Struggle to Save the War College 
The action taken against Mahan may have been motivated by yet another reason. Only weeks 
before, President Cleveland was defeated in the national election by the Republican candidate 
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Benjamin Harrison. It was now certain that Whitney would be replaced in the Navy Department, 
which may have prompted the attempt to scatter his antagonists before his departure from office 
in March 1889. To his credit, Luce urged Walker to intervene and reverse the orders given to 
Mahan, but the orders had come directly from Whitney himself and thus could not be revoked. 109 
Following a successful mission to Haiti with the North Atlantic Squadron, Luce prematurely 
relinquished his command on 28 January, and was instructed by Whitney to return home and 
await orders. "° No further orders were forthcoming, however, and Luce was subsequently 
removed from the active list weeks later upon reaching the age for statutory retirement. The fate 
of the War College thus rested on Whitney's successor, whose opinions on the subject were 
unknown. `The Republican administration may take advice if we can get a Secretary who wishes 
to run the Navy on true principles', wrote Porter to Luce in the final months of 1888.1111 'In that 
case we may in the end have the War College, provided we obtain a man who will prevent its 
rehabilitation in connection with the Torpedo School.... 112 
In the absence of Mahan, it was left to Luce and his contacts in Washington to secure the 
advocacy of Whitney's successor in favour of the War College. With no prior experience in naval 
affairs, Benjamin F. Tracy entered the Navy Department with no particular mandate from 
President Harrison, other than broad assurances to secure `the construction of a sufficient number 
of modem warships as rapidly as consistent with care and perfection in plans and 
workmanship' . 
113 In this regard, Tracy benefited throughout his four-year tenure from the 
technological focus of his predecessor, especially his efforts to promote industrial partnerships for 
the domestic production of armour, armament and warships. The Secretary was thus strongly 
encouraged to continue these successful industrial policies, but such was not the case when it 
came to the intellectual component to naval development. It was in this area where opportunities 
still existed to convince Tracy of the untapped potential of the War College and the contributions 
it could make to strategic naval thought. Luce therefore wasted no time in writing to Admiral 
Porter to see if he would act as an intermediary on his behalf. `The enemies of the War College 
so far succeeded under the late administration in destroying the institution, as to render the task of 
resuscitation somewhat difficult', he confessed to the Admiral of the Navy on 9 March, only days 
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after Tracy assumed control of the Department. 114 'If, however, you will lend your powerful 
influence, I trust the triumph of the enemies of the change will be but temporary' . 
115 
Porter was more than happy to assist Luce in this regard, and he sought a personal interview 
with Tracy within days of receiving the first of what became a series of letters from his former 
protege. What Porter reported back must have gratified Luce. `Mr. Tracy is an "old gentlemen" 
at sixty two, is a very accessible man, and will do nothing in a hurry', he assured Luce on 14 
March. 116 `He is very wary of having passed many years in the study of law. He listens quietly 
and doesn't commit himself . 
"' Porter would admit in a subsequent letter that, although `I have 
had only one special interview with the Secretary, I came away much impressed with the 
profound knowledge he possesses of naval affairs which I think must have been born in him! '. ' 18 
Aside from Porter, the Secretary was also visited by Senator Aldrich, a fellow Republican who 
must have harboured some resentment at Whitney and his actions against the War College. 
Aldrich quickly invited Tracy to visit Newport the next month, presumably so that the Secretary 
can make his own assessment of the institution and its former location on Coaster's Harbour 
Island. At the last minute, however, Tracy was forced to postpone the visit he would later make 
months later. ' 19 
Encouraged by the favourable impression of the new Secretary, in office for less than two 
weeks, Luce composed a nine-page letter which he sent to Admiral Porter for his endorsement 
before forwarding it to Tracy. As suggested by the length of the letter, Luce outlined a vigorous 
argument in favour of the War College, the purpose for its existence, and its progress in 
advancing the study of strategic and tactical problems in modem naval warfare. He first sought to 
distinguish the differences between the War College and the Torpedo Station before their 
consolidation. `One had to do with Materiel and the other with Personnel. One had to do with the 
manufacture of a single implement of war; the other with the intelligent uses of all implements 
[of] war' . 
120 Aside from the divergent lines of research, moreover, the Torpedo Station was meant 
for junior officers so that they could study the technical aspects of naval gunnery and torpedoes, 
whereas the War College was meant for a much higher purpose. The `higher plane of research' 
which was conducted at the War College, in contrast, was `intended, primarily, for Commanders, 
Captains, Admirals, and the General Staff which, it is hoped will one day form part of our naval 
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administration' . 
121 Luce went on to explain that the War College pioneered research in the 
science and art of modern naval warfare, the basis of which was an historical process to unveil the 
fundamental principles of warfare at both the strategic and tactical levels of analysis. In this 
endeavour Luce reserved no credit for himself, for which he was certainly entitled, but 
highlighted instead the individual accomplishments of Captain Mahan. `His labors, judged by the 
ordinary standards of brain workers, were all but Herculean; and the lectures he produced, 
challenge comparison with the best historical essays of the day'. 122 But, more importantly, the 
lectures Mahan produced on behalf of the War College `produced this additional merit - that they 
. entered a new 
field of inquiry, with an original and exhaustive method of treatment' 123 
At the same time, Luce was careful to point out that the research, analysis and teaching 
conducted at the institution was performed not by a single individual but a group of naval officers 
with different areas of expertise. He referred to these officers as `collaborators', who studied and 
taught their fellow naval officers on the proper role of the ram, naval gun and torpedo in naval 
warfare. These lectures were at times technical in content, but were ultimately intended to 
promote discussions of the strategic and tactical capabilities of each weapon. `It will be observed 
that these officers did not concern themselves with the manufacture of these weapons; that was 
left to others. But what they dwelt upon exclusively, was the best uses in war of the perfected 
arm under consideration'. 124 From these lectures, it was then left to Mahan to transform the 
tactical qualities of each weapon into a practical system of naval tactics, a task that would have 
been completed had his work not been interrupted by the opponents of the War College and his 
current detail to Puget Sound. `It was in the midst of this great work that Captain Mahan found 
himself treated with contumely by those to whom he had every right to look for encouragement 
and support, the College broken up and his labors brought to an untimely end' . 
125 In an indirect 
reference to Schley and the Bureau of Equipment, Luce complained that the underlying 
motivation to extinguish the War College could not be reduced to departmental concerns for naval 
efficiency and reform, but rather the opposition and selfish devices of the Bureau chief. 126 For all 
of these reasons, Luce concluded, an independent assessment was required so that Tracy could 
render an informed opinion as to the necessity of the War College and its proposed relocation to 
Coasters Harbor Island. 
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126 Mahan also believed that Schley was behind the consolidation scheme. See Mahan to Luce, 14 
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A Struggle Transformed - Strategic Ideas in the Navy Department 
The reaction from Tracy was both prompt and tempered, but conveyed an enthusiasm that 
reflected both prior discussions about the War College and the persuasive arguments outlined 
above. `The subject has already been brought to my attention', the Secretary wrote to Luce on 30 
March, `and I have had some conversation with Senator Aldrich in regard to it. I can assure you 
that I consider no matter of greater importance than the education of our officers on the subjects 
which have been introduced at the College' . 
127 In the following months, his words were matched 
by actions and decisions that further exemplified the Secretary's support for Luce and the 
institution. First, at the behest of Admiral Porter, Tracy ousted Schley from the Navy Department 
in April 1889, assigning the Bureau chief to the new cruiser U. S. S. Baltimore and replacing him 
with Captain George Dewey. 128 Two months later, Tracy reorganised the functions and duties of 
the Bureaus within the Department, transferring oversight for the apprentice training system and 
Coaster's Harbour Island to Commodore Walker and the Bureau of Navigation. Porter applauded 
these changes, especially the efforts to transform the officers of that Bureau into an unofficial 
general staff. `The fact of making the Navigation Bureau a Military Bureau', the senior Admiral 
wrote to Tracy on 1 July, `acting directly under the orders of the Secretary of the Navy, has 
removed the great source of difficulty in the Navy Department... '. 129 
Following a visit to Newport in August 1889, where Tracy conferred with Luce and possibly 
Aldrich, the Secretary also announced the formation of the Squadron of Evolution. The priorities 
of this new squadron were exactly what Luce intended to accomplish with the North Atlantic 
Squadron between 1886 and 1888, mainly the practical application of naval steam tactics, 
squadron movements and other doctrinal concepts derived from the tacticians at the War College. 
Appointed to command the squadron was Walker, who after eight years in the Navy Department 
was entrusted to fulfil the expectations of Tracy and his friend Luce. 130 Finally, in November 
1889, Tracy issued a definitive statement in support of the War College in his annual report, 
presumably so as to remove any doubt about his intention to reverse the actions of his 
predecessor. To the collective relief of Luce, Mahan, Walker and a supporting cast of naval 
officers, the Secretary warmly endorsed the intellectual activities undertaken at the War College 
which, in his estimation, `is unquestionably one of the most important institutions connected with 
the Navy'. 13' This in spite of the overwhelming opposition that was encountered during its short 
existence. `Its work, even in the restricted sphere to which it has hitherto been confined, has been 
127 Tracy to Luce, 30 March 1889. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel #7. 
128 Oliver Selfridge to Chandler, 28 January 1890. Cited in Walter R. Herrick Jr., The American Naval 
Revolution, (Baton Rouge 1966), p. 45f. 
129 Porter to Tracy. 1 July 1889. Tracy Papers. LC/MD/Container #2. 
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of immense benefit to the service, and it is of the highest importance that nothing should be done 
that will in any way interfere with its efficiency'. 132 With such strong words of endorsement, 
Tracy embraced the War College and its contributions to the process of strategic naval 
development, which began in earnest when the Secretary proved receptive to the innovative ideas 
of Luce and Mahan throughout the first year of his naval administration. 
Yet other opportunities still existed to further erode the mental barrier that currently divorced 
technology from strategy within the American naval establishment. In this regard, Tracy availed 
himself of the latest advances in strategic naval thought, which were also introduced to him 
through the writings and teachings of the two principal spokesman for strategic awareness in 
upper policy naval debates - Luce and Mahan. 
While Mahan was quickly elevated to the position of senior naval advisor to the Secretary 
following the publication of The Influence of Seapower Upon History in 1890, the historical 
record remains unclear as to when and if Tracy was privy to Mahan's manuscript prior to its 
widespread distribution. Unfortunately for historians, the extent of Mahan's written interactions 
with the Navy Department during this period is largely unknown, as a significant gap in 
departmental correspondence exists between 1885 and 1890 - most likely the result of inadvertent 
destruction. 133 Yet the letters retained in private collections indicate a strong possibility that 
Tracy previewed the manuscript prior to its publication, courtesy of the Bureau of Navigation. 
Selected portions of the manuscript, in fact, were in the possession of the Bureau as early as April 
1889, when Mahan wrote to the Department to confirm that his lectures had been received in the 
Post. 134 At some point between April and August, Walker either reviewed the lectures himself or 
relied upon the favourable comments of J. R. Soley, the naval historian and frequent lecturer at the 
War College who was currently detailed to Walker as head of the Naval Records and Library. 
That Walker and Soley responded favourably to the manuscript was evident shortly thereafter, 
when the Bureau chief assigned Mahan to the Bureau of Navigation so that he could continue his 
research endeavours under the auspices of the Navy Department. Walker also agreed to purchase 
50 copies of the book when finally published. When Mahan encountered difficulties in locating a 
interested publisher for his manuscript, Soley volunteered to recommend it to a friend who was in 
the business in Boston. 135 His original contact unsuccessful, Soley persevered and eventually 
located an interested publisher for Mahan during the last week of September 1889. 
132 Ibid. 
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If Tracy was not privy to the manuscript through Walker in the Navy Department, Mahan was 
at least afforded an opportunity to meet with the Secretary in July 1889, when Tracy arrived in 
Newport for the first of two visits to the War College. The meeting was arranged by Walker, 
apparently at the behest of the Secretary, and Mahan was subsequently ordered to Newport from 
his summer residence in Bar Harbor, Maine. 136 Given this sequence of events, it thus seems 
implausible that Tracy did not preview selected portions of the manuscript before November 
1889, when the Secretary first publicly endorsed a forward offensive naval strategy and the 
creation of American battlefleets to prosecute it. The Secretary more than likely was aware of the 
contents of the manuscript before receiving a personal overview of the highlights from the author 
during their meeting at Newport. 
Following his meeting with Mahan, Tracy was also provided with a timely summary of the 
strategic naval thought advanced by the War College. The summary first appeared in the form of 
an article written by Admiral Luce in May 1889 and published in the North American Review two 
months later. In the article, which was entitled `Our Future Navy', Luce broadly described the 
strategic framework that gradually evolved from the collaboration between the two naval officers 
since Mahan's attachment to the War College in October 1885. The central tenets of this 
framework were three essential concepts which, when viewed in the aggregate, form the basis of 
their prescription for American naval strategy in the future. What they advocated, in short, was a 
naval force with an offensive orientation and outfitted with battleships to harness the fighting 
power necessary to defeat an opposing force in a decisive engagement. 
At the heart of this strategic framework, from which future shipbuilding options should be 
assessed, selected and implemented, was the proper recognition of the wartime functions of 
modem naval forces. `The role of a navy is essentially offensive, as contrasted with seacoast 
fortifications, which are defensive. This broad distinction must be borne in mind, if the persistent 
but unavailing efforts of our highest naval authorities, in time past, to organize a navy, are to be 
understood'. 137 As such, Luce argued that an offensive naval force should be organised and 
equipped accordingly, so as to harness the fighting power of naval squadrons in decisive 
engagements with an adversary. In his estimation, fighting power was the most important 
attribute of modem naval forces, as naval campaigns in the future would be short-lived and 
decided in months. What was required on the line of battle, therefore, were battleships of superior 
fighting power to augment the accessories - cruisers, coastal defence monitors and other 
unarmoured vessels - that Luce considered peripheral to the roles and missions of an American 
136 Mahan to Walker, 2 July 1889; and Mahan to Chester, 3 July 1889. Printed in Seager and Maguire, p. 
692. 
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battlefeet in wartime. `[T]hose ships were designed expressly to run away from battleships.... 
That is the fundamental idea which is guiding the development of the new navy: to run away' , 
138 
He was equally critical of commerce destruction as the principal mode of American naval 
operations, which he deemed of secondary importance to the destruction of the battleship 
squadrons likely to be possessed by an enemy. For these reasons, it was imperative to discontinue 
current shipbuilding trends and strategic misconceptions, and instead allocate future resources to 
outfit a modern naval force along an offensive orientation. `A solitary American steel cruiser', 
Luce ominously warned in conclusion, `represents the latent possibilities of a great country 
139 
placidly awaiting some national disaster to generate its mighty forces'. 
Luce obviously intended the article for a much wider audience than the subscribers to the 
North American Review. As President of the U. S. Naval Institute, a post he held since October 
1887, Luce suggested that the voluntary organisation reprint the article for inclusion in the next 
volume of the Proceedings. 140 Included with the article were remarks solicited by the Institute 
from its members. Mahan's comments warrant particular mention here, as the reserved naval 
officer offered his unqualified assent to the arguments posited by his intellectual mentor. `I have 
only to express my entire concurrence in the general tenor of this admirable paper, and in the 
principles of naval policy adopted in it'. '4' While brief in length, Mahan provided a revealing 
snapshot of what seemed to be foremost in his mind - the folly of current strategic practices and 
the potential for strategic innovation within the Navy Department. `If I am right in my opinion', 
he confidently asserted, `a war against an enemy's commerce is an utterly insufficient 
instrument', which if continued would commit the country to `an erroneous and disastrous 
policy'. 142 While the building of steel cruisers were useful experiments, especially in terms of 
technology acquisition and domestic production, the `real strength of a navy' was harnessed in the 
fighting power of battleships. '43 
Strategy, Structure and the Origins of American Power Projection 
As for the prospect for strategic innovation within the Navy Department, Luce and Mahan had 
already succeeded in prompting Tracy to conduct a department-level strategic review. On 16 
July, in the wake of his meeting with Mahan and the article written by Luce, the Secretary 
appointed a board of officers to consider the next phase of American naval development. Under 
137 Stephen B. Luce, `Our Future Navy', USNIP, Volume XV (1889), p. 545. Published originally in the 
North American Review, Volume 149 (1889). 
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the direction of Captain W. P. McCann, the Commandant of the Boston Navy Yard, Tracy also 
named Captains R. L Phythian and W. T. Sampson, Commander W. M. Folger and Lieutenant- 
Commander W. H. Brownson to the what became known thereafter as the `Policy Board'. The 
scope of the Board was quite expansive, as Tracy expected its deliberations over the next six 
months to provide the strategic rationale behind a well-conceived shipbuilding programme for 
consideration by congressional authorities. The Secretary subsequently added Naval Constructor 
Richard Gatewood to augment the technical expertise of the group, which was composed mainly 
of naval practitioners with the exception of Sampson, the career naval educator and current 
Superintendent of the U. S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. A former member of the Luce and 
Endicott Boards in 1884 and 1885, respectively, Sampson provided the intellectual arguments in 
favour of the expansive shipbuilding programme. That he should be largely credited for the 
linkage between strategy and structure in the final report is quite evident when comparing it with 
similar arguments Sampson invoked in a lecture to the U. S. Naval Institute in April 1889, which 
also appeared in the Proceedings months later. 
In a lecture entitled `The Naval Defense of the Coast', Sampson returned to the same 
arguments he advocated as a member of the Endicott Board in 1885-86. His strategic prescription 
included a multifaceted naval force with an offensive posture to augment the existing coastal 
fortifications. `To the efficient defense of a coast', Sampson observed, `it is important to act 
offensively when opportunity offers.... A blow struck at such a moment may be decisive, while to 
be powerless to follow up the effect of a repulse by the fortifications would permit the enemy to 
recuperate and renew the attack, or at least to withdraw when they might have been destroyed'. 144 
Discounting the threat of a seaborne invasion, Sampson further depicted an offensive seagoing 
force as an outer layer of coastal defence, tasked primarily with destroying an adversary before it 
poses a threat to American cities and ports on the coastline. But the destruction of enemy naval 
squadrons was only one task to be accomplished by a multifaceted naval force which, when 
viewed in the aggregate, necessitated a substantial force to fulfil and exploit the benefits of a 
forward offensive naval strategy . '[T]he legitimate 
field of action of such a force is upon the 
high seas, in protecting our commerce, in destroying the commerce of the enemy, in making 
attacks upon undefended portions of the coast (thus forcing him to maintain a fleet at home), or in 
meeting and destroying a fleet'. 145 A clearly articulated naval strategy that failed to account for 
these offensive roles and missions would inherently restrict the functions of the navy in wartime. 
`If the navy is held for coastal defense', Sampson cautioned his audience, `these other important 
144W. T. Sampson, `The Naval Defense of the Coast', USNIP, Volume XV (1889), p. 185. 
'45 Ibid., p. 186. 
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duties must be largely neglected, and some of the most efficient means of bringing the enemy to 
terms be disregarded'. 146 
In a similar vein, the Policy Board highlighted the deterrent qualities of a overwhelming naval 
force equipped and organised along an offensive orientation, the primary aim of which was 
threefold: (1) the protection of commerce; (2) the protection of American cities and naval ports 
from bombardment and blockade; and (3) the preservation of American rights and interests 
abroad. To ensure these conditions required the complete destruction of enemy naval squadrons 
at the outbreak of hostilities, to be accomplished by a formidable complement of battleships and 
cruisers guided by the strategic doctrines of decisive battle, blockade and coastal bombardment. 
`We should be prepared with a naval force adequate to such work', the Board concluded, `and 
only the most powerful armor-clads would suffice. Whatever force our enemy could fairly be 
expected to assign to such duty, we should be able to destroy, beyond a doubt'. 147 Accordingly, 
the Board recommended an expansive multi-year shipbuilding programme to provide 35 
battleships, divided between capital ships of limited and extended ranges, and the addition of 24 
armoured and protected cruisers of greater than 4,000 tons displacement. The Board, moreover, 
attached particular importance to the longer-range battleships with extended coal endurance, 
especially as `a policy of protection without the power to act offensively, even to carrying a war 
to the very doors of an enemy, would, at the present time, double the force with which we would 
have to contend'. 148 In sum, the shipbuilding programme was estimated to cost an astounding 
$281,500,000, inclusive of torpedo-boats and other coastal defence vessels. 
It was an amount that Congress would never have approved but, at the same time, the grossly 
excessive sum should not overshadow the fact that it resulted from a deliberative process whereby 
strategic policy was used for the first time to determine force requirements in American naval 
affairs. The final report, after all, was originally intended as a confidential planning document 
from which to base future strategic and force structure choices. 149 With this in mind, Tracy opted 
for a more politically acceptable shipbuilding programme in his annual report of November 1889. 
Both the programme and the strategic rationale that accompanied it were essentially that 
advocated by Mahan and Luce throughout the first year of his administration, including his 
proposal to build 20 battleships - the same number of capital ships suggested by Luce in his 
article published in the North American Review and reprinted in the Proceedings. 150 Tracy even 
used the same arguments to support the creation of offensive battlefleets with enough fighting 
power to defeat enemy naval squadrons in decisive engagements. `Naval wars in the future will 
146Ibid. 
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be short and sharp. It is morally certain that they will be fought out to the end with the force 
available at the beginning. The nation that is ready to strike the first blow will gain an advantage 
which its antagonist can never offset, and inflict injury from which he can never recover' "151 
Thus, from this point forward, Tracy and his successors ensured that American naval 
modernisation proceeded according to the strategic framework advocated by Luce and Mahan, the 
roots of which can be traced in the 1880s to the emergence of an organisational culture that 
stressed the intellectual component to strategic naval development. 
EPILOGUE: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC IDEAS 
That the final report of the Policy Board was meant as a confidential planning document 
quickly became evident in January 1890, when Tracy was essentially compelled to disavow it 
when selected portions of the report were leaked to the press. The historical record is unclear as 
to who actually leaked the report, but the ramifications of the disclosure soon became apparent to 
observers both within and outside of the Navy Department. `No report of the Policy Board was to 
be published', a departmental insider explained to Luce. 152 `The general feeling here is that it was 
unwise to make any portion of its public, and it has unquestionably hurt the service as far as this 
year's appropriations are concerned. Senator Hale has been pretty positive on this point' . 
153 On 
the basis of Tracy's recommendations outlined in his annual report, Hale had already introduced 
legislation the month before for the immediate construction of eight medium-range battleships, 
three cruisers, five torpedo boats and two coastal defence monitors. Now the disclosure of the 
report threatened the proposed increase in naval construction. With support for the measure 
dwindling in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, Tracy sought to contain the 
damage caused by the leak, the prospects for which hinged upon the success of his repeated 
overtures to congressional authorities. `I very much regret', Tracy wrote to a friend on 21 
January, `that for the coming four weeks my time is to be continuously occupied before the 
Senate and House Committees that it will be utterly impossible for me to be away from 
Washington'. 154 
Tracy's lobbying campaign to secure congressional support for his shipbuilding programme 
was interrupted by tragedy on 3 February, when his wife and daughter perished in a fire that 
consumed their residence. The interruption was brief, for Tracy quickly returned to work and 
appeared before the House Naval Affairs Committee in late March 1890. With the Republicans 
now in control of both chambers of Congress, chairmanship of the committee reverted to 
150 Luce, `Our Future Navy', p. 552. 
151 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1889, p. 41-42. 
152 C. M. Chester to Luce, 18 February 1890. Luce Papers. NHFC/LC/Reel #7. At the time, Chester was 
assigned to the Navy Department as a member of the Board of Organisation. 
153 Ibid. 
-194- 
Boutelle, whose frequent correspondence with Luce between 1889 and 1890 ensured that the 
congressman was quite aware of Luce's views on naval strategy and the proposed shipbuilding 
programme. At one point, in fact, Boutelle asked Luce to send him a new copy of the article 
referred to above, presumably so that the congressman could refer to it when the naval affairs 
committee resumed its deliberations on the annual naval appropriations. 155 As a former naval 
officer, the congressman was impressed by the persuasive arguments offered by Luce, but as an 
experienced politician Boutelle also knew that the proposal to build offensive battlefleets was 
politically untenable, especially now the report of the Policy Board was made public. The 
exigencies of the situation eventually compelled Boutelle to broker an innovative compromise. In 
what appeared to be a setback for Tracy, Luce and Mahan, the congressman recommended that 
the number of battleships proposed to be built be reduced from eight to three. Boutelle also 
described these vessels as `coastline seagoing battleships', which he later explained was necessary 
to emphasise their defensive qualities while preserving the offensive capabilities embodied in 
their design. `By building such ships', he wrote to Luce on 6 March, `we should avoid the 
popular apprehension of jingoism in naval matters, while we can develop the full offensive and 
defensive powers of construction as completely as in foreign cruising battleships in all but speed 
156 and fuel capacity' . 
The revised shipbuilding programme attracted enough support for passage in both the House 
and the Senate. The final version of the bill, which became law on 30 June 1890, authorised the 
construction of the three coastline battleships, in addition to one protected cruiser, one torpedo 
cruiser, and one torpedo boat. Thus, when compared to Britain and the Naval Defence Act of 
1889, the American version did not include an overwhelming legislative affirmation for a forward 
offensive naval strategy, nor were the battleships of the Indiana-class functionally equivalent to 
the pre-dreadnought standard established by the British Royal Sovereigns. The first American 
battleships suffered from serious design flaws that ranged from inadequate armour distribution, 
excessive armament and blast interference, to a low-freeboard that was aggravated at maximum 
bunker capacity. 157 In time the disparity in design and performance would be narrowed, as 
American designers studied foreign naval construction and improved existing designs before 
proceeding with the construction of four classes of battleships before 1900. Furthermore, the 
concept of the `coastline' battleship was eventually dropped in 1896, when a board headed by 
Admiral Walker was convened on 26 March to consider the direction of future battleship design. 
The report of the Walker board, dated 10 June 1896, was a barometer of American naval 
aspirations to become a modern seapower in the image of the Royal Navy: `Our battleships, even 
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if strictly "coastline" in their sphere of operations, have greater need to be strictly "seagoing" than 
vessels of their class operating in the Mediterranean, or in the narrow seas in northern Europe'. 158 
The qualifications for a modem seapower, however, also included a strategic rationale to 
underwrite the shipbuilding programmes authorised in Britain and in the United States. In both 
countries, the strategic and force structure choices rendered were similar in origin, in that the 
decisional inputs and outputs to naval policy formulation were framed by the strategic ideas of 
naval officers and the actions taken in support of them. In this and the previous chapter, an 
organisational culture in transition was revealed to have shaped American progress toward 
strategic naval development, culminating in the adoption of a forward offensive naval strategy in 
November 1889. The transition was not without resistance and controversy, however, as 
evidenced by the intense struggle between the advocates of technology and strategy in the Navy 
Department. The conflict itself was precipitated by the opponents of the War College, the 
priorities of which were deemed inimical to the rigid technological objectives established by the 
department secretary. When a personal vendetta encouraged Secretary Whitney to move 
definitively against the War College and the naval officers associated with it, the challenge to 
preserve the institution was left to its most vocal advocates. Luce, Mahan and Walker worked 
together not only to save the War College, but also the research agenda and curriculum that 
offered the prospect for strategic innovation. Although the War College was eventually 
consolidated with the Torpedo Station, the setback was only temporary, as renewed appreciation 
for the institution and its research agenda heralded a new brand of strategic thinking in the Navy 
Department. Luce, Mahan and Walker were again instrumental in this regard, but ultimately the 
adoption of an offensive orientation in American naval affairs can best be explained by the ideas 
inspired, institutionalised and finally implemented by naval officers in shaping the evolving 
nature of American naval policy between 1882 and 1889. 
118 Ibid., p. 37. 
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Chapter 8 
Reflections on the Decisions of 1889 
- 198 - 
INTRODUCTION 
There are three mains themes that appear throughout this thesis, all of which revolve around 
organisational culture, naval policy formulation, and the decisions of 1889. The purpose of this 
final chapter is to consider what has been learned from both cases, not just about the decisions in 
and of themselves but also the implications for naval policy formulation in London and 
Washington. Accordingly, the chapter is divided into four main sections. The first two sections 
consider the impact of these decisions upon British and American naval policies in 1889, the 
outcomes of which can be distinguished in both cases by variations in the content and process of 
naval policy formulation. The third section reviews how, in both cases, strategic ideas were 
inspired, institutionalised and finally implemented despite bureaucratic and political opposition to 
them. The chapter concludes with some final observations about the cultural approach and its 
potential to improve the writing of naval history. 
THE DECISIONS IN LONDON: A SNAPSHOT OF BRITISH NAVAL POLICY IN 1889 
This thesis has challenged a misinterpretation of the Naval Defence Act that has been left 
uncorrected since the publication of Arthur Marder's The Anatomy of British Seapower in 1940. ' 
That this image is alive and well in current historical scholarship is evident in the recent 
biographies of Lord Salisbury which have appeared within the past year. 2 Not unexpectedly, both 
authors credit Marder's research for informing their shared conclusion that Salisbury was the 
thrust behind the Naval Defence Act, that it was because of his personal intervention that the 
Cabinet and the Admiralty were compelled to respond to a naval arms race that loomed between 
Britain, France and Russia. 3 In the process, the biographies perpetuate an image of British naval 
policy as reflective of a critical lapse of perspective in the manner in which the Admiralty 
conducted its business in the late 1880s, when threats from France and Russia were serious 
enough to warrant concern from Salisbury but not from professional naval opinion, thereby 
necessitating the remedial actions taken by the statesman to shore up British naval supremacy. 
The research presented in this study, however, strongly suggests that this interpretation of British 
naval policy and the Naval Defence Act is misinformed, in so far as it exaggerates the threats 
posed by hypothetical adversaries, mischaracterises how naval policy was formulated within the 
context of civil-military relations, and wrongly credits politicians for uncovering a strategic 
problem that had already been solved analytically by naval war planners in 1887 and 1888. From 
these observations emerge a different source for the motivations behind the Naval Defence Act, 
premised on the recognition that organisational cultures, defined broadly in terms of the strategic 
1 Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Seapower: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre- 
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, (New York 1940). 
2 Andrew Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, (London 1999) and David Steele, Lord Salisbury: A 
Political Biography, (London 1999). 
-199- 
ideas shared among naval officers, can and do shape the strategic and force structure choices of 
naval organisations. 
From the outset, it is important to consider what has been learned about the Naval Defence 
Act, and British naval policy in general, before venturing into the specifics. More than anything 
else, the Naval Defence Act represented a fundamental reassessment of the bases of British naval 
policy, which during the 1870s and 1880s remained in flux for reasons that varied between 
technological uncertainties, domestic political agendas, and most especially the bitter struggle for 
primacy between the professionals and politicians in the policymaking process. Whether it was 
under the premiership of Gladstone or Salisbury, naval policy received scant attention in the late 
Victorian era, except when reluctantly emphasised to assuage public opinion in the aftermath of 
an invasion scare, the latest occurring in 1884 when France posed an illusory cross-channel threat 
to the home isles. It was this vacillating pattern of ministerial apathy and vigilance that 
characterised the peaks and troughs of British naval policy, and in late 1886 Salisbury resumed 
the premiership with more apathy and less vigilance. His appointees to the Admiralty, Lord 
George Hamilton and Sir Arthur Bower Forwood, moved quickly to restrain naval expenditures 
through reforms conceived to promote `economy' through `efficiency' in British naval 
administration. In the process, the politicians alienated their naval advisors on the Admiralty 
Board, eventually prompting the resignation of two Naval Lords in 1888. The first to relinquish 
his post was Captain Lord Charles Beresford, the Fourth Naval Lord who resigned in protest over 
plans to downsize the Naval Intelligence Department, whose small contingent of naval officers he 
viewed as indispensable since it prepared naval campaigns, mobilisation plans and other 
analytical assessments aside from its traditional intelligence gathering activities. Three months 
later, in April 1888, Vice-Admiral William Graham resigned his post as Third Naval Lord and 
Controller of the Admiralty after a confrontation with Forwood over the Parliamentary 
Secretary's repeated criticism of the naval professionals on the Admiralty Board. 
Thus, throughout the period from 1886 to 1889, the overall direction of British naval policy 
was guided more by the `compass of finance' mandated by Hamilton than the professional 
competence of the naval officers in the Admiralty, particularly the strategic thinkers in the 
intelligence department whose force planning efforts were categorically dismissed by the First 
Lord. Yet the Naval Defence Act resulted in a formal expression of a strategic doctrine that would 
shape British naval policy until the First World War. 4 This sudden reversal in emphasis in the 
3 See especially Steele, pp. 243-244 and 252-253; and Roberts, p. 540. 
4 That British strategic doctrine remained consistent from 1889 to 1914 is evidenced in Paul M. Hayes, 
'Britain, Germany and the Admiralty's Plans for Attacking Enemy Territory', in Lawrence Freedman, Paul 
Hayes and Robert O'Neill, (eds), War, Strategy and Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard, 
(London 1992), p. 95-116; David French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905-1915, (London 
1982), pp. 27-31; Paul Haggie, `The Royal Navy and War Planning in the Fisher Era', Journal of 
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policymaking process, from finance to strategy, can be traced to the pervasive influence of 
strategic ideas and the actions taken by naval officers to uphold them. Fundamental to British 
naval thought in this period were the lessons of naval history, which were retained in the 
institutional memories of the Royal Navy but were infrequently applied in the nineteenth century 
until their formalised study in the 1870s at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, at the insistence 
of John Knox Laughton. With each year of instruction until 1887, when he was succeeded by 
Rear Admiral P. H. Colomb, Laughton imparted his particular brand of strategic thinking to the 
junior and senior members of the officer corps, thereby laying the future groundwork for a strong 
intellectual presence in the policy formulation process in the Admiralty. In this regard, Laughton 
was assisted by the creation of an ad hoc intelligence committee in 1882, later formalised as a 
department in 1886, charged with assessing foreign naval capabilities and their implications to the 
traditional wartime functions of the Royal Navy. Under the stewardship of Captain W. H. Hall, 
the intelligence department quickly established a precedent for combining applied naval history 
with strategic analysis to benefit the articulation of policy by the Admiralty Board. That future 
Admiralty Boards understood the value of this combination is amply reflected in the succession of 
service intellectuals appointed as D. N. I, between 1890 and 1905, among them Bridge, Battenberg, 
Beaumont, Custance, Slade and Ottley. These appointments, in the aggregate, ensured that 
British naval policy was inexorably linked with the solving of strategic problems, with naval 
history as a reference guide on which to base strategic and force structure choices. 
When viewed in this way, the Naval Defence Act can thus be seen as an answer to a strategic 
problem, which was examined by Captain Hall before submitting his analysis to the First Lord in 
December 1887. Hall used a worst case scenario and an unlikely threat, the prospect of a Franco- 
Russian naval combination, to prove an important point: the Royal Navy would be hard pressed 
to fulfil its traditional wartime functions, the blockade of enemy ports and the conduct of 
offensive coastal operations, with an adequate reserve to shield the home isles from the threat of 
invasion. The implications of the report, that a supplemental shipbuilding programme was in 
order, was a bitter pill to swallow for the First Lord, who chose to dismiss its conclusions and, 
coincidentally, approve the actions taken against the intelligence department. What occurred next 
transformed the dynamics of civil-military relations in naval policy formulation for the next 
twenty years, as `Hamilton and Forwood were forced out of the vital but narrow groove of 
administrative improvement into the broad atmosphere of national defence policy' .5 
Following 
the resignation of Beresford from the Admiralty Board in January 1888, a group of prominent 
naval officers undertook an extraordinary effort to use public opinion as an instrument to pressure 
Contemporary History, 8 (1973), pp. 113-132; and Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa 
Flow, Volume 1, (London 1961), pp. 367-372. 
5 Paul Smith, `Ruling the Waves: Government, the Service, and the Cost of Naval Supremacy, 1885-99', in 
idem., (ed), Government and the Armed Forces in Britain, 1856-1990, (London 1996), p. 35. 
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the Salisbury ministry to reform the manner in which naval policy was created and accept the 
necessity for naval modernisation. In taking such a stand on this issue, and the precedent of the 
Naval Defence Act that followed, it was virtually guaranteed that naval professionals would 
provide the substantive rationale behind critical decisions that affected British naval policy in the 
future. 
Finally, the Naval Defence Act also revolutionised how British naval constructors translated 
the strategic preferences of naval officers into capital ship design. In the age of steam prior to 
1889, especially in the 1870s and 1880s, the technology simply did not exist to design and build 
the battleships and cruisers that satisfied, in all respects, the expectations of the officers who were 
organised and trained for offensive naval warfare. When technology actually caught up to 
Admiralty war plans in the late 1880s, with the introduction of water-tube boilers and triple 
expansion engines, naval officers were invited to critique the proposed designs to ensure that the 
intended roles and missions of the vessels were amply reflected in capital ship design policy. 
Such was the case in the design development of what later became the Royal Sovereigns, the first 
pre-dreadnought battleships authorised by the Naval Defence Act which epitomised the 
connection between battlefleet strength and British naval supremacy. In November 1888, the 
Director of Naval Construction at the Admiralty, Sir William White, attended a special meeting of 
the Admiralty Board, which approved the standardised designs he proposed for the Royal 
Sovereigns and, more importantly, the strategic rationale behind their construction. The new type 
of battleship White envisioned for the Royal Navy would possess superior firepower and an 
extended radius of action to deter its potential adversaries and, if necessary, to destroy the 
remnants of the battlefleet that managed to evade the pincers of a British naval blockade. It was a 
strategy based upon decades of British naval experience and tradition, one which Admiralty war 
planners were poised to continue. 
THE DECISIONS IN WASHINGTON: A SNAPSHOT OF AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY IN 1889 
While it is impossible to discuss the Naval Defence Act without fully considering the merits of 
the Marder approach, it is equally difficult to avoid the Mahan hagiographies when reassessing 
the personalities, institutions and events that led to an unprecedented shift in American naval 
policy in 1889. It is, after all, widely held in the historical community that Mahan and his literary 
efforts provided American policymakers with a conceptual blueprint to construct a modem 
battlefleet in the image of the Royal Navy. This is not entirely inaccurate and, for this reason, the 
conclusions of this study are not unfriendly to Mahan, nor to the advocates of the Mahan 
approach in naval historiography, in the sense that his contributions to the process of strategic 
adjustment should not be considered separately from the activities of the naval officers he 
collaborated with to push this incremental process forward in the 1880s. When viewed in this 
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way, the worst that can be spoken of Mahan is that he was not an atypical pioneer in the manner 
envisaged in his hagiographies, that instead of originating the strategic ideas he popularised in his 
writings, he developed them jointly with assistance from a supporting cast of naval reformers who 
were also inspired by the notions of service professionalism, strategic innovation and the lessons 
of naval history. Not surprisingly, the interactions between these officers, particularly the 
strategic discourse between Mahan, Luce, Goodrich and Sampson, remains on the periphery of 
contemporary historical scholarship. That Mahan benefited from their naval professional 
arguments, for example, is not even acknowledged in the latest historiographical portrait of 
Mahan by Professor Sumida. 6 Luce is mentioned sparingly, while Goodrich and Sampson failed 
to warrant a single reference. This oversight can only be seen as an act of irony, for together these 
officers heralded a new mode of strategic thinking in the Navy Department and in the process of 
strategic adjustment effected a cultural and ideational shift in the content of American naval 
policy, both in terms of the strategic preferences advocated and the battlefleet constructed to fulfil 
them. 
On the surface, it would also appear that strategic adjustment, as reflected in the decisions of 
1889, was ultimately intended to bring the Americans closer to the British model of a modem 
seapower, especially when it came to the use of overwhelming naval force as instruments of 
deterrence and power projection. This, again, is not entirely untrue, as Mahan and his colleagues 
at the Naval War College perceived British naval history as a learning ground from which to tease 
out fundamental laws of naval warfare and apply them to modern strategic and tactical problems. 
`[T]he practical object of this inquiry', explained Mahan, `is to draw from the lessons of history 
inferences applicable to one's own country and service'. 7 Likewise, American naval constructors 
were equally fascinated with British ship designs in the 1880s, having obtained first-hand 
experience with them when the designs for the armoured cruiser U. S. S. Texas were purchased 
from the Barrow Shipbuilding Company in 1887.8 Also preserved in the Bureau of Construction 
was a volume of newspaper clippings, ostensibly supplied by the American naval attache in 
London, filled with technical descriptions of the latest achievements in British naval shipbuilding, 
including the launching of the H. M. S. Royal Sovereign in February 1891.9 Yet, while American 
naval officers were abundantly enthusiastic in their borrowing of strategic ideas and technology 
from the Royal Navy, the fact remains that American naval policy was not a mirror image of its 
British counterpart in 1889. Rather, the naval policies of both countries would forever be 
6 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred 
Thayer Mahan Reconsidered, (Baltimore 1997). 
7 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783, (Boston 1890), p. 83. 
8 Norman Friedman, U. S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History, (Annapolis 1985), p. 21. 
9 Bureau of Construction & Repair, `Newpaper Clippings from the London Times, 1886-1893'. RG 19/432. 
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distinguished by variations in naval strategy, the policy formulation process, and legislative 
interference in naval procurement. 
At the conceptual level, American naval policy was broadly defined in 1889 as the solution to 
a hemispheric defence problem. As the leading spokesman for this new strategic outlook, Mahan 
equated hemispheric defence with the struggle for command of the sea, the attainment of which 
linked operational performance and the outcome of decisive naval battles to the successful 
application of seapower in defence of the American coastline. Hence, for planning purposes, 
command of the sea quickly emerged as the overriding strategic concept from which to build an 
American battlefleet that was superior to the medium-sized fleets of its likely adversaries in 
Europe and South America (ie., Spain and Chile). Yet, in developing the strategic concept for 
American audiences, Mahan was curiously silent on the offensive potential that followed from 
command of the sea, examples for which appeared throughout British experiences with global 
warfare between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Ironically, in his 1891 book Naval 
Warfare, Admiral Colomb also used an historical methodology for a similar research agenda, 
from which he demonstrated that exploiting command of the sea, in the form of offensive coastal 
operations, was a vital aspect of British naval supremacy. 1° As observed by Professor Andrew 
Lambert: `There are striking parallels between the ambition of Colomb's work and the almost 
exactly contemporaneous work of Mahan'. 11 This is one of them. It is possible, even plausible, 
that Mahan avoided a similar emphasis in recognition of the opposition it would most certainly 
engender in Congress, where civilian preferences for a defensive naval force, composed of coastal 
and harbour defence monitors, remained particularly strong in 1889 and into the 1890s. Already 
Mahan and his mentor Luce had acquired first-hand experience with political inclinations to 
legislate naval policy from their interactions with the congressional naval committees over the 
fate of the Naval War College. Both men were acutely aware that the strategic ideas advocated by 
naval officers influenced the content but not the process in which naval policy was formulated in 
Washington. As reflected in the political controversy that followed the Navy Department's 
proposal for strategic adjustment in November 1889, the final decisions of naval policy were in 
the hands of civilians and not the professionals. 
If naval officers were virtually powerless in reforming the legislative atmosphere in which 
naval policy was created, the prospect of a favourable outcome in congressional deliberations 
over strategic adjustment was heightened considerably by the personal relationships forged with 
members of the naval committees. At the time, the naval committees were considered to be the 
most `powerful factors in determining the naval policy of the country. Their decision upon the 
10 Philip H. Colomb, Naval Warfare, (London 1891). 
I1 Andrew Lambert, The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the 
Historical Profession, (London 1998), p. 106. 
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numbers and types of vessels in the shipbuilding program each year is usually final. Their 
reviews upon any measure which the department wishes to have enacted into law must be 
reckoned with, for their opposition will prevent its passage'. 12 Working within the process was 
therefore more productive than opposing it, and in this regard Luce and Mahan were largely 
effective in gently prodding their political counterparts toward naval modernisation; their main 
opposition during the formative years of the Naval War College, ironically, came not from 
Congress but from within the Navy Department itself. Of these relationships, perhaps the most 
important in 1889-90 existed between Luce and Stephen Boutelle, the new Chairman of the 
House Naval Affairs Committee. With Luce as his unofficial naval advisor, it was Boutelle who 
conceived of the modest shipbuilding programme that eventually received congressional approval 
in June 1890. The three `coastline' battleships of the Indiana class that followed were designed 
deliberately with a smaller coal capacity than the Royal Sovereigns, in recognition of the intense 
and bitter political disputes over the course of American naval expansion. 13 Yet the political 
interference that surrounded their construction did not extend to the strategic rationale that 
inspired them in the first place. Thus, while the policy formulation process remained politicised, 
rigid and often independent from naval professional opinion, as it was intended to be in the 
traditional struggle between the legislative and executive branches of government, the Navy Law 
of 1890 was a restrained endorsement of the ideas and actions taken by naval officers in support 
of the decisions of 1889 and the process of strategic adjustment unfolding in the United States. 
THE CASES IN COMPARISON: NAVAL OFFICERS AND STRATEGIC IDEAS 
IN NAVAL POLICY FORMULATION 
So far the decisions of 1889 have been assessed in terms of their overall impact on the naval 
policies that resulted in Britain and the United States, with a particular emphasis upon the 
policymaking process and the efforts by naval officers to shape strategic and force structure 
choices with their professional arguments. How successful these efforts were in both cases 
become immediately apparent when distinguishing between the content and process of naval 
policy formulation. As described above, the Naval Defence Act did not represent a fundamental 
shift in the content of British naval policy, yet the circumstances surrounding its passage 
succeeded in transforming the process in which naval policy was formulated and articulated by 
the Admiralty. A much different result was achieved in the American case, as naval officers were 
successful in shaping the content but not the process of naval policy formulation. In spite of this, 
12 Charles Oscar Paullin, Paullin's History of Naval Administration, 1775-1911: A Collection of Articles 
from the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (Annapolis 1968), p. 375-376. 
13 For more on the political dimension to strategic adjustment, see Peter Trubowitz, `Geography and 
Strategy: The Politics of American Naval Expansion', in Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman and Edward 
Rhodes, (eds), The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions and Interests, (New York 1999), pp. 
105-138. 
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the decisional inputs and outputs that characterised naval policy formulation in both cases were of 
similar origin, in that the actions taken by naval officers to link policy decisions with strategic 
ideas can be attributed ultimately to the pervasiveness of these ideas and how they were packaged 
in the naval professional arguments they inspired. This, in essence, typifies how organisational 
cultures in navies can shape the decisionmaking process so that the outcomes match, as close as 
possible, the preferences of the senior officer corps and how it conceptualises the wartime 
functions of the service. To leave the decisions of 1889 at the doorstep of strategic ideas and 
organisational cultures, however, would be insufficient for purposes of this study, as it would fail 
to show how strategic ideas were inspired by naval history, became institutionalised in analytical 
frameworks, and were finally implemented with the assistance of service patrons when 
bureaucratic opposition threatened their usefulness. 
The Inspiration of Strategic Ideas: John Knox Laughton and Naval History 
Undoubtedly the most prominent linkage between the two cases is the extent to which naval 
history, or more precisely the teachings of John Knox Laughton, were used to inspire strategic 
preferences within the senior officer corps. While Laughton was never an active participant in the 
events that prompted the decisions of 1889, his imprint upon the strategic discourse that preceded 
the policy deliberations in both countries is unmistakable. That his unique and innovative 
perspective of naval history as the servant of strategic naval thought would in time be 
commonplace among British naval officers was virtually assured during his tenure as a lecturer at 
the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, between 1873 and 1885. For it was at RNC Greenwich that 
Laughton transformed his corpus of knowledge into a workable thesis which he later encapsulated 
in perhaps his most important lecture at RUSI, `The Scientific Study of Naval History' in June 
1874.14 Though Laughton was convinced that naval history would not be studied by British naval 
officers unless it was recognised as a `scientific' pursuit with practical applications, he 
nonetheless believed that embedded in the subject were instructive observations that were equally 
relevant to the naval profession. In the process, as observed by Professor Lambert, Laughton 
`pioneered the modernisation of naval thought, developing naval history as the basis for a 
thorough study of tactics, strategy, leadership and service doctrine'. 15 At his insistence and with 
the approval of the Admiralty, the course curriculum at the college was expanded in 1876 to 
include a series of lectures on naval history, an undertaking which Laughton used to remind the 
naval officers in attendance of the potency of naval history in resolving the strategic and tactical 
problems associated with modem naval warfare. 
14 John Knox Laughton, `The Scientific Study of Naval History', RUSI Journal (1874). 
15 Lambert, p. 11. 
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Equally important to Laughton and his work was an impressive list of personal contacts he 
managed to collect over the course of his career. Many of these contacts were with senior naval 
officers who would later assume critical roles in the shaping of British naval policy in the pre- 
dreadnought era. In the 1880s, for example, the list included prominent members of the Board of 
Admiralty, including two Senior Naval Lords, as well as countless naval practitioners and service 
intellectuals. In the former category was none other than Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, 
perhaps the most respected naval officer in uniform, who quickly became a close personal friend 
of Laughton during his brief tenure as President of RNC Greenwich in 1881-82. While at 
Greenwich, Hornby attended many of Laughton's lectures on naval history and agreed with most 
if not all of the observations offered by the historian on issues of naval strategy, tactics and 
command. 16 Fully versed in the range of strategic problems that confronted Admiralty war 
planners in the 1880s, Hornby would eventually lend his name and support to the public campaign 
for heightened strategic awareness - the subject of Chapter 5. It was an action that Laughton no 
doubt approved of, for there was no officer alive who was more capable than Hornby of 
convincing the Admiralty Board to embrace the strategic thinking endorsed by the newly formed 
Naval Intelligence Department. 
Laughton also benefited from his personal contacts with naval officers assigned to the 
Admiralty. As will be recalled from Chapter 3, his most accessible source of information resided 
within the intelligence department and, in particular, the D. N. I. and his two assistants. Laughton 
had first become acquainted with the current D. N. I., Captain Hall, when both were assigned to the 
Gunnery Training Ship H. M. S. Excellent for three years in the late 1860s. While the extent of the 
relationship between Laughton and Hall remains unknown - it appears that Hall had little time for 
anything else than his work - there is little doubt that Laughton was kept readily informed of the 
intellectual activities of the D. N. I. through his two assistants, Captains R. N. Custance and S. M. 
Eardley-Wilmot. Both officers frequently encountered Laughton at the lecture hall and various 
meeting rooms at RUSI where, in 1887 and 1888, all three men served on the executive council of 
the institution. More than likely Hall dispatched Custance and Eardley-Wilmot to listen, observe 
and consult with the resident strategic thinkers that attended the lectures sponsored at the 
institution, among them Laughton and the brothers Colomb. In this way, RUSI functioned as a 
semi-official think tank on naval matters, with Laughton as its leading authority on naval history 
to advise on strategic issues confronting the intelligence department. Finally, in January 1889, 
Hall was succeeded as D. N. I. by Captain Cyprian A. G. Bridge, Laughton's lifelong friend and 
fellow service intellectual who in 1893 co-founded the Navy Records Society with the pioneer 
naval historian, thereby strengthening the bridge between the lessons of naval history and the 
16 Ibid, p. 76. 
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strategic thinking encouraged in the intelligence department. '7 Upon his arrival there, Bridge 
would have found that his predecessor had already invoked the lessons of British naval history 
when articulating deeply rooted strategic preferences in a hypothetical war with France in 1884, 
with Russia in 1885, and yet again with a Franco-Russian naval combination in mind in 1888. 
Similarly, in the United States during the late 1880s, the lessons of British naval history were 
also being used to justify an unprecedented shift in American naval policy, complete with a 
forward offensive naval strategy and a complement of battleships and armoured cruisers to 
prosecute it. As noted above, Mahan is generally recognised for popularising the strategic 
rationale behind the creation of American seapower, yet the ideas that were eternalised in The 
Influence of Sea Power Upon History were far from original. As was the case in Britain, the 
credit for applying naval history in this fashion ultimately belongs to Laughton, who along with 
Luce provided Mahan with the historical fodder from which to formulate his famous treatise. In 
this regard, the relationship between Laughton and Luce has continued to remain on the margin of 
Anglo-American naval history, although a recent and illustrative biography of Laughton has 
largely redressed the void in the scholarly literature. `The most important aspect of this 
relationship', observes Lambert, `was the exchange of ideas. Luce exploited Laughton's original 
intellectual contribution in his efforts to revitalise the United States Navy' . 
'g As will be recalled 
from Chapter 6, Luce ensured that naval history was the centrepiece of an innovative research 
agenda at the U. S. Naval War College, envisioned by its founder to be an institution for higher 
learning and the advanced study of modern naval warfare. From this agenda emerged the 
conceptual elements of a new strategic framework for the U. S. Navy, for which Mahan was 
recruited to refine and validate through historical analysis between 1886 and 1889. That he 
managed to accomplish this task in the manner envisioned by Laughton is a testament to both the 
literary talents of the author and, more importantly, the strategic ideas used by him to arouse 
American interest in the lessons of naval history. On this latter point Laughton concurred without 
reservation, observing in October 1890 that Mahan's book was `at least not so much as a 
contribution to history as an exposition of the principles of naval strategy and tactics, and of the 
aims and methods of the science of naval war'. 19 
The Institutionalisation of Strategic Ideas 
A second feature common to both cases is the manner in which strategic ideas became firmly 
established in the analytical frameworks of innovative research institutions. For the Americans in 
the 1870s, the process first took shape in the form of a voluntary association of naval officers, the 
U. S. Naval Institute (USNI), whose professional membership and intellectual contributions were 
17 Lambert, p. 11. 
18 Ibid., p. 30. 
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modelled loosely around RUSI in London. Like its British counterpart, the research agenda of the 
USNI is evident from the topics addressed in the lectures that were subsequently published in The 
Proceedings for circulation to a wider audience within the naval establishment. Many of these 
lectures were about the same issues that also confronted British naval officers throughout the 
1870s and 1880s, with a particular focus upon the evolving relationship between naval strategy, 
tactics and the technological aspects of modem naval warfare. As one might expect, moreover, 
there was also a noticeable similarity in the type of naval officer who most closely identified with 
the underlying priorities of both institutions: the betterment of the armed services and in 
particular the naval profession. In this regard, the service intellectuals and their patrons were the 
most active among their contemporaries, using the lecture format as a means to disseminate their 
views on naval warfare, both in terms of the warships needed to be built and the strategic ideas to 
govern their use. Thus, while RUSI and its membership benefited from having the foremost 
strategic thinkers among its ranks, the membership of the USNI possessed an equally impressive 
stable of talent, among them Luce, Mahan, Goodrich, Sampson, Soley and Mason. All would 
exert a major influence in the shaping of American naval policy in the 1880s, when the strategic 
ideas they advocated as members of the USNI were advanced in the Navy Department by the 
formation of the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882 and the Naval War College in 1884. 
As was seen in Chapters 6 and 7, the establishment of these two research institutions were 
defining moments in American naval affairs, for reasons due mainly to their contributions to the 
process of strategic adjustment despite bureaucratic attempts from within the Navy Department to 
derail it between 1885 and 1889. While O. N. I. and the War College were originally conceived 
with different purposes in mind, the origins of both institutions can be traced to the USNI, and 
more specifically, the intellectual aspirations of Mason and Luce, respectively. Both officers had 
championed their creation as members of the USNI, and upon their formation the institutions, not 
ironically, were largely staffed by their colleagues from the voluntary organisation. Upon being 
appointed to head O. N. I. as the first Chief Intelligence Officer, Mason even received permission 
to formalise a relationship between the USNI and the new department, an arrangement similar to 
what existed between RUSI and the Naval Intelligence Department in the Admiralty. When the 
Naval War College was founded two years later, the institutions immediately became mutually 
supportive of one another, fostered at first out of financial necessity as the Bureau of Navigation 
failed to secure congressional funding to support the new postgraduate course. To assemble a 
faculty for the college the Bureau turned to the intellectual sanctuary it created in O. N. I., and 
thereafter the exchange of personnel and other resources between Washington and Newport were 
common. Finally, and most importantly, O. N. I. and the War College institutionalised a 
recognition of the import of naval history to policy analysis, an ideational linkage that no doubt 
19 [John Knox Laughton], `Captain Mahan on Maritime Power', Edinburgh Review, (October 1890), p. 420. 
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was strengthened further by the Office of Naval Records and Library, which was created along 
with O. N. I. in 1882 and attached to it under the supervision of Professor J. R. Soley. His presence 
in both institutions, as an archivist, lecturer and naval historian, brought widespread attention to 
the benefits of historical awareness and the strategic ideas that derived from it. It was Soley, in 
the end, who assisted Mahan in locating a publisher for the historical research he conducted under 
the auspices of the War College. 
No such relationship existed between RNC Greenwich and the intelligence function in the 
Admiralty, although the naval officers who staffed the department in the 1880s soon established 
themselves collectively as the strategic conscience of the Royal Navy. For decades since the age 
of Nelson, British naval officers were rarely challenged to think strategically in peacetime and did 
so only when prompted by the occasional invasion scare that arose from disturbing reports of 
naval developments in Europe. With the formation of an ad hoc intelligence committee in 
December 1882, strategic thinking thus became a full time enterprise in the Admiralty, and the 
analytical products generated in turn were reflective of the widening disparities in naval 
capabilities amongst the naval powers of Europe, the extent of British naval supremacy vis-a-vis 
France and Russia, and the scope of operations needed to be taken against them in the event of 
war. For the latter the committee turned to the lessons of British naval history, from which the 
strategic preferences of the senior officer corps and its organisational culture were derived. When 
war was anticipated with France in 1884, Captain Hall invoked naval history to assess the 
strategic options available to the Royal Navy for such a contingency, concluding that a forward 
offensive naval strategy was more preferable for its decisive impact upon the conduct of the war 
than a defensive posture that departed from the British way of warfare. Predictably, Hall again 
sided with the strategic traditions of the service in the next year, when he was asked to formulate 
the broad outlines of a naval campaign for a war with Russia in the aftermath of the Penjdeh 
incident in Afghanistan. When, in 1886, the committee was transformed into an official 
department within the Admiralty, Hall sought to ensure that the strategic thinking he advocated so 
strenuously informed the most essential aspects of British naval administration and, in particular, 
the budget-driven process to determine the force requirements of the Royal Navy. His efforts in 
this regard, especially the innovative force planning model he devised in late 1887, quickly 
incited opposition to the new department from within the Admiralty, to such an extent that the 
Admiralty Board was moved to reduce the budget of the department at the expense of the myriad 
of activities it supported to institutionalise strategic thinking in peacetime policy deliberations. 
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In time, Hall was recognised by his colleagues for `having done six years of most valuable 
work under circumstances of great difficulty and discouragement'. 20 Yet he left the Admiralty in 
January 1889 at the peak of his success, when the strategic preferences he articulated as D. N. I. 
were emerging as the underlying principles behind the Naval Defence Act and a new era of naval 
shipbuilding in Britain. While Hall was virtually powerless to overcome the institutional 
jealousies he encountered in 1887 and 1888, his plight had attracted the patronage of senior naval 
officers who supported the activities of the Naval Intelligence Department. What ensued was a 
six-month campaign to plead the case for heightened strategic awareness in the formulation of 
British naval policy. 
The Importance of Patronage in Implementing Strategic Ideas 
Aside from commonalities in strategic ideas and their institutionalisation, the British and 
American cases presented here are further linked by the role of patronage and its intervention in 
the policy formulation process within the context of civil-military relations. Both cases also 
highlighted the necessity of patronage in establishing critical pathways from which to navigate 
innovative ideas and their supporters around the obstacles of organisational resistance. As 
evidenced in Chapter 5, patronage transformed a minor controversy over the actions taken against 
the intelligence department into a national debate over British naval administration. Convinced 
that an internal pathway for policy innovation did not exist within the Admiralty, Captain Lord 
Charles Beresford resigned his seat on the Admiralty Board in January 1888 to protest not only 
the recent misfortunes that beset the new department but also the larger consequences of 
ministerial apathy in naval affairs, as indicated by the fact that finance and not strategy served as 
the final arbiter of British naval policy. A naval officer with a seat in Parliament, Beresford 
challenged the Salisbury ministry to respond to the allegations he levied against the Admiralty, 
eventually succeeding in pressuring the First Lord - Lord George Hamilton - to respond in 
defence of his naval administration. In the process, Beresford stirred considerable parliamentary 
interest in naval affairs, punctuated by frequent debates in the House and the appointment of a 
select committee to consider the annual budget proposed by the Government for the Royal Navy. 
In the next few months, the committee would elicit the testimony of every member of the 
Admiralty Board and produce four reports of its investigation, the last submitted in August 1888. 
Although the committee rendered few substantive conclusions, it was the sort of political 
interference that the Salisbury ministry could not have wanted as it struggled to parry the attacks 
of Beresford and other Tories in the House. 
20 Cited in William James, The Eyes of the Navy: A Biographical Study of Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, 
(London 1955) pp. 3-4. 
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Yet what appeared at first to be an individual crusade soon resembled an ad hoc campaign to 
arouse public support for heightened strategic awareness in the formulation of British naval 
policy. For there were other prominent naval practitioners and service intellectuals who were 
convinced that British naval supremacy was endangered more by ministerial apathy than the naval 
potential of France and Russia. At the head of list was Admiral Hornby, whose advice and 
support was frequently sought by Beresford and others throughout the short but effective 
campaign. The most revered naval officer alive, Hornby became increasingly involved in the 
campaign as a participant and spokesman at organised events. Less prominent but equally active 
was Captain C. C. P. Fitzgerald, whose frequent letters to The Times in support of the objectives of 
the campaign matched those contributed by Beresford. Fitzgerald was also instrumental in 
organising the City National Defence Meeting, which was held in June 1888 and attended by the 
elite of the senior officer corps. Finally, there were the contributions of Admiral Colomb, a 
frequent lecturer at RUSI who in 1887 had succeeded Laughton in his duties as lecturer in naval 
history at RNC Greenwich. Less influential in the public sector than Hornby, Beresford and 
Fitzgerald, Colomb used naval history to enlighten the audience at RUSI, and later the readers of 
The Times, of the strategic principles that guided British naval policy in the past and which should 
be allowed to do so in the future. In so doing Colomb focused less upon the maladies of British 
naval administration than the remedies envisioned to fix it, particularly his argument that naval 
shipbuilding should reflect strategic requirements, not only in the number of ships to be built but 
also in the design philosophies used to build them. It was a theme that resonated in The Times, 
and days later the editor, G. E. Buckle, published a lengthy article written by an anonymous 
contributor in support of Colomb and his prescription for the Admiralty. More than likely the 
article was written by Laughton, who in a secondary role preferred to allow colleagues better 
placed than him to lead a public campaign that eventually compelled the Salisbury ministry to 
reverse course and conduct the cabinet-level strategic review that inspired formulation and 
passage of the Naval Defence Act. 
Similarly, the benefits of patronage and the failure to obtain it is also chronicled in the 
American chapters, with frequent examples of how senior naval officers created internal pathways 
to support innovative institutions and the strategic ideas that originated from them. In this regard, 
the significance of the appointment of Commodore John G. Walker to head the Bureau of 
Navigation cannot be overlooked, for it was his sponsorship within the Navy Department that 
heralded the creation of O. N. I. and the Naval War College. Although Walker was not a member 
of the USNI until his appointment as Bureau chief in 1881, he nevertheless shared an enthusiasm 
for the prospect of increased naval professionalism to shape the formulation and conduct of 
American naval policy. Quite intentionally, the Bureau of Navigation soon became a sanctuary 
for service intellectuals in the Department, as Walker assigned the most talented junior officers to 
- 212 - 
staff O. N. I. and teach at the War College at the request of Luce or Mahan. Since both institutions 
were attached to the bureau, Walker also secured departmental approval to reallocate funds to 
sustain them financially in the absence of congressional support. 
Yet there were limits to how far Walker could shield the institutions from their opponents in 
Congress and in the Department. While Q. N. I. emerged unscathed from the criticism levied 
against the War College in the 1880s, the intelligence department would not receive congressional 
recognition until 1900. As for the War College and its principal spokesman Luce and Mahan, 
Walker eventually proved unsuccessful in persuading Secretary W. C. Whitney to silence their 
opponents with an unequivocal statement of support. Instead, Whitney sided against them, for 
reasons due more to personal animosities than to an objective assessment, and effectively quashed 
the campaign Luce and Mahan had enacted in 1888 to secure congressional recognition. Months 
before Whitney left office in March 1889, he carried out plans to merge the War College with the 
Naval Torpedo School, the consequences of which were short-lived when his successor 
resurrected the college and its research agenda at the behest of Luce, Mahan and their supporters 
in Congress. By the end of his first year in office, Tracy used the strategic ideas advocated at the 
college and endorsed by an independent policy board to formulate a proposal for strategic 
adjustment, requesting congressional approval December 1889 for the strategic and force 
structure choices that would result in an unprecedented shift in American naval policy. The 
outcome of congressional deliberations was mixed, as the Navy Department approved the 
strategic ideas contained in the proposal but not the battlefleet requested to implement them. 
Instead, political compromises were reflected in the Navy Law of 1890 and the provisions for 
three `coastline' battleships of the Indiana class. This was only a temporary setback, however, as 
the Navy Department would subsequently commission 26 additional `seagoing' battleships 
between 1890 and 1910.21 Although British naval supremacy remained undisputed during these 
twenty years, the combination of strategy and structure emboldened the United States to prepare 
itself for the role of understudy on the world stage before setting its sights to building a navy 
second to none at the height of the First World War. 
THE CULTURAL APPROACH AND NAVAL HISTORIOGRAPHY 
While this study has been more about the decisions of 1889 than the cultural approach used to 
explain them, the opportunity nonetheless exists to assess the cultural approach to explaining 
military behaviour and how it can be used to broaden future lines of inquiry with respect to naval 
policy formulation. While historians have been generally accused of using culture as a `rather 
vague and indeterminate concept', this study has been precise about what is meant by 
organisational culture without overstating its importance relative to other factors that might shape 
21 Friedman, pp. 418-419. 
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the strategic and force structure choices of military organisations. 22 It has been defined here as a 
set of attitudes, beliefs, and other common habits of thought that are shared among naval officers 
and serve as the intellectual basis for their conceptions of the roles and missions of the service. 
Moreover, it adheres to a basic premise, accepted by proponents as well as critics of the cultural 
approach, that `military organizations - indeed all organizations - acquire an ethos and develop an 
environment in which they work, one that shapes their assumptions and outlook'. 23 Even so the 
most vocal critics of the approach claim that cultural arguments are interpretative, lack causal 
determination, and as such are sui generis, in the sense that cultural explanations of particular 
aspects of military behaviour (ie., decisionmaking) cannot be used to develop `scientific' 
generalisations that in turn can be applied to other cases. All of these are certainly problematic 
for political scientists but not to naval historians, who like most of their contemporaries in the 
modern historical profession have traditionally rejected the positivist or predictive science of 
history. Likewise, the cultural approach adopted here is not meant to emulate the social sciences 
but to borrow the concept of organisational culture and combine it with an archival-based research 
methodology to produce an analytically robust interpretation of the decisions of 1889. 
That naval historians should borrow from the social sciences in this fashion is far from novel, 
as the discipline has been poised for years to embrace new innovative analyses and 
multidisciplinary approaches to improve the writing of naval history. While this study is the first 
to directly link the service cultures of navies with the policy sphere of the decisionmaking 
process, cultural arguments have appeared previously in other studies of naval policy formulation 
albeit tangentially. In his 1999 book on the Fisher era, Nicholas Lambert hinted at culture when 
concluding that `naval policy was not a function of Cabinet policy or strategic principles, but the 
product of individuals belonging to a bureaucratized institution and operating within a dynamic 
environment'. 24 Andrew Gordon's latest work on the Battle of Jutland (1996) includes a more 
explicit cultural argument, although his linkage of service culture with the operational 
performance of the Grand Fleet is incidental to this comprehensive study of British naval 
command. 25 Yet despite the different research agendas of both studies, and that professed in this 
thesis, all three works highlight in varying degrees the conceptual prerequisites for future 
applications of the cultural approach by naval historians. These prerequisites, not ironically, are 
largely consistent with current trends in naval historiography. 
" First, the cultural approach requires a departure from the policy-and-operations perspective of 
naval policy formulation, which in the past has oversimplified the policymaking process as 
22 Douglas Porch, `Military "Culture" and the Fall of France in 1940', International Security, (Spring 2000), 
p162. 3 Ibid., p. 164. 
24 Nicholas Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, (Columbia 1999), p. 7. 
-214- 
parochial responses to external considerations such as foreign naval rivalries and civilian 
overreactions to them. While careful not to dismiss them outright, the cultural approach 
reconciles them with the internal dimension of policy formulation, which includes factors 
such as organisational cultures, domestic political agendas, financial limitations and other 
factors shaping naval administration. Of these factors, organisational culture does not possess 
causal autonomy and is seen instead as an intervening variable between the decisional inputs 
and outputs that characterise organisational decisionmaking. 
0 Second, the cultural approach is reflective of the organisational perspective of naval policy 
formulation, the latest trend in naval historiography which presumes that navies are complex 
organisations and are characterised by their strategic, political, economic, technical and 
administrative components. Critical to understanding how these components filter through 
the decisionmaking process are the ideas and actions of senior naval officers, whose roles in 
determining policy are subject to the wider context of civil-military relations. As the cultural 
approach also presumes that naval officers have their own preferences for how to organise 
and prepare for war, the relationship between professionals and civilians needs to be 
adequately considered, for the interactions that occur between them are often indicators of the 
extent to which organisational cultures shape key policy decisions. 
0 Finally, the cultural approach requires an archival-based research methodology that includes a 
broader scope of primary source materials. This is an important corollary to the 
organisational perspective of naval policy formulation, which makes use of underutilised 
archival sources and supporting documentation to connect personalities, institutions and 
events that otherwise appear unrelated. As the cultural approach is ultimately directed at 
explaining organisational outcomes through the ideas and actions of naval officers, these 
connections represent vital historical linkages to show how professional naval arguments 
were inspired, institutionalised and finally implemented in the decisionmaking process. 
Evidence of these historical linkages can be found in departmental records, official and 
private communications, journal articles, newspaper submissions, personal memoirs, as well 
as the private papers of senior naval officers. 
When viewed in this way, the cultural approach thus represents a new analytic instrument to 
promote a wider understanding of how naval policy is formulated, especially now that its 
explanatory power has been established in a comparative study of the decisions of 1889. It is 
particularly effective in circumstances analogous to the peacetime lull of the late 1880s, when the 
more traditional determinants of naval policy - external provocations, threat perceptions, and 
25 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, (London 1996). 
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civilian intervention - cannot adequately explain what spurred Britain to suddenly enact the Naval 
Defence Act. Similarly, the cultural approach was shown to be equally effective in determining 
what prompted the United States into a period of strategic adjustment that culminated in an 
unprecedented shift in American naval policy. In both cases, conventional wisdom was shown to 
be misinformed to varying degrees, with the Marder account of the Naval Defence Act more 
problematic than the Mahan hagiographies in their interpretation of strategic adjustment. There 
should be no illusion, however, that the cultural approach is inherently revisionist, in the sense 
that naval histories without cultural arguments are automatically suspect and in need of extensive 
renovation. Rather, it is offered here as an example of how modern historical techniques can be 
used to complement and even strengthen the core naval histories of the period. 
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